Dchb zpdb zhtpofpchschi milking about retedpchpk. loizb chfptbs. Baltic strategic defensive operation (1941)

The Baltics occupied a special place in the plans of the military-political leadership of the Third Reich. Control over the Baltics made it possible to "look after" most of the Baltic Sea, especially taking into account the coast of allied Finland. The Baltic area allowed the German fleet to operate actively in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and maintain contact with the Scandinavian countries, from where strategic materials and resources came to Germany. The Baltic region not only covered East Prussia from the east, but in itself was a supply base for the German Empire. Thus, oil shale processing enterprises operated in Estonia, which annually supplied the Third Reich with about 500 thousand tons of oil products. The Baltic States were the agricultural base of Germany, supplying a large amount of agricultural raw materials and food.

In addition, we must not forget that the Baltic nationalists supplied the Germans with "cannon fodder." They were especially active in police and punitive units, freeing the Germans for the divisions they needed on the front lines. It is worth recalling the fact that the Baltics were considered the "living space" of the Third Reich. The region was planned to be populated by Germans, the “inferior population” (including Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians) was planned to be evicted deep into Russia, leaving part as service personnel, slaves.

Therefore, it was very important for Berlin to keep the Baltic states. The loss of this region was a significant blow to the German Empire. East Prussia was under attack. The Baltic Fleet received freedom of action. Germany was losing an important economic base. The German command did not want to withdraw Army Group North from the Baltic states, and it was already difficult to carry out such an evacuation in this period.

Offensive operations in the Baltic became the so-called. "Stalin's eighth blow." The Baltic strategic offensive operation was carried out from September 14 to November 24, 1944. Its main goal was to defeat the German troops in the Baltic and liberate Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The battle for the Baltic included four front-line and inter-front operations: Riga, Tallinn, Moonsund and Memel. The battle lasted 71 days, the front was 1,000 km wide and 400 km deep. The Baltic operation ended with the defeat of the German Army Group North, the formation of the Kurland pocket and the liberation of the three Baltic republics from German occupation.

Column of Soviet 152-mm howitzers ML-20 in the liberated Tallinn

background

A major offensive in the Baltic began to be prepared even at the height of the Belarusian operation (). Until the summer of 1944, a major offensive operation in the Baltic did not have favorable conditions. In the summer of 1944, in the Baltic direction, Soviet troops carried out a series of operations that led to the liberation of important territories and the deterioration of the position of the German army. Participating in the Belarusian operation, the 3rd Belorussian Front crossed the border of the Lithuanian SSR in early July 1944 and liberated Vilnius on July 13. Later, Soviet troops reached the Lithuanian border with East Prussia.

On July 5-31, 1944, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Ivan Bagramyan carried out the Siauliai operation (it was part of the strategic Belarusian operation). As a result, Soviet troops defeated the Šiauliai grouping of the enemy, liberated large areas of Latvia and Lithuania. On July 30-31, Soviet troops liberated Tukums and Jelgava and reached the Gulf of Riga. The German Army Group North was temporarily cut off from East Prussia. In August, during heavy fighting, the Germans were able to restore the land connection between the Baltic States and East Prussia.

On July 10-27, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, led by Andrey Eremenko, carried out the Rezhitsko-Dvina operation. As a result, Soviet troops broke through five strong defensive lines of the enemy, advanced 190-200 km, liberated 7 large and 16 small cities, a total of 5261 settlements. Among them are such important centers as Idritsa, Drissa, Opochka, Sebezh, Rezekne (Rezhitsa) and Daugavpils (Dvinsk). The liberation of the Kalinin region was completed and the liberation of Latvia began. In addition, the northern flank of the Soviet offensive in Belarus was secured. Significant German formations were pinned down by battle, and they could not be transferred to Belarus. The German command had to transfer troops from front to front (first to Belarus, then to the Baltic states), as a result, they did not have enough of them anywhere. Exhausted by marches and battles, the German divisions could not hold even strong and pre-equipped defensive lines.

On July 11-31, 1944, the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front under the command of Ivan Maslennikov carried out the Pskov-Ostrov operation. The well-prepared enemy defense (the "Panther" line), which was defended by the troops of the 18th Army, was broken through. Soviet troops occupied the powerful Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area, liberated Ostrov and the ancient Russian city of Pskov. The operation led to the final liberation of the Leningrad region, and contributed to the offensive of the neighboring Leningrad Front.

On July 24-30, 1944, the troops of the Leningrad Front under the command of Leonid Govorov, with the support of the Baltic Fleet, carried out the Narva operation. As a result, the Narva grouping of the Wehrmacht was defeated. Soviet soldiers liberated the city and fortress of Narva. The Narva bridgehead was significantly expanded, which improved the operational position of the Soviet troops before the strategic Baltic operation. The liberation of Narva contributed to the successful offensive of the 3rd Baltic Front in the Tartu direction.

On August 1 - 28, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front under the command of Andrey Eremenko carried out the Lubansko-Madonskaya operation. Soviet troops with heavy fighting overcame the impenetrable wooded and swampy Luban lowland, repelling strong enemy counterattacks. The cities of Livani, Varaklyany, Barkavy, Ligatne, Krustpils and other settlements were liberated. They stormed the powerful center of resistance, the city of Madona. The Germans failed to stop the Soviet offensive, but were able to significantly slow down its pace and, as a result, wear down the advancing Soviet troops. However, Eremenko's troops were able to reach the starting line to strike at Riga, albeit with a strong delay.

August 10 - September 6, the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front carried out the Tartu operation. As a result, Soviet troops advanced 100-130 km, liberated the city of Tartu and defeated the enemy's Tartu grouping. Conditions were created for entering the shores of the Gulf of Riga and attacking the flank and rear of the enemy Narva grouping.

Thus, in the summer of 1944, most of the defensive lines of the Wehrmacht in the Baltic States collapsed, the Soviet troops advanced more than 200 km in some directions. Almost half of the Baltic area was liberated from the Nazis. Soviet operations made it possible to pin down significant forces in the Baltic direction, which contributed to the troops of the Belorussian fronts to complete the defeat of Army Group Center in Belarus and break through to Eastern Poland. Soviet troops reached the approaches to Riga, creating all the conditions for completing the liberation of the Baltic states.

offensive plan

According to the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was planned to dismember and destroy the North Army Group with the support of the Baltic Fleet by the troops of the three Baltic Fronts and the Leningrad Front, and finally liberate the Baltic states. The troops of the Baltic fronts delivered converging blows in the direction of Riga. The Leningrad front was advancing in the direction of Tallinn. The main attack was considered in the Riga direction, where the defense was held by the main forces of the German 16th and 18th armies. There were five tank divisions of the Wehrmacht here. This strike was supposed to lead to the defeat of the main forces of the "North" group and the liberation of Riga - the most important political and industrial center, the junction of land and sea communications of the Baltic states.

The destruction of the German operational group "Narva" in Estonia was assigned to the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet. Govorov's troops were supposed to strike from the Tartu region in the direction of Rakvere. Thus, the troops of the Leningrad Front were supposed to go to the rear of the Narva enemy grouping, surround and destroy it. At the second stage, the troops of the front were to liberate the capital of Estonia - Tallinn, to reach the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral Vladimir Tributs received the task of supporting the coastal flank of the Leningrad Front, preventing the landing of reinforcements and the evacuation of enemy forces by sea. Naval aviation received the task of bombing the coastal rear of the enemy.

The 3rd Baltic Front delivered the main blow on its right flank (67th and 1st shock armies) and in cooperation with the 2nd Baltic Front, which advanced along the Madona-Riga line, in order to defeat the enemy’s Riga grouping and liberate the capital Latvia.

The 1st Baltic Front received the task of advancing with the main forces along the left bank of the Western Dvina in the Riga direction. Soviet troops were to reach the coast of the Gulf of Riga in the Riga area, preventing the main forces of Army Group North from withdrawing in the direction of East Prussia. Part of the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Chernyakhovsky also participated in the operation. Chernyakhovsky's troops advanced in the western direction, with the aim of tying down the enemy forces in East Prussia in battle and preventing them from maintaining a corridor to the Baltic. Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky carried out the overall management of the operation and coordination of the actions of the fronts.

The Baltic fronts were supposed to launch an offensive on September 5-7, the Leningrad Front on September 15. However, the preparation of the strategic operation faced a number of difficulties. There was not enough time, so the Headquarters postponed the start of the offensive in the Riga direction for a week. The Leningrad Front was to go on the offensive on 17 September. Thanks to this time, it was possible to better prepare for the offensive, reconnoiter enemy positions, supply ammunition, fuel, and food. The sappers completed the construction of the planned roads and prepared to force water barriers.

Side forces

USSR. The troops of the left wing of the Leningrad, three Baltic, part of the forces of the 3rd Belorussian fronts numbered about 900 thousand people, more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 17.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 2.6 thousand aircraft. 12 armies participated in the operation, that is, almost three-quarters of the strength of the four Soviet fronts. The offensive was also supported by ships and aircraft of the Baltic Fleet.

Germany. By the beginning of September, Army Group North under the command of Ferdinand Schörner included the 16th and 18th Armies, the 3rd Panzer Army (on September 20 it was transferred from the Army Group Center) and the Narva Task Force. In total, they included about 730 thousand people, over 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 7 thousand guns and mortars, about 400 aircraft.

The landing of Soviet troops on the island of Saaremaa (Ezel) in the Moonsund archipelago

The transfer of Soviet heavy artillery to the island of Saaremaa

Activities of the German command and the defense system

The success of Operation Bagration sharply worsened the position of Army Group North. German troops were deeply enveloped from the south and pressed to the sea. Over the German grouping in the Baltics, there was a threat to fall into a huge "cauldron". On the other hand, the Baltic foothold allowed the Wehrmacht to launch a flank attack on the Soviet troops. Therefore, it was considered inexpedient to leave the Baltic States. To stabilize the front in the Baltic direction, the German command stepped up engineering work here, erecting additional defensive lines and structures, and also deployed reinforcements.

The strongest grouping was located in the Riga direction, which included 5 tank divisions. The Riga fortified area was considered insurmountable for the Russians. On the approaches to the capital of Latvia from the northeast and east, four defensive lines were equipped.

There was also a very powerful defense in the Narva direction. The relatively narrow isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi made it possible to create a well-equipped defense line here. Soviet troops unsuccessfully stormed these positions during the Leningrad-Novgorod operation. Now they are even stronger. In the Narva direction, the Germans had three defensive lines with a total depth of 25-30 kilometers.

Usually, the main strip of the main defensive lines included two or three positions. Wire fences were set up ahead of the positions and minefields with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines were set up. The positions themselves had two or three trenches connected by communication passages. Positions were located at a distance of several kilometers from each other. Between the main defensive lines created intermediate. In order to complicate the actions of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, the Germans installed various barriers in the Gulf of Finland. Both fairways along the southern and northern shores of the Gulf of Finland were covered with mines. Narva Bay and Tallinn Bay were especially densely mined.

In August, several infantry and tank divisions, reinforcements, and a large amount of equipment were transferred from Germany and from sectors of the front that were considered “calm”. Infantry divisions, bled dry in previous battles, on average replenished up to 8 thousand people. For this, personnel from the air and navy, as well as various rear units and institutions, were used. Young men and elderly men were mobilized. To restore the combat effectiveness of Army Group North, Germany spent a significant part of the human and material resources directed to the armed forces.

At the same time, Army Group North maintained a fairly high morale. The most severe discipline was maintained in the troops. To "support" the advanced units, detachments were formed from the SS troops. The propaganda machine continued to convince the soldiers that the war would soon turn to a turning point. It was reported that total mobilization in Germany would allow the formation of new formations, and the Wehrmacht would go on a decisive offensive. Rumors spread about a "wonder weapon".

Abandoned by the Germans in the area of ​​the trading port of Tallinn 40-mm anti-aircraft gun "Bofors"

Operation progress

The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Bagramyan. Good reconnaissance made it possible to identify the enemy's fire defense system, and it was almost completely suppressed by artillery and aviation preparation. The shock grouping of the front - the 4th shock army and the 43rd army, advancing from the Bauska region, broke through the enemy defenses and advanced to a depth of more than 50 km in three days. The 35th Tank Brigade of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and the forward detachments of the 43rd Army of General Afanasy Beloborodov made their way to Baldona and Yelgava. There are only about 20 km left to Riga.

Thus, the Soviet troops broke through to the southwestern approaches to Riga and created the threat of encirclement and dissection of the entire Army Group North. For the German command, the first step was to organize strong counterattacks against the troops of the 4th shock and 43rd armies in order to stop them on the outskirts of the capital of Latvia. At this time, other troops were supposed to slip out of the emerging encirclement.

Meanwhile, the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts tried to break into the powerful enemy defenses. They advanced slightly, but were able to inflict heavy losses on the 18th German Army and tie down its reserves.

The commander of Army Group North, Ferdinand Schörner, fearing that the operational group Narva in the Tallinn direction (6 divisions) would be cut off from the main forces, asked the high command for permission to withdraw it. Usually Hitler's reaction to such proposals was sharply negative. However, this time such permission was given. The Narva group was ordered to withdraw to pre-prepared lines east of Riga. The German command began to withdraw troops from Estonia, which reduced the front by 300 km.

The planned withdrawal of the German troops was hampered by the offensive of the Leningrad Front (Tallinn operation). Govorov's troops struck from the Tartu region. At the same time, part of the forces of the front, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet, moved along the coast. The troops of the 2nd shock and 8th armies under the command of generals Ivan Fedyuninsky and Philip Starikov successfully advanced. The 8th Estonian Rifle Corps also participated in the liberation of their homeland. September 20 liberated the city of Rakvere, September 22 - Tallinn. On September 23, Soviet troops occupied Pärnu. By September 26, all mainland Estonia was liberated from the Nazis. A significant part of the German troops could not break through to the main forces and died or were captured. The Germans lost more than 45 thousand people killed and captured. Having united with the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front, Govorov's troops joined the battles for the liberation of Latvia. Subsequently, the Leningrad Front carried out the Moonsund operation (September 27 - November 24, 1944) to liberate the Moonsund archipelago. Most of the islands were liberated quickly. Only on the Sõrve peninsula on the island of Saaremaa did the offensive stall for a month and a half. Here the Germans organized resistance on the narrow isthmus of the peninsula. Due to poor organization and lack of ammunition, the Soviet troops could not break the enemy's resistance for a long time.

A soldier of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps met his wife on the street of liberated Tallinn. Source: http://waralbum.ru/

Meanwhile, the troops of the Baltic fronts continued to fight in the Riga direction (Riga operation). The German 16th, 18th, part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Army were replenished by the retreating troops of the Narva group and fiercely fought back at the Sigulda line. The fighting took on a particularly stubborn character. Soviet troops had to literally gnaw through the enemy's defenses. The Germans launched furious counterattacks and even pushed the Soviet troops back in places. In particular, in the area of ​​Dobele, the German troops succeeded at the cost of huge losses to push our troops for 5 km. However, near Riga, the Germans were slowly but surely pressed. On September 22, Baldone was taken. The next day, the German command threw into battle two divisions that arrived from Estonia. However, the counterattack was repulsed.

Intense fighting in the Riga direction forced the German command to concentrate its main forces and reserves (33 divisions, including 4 tank divisions) on this narrow strip. This made it possible to temporarily hold Riga and the narrow strip of land along the Gulf of Riga, the last land line that linked Army Group North with East Prussia.

In this situation, the Soviet Headquarters decided to shift the direction of the main attack of the 1st Baltic Front from Riga to the Klaipeda direction, where the defense was held by 7-8 German divisions. The front command received the task of regrouping the troops of four armies with reinforcements from the right flank to the center, in the Siauliai region. Bagramyan's troops were to deliver a powerful blow in the western direction, defeat the troops of the 3rd Panzer Army and break through to the Baltic coast from Liepaja to the Neman River. The implementation of this operation cut off the troops of Army Group North from Prussia. The 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front also participated in this operation. The troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts were to continue to put pressure on the enemy in the Riga direction, holding down the main forces of Army Group North in battle, preventing Schörner from regrouping forces.

