The beginning of the Kursk arc. The Battle of Kursk - a great turning point battle

Battle of Kursk(summer 1943) radically changed the course of World War II.

Our army stopped the Nazi offensive and irrevocably took the strategic initiative in the further course of the war into its own hands.

Wehrmacht plans

Despite the huge losses, by the summer of 1943 the fascist army was still very strong, and Hitler intended to take revenge for his defeat in . To restore its former prestige, it needed a major victory at any cost.

To achieve this, Germany carried out a total mobilization and strengthened its military industry, mainly due to the capabilities of the occupied territories of Western Europe. This, of course, gave the expected results. And since there was no longer a second front in the West, the German government directed all its military resources to the Eastern Front.

He managed not only to restore his army, but also to replenish it the latest designs military equipment. The largest offensive operation, Operation Citadel, was carefully planned, and was given great strategic importance. To implement the plan, the fascist command chose the Kursk direction.

The task was this: to break through the defenses of the Kursk ledge, reach Kursk, surround it and destroy the Soviet troops who defended this territory. All efforts were directed toward this idea of ​​the lightning defeat of our troops. Break up a group of millions Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, it was planned to encircle and take Kursk in literally four days.

This plan is set out in detail in order No. 6 of April 15, 1943 with a poetic conclusion: “The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world.”

Based on our intelligence data, the enemy’s plans regarding the direction of his main attacks and the timing of the offensive became known at Headquarters. Headquarters carefully analyzed the situation, and as a result it was decided that it would be more profitable for us to start the campaign with a strategic defensive operation.

Knowing that Hitler would attack only in one direction and concentrate the main striking forces here, our command came to the conclusion that it was defensive battles that would bleed the German army and destroy its tanks. After this, it will be advisable to crush the enemy by breaking up his main group.

Marshal reported this to Headquarters on 04/08/43: “wear down” the enemy on the defensive, knock out his tanks, and then bring in fresh reserves and go on a general offensive, finishing off the main forces of the Nazis. Thus, the Headquarters deliberately planned to make the beginning of the Battle of Kursk defensive.

Preparing for battle

From mid-April 1943, work began on the creation of powerful defensive positions on the Kursk salient. They dug trenches, trenches and ammunition magazines, built bunkers, prepared firing positions and observation posts. Having finished work in one place, they moved on and again began to dig and build, repeating the work at the previous position.

At the same time, they prepared fighters for the upcoming battles, conducting training sessions close to real combat. A participant in these events, B. N. Malinovsky, wrote about this in his memoirs in the book “We Didn’t Choose Our Fate.” During these preparatory work, he writes, they received combat reinforcements: people, equipment. At the beginning of the battle, our troops here numbered up to 1.3 million people.

Steppe Front

Strategic reserves, consisting of formations that had already participated in the battles for Stalingrad, Leningrad and other battles of the Soviet- German front, were first united into the Reserve Front, which 04/15/43. was named the Steppe Military District (commander I.S. Konev), and later - during the Battle of Kursk - 07/10/43, it began to be called the Steppe Front.

It included troops of the Voronezh and central fronts. Command of the front was entrusted to Colonel General I. S. Konev, who after the Battle of Kursk became an army general, and in February 1944 - Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Battle of Kursk

The battle began on July 5, 1943. Our troops were ready for it. The Nazis carried out fire raids from an armored train, bombers fired from the air, the enemies dropped leaflets in which they tried to intimidate Soviet soldiers with the upcoming terrible offensive, claiming that no one would be saved in it.

Our fighters immediately entered the battle, earned Katyushas, ​​and our tanks and self-propelled guns went to meet the enemy with his new Tigers and Ferdinands. Artillery and infantry destroyed their vehicles in prepared minefields, with anti-tank grenades and simply with gasoline bottles.

Already in the evening of the first day of the battle, the Soviet Information Bureau reported that on July 5, 586 fascist tanks and 203 aircraft were destroyed in the battle. By the end of the day, the number of enemy aircraft shot down had grown to 260. Fierce fighting continued until July 9.