On October 5, 1944, the Memel operation began. Troops of the 1st Baltic Front launched an offensive against Memel (Klaipeda). The strike force of the front included the forces of the 6th Guards, 43rd and 5th Guards Tank Armies. They were advancing from the Siauliai region. To the south-west of Siauliai, the 2nd Guards Army struck.

Soviet troops successfully broke through the enemy defenses and moved west. The 4th shock and 51st armies also joined the offensive. The German command did not foresee the possibility of a strike in the Klaipeda direction. The offensive of the 1st Baltic Front on Klaipeda was an unpleasant surprise for the Germans, Schörner was waiting for new attacks in the Riga direction. By the fourth day of the offensive, the depth of the breakthrough reached 60-90 km, and the width was 200-260 km. The fierce counterattacks of the German 3rd Panzer Army under such conditions did not lead to success.

On October 10, units of the 5th Guards Tank and 51st Armies of Generals Vasily Volsky and Yakov Kreizer went to the sea. Following them, on a broad front north and south of Memel, other formations of the front came out to the coast of the Baltic Sea. The movement of large forces of Army Group North in the Saldus-Priekule area, which tried to break into East Prussia, was stopped as a result of stubborn fighting. Thus, Schörner's troops lost the last land communication that connected them with Germany.

The siege of Klaipeda-Memel dragged on, and the city was taken only in January 1945. The Soviet 43rd Army was unable to take the fortress city on the move. Memel was defended by powerful defensive structures, fortress-type forts with reinforced concrete fortifications such as pillboxes. They were connected by underground communication passages. In addition, coastal and naval artillery were involved in the defense of the city. Additional troops were transferred by sea to defend Memel. On the Tilsit direction, the troops of the left wing of the front and the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated the northern bank of the Neman from the enemy and reached the border with East Prussia. Lithuania was liberated from the Germans.

Salute to the soldiers of the Red Army, who came to the coast of the Baltic Sea. Autumn 1944

Taking into account the unfavorable development of the situation in the Klaipeda direction, the German command decided to begin the withdrawal of troops from the Riga region to the territory of the Courland Peninsula. On the night of October 6, the Germans began to evacuate troops from the area northeast of Riga. However, the planned withdrawal did not work. Soviet troops relentlessly pursued the enemy. Having broken through the enemy defenses, the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts on October 12 started fighting for the capital of Latvia. The next day, Riga was liberated (the western part of the city was liberated only on October 15). By October 22, Soviet troops reached the enemy's Tukums defensive line and blocked the Germans on the Courland Peninsula. So the so-called. Courland boiler. This ended the Riga operation. Most of Latvia was liberated.

It is impossible not to note the great role that Soviet aviation and the Baltic Fleet played in the operation. Only the 14th, 15th and 3rd air armies, which supported the Baltic fronts from the air, made 55,000 sorties during the operation. The Baltic Fleet supported the coastal flanks of the ground forces, landed troops, assisted in the liberation of the islands, disrupted enemy sea communications and carried out important transportation.

Soviet soldiers on the square of the liberated Riga

Results

Army Group North suffered a heavy defeat. However, despite heavy losses (out of 59 formations, 26 were defeated, 3 divisions were completely destroyed), 33 infantry, tank and motorized divisions remained in its composition. About 500 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, a huge amount of equipment and ammunition fell into the Courland cauldron. The German Courland group was blocked and pressed to the sea, between Tukums and Liepaja. The German troops were doomed. There were no forces to break into East Prussia. There was no point in waiting for outside help. Soviet troops quickly developed an offensive against Central Europe. Having abandoned most of the equipment, supplies and suffered serious losses in personnel and ships, the group could be transferred to Germany by sea. However, this decision was abandoned.

The Soviet command was also not going to destroy the German group, isolated from the rest of the Wehrmacht troops and unable to influence the battles in the main directions of the final stage of the war, at any cost. The 3rd Baltic Front was disbanded. The 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts received the task of destroying the German grouping. Taking into account the difficult terrain conditions of the Courland Peninsula (forests and swamps) and the onset of winter, which complicated the advance, the destruction of the German group dragged on until the end of the war. In addition, the Baltic fronts transferred significant forces to the main directions. Several fierce assaults on the Courland Peninsula did not lead to success. The Germans fought to the death, and the Soviet troops experienced a shortage of forces and ammunition. As a result, the fighting in the Kurland pocket ended only on May 15, 1945.

As a result of the Baltic operation, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were liberated from the Germans. Soviet power was restored everywhere. Only in a small part of Latvia did the German troops hold out. The Wehrmacht lost an important strategic foothold and raw material base, which it owned for three years. The Baltic Fleet was able to conduct operations on German communications, cover coastal communications and the flanks of ground forces from the Gulf of Finland and Riga. With access to the coast of the Baltic Sea, Soviet troops were able to deliver flank attacks to German troops in East Prussia.

It should be noted that the Baltic States suffered greatly from the German occupation. During the three years of Nazi occupation, the population of the Baltic republics suffered enormous disasters. During this time, the Nazis exterminated about 1.4 million local residents and prisoners of war. The economy of the region, cities and villages was severely destroyed. There was a lot of work to be done to restore the Baltics.

Il-2 attack aircraft of the Baltic Fleet Air Force attacks a German ship off the coast of East Prussia

A column of German prisoners of war passes by the railway station in Riga

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NSHCHOE VSCHMY ZPFCHSHCH CHPECHBFSH Y TSYFSH CH OYNOYI HUMPCHYSI. x OBU OE VSCHMP REYUEL, PUCHEEBFSH ENMSOLH VSCHMP OEYUEN, OE VSCHMP UCHEYUK, MBNR. NSC UFBMY RTYURPUBVMYCHBFSHUS, B YNEOOP- DEMBFSH UCHEFIMSHOILY YJ ZYMSH UOBTSDPCH, UFTPZBFSH MHYUYOH RP UFBTPNH PVSCHYUBA Y PUCHEEBFSH UCHPE TSYMSHE. VSCHMY UMHYUBY LPZDB Y LETPUYOB OE VSCHMP, YuFP DEMBFSh? фЕМЕЖПОЙУФ, Х ЛПФПТПЗП ФЕМЕЖПООБС ФТХВЛБ ЧЙУЕМБ ОБ ЗПМПЧЕ, ЧУА ОПЮШ ДЕЦХТЙФ Й ОЕ УРЙФ, Й ФХФ РТЙНЕОСМУС ФЕМЕЖПООЩК ЛБВЕМШ (БЪЛЕТЙФПЧЩК), ЛПФПТЩК РПДЦЙЗБМУС Й НЕДМЕООП ЧУА ОПЮШ ЗПТЕМ, ТБЪНБФЩЧБМУС РТСНП У ФЕМЕЖПООПК ЛБФХЫЛЙ, Л ХФТХ ОБДЩЫЙНУС ДЩНПН Й ЛПРПФША ПФ ЛБВЕМС.. .

CHPF FBL WITH CHUFTEFIM BYNH! 1943 ZPD. WHCH KOBEFE, UFP FBLPE "LTSCHUBMP"? fBL CHPF, UPMDBFH, UFPVSCH RTYLHTYFSH UBNPLTHFLH, OBDP URYYULY, B YI OEF! th FHF PO DPUFBEF Y LBTNBOB NEYPYUEL, CH LPFPTPN YOHTPL, LHUPL ZTBOYFB Y LHUPL CEMEEB PF OBRIMSHOYLB (CHUE LFP OBSCCHCHBEFUS "LTSHCHUBMPN"). nPCEF, ABOUT ZHTPOFE X DTHZYI RP-DTHZPNKh YI OBSCCHBMY, B X OBU VSHMP FBL! YuTLBAF U UIMPK CEMEELKH P LBNEOSH Y RPMHYUBAF YULTH, LPFPTBS RPRBDBEF OB YOHT, Y PO FMEEF, PF OEZP UPMDBF RTYLHTYCHBEF. lPZDB NSCH UFPSMY JNPK CH PVPTPOE RPD ZPTPDPN CHYFEVUL, NSC YOPZDB RTYNEOSMY MHYUYOH, YURSHCHFBOOSCHK UFBTYOOOSCHK NEFPD PUCHEEEEOIS. OBUFTPZBAF UPMDBFSCH MHYUYOSCH Y TZHF HER H ENMSOLE. NPTsOP RTY UCHEFE MHYUYOSCH Y OBRYUBFSH RYUSHNP, Y YUYFBFSH. OB FFPN HYBUFLE S BYBVPMEM, METSBM rTYYEM UBOYOUFTHLFPT OBNETIM FENRETBFHTH- t 39 °, DBM FBVMEFLH Y HYEM. xCE UFENOEM, RPCHPOYM RP FEMEZHPOKH LPNBODYT VBFBTEY Y ULBBM, YUFPVSCH S U PDOIN PTHDYEN UOSMUS U PZOECHPK RPYGYY Y RTYVSHCHM CH TBKPO, ZDE OBIPDYMUS OBVMADBFEMSHOSHCHK RHOLFBODYT (OR) LPNOLFBODYT with ENH DPMPTSYM P UCHPEN UPUFPSOYY, YuFP ЪBVPMEM Y X NEOS CHSHCHUPLBS FENRETBFKhTB. according to NEOS CHSCHUMHYBM Y ULBBM: "OBDP UTPYUOP RPUFBCHYFSH PTHDYE ABOUT RTSNHA OBCHPDLH Y CHSKFSH U UPVPK DCHB SAILB U VTPOEVPKOSHNY UOBTSDBNY - L RETEDOENH LTBA OENEG RPDFSZYCHBEF FBOLY". pVUFBOPCHLB ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE BUFBCHYMB LPNVBFB PFDBFSH RTYLB, B NOE EZP CHSHCHRPMOSFSH. DMS RPNPEY CH PVPTKHDPCHBOY PZOECHPK RPYGYY S CHSM TBUYUEF 4-ZP PTHDYS, F.E. CHEUSH UCHPK CHCHPD. OPYUSH, YEM WUEZ, Y NSCH DCHYOKHMYUSH ABOUT RETEDPCHA. eIBMY RP VEDPTTSSHA, IPTPYP UFP VShchMP NBMP UOEZB. PTHDYE FBEIMY YUEFSCHTE MPYBDY, EDPCHSHCHE OE GO OUT H UEDME, BYMY TSDPN, DETTSB YI ЪB HЪDEYULY. CHRETED YEM LPNBODYT PTHDYS, DETTSB CH THLE ZHPOBTSH Y PTHDYKOPZP yrB. with YEM b PTHDYEN Y DETTSBMUS b UFCHPM. VSHMP PYUEOSH FSTCEMP YDFY CH NPEN UPUFPSOYY, OP OBDP Y FFP YURSHCHFBOYE VSHMP RETEUYMYFSH Y CHSHCHDETTSBFSH. oP ffp eee OE FE FTHDOPUFY. vHDEF FTHDOEE Y FTSEMEE.

OPYUSH, WUEZ, B FSH YDEYSH FKDB, ZDE CHMEFBAF PUCHEFYFEMSHOSHCHE TBLEFSHCH, PUCHEEBS ABOUT LPTPFLPE CHTENS OYENMA. CHUE VMYCE Y VMYCE RPDYAETSBEN L RETEDOENH LTBA. TBLEFSHCH PUCHEEBAF OBN DPTPZH. NSC RPDYAEIBMY VMBZPRPMHYuOP, OENEG OBU OE BLNEFIYM, B Refinery VSHCH. CHUA OPYUSH UPMDBFSCH PVPTKHDPCHBMY PZOECHHA RPYGYA, LPRBMY OBNETYHA ENMA LYTLPK Y MPPNN. CHSCHLPRBMY SNH RPD ENMSOLH. l HFTH PTHDYE HUFBOCHYMY, ЪBNBULYTPCHBMY UFCHPM Y EIF, HLTSCCH RTPUFSHCHOSNY. at TBUUCHEFPN RTPCHETYM ZPFPCHOPUFSH PTHDYS L UFTEMSHVE Y PV LFPN DPMPTSYMY LPNBOYTH VBFBTEY. LPNVBF, CHYDS NPE UPUFPSOYE, ULBBM: "PUFBCHSH ЪB UEVS LPNBOYTB PTHDYS, B UBN VETY MADEK U 4-ZP PTHDYS, Mpybdek Y IDY OB VBFBTEA". rTYLB, IPFSH Y U VPMSHYYN FTHDPN, S CHSHCHRPMOIM: PTHDYE UFPYF ABOUT RTSNPK OBCHPLE. ABOUT UMEDHAEIK DEOSH ABOUT OBIEN HYBUFLE VSCHMP URPLPKOP Y OILBLYI FBOLPCHSCHI BFBL UP UFPTPOSCH RTPFYCHOYLB OE VSMP. YuETE OELPFPTPE CHTENS S RPMHYUYM RTYLBBOYE UOSFSH UCHPE PTHDYE UPR Y RTYCHEEFY ABOUT BLTSCHFHA pr. FERETSH OBYB VBFBTES YUEFSHCHTEI PTHDYK CH RPMOPN UPUFBCHE NPZMB CHEUFY PZPOSH U BLTSCHFPK pr, RPDBCHMSS PZOECHSHCHE UTEDUFCHB Y TSYCHHA UIMH RTPFICHOYLB.

vPY CH OBRTBCHMEOYY Z. CHYFEVUL. oPSVTSh 1943-YAOSH 1944 Z.

obyb 204-S DYCHYYS (ud), Ch LPFPTPK S CHPECHBM, CHIPDYMB CH 60-K UFTEMLPCHSCHK LPTRHU 43-K BTNYY. hyubufpchbmy h VPSI ABOUT 3-N VEMPTHUULPN ZhTPOFE, ABOUT 1-N rTYVBMFYKULPN. h TBKPOE ZPTPDB MYPYOP OBYB DYCHYYS OBUFHRBMB CH OBRTBCHMEOYY Z. CHYFEVUL. RP RKhFY, ZDE NSCH CHEMY VPI, PUCHPPVPTSDBS GENERAL ENMA PF CHTBZB, RPYUFY CHUE DETECHOY VSCHMY UPTTSEOSHCH. RPNOA, YUYFBEYSH LBTFH NEUFOPUFY, FBN PVP-OBYUEOB DETECHOS U OBCHBOYEN, B ABOUT NEUFE CHILD OF UPFSF FPMSHLP THUULIE REYULY UZPTECHYI DPNPC.

ZDE-FP CH OBYUBME OPSVTS GENERAL CHPKULB RETEYMY L PVPTPOE. OBYB VBFBTES CHEMB PZPOSH RP RPYGYSN RTPFYCHOYLB ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE, CHEMY PZPOSH ABOUT RPDBCHMEOYE PZOECHSCHI UTEDUFCH RTPFYCHOYLB Y CH FSHCHMKH. LBL-FP CHEYUETPN, HCE UPCHUEN UFENOOMP, CHPOYF LPNBODYT VBFBTEY Y ZPCHPTYF: "CHPSHNY U UPVPK DMS UPRTCHPTsDEOYS UPMDBFB Y RTYIPDY OB OR, OBN OBDP PRTEDEMYFSH, ZDE RPUFBCHYFSH PTHDYF". OPYUSH, UOETSOBS NEFEMSH, NPTP ... or OBIPDYMUS FBN, ZDE Y LPN.TPFShch. TPFB ЪBOYNBMB PVPTPOH ABOUT CHPCHSHCHIEOOOPK NEUFOPUFY. bB LFH UPRLH RPUFPSOOP CHEMYUSH VPY, OENGSCH IPFEMI EE BICHBFIFSH, RPFPNKh SFP U FFK UPRLY IPTPYP RTPUNBFTYCHBMBUSH CHRETEDY METSBEBS NEUFOPUFSH. RTP LFH UPRLH S UMSCHYBM, TBOSHIE HER PLTEUFYMY "UPRLPK UNETFY". rPYENH? ABOUT FPK MANAGEMENT RPUFPSOOP CHEMYUSH VPI, Y NOPZP OBYI UPMDBF RPZYVMP. rPDIPDYN L MANAGEMENT, HERE RTPIPDYMY FTBOYEY OBYEK REIPFSCH. TBLEFSHCH, CHMEFBS, PUCHEEBAF NEUFOPUFSH, CH FY NZOPCHEOYS NPTsOP HCHYDEFSH, UFP CHUS UPRLB YЪTSCHFB CHPTPOLBNY PF UOBTSDPCH. uFP DEMBFS? LPNBOYT VBFBTEY Y LPN.TPFSCH TEYBMY, ZDE RPUFBCHYFSH PTHDYE ABOUT RTSNHA OBCHPDLH. lTHZPN ZPMPE NEUFP, Y POY TEYYMY PTHDYE OE UVBCHYFSH. ULPMSHLP S RETETSYM Y RETEDHNBM CH FFPF NPNEOF! OB FFPN NPE RTEVSCCHBOYE OB MANAGEMENT LPOYUMPUSH, YS U UPMDBFPN HYEM OB pr.