The enemy had undermined his forces and was forced to order a temporary halt to the offensive in order to make some changes to the original plan. But then the fighting resumed. Our troops still managed to stop the German offensive, although in some places the enemy broke through our defenses 30-35 km deep.

Tank battle

A large-scale tank battle played a huge role in the turning point of the Battle of Kursk in the Prokhorovka area. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns were involved in it on both sides.

General valor was demonstrated in this battle by the general of the 5th Guards. tank army P. A. Rotmistrov, General of the 5th Guards Army A. S. Zhdanov and heroic fortitude - the entire personnel.

Thanks to the organization and courage of our commanders and fighters, the offensive plans of the fascists were finally buried in this fierce battle. The enemy's forces were exhausted, he had already brought his reserves into the battle, had not yet entered the defensive stage, and had already stopped the offensive.

This was a very convenient moment for our troops to transition from defense to counteroffensive. By July 12, the enemy was drained of blood, and the crisis of his offensive had ripened. This was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk.

Counteroffensive

On July 12, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive, and on July 15, the Central Front. And on July 16, the Germans had already begun to withdraw their troops. Then the Voronezh Front joined the offensive, and on July 18 - the Steppe Front. The retreating enemy was pursued, and by July 23 our troops had restored the situation that existed before the defensive battles, i.e. returned, as it were, to the starting point.

For the final victory in the Battle of Kursk, it was necessary to massively introduce strategic reserves, and in the most important direction. The Steppe Front proposed such tactics. But Headquarters, unfortunately, did not accept the decision of the Steppe Front and decided to introduce strategic reserves in parts and not simultaneously.

This led to the fact that the end of the Battle of Kursk was delayed in time. From July 23 to August 3 there was a pause. The Germans retreated to previously prepared defensive lines. And our command needed time to study the enemy’s defenses and organize the troops after the battles.

The commanders understood that the enemy would not leave his prepared positions, and would fight to the last, just to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. And then our offensive continued. There were still many bloody battles with huge losses on both sides. The Battle of Kursk lasted 50 days and ended on August 23, 1943. The Wehrmacht's plans completely failed.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

History has shown that the Battle of Kursk became a turning point during the Second World War, the starting point for the transfer of strategic initiative to the Soviet army. lost half a million people in the Battle of Kursk and huge amount military equipment.

This defeat of Hitler also influenced the situation on an international scale, because it provided the preconditions for Germany’s loss of allied cooperation with. And in the end, the struggle on the fronts where the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition fought was greatly facilitated.

In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to at some point crush the advancing German tanks with thousands of Soviet T-34 tanks.

CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12

July 5 – 04:30 the Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

July 6 – over 2,000 tanks from both sides took part in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the Soviet defenses.

July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern front of the arc and went on the defensive.

July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the attack of German tanks in the grandiose battle of Prokhorovka.

Background. Decisive bet

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In the summer of 1943, Hitler directed the entire military power of Germany to the Eastern Front to achieve a decisive victory at the Kursk Bulge.

After the surrender of German troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht was about to collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold out. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the onset of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to west of Rostov on the Black Sea.

In the spring, both sides summed up their results. The Soviet leadership wanted to resume the offensive. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrific losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. Shortage German army overall there were 700,000 people.

Hitler entrusted the revival of tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of armored forces. Guderian, one of the architects of the lightning victories at the start of the war in 1939-1941, tried his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped introduce new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V Panther.

Supply problems

The German command was in a difficult situation. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the German army to transition to defense, there were clearly not enough reserves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to wage maneuver warfare, the problem would be solved by “elastic defense” with “inflicting powerful local attacks of a limited nature on the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level.”

Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first he sought to achieve success in the East in order to induce Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers. Secondly, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade in the summer southern Europe. This would further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - that was the name of the protrusion in the front line, which was 100 km across at its base. In the operation, codenamed Citadel, German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would thwart the plans for the Red Army's summer offensive and shorten the front line.

The plans of the German command are revealed

German plans for an offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident “Luci” in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly argued that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group " Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.

The Germans planned to strike at the end of spring or early summer, but they were unable to concentrate attack groups. It was not until July 1 that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on July 5. Within 24 hours, Stalin learned from “Lutsi” that the strike would be carried out between July 3 and July 6.