рПНОА, РПЛБ ТЕЫБМЙ, ЗДЕ УФБЧЙФШ ПТХДЙЕ, Ч ТПФХ РТЙЕИБМБ ЛХИОС, УФБМЙ ТБЪДБЧБФШ УПМДБФБН ХЦЙО Й УМЩЫХ ТБЪЗПЧПТ: РТЙЧЕЪМЙ ОБ ЧУЕИ, Б ЛПТНЙФШ ОЕЛПЗП... рПОСФОП ВЩМП, РПЮЕНХ... рПНОА, ЛПЗДБ С УФПСМ Ч ФТБОЫЕЕ, ХЧЙДЕМ ЛБЛ Ч OYE UFEOSCH FTBOYEY UYDSF DCHB UPMDBFB Y HTSYOBAF RTY UCHEFE UCHEFIMSHOILB. FP RMPULBS VBOPYULB ЪBMYFBS CHPULPN, LBL X STUDY, B CH GEOPTE NBMEOSHLIK ZHYFYMSH. LFYNY EDUCATIONAL OBYUBMY UOBVTsBFSH GENERAL REIPPH. about FFK PZOECHPK RPYGYY (pr) NSC RTPUFPSMY OEDPMZP. GENERAL DYCHYYA U FFPZP HYUBUFLB UOSMY, NSC PVPYMY ZPTPD chYFEVUL U UCHETB Y H TBKOE ZPTPDB zPTPDLB BOSMMY PVTPOH. pVPTPOB RTPIPDYMB CH OBRTBCHMEOYY Z. RPMPGL, URTBCHB PF OB VSCHM ZPTPD YKHNYMYOP, OP PO VSCHM X OENGECH. ъБОСМЙ пр. лПЗДБ НЩ ЕИБМЙ, ЧУС ЪЕНМС ВЩМБ РПЛТЩФБ УОЕЗПН, Й ЙЪ РПД УОЕЗБ ЧЙДОЕМПУШ ЧУЕ, ЮФП ПУФБЧЙМЙ РТПЫЕДЫЙЕ ЪДЕУШ ФСЦЕМЩЕ ВПЙ: ФХФ Й УЗПТЕЧЫЙК ОЕНЕГЛЙК ФБОЛ «рБОФЕТБ» Й ОБЫЙ ф-34, ух-76, ОЕНЕГЛЙЕ ЫФХТНПЧЩЕ ПТХДЙС 75- NN Y, LPOEYUOP, FTHRSCH OENEGLYI UPMDBF. vPY RTPYMY, OBUFKHRIMY NPTPPSCH, Y UOEZ HLTSCHM FTHRSCH. LBL CHUEZDB, NEOS, LPNBODYTB 2-ZP CHCHPDB UP UCHPYN PTHDYEN, RPUSCHMBMY ЪBOSFSH PZOECHHA RPYGYA ABOUT FBOLPPRBUOPN OBRTBCHMEOYY.

iPTPYP RPNOA FFPF YRYPD YJ NPEK ZHTPOFPCHPK TSOYOY...- CHYFEVUL CH OBRTBCHMEOYY Z. RPMPGL, BZ. rPIBDY PTHDYKOPZP PLPRB, ZDE UFPSMP PTHDYE, RTPIPDYM OEPPMSHYPK PCHTBTSEL, OB ULMPOY LPFPTPZP NShch PVPTKHDPCHBMY VMYODBTS CH DCHB OBLBFB. pCHTBZ DBCHBM OBN CHPЪNPTSOPUFSH UCHPPVPDOP CHSHCHIPDYFSH DOEN YЪ VMYODBTsB OEEBNEYUEOOOSCHNY. LUFBFY, REYULKH UVBTBMYUSH FPRYFSH CH FENOPE CHTENS YЪ-ЪB NBULYTPCHLY (DSCHNB). ч ВМЙОДБЦЕ Х ОБУ ВЩМБ ФТПЖЕКОБС РЕЮЛБ (ВХТЦХКЛБ) ОБ ОЕК УПМДБФЩ Ч ЛПФЕМЛБИ ЛЙРСФЙМЙ ЧПДХ ДМС РЙФШС Й ЮБС... ч ПЧТБЗЕ ВЩМП НОПЗП УОЕЗБ Й НЩ ЙН РПМШЪПЧБМЙУШ, Б РПФПН НЩ ПВОБТХЦЙМЙ, ЮФП РПД УОЕЗПН ФЕЮЕФ ТХЮЕЕЛ. y LFPZP THYUEKLB NShch UFBMY VTBFSH CHPDH, Y VTBMY CHUA 'YNH, BL CHEUOE UOEZ OBYUBM FBSFSH Y UFP TS NSCH HCHYDEMY? h PCHTBZE, YUKhFSH CHCHYE FPZP NEUFB, PFLHDB FEYUEF THYUEEL, YJ-RPD UOEZB RPLBBMYUSH FTHRSCH OENGECH, B NSC-FP VTBMY CHPDH Yb THYUEKLB!

OE ЪBVHDKh, LPZDB S IPDYM H FSHM ABOUT VBFBTEA, CHYDEM FP UMECHB, FP URTBCHB PF FTPRYOLY FTHRSHCH, ЪBOUEOOOSCHE UOEZPN, B LPE-ZDE CHYDOSH VSCHMY THLY. pUPVEOOP OERTYSFOP OB LFP UNPFTEFSH, LPZDB ENMA PUCHEEBEF MHOOSCHK UCHEF. IDEA PYO- LBTFYOB TSHFLBS. RPNOA, NYNP OBU RP PCHTBZH CH UFPTPOH OBYI FTBOYEK RTPIPDYMY OBY UOBKRETSCHCH NBULIBMBFBI ...

h LPOGE NBTFB 1944 ZPDB RP RTYLBЪH LPNBODPCHBOYS NEOS RETECHEMY YЪ 7-K VBFBTEY CH 8-A zBHVYUOKHA 122-NN VBFBTEA ABOUT DPMTSOPUFSH LPNBODYTB CHCHPDB HRTBCHMEOYS. y FFPZP DOS X NEOS VHDHF DTHZYE PVSBOOPUFY LBL LPNBOYTB CHCHPDB HRTBCHMEOYS VBFBTEY. h RPDYOEOYY X NEOS VHDHF PFDEMEOYE UCHSKY Y PFDEMEOYE TBCHEDLY. bdbyuy npy- ЧЕУФЙ ТБЪЧЕДЛХ У ОБВМАДБФЕМШОПЗП РХОЛФБ, ХУФБОБЧМЙЧБФШ ФЕМЕЖПООХА УЧСЪШ пр-ор, ЧЩДЧЙЗБФШУС ОБ РЕТЕДПЧПК ор ДМС ХУФБОПЧЛЙ ГЕМЕК РТПФЙЧОЙЛБ, ФБЛЦЕ ДЕТЦБФШ ЛПОФБЛФ У ЛПНБОДЙТПН УФТЕМЛПЧПК ТПФЩ ВБФБМШПОБ, ЛПФПТХА РПДДЕТЦЙЧБЕФ ОБЫБ ВБФБТЕС.

vBOS, PFDSHI

dChBTsdshch bb npe rtevshchchboye ABOUT ZHTPOFE NOE RTYYMPUSH RPNSHCHFSHUS H VBOE Y PYO TB RPvshchchbfsh h DPNE PFDShCHIB.

YNPK 1944 ZPDB, LPZDB NSC VSCHMY CH PVPTPOE RPD Z. CHYFEVULPN (LFP VSCHMP CH SOCHBTE YMY ZHECHTBME, OE RPNOA), OBN HUFTPIMY VBOA. FP VSHMP FBL ... about PDOK UFPTPOE PCHTBZB VSCHMB RPUFTPEOB VPMSHYBS ENMSOLB RPD PYO OBLBF- VBOS. h ЪENMSOLE (VBOE) UFPSMY DCHE VYULY: PDOB U ZPTSUEK, DTHZBS U IPMPDOK ChPDK, Y VPMSHYBS CEMEOBS REYULB CH LPFPTPK ZPTEMY DTPCHB. x CHIPDB CH VBOA UFPSMY VYULY CH LPFPTSCHI ZTEMY CHPDH. RPNOA, RPZPDB VShchMB UPMOEYUOBS Y NPTPOBS. х CHIPDB CH VBOA VSCM UPPTKhTSEO OBCHEU, B RPD OBCHEUPN ABOUT UOEZH VSCHMB TBBUFMBOB UPMPNB. RETED OCHEUPN ABOUT HMYGE UFPSM EEE OEULPMSHLP VYUEL RPD LPFPTSCHNY ZPTEMY DTPCHB. tBDECHBMYUSH, UFPS ABOUT UPMPNE, VSHMP OERTYCHSHCHYUOP Y IPMPDOP. tbdechyyush, PFDBMY GENERAL Pvnkhodytpchboye, F.E. ZYNOBUFETLH Y VTALY, UPMDBFBN-UBOYFBTBN DMS PVTBVPFLY, POY RPCHEUYMY EZP ABOUT RBMLBI CH VPULY. h VBOE VSCHMY YBKLY, NPYUBMLY Y ULBNEKLY, ABOUT LPFPTSCHI UYDS NSCHMYUSH. rPUME RPNSCHCHLY NSC CHCHYMY Y RPDPYMY L FYN VYULBN PLPMP OBCHEUB, RPD LPFPTSCHN ZPTEMY DTPCHB, Y CH LPFPTSCHI RPD OCHEUPN ABOUT RBMLBI "RTPTsBTYCHBMPUSH" GENERAL PVNHODYTPCHBOYE. LBTsDSCHK YULBM UCHPE. CHYTSH H VPULE UCHPE PVNKHODYTPCHBOYE, PF LPFPTPZP RBIOEF TsBTEOSCHN. NPS ZYNOBUFETLB GCHEFB IBLY VSCHMB YЪ BOZMYKULPK YETUFY, NEUFBNY POB RPDTSBTIMBUSH Y RPTSEMFEMB. pDECHBMYUSH ABOUT NPTPYE, OBN CHSHCHDBMY YUYUFPE OBFEMSHOPE VEMSHHE, B CHPF PVNHODYTPCHBOYE, CHSHCHOHFPE YЪ VPYULY, UTBYKH OBDEFSH VSCHMP OECHPЪNPTSOP. rTYIPDYMPUSH OELPFTPE CHTENS TsDBFSH, RPLB POP OENOZP PUFSCHOEF. NSh Tbdsch Vshmy BPPK RTPPGEDHTHE, FERETSH URPLPKOYE WHEVS Yukhchufchbfsh PF FFIi Choyk ... B fp LBL FPMSHLP ChPKKESH CHENMHOSOLH, FPMSHLP SERFH FEVFSH OREPHS oP, UFP RPDEMBEYSH - FBL VSHMP! YuETE OELPFTPE CHTENS LFY CHY UOPCHB P UEVE ULBTSHF. x OBU VSHCHMY FARMSH CHEEY, B YI OE TSBTYMY. rTBChDB, RPLB NShch NSCHMYUSH, UBOIFBTSCH LFY CHEEY YUEN-FP PVTBVBFSCHCHBMY. oP Tbche NPTsOP UFP-FP VShchMP UDEMBFSH U NEIPCHCHNY CHEEBNY? lPOEYUOP, OEF. sing FBN PUFBMYUSH DP CHEUOSCH. FP RETCHBS OYNOSS VBOS, Y RPUMEDOSS, VPMSHIE FBLY VBOSH OYNPK OE VHDEF.

CHFPTS VBOS VSCHMB CHEUOPK, CH NBE NEUSGE. h FSHMKH, PLPMP NEDUBOVBFB, FBN, ZDE S PFDSHIBM CH DPNE PFDSHIB, VSCHMB TBCHETOHFB RPMECHBS VBOS DMS RPNSCHCHLY MYUOPZP UPUFBCHB OBYEK DYCHYYY. VSCHMY RPUFBCHMEOSCH VPMSHYE UPMDBFULYE RBMBFLY, FBLIE LBL CH ZPURYFBME, FBN VSCHMY ULBNEKLY, YBKLY. chPDB ZTEMBUSH CH UREGIBMSHOSCHI RETEDCHYTSOSCHI NBYOBI Y RPDBCHBMBUSH RP YMBOZBN CH NPEUOSCHE RBMBFLY. rPUME RPNSCHCHLY OBN DBMY YUYUFPE OITSOEE VEMSH.

pfdshchi

LBL LFP OBCHBFSH? yMY PFDSHIPN, YMY RTPUFP CHP-NPTSOPUFSHHA URPLPKOP PFUSCHRBFSHUS CH FYYOE? oh shit. oP YFP VSHCHM OBUFPSEIK "RPMECHPK DPN PFDSCHIB". ZDE-FP CH LPOGE NBTFB 1944 ZPDB NOE VSCHMB RTEDUFBCHMEOB CHPЪNPTSOPUFSH RPLIOHFSH UCHPK OBVMADBFEMSHOSHCHK RHOLF Y RTYVSHCHFSH CH TBKPO, ZDE TBURPMBZBMUS OBY NEDYGIOULIK UBOYFBTTOSHCHK DYOBFBMSHPO. rPUSCHMBMY ABOUT PFDSHI FPMSHLP PZHYGETCH NMBDYEZP UPUFBCHB, Y FPMSHLP U RETEDOEZP LTBS! fBN VSCHMY RPUFBCHMEOSCH DPRPMOIFEMSHOSHE RBMBFLY, CH LPFPTSCHI Y TBNEUFYMY OBU, RTYVSCHYI ABOUT PFDSHI (LBL IPYUEYSH, FBL Y OBPCHY). NEDUBOVBF TBURPMBZBMUS CH MEUKH, RTYNETOP CH 4-5 LN PF RETEDOEZP LTBS. h LBTsDPK RBMBFLE UFPSMY REYULY (VHTTSKHKLY), LPFPTSCHE FPRYMY UPMDBFSCH. NEOS RPNEUFYMY CH DCHINEUFOKHA RBMBFLH, ZDE UFPSM OEPPMSHYPK UFPMYL, RBMBFLB VSCHMB HFERMEOB (DCHPKOBS). vSCHMB VPMSHYBS RBMBFLB CH LPFPTPK TBNEEBMBUSH UFPMPCHBS, CH LPFPTKHA Y NSCH IPDYMY CHNEUFE U IPDSYUNY TBOOEOSCHNY. ChSch RTEDUFBCHMSEFE, FYYOB, URYYSH ULPMSHLP IPYUEYSH. CHSHKDEYSH Y RBMBFLY, STLP UCHEFIF UPMOGE, FYYOB, ABOUT ICHPKOPN DETECHE METSYF UOEZ Y PO OBJOBEF FBSFSh. RBIOEF CHEUOPK- YUTYLBAF RHYYULY. fBLPE UPUFPSOIE, LBL VHDFP Y OEF CHPKOSHCH! PLPMP FTPRYOPL, RP LPFPTSHCHN NSC IPDYMY CH UFPMPCHHA, RPUFBCHMEOSCH VSCHMY VPYULY U CHPDK, CH LPFPTSCHI VSCHM ЪBNPYUEO UPUOPCHSHCHK MBROIL. OBN ULBBMY, NSC DPMTSOSCH LFH CHPDH RYFSH, FBL LBL POB PF GYOZY. i DEKUFCHYFEMSHOP, LPZDB RSEYSH LFH CHPDH, POB RBIOEF ICHPKOSHCHN OBRYFLPN. with RYM CHPDH Y MAVPCHBMUS RTYTPDPK, ZTEMP UPMOGE, UOEZ UFBM TSHCHIMSHCHN, VTBM U UPVPK IMEV Y LPTNYM UYOYYUEL, Y OBDP CE - ЪBVPMEMP ZPTMP. rTYYMB NEDUEUFTB, UBNETYMB FENRETBFHTH, t 37.4° , DBMB FBVMEFLY Y ULBBMB, UFPVSCH S METSBM, YOE RYM IPMPDOHA CHPDKH. CHUE RSFSH MILKING NPEZP RTEVSCHCHBOIS CH RBMBFLE S METSBM, URBM Y PFDSHIBM Y P NOPZPN DKhNBM ... p Yuen? b P Yuen NPTsOP DKhNBFSH H FFP CHTENS? DOS YuETE DCHB NOE RPDUEMMYMY UPUEDB, NPMPDPZP MEKFEOBOFB YU UFTEMLPCHPZP RPMLB, ZHBNYMYA OE RPNOA.

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with IPIUKH OENOPTsLP ULBBFSH P RBTFYOBOBI VEMPTKHUUYY, S U OYNY CHUFTEYUBMUS. rBTFYBOULYE PFTSDSC CHUFTEYUBMYUSH UPDATE ON RHFY OBYEZP OBUFHRMEOYS. LBL RTBCHYMP, SING CHSHCHIPDYMY YY MEUB, BCH VEMPTHUYY MEUPCH Y VPMPF NOPZP. LBL RTBCHYMP, POI YULBMY LPOFBLF U OBYN LPNBODPCHBOYEN. rty PFUFHRMEOYY OBYI CHPKUL CH 1941 ZPDKH CH NEUFOSHCHI MEUBI PUFBMPUSH NOPZP OBYI UPMDBF Y PZHYGETCH, LPFPTSCHE VSHMY CH PLTHTSEOYY, Y POY VSCHMY PTZBOI’PCHBOSHCH RBTFIYBOULYE PFTSDSHCH. RBTFYBOWULYN DECUFCHYSN URPUPVUFCHPCHBMY Y PUPVEOOPUFY NEUFOPUFY. yuBUFSH RBTFYBO RPRPMOYMY OBVIE UFTEMLPCHSHCHE RPMLY MYUOSCHN UPUFBCHPN. lPZDB S PFDSCHIBM CH UBOBFPTYY CH vPTTSPNY CH 1980 ZPDH, FBN S CHUFTEFYMUS U PFDSHCHIBAEIN uEMEPCHSHCHN, LPFPTSCHK CHPECHBM CH RBTFYBOBI. th CHPF PDOKH ZTHRRH RBTFYBO BYUYUMYMY H TSDSH OBYEK DYCHYYYY. PO CHPCHBM CH UPUFBCHE UFTEMLPCHPZP RPMLB DP LPOGB CHPKOSHCH. RTY CHUFTEYUBI NSC U OIN ZPCHPTYMY Y CHURPNYOBMY VPECHPK RHFSH. x NEOS VSHCHM ZHPFPBRRBTBF, NSC UZHPFPZTBZHYTPCHBMYUSH ABOUT RBNSFSH, J S ENH CHSHUMBM ZHPFP CH Z. chYFEVUL. rPMHUIM PF OEZP RYUSHNP. ChPF FBL VSCCHBEF... bB PUCHPVTCDEOYE ZPTPDB CHYFEVULB OBYEK DYCHYYY RTYUCHPYMY OBCHBOYE 204-S CHYFEVULBS ud.

vPY CH rTYVBMFYLE

DYCHYYS CHEMB HRPTOSHCHK VPK ABOUT MYFPCHULPK YENME, PUCHPPVPDYMB ZPTPD HFEOB, TPLYYLYU Y RPDPYMY L ZPTPDKh RBOECHETSYU. OBYB REIPFB SBOSMB RPYGYY ABOUT PLTBYOE ZPTPDB. with ЪBOSM or OEDBMELP PF LPNBOYTB TPFSCH. ABOUT PRYLE MEUB UFPSM DPN MEWOYLB, FBL ON VSCHM PVPOBBYUEO ABOUT LBTFE. oEDBMELP PF DPNB VSCHMP RPUFBCHMEOP 76-N PTHDYE ABOUT RTSNHA OBCHPDLH. LUFBFY, LFP PTHDYE YЪ VBFBTEY, CH LPFPTPK S VSHCHM LPNBODYTPN PZOECHPZP CHCHPDB. new VSHMP RTYLBBOP FFYN PTHDYEN LPNBODPCHBFSH RTY PFTBTSEOY FBOLPC RTPFYCHOYLB, Y RPDDETSYCHBFSH PZOEN REIPPH RTY OBUFHRMEOYY. th CHPF RPD CHEYUET LP NOE RTYYEM UPMDBF YJ PTHDYKOPZP TBUYUEFB U CHEDTPN, B S CH FP CHTENS OBIPDYMUS CH DPNE. UPMDBF NOE ZPCHPTYF: "FPCHBTYE MEKFEOBOF, OE IPFIFE NEDB?" with UNPFT, B H CHEDTE- OBTEBOOSCHE LHULBNY NEDPCHSHCHE UPFSHCH. UPMDBF PFTEBM NOE VPMSHYPK LHUPL UPF, S EZP FHF TSE CH TPF, OP... obdp Vshch PUNPFTEFSH, RTETSDE YUEN EUFSH, B S PVTBDPCHBMUS, Y ULTTEE CH TPF, B FBN UYDEMB RYUEMB Y HTSBMYMB NEOS CH LPOYUYL SHCHLB! with FHF CE VTPUYM UPPH Y CHSHCHTKHZBMUS H EZP BDTEU. rPUME HLHUB NPK SHCHL TBURHI Y - UFTBYOBS VPMSH! with URTPUYM: “WHERE IS FSH LFP CHSM?” - "h UBDH X MEUOILB, FBN UFPSMY HMSHY Y OBN BIPFEMPUSH NEDB, NSC OBDEMY RTPFYCHPZBSHCH, HLTSHMYUSH RPD UPMDBFULHA RMBERBMBFLH, CHCHMYMY CH HMEK DCHB CHEDTB CHPDSH Y CHCHOHMY UPFSHCH". with CHCHYEM YЪ DPNB Y CHITSKH - PLPMP PTHDYS PYO UPMDBF, URTBYCHBA, ZDE PUFBMSHOSHCHE? according to PO, PFNBIYCHBSUSH PF RYUEM, ULBBM: "FPCHBTYE MEKFEOBOF, SING HVETSBMY CH UBTBC". with CHPYEM CH UBTBC, DP UBNPZP RPFPMLB OBVIFSCHK UEOPN, B YU UEOB FPTYUBF OPZY UPMDBF. with YI FHF CE PFRTBCHYM L PTHDYA, FHF VSCHMY Y EDPCHSHCHE, WITH YI URTPUYM, LBL OBEY MPYBDY? NSC U ONYY RPYMY L MPYBDSN, RTYCHSBOOSHCHN BY UBTBEN, B YI FBN OEF. pF HLHUCH RYUEM MPYBDY UPTCHBMYUSH U RTYCHSKY Y HVETSBMY H MEU. CHPF FHF ... S UTBYH RPOSM YUEN LFP RBIOEF ... oEF MPYBDEK, B OBBYUIF, PTHDYE OE VPEURPUPVOPE.

eEE PYO RYJPD. rPUME VPEC ЪB rBOCHETSYU GENERAL DYCHYYA OBRTBCHYMY ABOUT DTHZPK HYUBUFPL MYOYY ZHTPOFB. NSC YMY RP DPTPZE H OBRTBCHMEOYY ZPTPDB dPVEME. ZPTPD vBHULB OBIPDYMUS URTBCHB RP IPDH DCHYTSEOIS ЪB MEUPN, VSHMP CHYDOP LHRPMB GETLCHY. y FHF RPSCHYMYUSH OENEGLIE UBNPMEFSCH a-87 Y OBYUBMY VPNVYFSH GENERAL LPMPOOH. lPMPOOB PUFBOCHYMBUSH Y UPMDBFSCH CHTBUUSCHROHA RPVETSBMY H TBOSHE UFPTPPOSH PF DPTPZY. MYUOSCHK UPUFBCH VBFBTEY, PFVETSBCH PF DPTPZY, MEZ ABOUT ENMA. with PFVETSBM PF DPTPZY Y MEZ CH OEZMHVPLHA VPTPDH. UBNPMEFSCH RYLYTPCHBMY Y ABOUT OYLPK CHSHCHUPFE UVTBUSCHCHBMY VPNVSCH. with RPUNPFTEM CHCHETI, RPNOA, HCHYDEM MEFUYLPCH CH UBNPMEFE. pFYUEFMYCHP RPNOA, LPZDB HCHYDEM LFPF LPYNBT, PRHUFYM ZPMPCH Y RTILTSCHM HER THLBNY. OP FHF KHUMSCHYBM ZKHM Y TECH NPFPTPCH FBOLPCH. with OYUEZP OE RPOSM, UFP LFP? h OBYEK LPMPOOE FBOLPCH OE VSHMP. nYNP NEOS, CH NEFTE PF NPEK URBUIFEMSHOPK VPTPJDSCH, RTPEIBM FBOL, YuEK PO? th PFLHDB BY RPSCHIMUS? rPDOSM ZPMCHKH Y CHYTSKH- B FBOL-FP OBY, f-34, Y PFLHDB ON RPSCHIMUS? h FP CHTENS UPCHUEN TSDPN U NPEK ZPMCHPK RTPYMB PYUETEDSH LTHROPLBMYVETOSHCHI RHMSh, CHSHCHRHEOOOSCHI U UBNPMEFB a-87, Y PUSCHRBMB NPA ZPMPCH ENMEK. uFP NOE RTYYMPUSH RETECYFSH bb ffp LPTPFLPE CHTENS! th RPVSCHCHBM RPD VPNVETSLPK, Y UHFSHOE RPRBM RPD RKHMENEFOKHA PYUETEDSH, Y UCHPK FBOL YUKHFSH NEOSOE TBBDCHYM: S METsBM CH VPTPDE, B PO RTPNYUBMUS NYNP NEOS CHUEZP CH NEFT. UBNPMEFSCH HMEFEMY, NSC UPVTBMYUSH ABOUT DPTPZE Y RTPDPMTSYMY RHFSH H TBKPO ZPTPDB dPVEME. plbshchchbefus, GENERAL FBOLY UFPSMY ABOUT LFPN RPME, SING VSCHMY ЪBNBULYTPCHBOSH OPRBNY UPMPNSCH. CHYDYNP, OENGSCH BUELMY FBOLY Y OBYUBMY YI VPNVYFSH, Y POY HIPDYMY U U FFPZP RPMS CH TBOSCHE UFPTPOSCH.

h VPSI RPD ZPTPDPN dPVEME CH BCHZHUFE 1944 ZPDB

RETEDOIC LTBC RTPIPDYM PF ZPTPDB 3-4 LN. with HUFBOCHYM UCHSHSH U LPNBODYTPN TPFSCH, LPFPTHA RPDDETSYCHBEF OBYB VBFBTES. at FSCMSHOPC UFPTPPOSC DPNB PLPMP UFEOSCH NPY TEVSFB (FEMEZHPOYUF Y TBCHEDYUYL) CHCHLPRBMY EEMSH DMS HLTSCHFYS. HUFBOCHYMY UCHSHSH (FEMEZHPOOKHA) AT VBFBTEEK. bB DPNPN CH UFPTPOH RTPFICHOYLB 100 NEFTCH PLPRBMBUSH OBYB REIPFB. DPN UFPSM ABOUT ULMPO Y RTPFICHOYLKH OE VSCHM CHYDEO, B CHETIHYLKH LTSCHNY U REYUOPK FTHVPK ENKH VSCHMP CHYDOP. NSCH OBMEYMY ABOUT YUETDBL Y PYUEOSH PUFPPTTSOP, NBULYTHSUSH, CHEMY OBVMADEOYE RB RTPFYCHOYLPN.

VSCHM FERMSHCHK Y UPMOEYUOSCHK DEOSH, NEOS CHSHCHCHBMY CH YFBV DYCHYYY Y CHTHYUIMY RBTFYKOSHCHK VYMEF. ZPTPD OEVPMSHYPK, RP HMYGE OBTPD IPDIF ChP CHEUSH TPUF. fHF Y ZEOEYOSCH-UPMDBFLY CH AVLBI, Y NOPZP UPMDBF. rPNOA, S YEM RP FTPFHBTH, RETEDP NOPC YMY DCHE NEUFOSHCHE TSEOEYOSCH- ABOUT OPZBI HOYI CHNEUFP FKHZHEMSH VSHCHMY DETECHSOOSHCH LPMPDLY, SING YDHF Y UFHYUBF YNY, NOE FBL VSHMP UFTBOOP UFP CHYDEFSH! th NEUFOSHCH TSYFEMY, Y GENERAL CHPEOOSH IPDSF UCHPPVPDOP, PE CHEUSH TPUF, BOE FBL LBL NSC ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE: ZDE RTYZYVBEYSHUS, B ZDE RPMLPN RPMEYSH. oh, DHNBA, LBL SING UCHPVPDOP IPDSF, FBL CHPECHBFSH NPTsOP! RPMHYUYM RBTFYKOSHCHK VYMEF Y RPYEM ABOUT UCHPE NEUFP, ABOUT RETEDOYK LTBC. уФБМ РПДИПДЙФШ Л УЧПЕНХ НЕУФХ (ром), ПФЛХДБ ХЫЕМ, УМЕЧБ РП ЖТПОФХ РТПИПДЙМБ ОЕКФТБМШОБС РПМПУБ, ЛПФПТБС РТПУНБФТЙЧБМБУШ Й РТПУФТЕМЙЧБМБУШ РТПФЙЧОЙЛПН, РТПЫЕМ ХДБЮОП... рЕИПФБ ОБИПДЙМБУШ ТСДПН, Б ЗДЕ РЕИПФБ, ФБН ЧУЕЗДБ Х ОЙИ УЧПЙ РПТСДЛЙ. CHPF UNPFTA CH PLOP, LPFPTPE CHSHCHIPDYMP CHP DCHPT, FBN LPUFTSHCH TsZHF, B FTBOYEY UPCHUEN TSDPN. UCHYOSHY RP DCHPTH VEZBAF, PLBSCCHCHBEFUS, S RPFPN HOBM, FBN UPMDBFSCH TsBTYMY ABOUT LPUFTE UCHYOYOH. l PVEDH NPY UPMDBFSCH (B YI VSCHMP DCHPE, TBCHEDYUYL Y FEMEZHPOYUF) RTYOEUMY VPMSHYHA ULPCHPTPDKh U TsBTEOPK UCHYOYOPK Y LBTFPYLPK. rTEDUFBCHMSEFE, LBLPK UFPSM BRBI PF LFPZP TSBTLPZP! fPMSHLP UEMY ЪB UFPM - Y FHF OENEG PFLTSCHM PZPOSH RP OBYENH DPNH YЪ NYOPNEFCH. NSCH CHUFBMY YЪ-ЪB UFPMB Y RPYMY CH HLTSHCHFYE, LPFPTPE OBIPDYMPUSH PLPMP UFEOSCH DPNB.

with CHSCHIPDYM RPUMEDOYK, Y FPMSHLP KHUREM IB UPVPK BLTSCHFSH DCHETSH, LBL RPMHYUYM UYMSHOSHCHK HDBT CH MECHSHCHK CHYUPL PLPMP HIB. with OYUEZP OE RPOSM, Y LPZDB RTYVETSBM CH HLTSHCHFYE, NPY UPMDBFSCH ZPCHPTSF, FPCHBTYE MEKFEOBOF, CHSH TBOEOSCH. i FPMSHLP LPZDB THLKH RTYMPTSYM L CHYULKH, RPOSM, UFP FEYUEF LTPCHSH, Y YUHCHUFCHHA- FPTUYF PULPMPL. NPK FEMEZHPOYUF FHF CE RPVETSBM CH UFTEMLPCHHA TPFF ЪB UBOYFBTPN, PO CHSHCHFBEYM RYOGEFPN PULPMPL, PVTBVPFBM TBOH, OBMPTSYM VYOF Y ULBBM NOE, EUMY YuFP OBDPTB, RTYIPDYFE, NEUFPYFE, NEUFPYFE with PULPMPL ЪBCHETOKHM CH LHUPL VYOFB Y RPMPTSYM CH LBTNBO ZYNOBUFETLY, IPFEM UPITBOYFSH. oP YMY CHUE CHTENS VY Y ZDE-FP WITH EZP RPFETSM. OP S PYO TB P OEN CHURPNOIM, YULBM RP LBTNBOBN, OP... PULPMPL OEPPMSHYPK, DYBNEFTPN 5-6 NN, S EEE OE RPOSM, RPYUENKH PO OE RTPVYM NOE LPUFSH?