The Germans planned to cut off the ledge under its base with powerful simultaneous attacks from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was supposed to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven tank and motorized divisions. In the south, General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance to Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.

The northern front of the arc was defended by the Central Front of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was to be repelled by the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. Powerful reserves were concentrated in the depths of the ledge as part of the Steppe Front of Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. In the most tank-dangerous directions, up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were installed for every kilometer of the front.

Opposing parties. The Great Controversy

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In the Battle of Kursk, Wehrmacht tank divisions faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - the experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In reality, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, three SS tank divisions (as well as the Grossdeutschland division) each had 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.

Mainly tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types took part in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the striking power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular those associated with unreliable transmission and chassis, as Heinz Guderian warned.

1,800 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battle, especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Ju 87 bomber squadrons last time in this war, classic massive dive bombing attacks were carried out.

During the Battle of Kursk, the Germans encountered reliable Soviet defensive lines of great depth. They were unable to break through or get around them. Therefore, German troops had to create a new tactical group for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - “Panzerkeil” - was supposed to become a “can opener” for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. At the head of the strike force were heavy Tiger I tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand hits from Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front with intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure cooperation in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.

Red Army

In 1943, the Wehrmacht's combat power was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. A uniform with shoulder straps and unit insignia was reintroduced. Many famous units earned the title of “guards”, as in the tsarist army. The T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army. But already in 1942, modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank in terms of their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the T-34's armor and armament needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered service in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery unit was armed with a 152 mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.

The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its successes. Anti-tank artillery batteries included 152 mm and 203 mm howitzers. Rocket artillery combat vehicles, the Katyushas, ​​were also actively used.

The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters negated the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also turned out to be effective.

Victory tactics

Although at the beginning of the war the German army had superiority in the use of tanks, by 1943 this difference had become almost imperceptible. The bravery of the Soviet tank crews and the courage of the infantry in defense also negated the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its glory. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in a labyrinth of trenches in a futile attempt to break out. Soviet troops, with the help of the local population, dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected wire fences, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.

Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mainly women and children, were recruited to build defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.

				Red Army
	Red Army groups: Central Front - 711,575 people, 11,076 guns and mortars, 246 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,000 aircraft; Steppe Front - 573,195 soldiers, 8,510 guns and mortars, 1,639 tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 aircraft; Voronezh Front - 625,591 soldiers, 8,718 guns and mortars, 272 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,704 tanks and self-propelled guns and 900 aircraft.
	Commander-in-Chief: Stalin Representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters during the Battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky
	Central Front Army General Rokossovsky 48th Army 13th Army 70th Army 65th Army 60th Army 2nd Tank Army 16th Air Army				Steppe (Reserve) Front Colonel General Konev 5th Guards Army 5th Guards Tank Army 27th Army 47th Army 53rd Army 5th Air Army	Voronezh Front Army General Vatutin 38th Army 40th Army 1st Tank Army 6th Guards Army 7th Guards Army 2nd Air Army
			German army
	Grouping of German troops: 685,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft.
	Army Group "Center": Field Marshal von Kluge e 9th Army: Colonel General Model
	20th Army Corps General von Roman 45th Infantry Division 72nd Infantry Division 137th Infantry Division 251st Infantry Division 6th Air Fleet Colonel General Graham 1st Air Division	46th Tank Corps General Zorn 7th Infantry Division 31st Infantry Division 102nd Infantry Division 258th Infantry Division 41st Tank Corps General Harpe 18th Panzer Division 86th Infantry Division 292nd Infantry Division							47th Tank Corps General Lemelsen 2nd Panzer Division 6th Infantry Division 9th Panzer Division 20th Panzer Division 23rd Army Corps General Friessner 78th Assault Division 216th Infantry Division 383rd Infantry Division
	Army Group South: Field Marshal von Manstein 4th Panzer Army: Colonel General Hoth Army Task Force Kempf: General Kempf
	11th Army Corps General Routh 106th Infantry Division 320th Infantry Division 42nd Army Corps General Mattenklott 39th Infantry Division 161st Infantry Division 282nd Infantry Division	3rd Tank Corps General Bright 6th Panzer Division 7th Panzer Division 19th Panzer Division 168th Infantry Division 48th Tank Corps General Knobelsdorff 3rd Panzer Division 11th Panzer Division 167th Infantry Division Panzer Grenadier Division "Greater Germany"							2nd SS Panzer Corps General Hausser 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" 52nd Army Corps General Ott 57th Infantry Division 255th Infantry Division 332nd Infantry Division 4th Air Fleet General Dessloch
	Army group	Frame							Tank Corps
	Army	Division							Tank division
	Airborne Brigade