pVUFTEM LPOYUIMUS Y NSC RPYMY H DPN H LPNOBFKH, ZDE PUFBCHYMY ABOUT UFPME ULPCHPTPDLKH, S UNPFT ABOUT DCHETSH, LPFPTHA BLTSCHCHBM, B OB OEK UCHEFSFUS DCHE DSHTLY: NBMEOSHLBS- LFP FPF PULPMPL, LPFPTSCHK RPRBM NOE CH ZPMPCH, B YUHFSH CHCHYE - VPMSHYBS, TBNETPN U NPK NYYOYEG. ChPF FHF Y CHURPNOIM P UCHPEK RYMPFLE, LPFPTPK ABOUT ZPMPCHE X NEO OE VSHMP. RYMPFLB METSBMB ABOUT RPMH, CHETIOSS YUBUFSH EE VSCHMB RTPVYFB PULPMLPN. eUMMY VSC YUHFSH OYCE, S VSC UEKYUBU LFY UFTPLY OE RYUBM. UPTSBMEA, UFP S LFH RYMPFLH OE UPITBOYM ABOUT RBNSFSh. с ОЕ ЪОБМ, ЮФП ВХДХ ЦЙЧ, УНЕТФШ НЕОС ПЦЙДБМБ ОБ ЖТПОФЕ ОБ ЛБЦДПН ЫБЗХ, ЛБЛ НПЦОП ДХНБФШ П УПИТБОЕОЙЙ РЙМПФЛЙ ДМС РБНСФЙ, Й НЩУМЙ ОЕ ВЩМП... чУЕ ЧПЪОЙЛМП РПУМЕ ЧПКОЩ: ОБДП ВЩ УПИТБОЙФШ ФПФ ПУЛПМПЛ, ЛПФПТЩК ЧЩОХМ ЙЪ ЧЙУЛБ.

OP CHETOENUS L UFPMKh. NSC RTYYMY Y U UCHPEZP HLTSCHFIS U OBDETSDPK RPPVEDBFSH, DCHETSH VSCHMB BLTSCHFB, PFLTSCHMY- B ABOUT UFPME Y CH ULPCHPTPDLE METSBF NEMLIE LHULY YFHLBFHTLY! rPUNPFTEMY ABOUT RPFPMPL, B FBN UMEDSCH PF VPMSHYPZP PULPMLB, LBL UEKYUBU RPNOA! NSC FBL IPFEMI BRREFIFOP RPPVEDBFSH, PUFBMPUSH FPMSHLP UPTSBMEFSH...

PRYYH EEE DCHB RYJPDB, LPFPTSHCHE IPTPYP RPNOA. rPUME PUETEDOPZP PVUFTEMB VSCHMB OBTHIEOB UCHSHSH U OBYEK VBFBTEEK, Y HER OBDP VSCHMP CHPUUFBOCHYFSH. chTENS RPD CHEYUET, OBYUBMP FENOEFSH, FEMEZHPOYUF TSDPCHPK nBTFSHCHOPCH CHSM H THLY FEMEZHPOOSCHK RTCHPD Y RPYEM RP MYOYY YULBFSH RPTSCHCH RTCHPDB. FEMEZHPOOBS MYOYS VSCHMB RTPFSOHFB ABOUT PZOECHHA RPYGYA, B FP 1.5-2 LN. TEMSHEZH NEUFOPUFY VSCM FBLPK: RPBDY OBU OYYOB (MPEYOB) Y DBMSHY CHPCHSHCHIEOOOBS NEUFOPUFSH, UMECHB RP ZHTPOFH VPMPFYUFBS NEUFOPUFSH, FBN RTPIPDYMB OEKFTBMSHOBS RPMPUB. UPCHUEN UFENOOMP, RTYYEM FEMEZHPOYUF Y DPMPTSYM, PVTSHCHCH VOLUME TSDPN U MYOYEK, ZDE TBBPTCBMBUSH NYOB, Y ZPCHPTYF: “fPCHBTYE MEKFEOBOF, S CHYDEM OENGECH”. with PREYM, LBLIE OENGSCH X OBU CH FSHCHMH? й ЧПФ ПО НОЕ УФБМ РПДТПВОП ТБУУЛБЪЩЧБФШ: ЛПЗДБ ЫЕМ ПВТБФОП РПУМЕ ХУФТБОЕОЙС РПЧТЕЦДЕОЙС, ФП ХЧЙДЕМ ДЧХИ ОЕНГЕЧ, ЛПФПТЩЕ ЫМЙ УП УФПТПОЩ ВПМПФБ, ЗДЕ ОЕКФТБМШОБС РПМПУБ, Й Х ПДОПЗП ЪБ УРЙОПК ВЩМ СЭЙЛ, РПИПЦЙК ОБ ТБДЙПУФБОГЙА, ЫМЙ ПОЙ, РТЙЗЙВБСУШ Л ЪЕНМЕ. with EZP URTPUYM, RPYUENKH TS FS OE UFTEMSM? uNPFTA ABOUT EZP MYGP, PO OENOPTsLP UNKHFIMUS, Y U HLTBJOULYN BLGEOFPN ULBBM "IYVB...", Y RPLBJSCHCHBEF ABOUT LBTVBYO, YUFP PO NPZ Vshch UDEMBFSH? vshchm VShch BCHFPNBF ... s, LPOEYUOP, EZP RPOSM. PO RTYUEM Y OBVMADBM, LHDB SING RYPYMY, B RPYMY POI L MEUKH. pV LFPN UMHYUBE WITH DPMPTSYM LPNBOYTH VBFBTEY. YuETE OELPFTPE CHTENS NOE CHPOYF LPNVBF Y ZPCHPTYF: "IDY CH UFTEMLPCHHA TPPHH, FBN FEVE DBDHF PFDEMEOIE BCHFPNBFYuILPC, FCHPS ЪBDBYUB - FBL LBL ЪB MEUPN RTPIPDYF YPUUE, LPFPTPE TBDEMSEF MEUOPK NBUUYCH (UN. UIENKH), OE DPRHUFYFSH, YUFPVSH OENGSHCH UNPZMY RETEKFI DPTPZH Y HKFY CH FSHM. with UEKYUBU TBNSHYMSA, RPYUENKh LFH BDBYUH DPMTSEO CHSHCHRPMOSFSH BTFYMMETYKULYK MEKFEOBOF, BOE REIPFB? LPOEYUOP, EUMY VSC LPNBOYTH UFTEMLPCHPK TPFSCH O RTYLBBMY ACCOUNT, ON VSHCH MADEKOE CHSHDEMYM. with FPYuOP OE RPNOA, ULPMSHLP VSCHMP BCHFPNBFYuILPCH, RTYNETOP 8-10 YuEMPCHEL, DB DCHB NPYI. OILPZDB NOE DP FFPZP OE RTYIPDYMPUSH LPNBODPCHBFSH REIPFPK, B FHF EEE Y OPYUSHA! rTYLB EUFSH RTYLB... ch sm ABOUT PRYLE MEUB PUFBCHYM DCHPYI UCHPYI UPMDBF, B U PUFBMSHOSHCHNY RPYEM CHDPMSH MEUB ABOUT RETEICHBF L YPUUEKOPK DPTPZE. oBUFKhRYMB OPYUSH, STLP UCHEFYMB MHOB, IPTPYP PUCHEEBMB NEUFOPUFSH. tBUUTEDPFPYUYM BCHFPNBFUYLPCH CHDPMSH DPTPZY RP PRHYLE MEUB ABOUT TYFEMSHOHA CHYDYNPUFSH NETSDH UPMDBFBNY. LTBUICHP VSHCHMP UNPFTEFSH, LPZDB OBD FCHPEK ZPMCHPK MEFSF FTBUUYTHAEIE RKHMY UP UFPTPOSCH OENGECH, B TBTSCHCHOSCHE RKHMY, OBDECH BY CHETIHYLY DETECHSHECH, YIDBAF FTEUL (IMPRLY). FP Y DEMP CHMEFBAF PUCHEFYFEMSHOSHOSCHE TBLEFSHCH, CHSHCHHRHEOOOSCHE ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE DMS PUCHEEEOYS NEUFOPUFY, FP OBN IPTPYP RPNPZBMP CH PTYEOFYTPCHLE ABOUT NEUFOPUFY. yFBL, S UEKYUBU OE RPNOA ULPMSHLP READING NSC OBIPDYMYUSH H UBUBDE CHDPMSH DPTPZY, CHUNBFTYCHBSUSH CH FENOPFKH. rPUPCHEFPCHBMUS U UPMDBFBNY, TEYYM TBUUTEDPFPYUYFSH YI CH RTEDEMBI CHYDYNPUFY DTHZ DTHZB Y RTPKFY Yuete CHEUSH FFPF OEPPMSHYPK HYUBUFPL MEUB. yMY FYIP, U OBDETSDPK BICHBFYFSH SHCHLB YMY YI HOYUFPTSYFSH. h THLE H NEO OENEGLYK "RBTBVEMMHN", B H LBTNBOE OENEGLBS ZTBOBFB. RPD OPZBNY FTEEBF UKHYUSHS, OPYUSH, NHTBYLY RP LPTS VEZHF ... nOPZP VSHMP OCHBMEOP DETECHSHECH, YUETE LPFPTSCHE RTYIPDYMPUSH RETEMEBFSH. with UEKYUBU CHURPNYOBA, UFP FPZDB PV LFPN DKhNBM: TBCHE NPTsOP VSCHMP TBZMSDEFSH Y HCHYDEFSH H MEUKH YUEMPCHElb, ZDE NOPZP LHUFCH Y RPCHBMEOOSHCHI DETECHSCHECH? oP UFP RPDEMBEYSH, FBL UMHYUYMPUSH. OP CHPF RTPUCHEF, NSC CHSHCHIPDYN ABOUT LTBC PRYLY, ZDE VSCHMY PUFBCHMEOSCH GENERAL DCHPE UPMDBF. FEMEZHPOYUF nBTFSHCHOPCH NOE ZPCHPTYF: “FPCHBTYE MEKFEOBOF, DP OBU DPOPUYMYUSH ЪCHKHLY TBZPCHPTTB, OP LPZDB, CHYDYNP, L OYN RTYVMYYYMYUSH, POY OBU PVOBTKHTSYMY Y TBBZPCHPT RTEL.” lPZDB NSHCHCHYMY YY MEUB, S Y CHUE NPY UPMDBFSHCH CHADPIOKHMY P RETETSYFPN Y FPMSHLP PDOP Y ZPCHPTYMY, NPTsOP MY VSCHMP YuFP-FP HCHYDEFSH YMY PVOBTHTSYFSH H LFPK FENOPFE? with ULBBM UPMDBFBN: "dBCHBKFE GERPYULPK CH TSD CHPKDYFE CH MEU Y CHSHCHRHUFYFE Y BCHFPNBFB RP PYUETEDY", - Y POY YFP NYZPN UDEMBMY. th OB FFPN OBYB PRETBGYS RP BICHBFKh SHCHLB LPOYUYMBUSH, B UBN WITH RPYEM ABOUT UCHPK op. uPMDBF PFRTBCHYM CH TPPH. dPMPTSYM LPNBOYTH VBFBTEY CHUE RPDTPVOP, B UBN H YPLE PF CHUEZP RETECYFPZP MEZ PFDSHIBFSH. rTPFICHOYL OBYUBM CHEUFY RTYGEMSHOSHCHK PZPOSH RP OBYN PZOECHSHCHN BTFYMMETYKULYN RPYGYSN, LPFPTSHCHE OBIPDYMYUSH H TBKPOE, ZDE UFPSMB Y OBYB VBFBTES. RPNOA, Yeta LBLPE -FP CHENE LPN. VBFBei ulbbm pi dchih, lpfptshchi with Ippem RPKNBFSh, - yi kosyu RPKNBMI Ch DPNU PDOPZP HISFPTB, b -shchmi tbgedyle near TBDIPOVKBOVK. sing LPTTELFYTPCHBMY PZPOSH UCHPYI VBFBTEK (LTHROPZP LBMYVTB), UYDS ABOUT YOUETDBLE DPNB-IHFPTB.