First stage. Strike from the North

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Tanks and infantry from Model's 9th Army launched an attack on Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky’s troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation, they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.

Taking this data into account, Rokossovsky ordered counter-artillery preparation to begin at 02:20 in the areas where German troops were concentrated. This delayed the start of the German offensive, but nevertheless, at 05:00, intense artillery shelling of the advanced units of the Red Army began.

The German infantry advanced with great difficulty through densely shot terrain, suffering serious losses from established high density anti-personnel mines By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions that were the main striking force of the group on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.

The advancing German tanks achieved more significant successes. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, in some places wedged 6-8 km deep into the defense line, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, having assessed the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The main defense center was the town of Maloarkhangelsk.

On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command appreciated the significance of this position at the end of June. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified section of the defense.

On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the vanguard, but they had to not only break through the Red Army's defensive lines, but also repel counterattacks from Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails onto the engine shutters. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively shelled by machine guns and artillery. Although the Soviet tanks suffered damage from the fire of the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, German losses were very heavy.

German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements that arrived in Maloarkhangelsk in time strengthened the defense.

The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to an insignificant depth, but every time Model thought that he had managed to break through, the Soviet troops retreated and the enemy encountered a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave the northern group of troops a secret order to prepare for a counteroffensive.

Particularly strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on the same scale, desperate battles broke out for the most important positions - a school, a water tower and a machine and tractor station. During fierce battles they changed hands many times. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but they could not break the resistance of the Soviet troops.

Although the Germans did capture most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to wedge 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.

The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by then the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which marked the beginning of Zhukov's counter-offensive on Orel to the rear of the 9th Army. Model had to withdraw tank units to eliminate this new threat. By noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was confidently withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.

Map of the battle for the village of Ponyri

July 5-12, 1943. View from southeast

Events

1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked Soviet positions in and near the village.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th tank divisions attack Ponyri, but encounter Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft strike attacking tanks from the air.
4. In the village itself there are fierce hand-to-hand fights. Particularly heated battles took place near the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key defense points. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called “Kursk Stalingrad”.
5. On July 9, the 508th German Grenadier Regiment, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupied height 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, German troops advanced forward, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this sector, Model, on the night of July 10-11, throws its last reserve, the 10th Tank Division, into the assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they were never able to completely break through the Soviet defenses.

Second stage. Strike from the south

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Army Group South was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Its offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was possible to stop the advance of Model’s 9th Army from the north relatively easily for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would deliver the decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful group was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their best troops on the southern front of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops. Already at the initial stage, the German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.

Vatutin became aware of the exact date of the start of the German offensive, as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-artillery preparation against the German shock forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were expended in this artillery barrage than in the entire war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.

The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoye only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.

2nd SS Panzer Corps

In the center of the German group was advancing the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type as part of Army Group South). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the army task force "Kempf" was hopelessly stuck near the crossings of the Donets River.

These first offensive actions of the German army worried the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.

Despite this, the next day the German SS panzer divisions continued their success. The powerful 100 mm frontal armor and 88 mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to fire from Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.

Resilience of the Red Army

However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that the II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own regular units, which hampered the advance. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Still, on July 8, it seemed that the 48th Tank Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite persistent counterattacks by Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met by heavy fire from Tiger tanks of the elite Grossdeutschland tank division (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.

During July 10, the 48th Tank Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command had decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. Having won this battle, the Germans would have been able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was to become the site of a tank battle that would decide the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.

Map of the defense of Cherkasy

Attack of the 48th Tank Corps on July 5, 1943 - view from the south

Events:

1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Tank Army.
3. New Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade begin the offensive with the support of the fusilier regiment of the Grossdeutschland division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, the battle formations were mixed up, and the tanks stopped under concentrated hurricane fire from Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the 48th Tank Corps' offensive stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division began at 05:00. At the head of the strike group, a company of Tiger tanks from this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoe. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the Grenadier Regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the Grossdeutschland division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet defense line.
6. Soviet troops offer stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with destroyed German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, reinforces the 67th Guards Rifle Division with two regiments of anti-tank guns to repel the German offensive. It didn't help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psel River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.

Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka

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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in a battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. On July 11, the German offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge reached its culmination. Three significant events occurred that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further attack to the west. In this direction there remained defensive lines through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly launched counterattacks, limiting the Germans' freedom of action. Since German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Tank Corps was suspended.

Also on July 11, the Army's Task Force Kempf, on the far right flank of the German advance, finally began to advance north. She broke through the Red Army's defenses between Melekhovo and Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance to Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support an even larger group of 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system of the Soviet army, and forces were gathered in this area to prepare for the decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.

July 12th is the decisive day

Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tank crews prepared their vehicles for the battle that lay ahead the next day. Long before dawn, the roar of warming tank engines was heard in the night. Soon their bass roar filled the entire area.

The SS Tank Corps was opposed by the 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombed by German aircraft. Then three SS tank divisions went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the vanguard. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 tanks of the Red Army, only 500 vehicles were T-34s. They attacked German Tiger and Panther tanks at top speeds to prevent the enemy from exploiting the superior guns and armor of their tanks at long range. Having approached, Soviet tanks were able to hit German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.

A Soviet tankman recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It illuminated the contours of German tanks well and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army crashed into the German battle formations at full speed. fascist troops. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such a large number of our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Control in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The Nazi Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantages of their weapons in close combat, were successfully shot at by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when hit on the side. Essentially it was tank hand-to-hand combat. Russian tank crews went to ram. The tanks flared up like candles when hit by direct shots, scattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, and turrets fell off.”

Thick black oily smoke billowed over the entire battlefield. Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were also unable to achieve success in the offensive. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of significant losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported destroying 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of its own tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its fighting vehicles, but the Germans also suffered damage amounting to approximately 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that attacked in the morning.

Defeat of the German army

The Germans could have won this colossal tank battle if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but they failed. The units of the Red Army opposing him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov’s positions until the evening.

From July 13 to July 15, German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.

Map of the tank battle near Prokhorovka

Hausser tank attack on the morning of July 12, 1943, as seen from the southeast.

Events:

1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe planes begin intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and the lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks emerge from camouflaged shelters and rush towards the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of the German armored armada at high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range guns.
3. The clash of armored “fists” turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, breaking up into many local actions and individual tank battles at very close range (the fire was almost point-blank). Soviet tanks seek to envelop the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the Tigers fire from the spot. All day and even into the approaching dusk, a fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, the Totenkopf division is attacked by two Soviet corps. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been engaged in very heavy fighting with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command allegedly estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles

Results of the Battle of Kursk

up

The result of the victory in the battle of Kursk was the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. The outcome of the Battle of Kursk was influenced, among other things, by the fact that a thousand kilometers to the west the Allies landed in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were disastrous. The courage and tenacity of the Soviet troops, as well as the selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the selected Wehrmacht tank divisions.

As soon as the German offensive stalled, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, Soviet troops immediately went on the offensive on the Oryol salient, which jutted deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for Model’s refusal on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle of Prokhorovka. The model himself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol salient (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to a prepared defense line (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which could not be replenished.

On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units wedged into the Kursk ledge. On July 23, the Germans were forced to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had retreated to the western bank of the Dnieper.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk are assessed differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to July 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still trying to continue its advance at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often seen as separate from the Battle of Kursk. German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten after the fact, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count its losses after the battle. The enormous importance that these data had from the point of view of propaganda of both sides was also reflected.