U FFPZP TKhVETSB OBYB REIPFB CHSCHYMB YЪ FTBOYEY Y RPYMB CHRETED, REIPFB RTPYMB RPME Y ULTSHMBUSH OB OEVPMSHYYN LHUFBTOYLPN, B NSC RPYMY BY OEK. rPNOA, LPZDB NSC RTPYMY OENEGLHA PVPTPOH, F.E. FTBOY RTPFYCHOYLB, S PVETOHMUS OBBD Y RPUNPFTEM OB OBY DPN, CH LPFPTPN NSC OBIPDYMYUSH Y CHEMY U LTSCHNY OBVMADEOYE, Y DEKUFCHYFEMSHOP ON RTPUNBFTYCHBMUS - CHETIOSS YUBUFSH LTSCHY DPNB VSCHMB CHYDOB, CHPF RPYUENKh RTPFYCHOYL CH RTYGEMSHOSHCHK PZPOSH. rTPYMY OEPPMSHYPK HYBUFPL MEUB Y CHCHYMY ABOUT RPME, Y FHF S HCHYDEM UMEDSCH FPMSHLP UFP RTPYEDYEZP VPS. оБ ЪЕНМЕ МЕЦБМЙ ОЕУЛПМШЛП ХВЙФЩИ ОБЫЙИ УПМДБФ, С РТПИПДЙМ НЙНП ПДОПЗП ХВЙФПЗП, ЬФП ВЩМ ПЖЙГЕТ, НМБДЫЙК МЕКФЕОБОФ, НЩ РПЧЕТОХМЙ ЕЗП ОБ УРЙОХ, ЙЪ ЛБТНБОБ ЗЙНОБУФЕТЛЙ ЧЙДОЕМУС ЛПНУПНПМШУЛЙК ВЙМЕФ, НЩ РПДХНБМЙ, НПЦЕФ, ПО ЕЭЕ ЦЙЧ, ОП... пО ВЩМ НЕТФЧ . CHRECHSHE ABOUT ZHTPOFENOE RTYYMPUSH U LFYN CHUFTEFYFSHUS ... rpymy DBMSHYE, CHRETEDY EM VPK, FTEEBMY RKHMENEFOSHCHE PYUETEDY, LPTPFLYE BCHFPNBFOSHCHE PYUETEDY - FBN IDEF VPK, B OBN OBDP FHDB YDFY? REIPFB BOSMB RPYGYA CH TBKPOE, ZDE RTPFELBMB OEPPMSHYBS TEYULB, NSC PUFBOCHYMYUSH PLPMP UBTBS IHFPTB. with RPYEM ABOUT RPYGYY UFTEMLPCHPK TPFSCH L LPNBODYTH TPFSCH, YUFPVSCH HUFBOPCHYFSH LPOFBLF U OIN. DEMP VSMP L CHUETH, UPMOGE UBDYMPUS L ZPTYJPOPH. YEM, RTYZYVBSUSH L ENME, Y CHYTSKH - PLPMP DPNB CHPCHSCHYBEFUS CHIPD CH RPZTEV, B PLPMP OEZP METSYF UBKRET, UNPFTA - TSEOEIOB, S Y URTPUYM: "vKhDEFE UFTEMSFSH?" FURTHER ULBBMB: “CHP, CHYDYFE?” - Y RPLBSHCHCHBEF THLPK CH UFPTPOH EMEOZP RPMS, B OYN RTPFELBEF TEYULB. with UFBM OBVMADBFSH CH UCHPK VYOPLMSH, U LPFPTSCHN OILPZDB OE TBUUFBCHBMUS. unNPFTA, DEKUFCHYFEMSHOP CHYDOP, LBL OENGSCH PLBRSHCHCHBAFUS ABOUT EMEOPN MXZH, IPTPYP CHYDOP, LBL POY NBYHF MPRBFPK, CHCHLYDSCHCHBS ENMA. with URTPUYM, CH LBLPZP ZHTYGB VKhDEFE UFTEMSFSH? POB RPLBBMB NOE PTYEOFYT, WITH THE OBJEM OF FFPF PLPR, WE WILL GO HERE ZHBYUF. with NOPZP UMSCHYBM P WOBKRETBY, LBL POY PIPFSFUS. CHPF RYYKH Y CHURPNYOBA, Y ZPTSKHUSH FEN, YuFP NOE RTYYMPUSH METSBFSH TSDPN UP UOBKRETPN, LPFPTSCHK CHEDEF UFTEMSHVKh RP ZHBYUFBN, B NOE DBM CHPNPTSOPUFSH OBVMADBFSH CH VYOPLMSH. uOBKRET, GEMSUSH, THAN UFTEMSHVKH U KHRPTB, B S METSBM Y OBVMADBM ЪB ZHTIGEN, LPFPTSCHK FP RPLBTCEFUS YЪ PLPRB Y RPUNPFTYF H GENERAL UFPTPOH, FP ULTPEFUS, B UBN RTPDPMTSBEF LPRBENMACHB MTBUSHCH. LBL FPMSHLP RPSCHYFUS ZPMCHB YJ PLPRB CH LBULE, POB UVBOPCHYFUS PF BLBFB UPMOGB STLP-LTBUOPK. i ChPF UOBKRET RTPYCHEMB CHSHCHUFTEM. OBVMADBA CH VYOPLMSH, NOY IPFEMPUSH IPFSh TB HCHYDEFSH LBL UOBKRETSCH CHEDHF UFTEMSHVKh RP TSYCHPNKH YUEMPCELKH. rTBCHDB, LPZDB S CHPECHBM CH VEMPTKHUYY, RP NOE FPTS UFTEMSM UOBKRET. rTPPDPMTSBA CHOYNBFEMSHOP UNPFTEFSH CH UCHPK VYOPLMSH, Y DKHNBA, OEKHTSEMY HVYMB? CHYTSH, OENEG OE RPLBSCCHCHBEFUS, B UBN RTPDPMTSBEF LPRBFSH Y CHSHVTBUSCHCHBFSH Y PLPRB ENMA, CHYDOP, LBL ENMS LBFIYFUS RP VTHUFCHETH. with EK ULBBM: "fshch EZP OE HVYMB, PO RTPDPMTSBEF LPRBFSH PLPR". YuETE LPTPFLYK RTPNETSHFPL READING Y PLPRB RPSCHYMBUSH ZPMCHB, FBL TSE PUCHEEEOOOBS MHYUBNY UPMOGB. S RPRTPUYM UOBKRETB DBFSH NOE RPRTPVPCHBFSH CHSHCHUFTEMYFSH RP ZHTYGH, POBNOE OE PFLBBMB Y DBMB CHYOFPCHLH. with OILPZDB OE DETTSBM H THLBI FTEIMJOEKLH, LBL EE GENERAL, DB EEE U PRFYUEULYN RTYGEMPN. deTTSBFSh - FFP PDOP, B FHF OBDP Y UFTEMSFSH. with BTFYMMETYUF Y U UBKRETULYN RTYGEMPN OBBLPN, FBL LBL X NPEK RHYLY FPCE VSCHMB RBOPTBNB DMS OBCHPDLY PTHDYS ABOUT GEMSh. с ДЕЧХЫЛЕ ПФДБМ УЧПК ВЙОПЛМШ, Б УБН РТЙУРПУБВМЙЧБАУШ ДМС УФТЕМШВЩ, ДЕТЦБ ЧЙОФПЧЛХ ОБ ХРПТЕ, Б МЕЧПК ТХЛПК РТЙЦЙНБА РТЙЛМБД Л РМЕЮХ, Й УНПФТА Ч РТЙГЕМ Й ОЙЛБЛ ОЕ НПЗХ РПКНБФШ Ч РЕТЕЛТЕУФШЕ РПЛБЪБЧЫХАУС ЙЪ ПЛПРБ ЗПМПЧХ. fPMSHLP, LBCEFUS, RPKNBM, B ON ULTSCHMUS. lPZDB S HYUYMUS CH HYUYMYEE, NO RTYIPDYMPUSH UFTEMSFSH RP NYYEOSN Y LBTVBYOB, Y OBCHSHLY UFTEMSHVSHCH H NEOS VSCHMY. CHTENS URHULB LTAYULB OBDP EEE Y BDETTSBFSH DSCHIBOYE. yuEUFOP RTYOBAUSH, VSCHM Y ZBLFPT OETCHPKOPUFY. CHUE-FBLY RETCHSHCHK TBH TSYOY RTYIPDYMPUSH UFTEMSFSH H ZPMPCH YUEMPCHELH, BOE RP NYYIEOY. OH, OILBLOE NPZH KHUREFSH RPKNBFSH CH RETELTEUFSHHE RPDOSCHYHAUS Y PLPRB ZPMCHKh OENGB. uPMOGE UBDYMPUS L blbfh, y zpmpchh PUCHEEBMP STLYN UPMOEYUOSCHN UCHEFPN. ChTPDE VSC RPKNBM CH RTYGEM, UBFBYM DSCHIBOYE Y CHCHUFTEMYM. fHF CE CHSM H UOBKRETB UCHPK VYOPLMSH, B UBN DHNBA, OEKHTSEMY RPRBM? and UNPFTA ABOUT FPF PLPR. yuEUFOP ZPCHPTS, PYUEOSH OETCHOYUBM FPZDB - RPRBM YMY OE RPRBM? unNPFTA CHOYNBFEMSHOP ABOUT PLPR, OENEG OE RPLBSCCHCHBEFUS, OP CHYTSKH, UFP PO RTPDPMTSBEF LPRBFSH Y CHSHVTBUSCHCHBFSH YЪ PLPRB ENMA. with IPTPYP CHYTSKH, LBL ENMS ULBFSHCHCHBEFUS U VTKHUFCHETB, OBBYUIF, Y S FPTS OE RPRBM. nPE UPUFPSOYE CH FFP CHTENS VSCHMP HDTHYUBAEEE: SOE UNPZ EK DPLBBFSH, UFP FPCE NPZH UFTEMSFSH Y UOBKRETULPK CHYOFPCHLY. YuETE OELPFTPE CHTENS ON RPLBBMUS Y PLPRB UOPCHB. NSC U OEK OENOPTSLP RPZPCHPTYMY, WITH ITS RPVMBZPDBTYM bB RTEDUFBCHMEOOHA NOE CHPNPTSOPUFSH HVYFSH OENGB, OP ...

s, RTYZOKHCHYUSH, RPYEM H TBURPMPTSEOYE UFTEMLPCHPK TPFSCH, FBN CHUFTEFYM LPNBOYTB TPFSCH, Y PO NOE ULBBM, YUFP BCHFTB OCHETOPE RPKDEN CH OBUFHRMEOYE. O Madudhayke deosh Reipfb RPhhrmeye, th Ipyuh Pryubfsh EEE PDYOD: NOOE RTYMPUSH CHROUSHECHEY ZHPTUITPCHBFSHELH, B ZMBCHA, FC LPFPPPPPPPTPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP does eEE IPYUKH RPDYUETLOHFSH, RTY OBUFHRMEOYY REIPFSCH NSCH UVBTBMYUSH LBL NPTsOP VMYCE OB OEK RETENEEBFSHUS, YUFPVSHCHOE RPRBUFSH RPD PZOECHPK OBMEF. vPMSHYBS UBUFSH UOBTSDPCH Y NYO, RTPMEFBS OBD OBNY, TCHFUS ZDE-FP UBDY. REIPFB YMB, OE PUFBOBCHMYCHBSUSH, EUMY POB CH OBUFHRMEOYY. b CHPF EUMY REIPFB PUFBOPCHYMBUSH Y SBOSMB RPYGYA RETED RTPFYCHOYLPN, FP FHF YOPZDB Y NEYBEF VMYЪPUFSH UCHPYI Y OENEGLYI RPYGYK: RTPFICHOYL CHEM RP OBN RTYGEMSHOSHCHK. rPYUENKh S DEMBA FBLK CHSHCHPD? b RPFPNH, UFP S YURSHCHFBM ffp OB UEVE, OBIPDSUSH CHUA CHPKOH OB RETEDPPCHPK, Y CHYDEM CHUE, OP VSCHMY UMHYUBY- Y S RPRBDBM RPD UCHPY PZOECHSHCHE OBMEFSHCH.

rPDPYMY L TEYULE, UNPFTYN- CHRETEDY OBU CHPYMY H CHPDH NYOPNEFUYLY Y FBEBF ABOUT UEV 82-NN NYOPNEFSHCH, H LBTsDPZP ABOUT RMEYUBI RP DCHE NYOSCH. th FBL NSCH CHPYMY H CHPDKH, OP DP LFPZP NSCH CHSCHOKHMY YЪ LBTNBOPCH CHUE UFP VSCHMP, S CHSHCHOHM THYuOHA ZTBOBFH FTPZHEKOHA (MYNPOLKH) Y Y LPVKhTSCH RYUFPMEF. hTPCHEOSH CHPDSH CH TEYULE CH NEUFE RETEIPDB VSHCHM RP RPSU. RETEYMY ABOUT DTHZPK VETEZ TEYULY, LFP CH PVNPFLBI - OEF ЪBVPF, B X OBU U LPNBODYTPN VBFBTEY UBRPZY, NSC MEZMY ABOUT URYOKH, OPZY CHCHETI. ChPDB ChShCHFELBMB Y' ZPMEOYE OBYI UBRPZ H YFBOSHCH, B LPZDB CHUFBMY, ChPDB Y' YFBOCH PRSFSH UFELMMB Ch UBRPZY. VETSYN, B CH UBRPZBI VKHMSHLBEF CHPDB, VETSYN DP RETCHPK PUFBOPCLY. lPZDB REIPFB PUFBOCHYMBUSH, NSC OBOSMY UCHPK op. EFP VSHCHMP PLPMP OBUEMEOOPZP RKHOLFB, CHPF FBN NSCH UOSMY UCHPY LYTPCHSHCHE UBRPZY Y CHCHTSYNBMY RPTFSOLY Y FBL ABOUT USCHTSCHE RPTFSOLY OBDECHBMY UBRPZY.

oBUFHRYMB ZMHVPLBS PUEOSH, UFTEMLPCHSCHE YUBUFY OBYEK DYCHYYY BOINBMY RPYGYY H TBKPOE IHFPTB enemy- LFP RP LBTFE. ч ДПНЕ ИХФПТБ ЧНЕУФП РПМБ ВЩМЙ ЧЩТЩФЩ ИПДЩ УППВЭЕОЙС, ФБН ВЩМ ЛПНБОДОЩК РХОЛФ УФТЕМЛПЧПЗП ВБФБМШПОБ (ФПК ДЙЧЙЪЙЙ, ЛПФПТХА НЩ УНЕОЙМЙ), Й НЩ ФБН ЪБОСМЙ ОБВМАДБФЕМШОЩК РХОЛФ Й ЧЕМЙ ОБВМАДЕОЙЕ ЪБ НЕУФОПУФША Й РТПФЙЧОЙЛПН, С УФБТБМУС ЪБУЕЮШ ПЗОЕЧЩЕ ФПЮЛЙ РТПФЙЧОЙЛБ, ОБВМАДБС Ч УФЕТЕПФТХВХ, WITH CHYDEM CHYDYNP VPMPFYUFHA NEUFOPUFSH, RPCHBMEOOSHK MEU. rTPUNBFTYCHBMUS RETEDOIK LTBC RTPFYCHOYLB, RTCHPMPYUOPE ЪBZTBTSDEOYE, ABOUT LPFPTPN CHYUEMY TSEME'OSCHE VBOLY, YI IPTPYP VSCHMP CHYDOP, LPZDB UCHEFIMP UPMOGE. obvmadbs y CHUNBFTYCHBSUSH CH ffp OBRTBCMEOYE, S OE OBM, UFP ULPTP FHDB, LHDB FBL CHOYNBFEMSHOP UNPFT, DPMTSEO VHDH YDFY - CH FSHM L OENGBN.

нОЕ ВЩМП РТЙЛБЪБОП ЧЪСФШ У УПВПК ТБДЙУФБ У ТБДЙПУФБОГЙЕК Й ЧНЕУФЕ У РЕИПФПК ЙДФЙ Ч ФЩМ РТПФЙЧОЙЛБ, ОЕЪБНЕФОП РТЙКФЙ Ч ФЩМ Й ФБН ЪБИЧБФЙФШ РЕТЕЛТЕУФПЛ ДПТПЗ (УН. УИЕНХ), Б ХФТПН ОБЫЙ ЧПКУЛБ ДПМЦОЩ ВЩМЙ ОБУФХРБФШ. th CH UMKHYUBE KHUREIB S DPMTSEO DETTSBFSh UCHSH Y CHSHCHCHCHBFSH BTFYMMETYKULYK PZPOSH DMS RPDDETZLY REIPFSCH. th CHPF LBL FPMSHLP UFENOEM L OBN ABOUT IHFPT 'ENEMY RPDPYMB REIPFB, CHYDYNP, POB HTS VSCHMB UPUTEDPFPYUEOB ZDE-FP RPBDY OBU. REIPFB YMB GERPYULPK FYIP, NPMYUB. oEUMY ABOUT UCHPYI RMEYUBI CHUE VBFBMSHPOOPE PTHTSIE, RHMENEFSHCH, NYOPNEFSHCH 82-NN. FEMEZHPOYUFSHCH OEUMY LBFHYLY U FEMEZHPOOSCHN LBVEMEN. NShch FPCE FTPOKHMYUSH CH RHFSH CHUMED ЪB LPNBODYTPN VBFBMShPOB, CHETOEE ULBBFSH, ЪB EZP UCHIFPK, F.E. ZTHRRPK HRTBCHMEOYS. oEVP VSCHMP CHEDOPE Y FYIP, CH FPN OBRTBCHMEOYY, LHDB NSCH YMY, YITEDLB CHMEFBMY OENEGLIE PUCHEFYFEMSHOSHCHE TBLEFSHCH, PUCHEEBS NEUFOPUFSH.

CHPYMY CH OYYOKH, FHF MEU, Y RP CHUENKH CHIDOP, UFP OBJOYOBEFUS VPMPFP. OP CHPF NSCH PUFBOCHIMYUSH, S PUNPFTEMUS: RPD OPZBNY LPULY Y RBIOEF USCHTPUFSHHA. NSC UFPYN, TSDPN PUFBOCHIMYUSH NYOPNEFYUYLY. h CHPDHI UFBMY CHMEFBFSH PDOB b DTHZPK PUCHEFYFEMSHOSHCHE TBLEFSHCH. bFTEEBMY RHMENEFSHCH, FTBUUYTHAEYE RHMY MEFSF OBD ZPMCHPK, CHUE RTYUEMY ABOUT LPTFPYuLY. OP FHF UFBMY TCHBFSHUS NYOSCH, Y OBYUBMPUSH ... CHUE MEZMY ABOUT ENMA, DCHYTSEOYE CHRETED PUFBOCHMEOP, UFP UMHYUYMPUSH CHRETEDY? NSC FPZDB OYUEZP OE OBMY. rPSCHIMYUSH HVYFSHCHE Y TBOEOSCHE, B NSCCHUE METSYN Y CHRETED OE YDEN. rPNOA, METsBMY NETsDH LPYULBNY ABOUT USCHTPK, OBUSHEEEOOPK ChPDK ENME. ULPMSHLP READ NSC VSCHMY H FBLPN UPUFPSOYY ABOUT USCHTPK ENME, CH LTPNEYOPK FENOPFE Y RPD PZOEN RTPFYCHOYLB? UEKYUBU, CH NYTOPE CHTENS, NPTsOP ULBBFSH, UFP UCHETYMY RPDCHYZ. b FPZDB, CH FE DBMELIE CHTENEOB OBYEK NPMPDPUFY, FFP VSCHM PVSCHUOSCHK ZHTPOFPCHPK RYJPD.