According to some studies, for example, Colonel David Glanz, from July 5 to July 20, the 9th Army of Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, and the formations of Army Group South - 29,102 people. Total – 49,822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data used by Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people were lost by the Central Front and 73,892 people by the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were lost to the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.

The losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often damaged tanks were repaired or restored the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law that usually up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk German tank formations lost 1b12 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1,600 vehicles. This is explained by the fact that the Germans had more powerful tank guns.

During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 more were lost during the subsequent offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk became the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. Germany's defeat was only a matter of time. That is why, from July 1943, many strategically thinking German military leaders realized that the war was lost.

Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and the writer, author of more than 40 published works on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov, Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth Region.

The article is based on material from the program “The Price of Victory” of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”. The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full at this link.

After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which Soviet troops captured significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - launched a crushing counterattack by the Germans. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high price.

After German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (later referred to as 6 -I and 7th Guards Armies). In addition, by the end of March there was a muddy road, which, of course, helped our troops hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were made for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact a certain balance was maintained, equilibrium, without sudden, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such stunning defeat, so the political leadership was faced with an important task - to consolidate its bloc, because Germany’s allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; What will happen if suddenly there is another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed, after a fairly victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

Although no, not small. If Operation Citadel had been successful, which the German command naturally counted on, then two fronts would have been encircled - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they would pass there, and then with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (in the lower part were the Azov and Black Seas).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. Firstly, he said that Germany cannot make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on developing Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that it was convenient for our troops to launch flank attacks from the Kursk ledge, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the process of forming tasks and the preparation process took a lot of time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation due to understaffing both in manpower and technical strength. And, by the way, the second date of “Citadel” was set for June 10 (the first was May 3-5). And already from June 10 it was postponed even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only “Tigers” and “Panthers” were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these vehicles began to be produced in a relatively large series in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-vehicle group was not used, because like any new equipment, both tanks suffered from “childhood diseases.” As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers' carburetors caught fire quite often, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in combat during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more dire.

It is important to understand here that the German command initially planned the Belgorod group, that is, Army Group South, which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it was supposed to solve the main problem. The attack by Model's 9th Army was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining Model’s troops, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (there were reconnaissance reports and photographs) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first came to Bogodukhov, to the CP of the 4th Tank Army, to Hoth. For what? The fact is that Hoth wrote a letter - there was also an attempt to develop Operation Panther (as a continuation if Citadel was successful). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 mechanized tank corps that the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.

If this whole colossus moves towards Army Group South, then, as they say, it will not seem like much. This is precisely why it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the Citadel. On May 9–11, Hoth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorovsky battle was developed here.

It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when the condition of the German troops is assessed, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.

In the area of ​​the Kursk salient, both in the north and in the south, for Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles at their disposal on the Eastern Front. It was assumed that these forces would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After this, under a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

The SS Corps, part of the 48th Corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps were planned for the battles near Prokhorovka. These three corps were supposed to grind down the mobile reserves that were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why to the Prokhorovka area? Because the terrain there was favorable. It was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks in other places. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that they didn’t calculate the strength of our defense.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that the situation in Africa was already in turmoil. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British would establish complete control over the Mediterranean Sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was ultimately carried out. That is, for the Germans in other areas, everything was not going well either, thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania, and other allies...

Planning for the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately simultaneously: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the containment of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the front line was stabilized, he was here, in the Belgorod region; Together with Vasilevsky, they discussed future plans. After this, he prepared a note in which he outlined his point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before which he commanded the Southwestern Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of Headquarters, was removed from this post).

So, at the beginning of April, a note was placed on Stalin’s desk, which outlined the basic principles of conducting military operations in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which the proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the Kursk salient area suggested a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi Operation Citadel failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army did not create such powerful defensive lines. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans needed to plow, ram, and drill through 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just trenches dug in full height and reinforced with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, hollows, this is the most powerful system of minefields made for the first time during the war; and, in fact, every settlement on this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the Germans nor our side had ever built such a strong defensive line, filled with engineering barriers and fortifications, on the Eastern Front. The first three lines were the most fortified: the main army line, the second army line and the third rear army line - to a depth of approximately 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groups were unable to break through them within two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.

The fact is that in May, fairly accurate data was received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would deliver the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally given significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how they developed fighting in the south. Vatutin was forced to repel the attacks of the enemy’s main tank group with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that participated directly in the attack on the Central Front, but they had to deal with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.

But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov’s film “Liberation”: the defector says that the Germans have concentrated there and there, a colossal artillery attack is carried out, almost all the Germans are killed, it is not clear who else has been fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?

There really was a defector, and not just one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a reconnaissance battalion soldier from the 168th Infantry Division came over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy, who was preparing to attack, it was planned to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike an air strike from the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's talk about the air raid - it was a failure. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the timing was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, in the zone of the 6th Guards Army it was partially successful: mainly telephone communication lines were disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but they were insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which occupied the defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, accordingly, are on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to cross the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sections of the front, and previously established several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineering reconnaissance, by the way, worked very well), and the artillery strike was carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on populated areas where these assault groups of the 3rd Panzer Corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the 7th Guards Army zone was significantly higher. The losses from it both in manpower and equipment, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the advance and in some places paralyzed it.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy’s strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempff’s Army Group, to cover the right flank of Hausser’s 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the main strike group and the auxiliary group began to advance along diverging lines. This forced the enemy to attract additional forces from the spearhead of the attack to cover their flanks. This tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and was perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky are famous people, but the latter has a reputation as, perhaps, a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, since he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, we can say with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very intelligently and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main group, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation practically turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and control, of course, went very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander-in-chief.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov’s tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before this, at the line of the German attack, at the forefront, was the well-known Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did this happen? The fact is that the defense was structured as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans would most likely strike along the Oboyanskoye Highway. And then they had to be stopped by the tankmen of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th they advanced to the second army line and took the main attack almost in the morning. By mid-day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was cut into several parts, three divisions were scattered, and we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and perseverance of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held until the 9th inclusive.

The commander of the Voronezh Front, Army General N. F. Vatutin, accepts a report from one of the formation commanders, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were made up for in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin took over the Voronezh Front in a very poor condition. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the conscription of the local population that left the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the arrival of reinforcements from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in 1942 in the spring was made up for by officers from academies, from rear units, and so on. And after the battles at Stalingrad, the situation with the tactical command staff, especially battalion and regiment commanders, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, there was a well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that was possible was done.

The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is this true? At the first stage - undoubtedly. No matter how we now evaluate the battle in the Black Earth Region, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, German army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was tasked with exhausting the enemy’s forces and knocking out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they were unable to do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base for the 10th Tank Brigade. There, the Germans blew up some of the Panthers, up to forty units, and we captured some. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to Wehrmacht plans, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army began to retreat for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped at the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans organized a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it should have withstood any attack.

Strengths of the parties

Germany
At the start of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to the huge amount of manpower, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: these are more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant "including about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank army there were three elite tank divisions that had not suffered a single defeat before - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the ground army, an air fleet was sent with a total number of more than 1,000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

USSR
To slow down and make it more difficult for the enemy to attack, Soviet Army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines on every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However large number Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same “Tigers” of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Progress of the battle

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to accomplish this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike to weaken the initial enemy attack.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern front of the arc, German tanks went on the offensive, but soon encountered very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the attack, but did not achieve significant results; by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
On July 5, the attack began on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. First came a powerful artillery barrage. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
The famous battle of Prokhorovka is the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle was on July 12. On a small section of the front, 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided. The tanks of both sides mixed and throughout the day many tank crews left their combat vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of July 12, the tank battle began to wane. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy's tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
German losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were almost completely bled dry and had lost their attacking potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large amount of equipment and guns. According to various estimates, the Soviet army lost up to 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure being irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations on the Soviet side began on July 5, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this section of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkovsky operation began from the Soviet army. The Soviet command set the goal of encircling the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to cross the Northern Donets, seize a bridgehead on the right bank and, most importantly, pin down German reserves on this section of the front.
During the Mius offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the arc itself.
On July 12, the offensive began in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Orel and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So on August 5, the first fireworks display during the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War was organized in the capital. During the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
In the southern region, the offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 and was called Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). During this offensive, the Germans attempted to counterattack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the offensive operation “Kutuzov” was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the “Center” group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 – September 22), the Donetsk basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost all of Left Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued its offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
The losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers died on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans talk about a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns were lost.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went on the defensive. In 1944 and 45, local offensives were launched, but they did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.