YOFEOUYCHOP CHEDHF PZPOSH OENEGLIE RHMENEFSHCH, CH CHPDHI OERTETSCHCHOP CHMEFBAF TBLEFSHCH. CHTENS YMP, B NSC RTYUEMY ABOUT LPYULY Y TsDEN... NSCH OBMY, UFP DMS OBU UBRETSC RTPDEMMBMY CH RTCHPMPYUOSCHI OBZTBTSDEOYSI RTPFYCHOYLB RTPIPDSH, OP YUFP-FP UMHYUMPUSH Y RTPFYCHOYL OBU PVOBTHTSYM. h FENOPFE OE CHYDYYSH, B UMSHCHYYSH- LPZP-FP TBOYMP, PYUEOSH PRBUOP CH MEUKH RPD DETECHSNY, LPZDB NYOSCH TCHFUS, LPUOKHCHYUSH CHEFPL DETECHSCHECH, Y OILBLPK PLPR FEVS PF PULPMLPC OE URBUEF. OP CHPF REIPFB BLPPYMBUSH, CHUFBMB Y RPYMB. h PVTBFOSHK RHFSH NYNP OBU, ZDE NSC GO OUT U TBDYUFPN ABOUT LPULE, RTPYMY MEKFEOBOF REIPFSCH, LPFPTPZP S OE OBM, OP S X OEZP URTPUIM, UFP UMHYUMPUSH? PONOE ULBBM, RPMKHYUEO RTYLB PFIPDYFSH Y UFP VBFBMSHPO YNEEF RPFETY. NSC FHF CE CHUFBMY Y RPYMY ЪB MEKFEOBOFPN. rTYVSHMY ABOUT OBY OR, DPMPTSYM LPNBOYTH VBFBTEY, B ON PV LFPN HCE CHUE OBM. NSCHCHYMY YY LFPZP LPYNBTTB TSICHSHCHNY.

ABOUT LFPN CE HYBUFLE YUETE OEULPMSHLP DOK RPUME LPTPFLPK BTFYMMETYKULPK RPDZPPFPCHLY NSC RPYMY H OBUFHRMEOYE, UMECHB Y URTBCHB PF OBU VSCHMP URPLPKOP. OBYUYF, VSCHMB TBCHEDLB VPEN. fBL VSCCHBMP YUBUFP, LPZDB fBOLY OE HYBUFCHPCHBMY. CHUE YMP, LBCEFUS, OPTNBMSHOP, REIPFB RPYMB CHRETED. LPNBOYT VBFBTEY, S, TBCHEDUYL Y FEMEZHPOYUF U LBFHYLPK CHSHYMY YHLTSHCHFIS Y FPCE RPVETSBMY CHUMED IB REIPFPK. VETSBMY RTYZOKHCHYUSH, LPTPFLYNY RETEVETSLBNY. OP CHPF OENEG PFLTSCHM RP OBN BTFYMMETYKULYK PZPOSH.

pZOECHPK OBMEF BUFBM OBU ABOUT TPCHOPN NEUFE, OP ABOUT GENERAL UYBUFSHHE ABOUT RHFY PLBMBBUSH OEZMHVPLBS CHPTPOLB PF UOBTSDB, Y NSCH CH OEE MEZMY. RPNOA, METSBM CHOI ZPMCHPK. CHPTPOLB VSCHMB SCOP NBMB DMS OBU DCHPYI. IPFEMY CHUFBFSH Y VETSBFSH, YUFPVSHCHOE PFUFBFSH PF REIPFSCH, LPNBOYT VBFBTEY NOE ZPCHPTYF, HMSCHVBSUSH: "OYLPMBK, S TBOEO". with UNPFT ABOUT OEZP, LBL TBOEO? nSch TSE METSBMY CHNEUFE? "LBCEPHUS, TBOEO H BDOYGH". with FPCE HMSCHVOHMUS Y ZPCHPTA, DBCHBK, RETECHSCH.- “OEF, FSH, DBCHBK, YDY ЪB REIPFPK, B S PUFBOKHUSH, Y NEOS RETECHSHF OB OR”. LPNBOYTB VBFBTEY S PUFBCHYM H ChPTPOLE, B UBN U TBCHEDYUILPN Y FEMEZHPOYUFPN RPVETSBM b REIPFPK. rTPYMY UPCHUEN EEE OEENOPZP Y PRSFSH ЪBMEZMY, ABOUT FFPF TB H SNH. REIPFB UBMEZMB Y DBMSHYOE RPYMB. oENEG CHUFTEFIM HER PZOEN ABOUT TPCHOPN NEUFE. REIPFB PFIPDYMB OBBD H UCHPY FTBOYEY, Y NSC FPTSE FBLNY CE RETEVETSLBNY PFIPDYMY OBBD. CHPF CHFPTS PUEYULB ABOUT PDOPN FPMSHLP HYBUFLE H TBKPE IHFPTB enemy. rTYYUYOB OBYEZP OEKHUREYIB CH BFBLE - LFP UMBVBS BTFYMMETYKULBS RPDZPFPCHLB, F.E. PZOECHSHCHE FPYULY RTPFICHOYLB OE VSCHMY RPDBCHMEOSCH. th OENGSCH PFLTSCHMY RP OBN PFCHEFOSHCHK PTZBOYPCHBOOSCHK NYOPNEFOSHCHK PZPOSH. CHYDYNP, OBIE LPNBODPCHBOYE RPUYUYFBMP, UFP ABOUT LFPN HYBUFLE X OENGECH VSCHMB UMBVBS PVPTPOB. OP ЪBVSCHMY, YuFP RTPFYCHOYL YURPMSHЪPCHBM MEU DMS UPPTKhTSEOIS DPFPCH, LPFPTSCHE NPTsOP KHOYUFPTSYFSH FPMSHLP RTSNCHN RPRBDBOYEN, B NYOPNEFOSHCHE VBFBTEY RTPFYCHOYLB UFPSMY RTSNP O VPMPFE. djpfshch vshmy upptkhtseoshch y vtecheo, rpiptsy o ybmby, ffp s chydem lpzdb yjhyubm retedoyk ltbk rtpfychoylb.

oBUFKHRIMB OYNB 1944 ZPDB. rPUME HYBUFIYS H VPSI RPD IHFPTPN ENEMY GENERAL VBFBTEA DMS RPDDETTSLY RETEDBMY DTHZPNH UFTEMLPCHPNH VBFBMSHPOH, LFP SWORD RP ZhTPOFH, CH TBKPOE NBUMPBCHPDB. ftboyey obyek REIPFSH RTPIPDYMY RETED UBNSCHN BBCHPDULYN BDBOYEN (RP LBTFE), B OENEGLIE RTPIPDYMY RP CHPCHSHCHYEOOPUFY RETED LMBDVYEN. nBUMPBCHPD, UHDS RP LBNEOOSHCHN RPUFTPKLBN, VShM, CHYDYNP, TBKPOOPZP OBBYUEOYS. 'DBOYE Y' LTBUOPZP LYTRYUB VSCHMP TBTHYEOP. TSDPN U BCHPDPN VSCHMP RPDCHBMSHOPE RPNEEEOYE, RPFPMPL Y UFEOSCH YY VEFPOB, RTYZPDOSH DMS OBDETSOPZP HLTSCHFIS, OP CH RPFPMLE OYSMY DSHCHTSCH PF RPRBDBOYS UOBTSDPCH. h RPDCHBME OBIPDYMUS LPNBOYT UFTEMLPCHPK TPFSCH, Y NSC TSDPN PVPUOPCHBMYUSH. PLPMP UFEOSCH U BDOEK UFPTPOSCH VSCHMY CHCHLPRBOSH VMYODBTSY. h FYI HLTSCHFISI OBIPDYMBUSH Y REIPFB, Y TBMYUOSCHE LPNBODOSHCH RHOLFSCH BTFYMMETYUFCH, RPDDETSYCHBAEYI REIPPHH UCHPYN BTFPZOEN. oh, B OBN Y UBN vpz CHEMEM FHF VSHCHFSh. RPUMEDOEE CHTENS ABOUT ZHTPOFE VSCHMP RTYOSFP RTYNEOSFSH DMS UFTEMSHVSCH RP OBENOSCHN GEMSN EOYFOSHCHE PTHDYS. fBL VSCHMP Y CH FFPF TB. OPYUSHA RTYCHEMY YEOIFOPE PTHDYE 76-NN. CHUA OPYUSH UPMDBFSCH LPRBMY PLPR Y PZOECHHA RPYGYA. NSCHUE FPZDB VSCHMY HDYCHMEOSCH, LBL LFH NBIYOH NPTsOP VHDEF HUFBOPCHYFSH DEUSH, PLPMP FTBOYEK, Y LBL NPTsOP PTHDYE bNBULYTPCHBFSH? OP, PLBSHCHCHBEFUS, NPTsOP, Y POI FFP UDEMBMY, L TBUUCHEFKH PTHDYE VSCHMP CHLPRBOP Y bNBULYTPCHBOP. NSCH OBMY, UFP RTPFYCHOYL ZPFPCHYFUS RTPTCHBFSH GENERAL PVPTPOH Y CHSHKFY CH FSHM OBYI CHPKUL. ChPF L LFPNH NSC CHUE ZPFPCHIMYUSH Y RPFPNKH ЪDEUSH UPUTEDPFPYUYMYUSH FBL NOPZP BTFYMMETYKULYI op. at LFPC GEMSHA Y VSHMP RPUFBCHMEOP ЪEOIFOPE PTHDYE. h PDOH YJ DSHHT ABOUT RPFPMLE OBYEZP RPDCHBMB NSCH HUFBOPCHYMY UFETEPFTTHVH Y RTCHEMY RTYUFTEMLH OBYEK VBFBTEY RP PZOECHSHCHN FPYULBN RTPFICHOYLB. rPDZPPFPCHYMY PZOY RP PFDEMSHOSHCHN HYBUFLBN NEUFOPUFY DMS NBUUYTPCHBOOPZP PZOS RP RMPEBDY. CHEMY OBVMADEOYE Y DOEN, Y OPYUSHA, BUELBMY GEMY, RP LPFPTSCHN VBFBTES CHEMB PZPOSH. rTPFICHOIL RETYPDYUEULY THAN PVUFTEM OBYI VPECHCH RPTSDLPCH, RP OBYN FTBOESN Y NBUMPBCHPDH. dCHE NYOSCH RPRBMY RP OBYENH HLTSHCHFYA, OP VEFPOOSCHK RPFPMPLOE RTPVYMY, NSC PEKHFIMY FPMSHLP UIMSHOSCHK HDBT CH FFPF NPNEOF, CH RPNEEEOYY RPDOSMBUSH RSHCHMSh. Reading UP UFPTPOSCH RTPFYCHOYLB DP OBU DPPIPDYM TPLPF FBOLPCHSCHI DCHYZBFEMEK Y YHN NBYYO, LFP PUPVEOOP UMSCHYOP VSCHMP OPYUSHA.

th CHPF H LBLPK-FP DEOSH HFTPN OENGSCH RP OBYYN RPYGYSN PFLTSCHMY HTBZBOOSCHK PZPOSH Y CHUEI CHIDPCH PTHDYK. NSC CHUE RTPYMY ZHTPOFPCHHA TSIOYOSH RP-TBBOPNKH, LFP ULPMSHLP, Y NSC RPOYNBMY, YuFP YFP OBBYUYF- FBLPK YLCHBM PZOS: RTPFICHOYL RPKDEF CH OBUFHRMEOYE YMY TBECHEDLB VPEN. GENERAL HLTSHCHFYE UPDTPZBMPUSH PF TBTSCHCHCHCH. LFP OBIPDYMUS H RPDCHBME, RTYTSBMYUSH L UFEOE. LBL FPMSHLP NYOB TB'PTCHEFUS ABOUT LTSCHIE, CH RPDCHBME RPDOINBEFUS RSHCHMSH, B CH DSHTSCH RPFPMLB USCHRMEFUS NHUPT Y RBIOEF RPTPIPN. eUMMY MAVBS NYOB YMY UOBTSD RPRBMY VSCH CH DSHCHTH CH RPFPMLE, OBN CHUEN VSCHM VS LBRHF. FP RETCHBS OBUFPSEBS BTFYMMETYKULBS RPDZPFPCHLB RTPFYCHOYLB, RPD LPFPTKHA S RPRBM, CHPF FBL UIDEFSH Y TsDBFSH, LPZDB LPOYUYFUS PVTTBVPFLB OBYI RPYGYK? YFP IPTPYP, EUMY OBDETSOPE HLTSHCHFYE, YMY VMYODBC CH FTY OBLBFB. lBLPCHB BDBYUB BTFIMMETIKULPZP PZOS? HOYUFPTSYFSH CHUE TSYCHPE CH FTBOYESI RTPFYCHOYLB, B LFP TSYCHPK - UDEMBFSH OEVPEURPUPVOSCHN. CHPF RPD FBLYN UFTBIPN CHUE 45 NYOHF NSCH GO OUT CH FFPN USHTPN Y ZTSOPN VHOLETE. FEMEZHPOOBS UCHSHSH U VBFBTEEK RTELTBFIMBUSH. RETEVYF FEMEZHPOOSCHK LBVEMSH. h ZPMPCHE ЪCHEOYF PF BDULPZP ZKHMB TBTSCHCHCHCH. CHUE TsDBMY - CHPF-CHPF DPMTSEO PVUFTEM RTELTBFIFSHUS. OP CHPF, LBCEFUS, VPMSHYBS YUBUFSH UOBTSDPCH U YKHTYBOYEN RETEMEFBEF YUETE ZPMCHSHCH Y CHTSCHCHBEFUS CH FSHCHMH. zhBYUFSH RETEOEUMY PZPOSH CHZMHVSH OBYI RPYGYK. nSCH UOPCHB HUFBOCHYMY UFETEPFTHVH, LPFPTHA UOSMY RETED BTFOBMEFPN, YUFPVSCH OBVMADBFSH bB RETEDOIN LTBEN. LPNBOYT VBFBTEY OBIPDYMUS ABOUT OR LPNBOYTB DYCHYYPOB Y HRTTBCHMSM PZOEN VBFBTEY RP TBDYP. h OEVE RPSCHYMYUSH UYZOBMSHOSHCHE TBLEFSHCH, B UP UFPTPOSCH LMBDVYEB RPSCHYMYUSH OENGSCHCH, LPFPTSHCHE, RTYZOKHCHYUSH, YMY CH GENERAL UFPTPOH. bFTEEBMY RHMENEFSHCH, BCHFPNBFSCH, H TBKPOE LMBDVYEB TCHFUS GENERAL UOBTSDSCH. CHUE VBFBTEY RPDDETSYCHBAEYI PFLTSCHMY PZPOSH RP OBUFHRBAEENH RTPFICHOYLH, OBYB VBFBTES CHEMB PZPOSH RP BTBOEE RTYUFTEMSOOSCHN GEMSN. CHYDYN, MOSCHE LMBDVYEB RPSCHYMUS RETCHSHCHK FBOL, CHFPTPK... pDYO FBOL ЪBDSHNYMUS - LFP CHAMP PZPOSH TSDPN UFPSEEE ЪEOIFOPE PTHDYE. BUFHYUBMY GENERAL UFBOLPCHSHCHE RKHMENEFSHCH. oENGSHCHOE KHUREMY RPDPKFI L OBYN ЪBZTBTSDEOYSN Y ЪBMEZMY. OENGSHCH CHEMY RP OBYN RPYGYSN OERTETSCHCHOSCHK STPUFOSHCHK PZPOSH YЪ RHMENEFPCH. bFBLB YI ЪBZMPIMB. rTPFICHOYL PFPYEM ABOUT RTETSOYE RPYGYY. CHEYUETPN L RETEDPCHPNH LTBA, LBL CHUEZDB H FFP CHTENS, RPDYAETSBAF LHIOY - LPTNYFSH REIPPH. unNPFTA - NPY UPMDBFSCH OEUKHF RPMOSH LPFEMLY LBY. s OE URTBYCHBA H YI OYYUEZP, DMS NEOS Y FBL CHUE UFBMP SUOP: H TPFE NBMP PUFBMPUSH UPMDBF. about RETEDOEN LTBE FBL YUBUFP VSCCHBEF.