A people who forgets their past has no future. This is what the ancient Greek philosopher Plato once said. In the middle of the last century, “fifteen sister republics” united “ Great Russia", inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of humanity - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be crushed on all fronts. The purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. From that time on, the fascists forgot what “forward to the East” meant.

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again took effect. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander to the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from the North Caucasus, Don, and Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of spring 1943 the front had stabilized. On the map of the fighting in the center of the front line with the Germans, towards the Nazi army, a protrusion stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought calm to the front: no one was attacking, both sides were rapidly accumulating forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation for Nazi Germany

After the defeat of Stalingrad, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. There were 9.5 million people “under arms” (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Fuhrer longed to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, should have occurred precisely on that section of the front where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation “Citadel”. The plan involved delivering attacks converging on Kursk (from the north - from the Orel region; from the south - from the Belgorod region). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts fell into the “cauldron”.

For this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this section of the front, including. 16 tank and motorized troops, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this group, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

When preparing Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the leadership talent of the deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G. K. Zhukova. He, together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future site of the battle, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy group.

Along the front line, the fascists were opposed by the Voronezh (commander - General N. F. Vatutin) and the Central Front (commander - General K. K. Rokossovsky) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As we can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located behind the listed fronts. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

Control and coordination of the actions of this group were carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Tactical battle plan

Marshal Zhukov's plan assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A deeply echeloned bridgehead (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the Moscow-Vladivostok distance. It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, deprive him of the initiative, making the task as easy as possible for the attackers. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: Operation Kutuzov with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of Orel. Second: “Commander Rumyantsev” to destroy the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place on the Soviet side “from defense.” For offensive actions, as tactics teach, two to three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It turned out that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. The day before, German sappers began making passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence began a battle with them and took prisoners. The time of the offensive became known from the “tongues”: 03:00 07/05/1943.

The reaction was prompt and adequate: At 2-20 07/05/1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov, carried out a preventive powerful artillery shelling by frontal artillery forces. This was an innovation in combat tactics. The invaders were fired upon by hundreds of Katyusha rockets, 600 guns, and 460 mortars. For the Nazis this was a complete surprise; they suffered losses.

Only at 4:30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5:30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

Start of the battle

Of course, our commanders could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, towards the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, commander - General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge on the part of the German troops focused on Voronezh Front, from the north. Two battalions moved against Nikolai Fedorovich’s troops heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, an assault gun division, one motorized division. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoe (virtually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the advance of five enemy divisions for 24 hours.

German offensive tactics

This one is famous for its martial art Great War. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the front of the attack: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Following them were from fifty to a hundred medium Panther tanks, accompanied by infantry. Thrown back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks resembled the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

We will follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about German tactics conducting a tank battle. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel General Hermann Hoth; he “jewelfully,” if one can say so about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of work The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I.M. Chistyakov) had a gun density per 1 km of 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, was hit by Army Group South, whose commander was the most gifted Wehrmacht strategist, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which, in fact, he was dismissed in 1944).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander P. A. Rotmistrov) and the 5th Guards Army (commander A. S. Zhadov)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions “Totenkopf” and “Leibstandarte” changed the direction of attack to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle on the German side, 850 on our side. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was so loud that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, which caused the towers to collapse. When approaching the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire at the tanks, causing the tanks to burst into flames. The tankers seemed to be in prostration - while they were alive, they had to fight. It was impossible to retreat or hide.

Of course, it was unwise to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses of one in five, what would they have been like during the offensive?!). At the same time Soviet soldiers true heroism was demonstrated on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded high rank Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nowadays, the day of its end - August 23 - is celebrated annually by residents of the country like Russia.