rPDZPFPCHLB L OBUFHRMEOYA

fBL KhTs RPMKHYUMPUSH, UFP NOE RTYYMPUSH ABOUT PDOPN Y FPN CE HYBUFLE HYBUFCHPCHBFSH CH VPSI CH TBKPOE IHFPTB enemy, PFTBTSBFSH OBUFHRMEOYE OENGECH Y HYBUFCHPCHBFSH CH VPSI RTY OBUFHRMEOYY REIPFSHCHCHCH. i YNEOOP CH FFPN OBRTBCHMEOYY, PFLHDB OBUFHRBM RTPFICHOYL. vSCHMB ZMHVPLBS RTYVBMFYKULBS PUEOSH, OBUFKHRIM OPSVTSh. rPUME OERTPDPMTSYFEMSHOPK BTFRPDZPFPCHLY, CH LPFPTPK HYUBUFCHPCHBMY CHUE RPDDETSYCHBAEYE BTFYUBUFY, CHLMAYUBS Y "LBFAY", REIPFB RPYMB CH OBUFHRMEOYE. FP VSHMY UFTEMLPCHSHCHE RPDTBDEMEOYS OBYEK DYCHYYY. pZPOSH RETEOEUMMY CHZMHVSH PVPTPOSCH RTPFYCHOYLB, B REIPFB CH RETEUFTEMLE CHCHYMB ABOUT OENEGLIE FTBOYEY, LFP FB FTBOYES, LPFPTBS RTPIPDYMB RETED LMBDVYEEN Y ULTSCHMBUSH BY OIN. NSC UOSMYUSH U NEUFB Y FTPOKHMYUSH CHUMED IB REIPFPK, IPTPYP RPNOA, LPZDB NSC RTPIPDYMY NYNP UZPTECHYEZP OENEGLPZP FBOLB "rBOFETB", LPFPTSCHK VSCHM RPDVYF, PO UFPSM ABOUT DPTPZE. y FBL U LPTPFLYNY PUFBOPCHLBNY, RTEPDPMECHBS UPRTPFYCHMEOYE RTPFYCHOYLB, OBYB REIPFB RTPDCHYOHMBUSH DP UBNPK TELY vBTFB. rPYUENKh-FP FFPF PFTEJPL NPEK VPECHPK TSOYOY BRPNOYMUS IPTPYP. rPFPNH, UFP OB LFPN HYBUFLE NOE RTYYMPUSH Y OBUFHRBFSH, Y PFUFHRBFSH, Y UOPCHB OBUFHRBFSH. NSC LBL-FP CHLMYOYMYUSH CH PVPTPOH RTPFICHOILB, S VSC ULBBM, VEI HRPTOZP UPRTPFICHMEOYS. REIPFB ЪBOSMB PVPTPOH RETED TELPK, Y URTBCHB Y UMECHB CHDPMSh MEUOPZP NBUUYCHB (UN.UIENKH). yFBL, NSC HZMHVYMYUSH H PVPTPOH ABOUT 6-7 LN Y CH YYTYOKH ABOUT 5-6 LN. DYCHYYS, ЪBOSCHYBS FFPF HYBUFPL, RETEYMB L PVPTPOE.

obufkhrymy IPMPDB, RTYYMB OYNB 1944 ZPDB. obor CHSHCHLPRBMY LPFMCHBO RPD VMYODBTS U DChKhNS OBLBFBNY, IPTPYP EZP PVPTKHDPCHBMY, S YNEA CH CHYDH, UFP NSCH CHETCHSCHE PVYMY UFEOSCH FTPZHEKOSHCHNY PDESMBNY, RTSNP YЪ VMYODBTSB VSHCHPFKhPH CHIPD PRSHCHF RTPYEDYEK ЪYNSCH OBU OBHYUYM, LBL HLTSCCHBFSHUS Y TSYFSH CH FARM. TBOSHIE GENERAL CH ЪENMSOLE VSCHMY ЪENMSOSCHE, B FERETSH NSCH YI UDEMMBMY YЪ TSETDEK. rPUFBCHYMY FTPZHEKOHA REULH. HUFBOCHYMY FEBFEMSHOPE OBVMADEOYE b RTPFICHOYLPN. TSDPN U OBYN or VBFBTEY VSCHM or LPNBOYTB DYCHYYY, RTYNETOP CH 10 NEFTBI DTHZ PF DTHZB. YNB, S VSH ULBBM, OE PUPVP IPMPDOBS, OP UOEZB VSHMP NOPZP. ABOUT RETEDPPK VSCHMP PFOPUYFEMSHOP URPLPKOP. oENGSH RETYPDYUEULY CHEMY PZPOSH RP OBYYN VPECHSHCHN RPTSDLBN Y RP PFDEMSHOSHCHN GEMSN H OBYEN FSHCHMH. x OBU VSHCHM UFTPZYK MYNYF UOBTSDPCH Y NSC NPZMY TBUIPDPCHBFSH UOBTSDSC FPMSHLP ABOUT RTYUFTEMLH RP TKhVETSBN. x OBU UOBTSDSCH U TBDEMSHOSHCHN BTTSEOEN 122-NN, EUMY SOE PYYVUS, ZDE-FP CHEUPN 21 LZ. uOBYUBMB UABTSD DPUSHMBEFUS CH LBEOOIL, B BLFEN PFDEMSHOP ZYMSHH U RPTPPN. x OBU VSHMP PTZBOICHBOP DOECHOPE OBVMADEOYE BL TBURPMPTSEOYEN RTPFICHOYLB, Y CHUE, UFP OBNEFYMY Y UMSCHYBMY (EUMY DPIPDYM BCHL), BRUSCHCHBMY CH TSKHTOBM. LBL RPNOA, VSCHMY FBLIE BRYUY.

1. rTPYMB ZTHRRB UPMDBF PF DPNB U LTBUOPK LTSCHYEK CH OBRTBCHMEOYY PTYEOFIT No. 3.

2. rTPYMY DCHE ZTHBCHSHCHE NBYYOSCH ABOUT PLTBYE Z. vBTFShch.

3. UPMDBFSCH RYMSF DTCHB PLPMP UBTBS SWORD 0-30 PF PT No. 1.

4. CHYDEO DSHCHN BL FTBOYEK SWORD 0-50.

5. pVOBTHCEO DEPF PTYEOFIT No. 2 SWORD 1-30.

th FBL LBTsDSHK DEOSH NSCH OBVMADBMY Y ЪBRYUSCHCHBMY CH TSKHTOBM, RTBCHDB OE CHUE. NEUFOPUFSH, LPFPTBS OBIPDYMBUSH ЪB RETEDOIN LTBEN CH FSHMKH X RTPFYCHOILB CH OBRTBCCHMEOYY Z. vBTFB, PFMYUOP RTPUNBFTYCHBMBUSH U OBYEZP op. RMAU L LFPNH ABOUT ZHPOE VEMPOOETsOPZP RPLTPCHB UOEZB PFUEFMYCHP VSCHMP CHYDOP CHUSLPE RPSCHMEOYE FENOPZP RTEDNEFB, LBL PZOECHBS FPYULB, VMYODBTS. with MAVYM UYDEFSH YUBUBNY X UFETEPFTHVSHCH Y OBVMADBFSH ЪB RTPFYCHOYLPN. VSCHMY FBLYE UMHYUBY, LPZDB CHYDYYSH - RETEDCHYZBEFUUS ZTHRRRB UPMDBF, B CHPF LPNBOYT VBFBTEY VE TBTEYOYS CHCHYEUFPSEYI LPNBOYTPCH UBNPUFPSFEMSHOP PFLTSCHFSH PZPOSH OE NPTSEF. oEF OB FFP TBTEYOYS CHSHCHYUFPSEEZP OBYUBMSHOILB, B LPZDB TBBTEYBF CHEUFY PZPOSH RP GEMY, FP OENGECH DBCE OE CHYDOP Y PFLTSCHCHBFSH PZPOSHOE RP LPNKh. h OBYUBME DElbVTS LPNBOYT VBFBTEYNOE RTYLBBM CHSHCHDCHYOHFSHUS CHRETED H FTBOYEA, CH TBURPMPTSEOYE UFTEMLPCHPK TPFSCH, Y ЪBOSFSH FBN RETEDPPCHPK or. LBL VSHMP PVIDOP Y TsBMLP RPLYDBFSH FERMHA Y HUFTPEOOHA YENMSOLKH, LPFPTHA NSC FBL IPTPYP PVPTKHDPCHBMY Y HFERMYMY. NSC YMY CH FTBOYEA, ZDE OE VKHDEF FBLPZP RTPUFPZP LPNZHPTFB, DB YENMSOLY OE VKhDEF FPTS. chSM U UPVPK TBDYUFB U TBDYPUFBOGYEK Y TBCHEDYUYLB, YVP UCHSY, LBL PVSCHYuOP FEMEZHPOOPK, OE VKhDEF. PYUEOSH TsBMLP, UFP S ZHBNYMYY YI OE RPNOA, B BRYUY, LPFPTSHCHE VSCHMY, CH 1945-N HLTBMY CHNEUFE U RPMECHPK UHNLPK. LTPNE PDOPK UBRETOPK (VPMSHYPK) MPRBFSCH, NSCH CHSMY DCHB PDESMB Y CHUE. UPMDBFSCH CHSMY UCHPY CHEEECHCHE NEYLY, B S RPMPTSYM CH LBTNBO PDOH OENEGLHA THYUOKHA ZTBOBFH (MYNPOLKH), RPNOA, POB VSCHMB UYOEZP GCHEFB U VEMSCHN LPMRBYULPN, PYUEOSH HDPVOP DETTSBFSH HER H LBTNBOOE. y, LPOEYUOP, CHUEZDB RTY UEVE OENEGLIK "RBTBVEMMHN". with CHUEZDB, EUMY LHDB-OYVHDSH YDH - YMY CH TPFFH, YMY CHPPVEE RETENEEBAUSH - WITH CHUEZDB VETH CH LBTNBO "MYNPOLH" ABOUT CHUSLYK UMHYUBK. x UPMDBFB REIPFSCH, LPFPTSCHK OBIPDYMUS ABOUT RETEDPPCHPK, CHUEZDB CH NBMEOSHLPN NEYPYULE METSBF ЪBRBUOSCHE RBFTPOSHCH. ffp with CHIDEM. zhTPOFPChBS TsYOSH BUFBCHMSEF RTEDIUKHCHUFCHPCHBFSH Y FPYuOP, UFP-FP OEIPTPYEE TsDEF FEVS. with OBTYUPCHBM RP RBNSFY UIENH TBURPMPTSEOIS OBYI YUBUFEK DYCHYYYY ABOUT LFPN HYBUFLE, ZDE NSCH BOYNBMY VPECHCHE RPTSDLY LBL OR Y ror. with FPYuOP UEKYUBU OE RPNOA, OBMY NSCH, UFP OENGSCH ULPTP DPMTSOSCH RPKFY CH OBUFHRMEOYE? CHYDYNP, OBMY. th RPFPNKh OBU RPUMMBMY CH TPPH. ChPF UEKYUBU S CHURPNYOBA, RPYUENKH ABOUT FTHDOSCHI HYBUFLBI CHUEZDB RPUSCHMBMY OERPUTEDUFCHEOOP CH TPFH LPNBODYTB CHCHPDB HRTBCHMEOYS VBFBTEY, LPFPTBS RPDDETSYCHBEF EE BTFPZOEN. pupveoop ffp okhtsop chp chtens obufhrmeoys, LPZDB REIPFB CHUFTEYUBEF UPRTPFYCHMEOYE, NShch PVSBOSH RPDBCHYFSH PZOECHSHCHE FPYUL RTPFYCHOYLB Y PVEUREYUIFSH REIPFE RTPDCHYTSEOYE. NSCH BOSMY H FTBOYEE PLPR, LPFPTSCHK HLBBM LPNBODYT TPFSCH. yFP VSCHMB OYYB CH UFEOE FTBOYY TBNETPN 1I1.5 N. ACCOUNT OYYB VSCHMB RPLTSCHFB FPOLYNY CETDSNY Y CHPTPUFPN Y BUSCHRBOB FPOYN UMPEN ENMY, B ACCOUNT METSBM UMPC UOEZB. ffp HLTSCHFYE UMHTSYMP PF DPTsDS Y UOEZB, FPF LFP DEMBM, TBUUUYFSHCHCHBM OB ffp. x OBU OE VSHMP READING PUNPFTEFSHUS Y P'OBLPNYFUS - PYUEOSH VSHCHUFTP UFENOMP, OBUFHRYMB OPYUSH. h OBYEK LPOKHTE OE VSHMP OH UCHEYUY, OH UCHEFIMSHOILB. x TBDYUFB VSCHMB NBMEOSHLBS MBNRPYULB DMS PUCHEEEEOIS UCHPYI BRJUEK, LPFPTHA NPTSOP VSHMP ABOUT LPTPFLPE CHTENS CHLMAYUYFSH, Y FP FPMSHLP CH CHYDE YULMAYUEOYS. h LFPN NBMEOSHLPN HLTSHCHFIY OBU VSCHMP FTPE, NSC NPZMY FPMSHLP UIDEFSH, RTYUMPOYCHYUSH L NETMPK UFEOE. CHIPD BCHEUYMY PDESMPN. eUMMY ABOUT CHPDHIE VSCHMP NYOKHU 12-15°, FP X OBU, OBCHETOPE, VSMP NYOKHU 3-5°, Y FP RP FEN HUMPCHYSN FETRYNP. rTBCHDB, NSC RP PYUETEDY CHUA OPYUSH IPDYMY ZTEFSHUS CH YENMSOLKH L REIPFE. fBL NSC RTPUYDEMY, UPZTECHBS UCHPE TSYMYEE UCHPYN FEMPN, UYDS DTENBMY DP HFTB.

eEE Y EEE TB RTYIPDYFUS CHURPNYOBFSH P CHUEI FSZPUFSI ZHTPOFPCHPK TSOYOY OBYEK UMBCHOPK REIPFSCH. sFP NSC RTCHEMY FBL PDOKH OPYUSH. b REIPFB OBIPDIFUS CH FBLYI HUMPCHYSI ETSEDOECHOP. HFTPN OBN RTYOEUMY H FETNPUE U PZOECHPK RPYGYY EDH, NSC RPEMY, Y SOY, OE BDETTSYCHBSUSH, KHYMY ABOUT pr.- LBL OBSCCHCHBEFUUS ABOUT ZHTPOFPCHPN SHCHLE, BTFYMMETYKULBS PVTBVPFLB RETEDOEZP LTBS. oENGSCH PFLTSCHMY RP OBN HTBZBOOSCHK PZPOSH. uOBTSDSHCH Y NYOSCH TCHBMYUSH RP CHUEK OBYEK FTBOYEE, PF LBTsDPZP VMYЪLPZP TBTSCHCHB OBU CHUFTSIYCHBMP. rTPYMP OEULPMSHLP NYOHF, B PZPOSHOE HFYIBM, Y NSC RPOSMY, YUEN LFP RBIOEF. h ZPMPCHE UFPSM URMPYOPK YHN. with ULBBM TBDYUFH: "dBChBK, UCHSTSYUSH U LPNBODYTPN VBFBTEY", TBDYUF FBL YOE UCHSBMUS, OBYB TBDYPUFBOGIS FHF CE PFLBBMB. OETCHSH VSHCHMY OBRTSEOSH DP RTEDEMB ... pFLTPCHEOOP ULBTSKH - S ABOUT UEVE Y ABOUT UCHPYI OETCHBI YURSHCHFBM FFPF UFTBI PTSYDBAEK FEVS UNETFY. LFP RETEZYM LFP, Y ChSCHTSYM, PO LFPZP LPYNBTTB OE BLVKhDEF. eUMMY CHSH RPNOYFE LYOPZHIMSHN "POI UTBTSBMYUSH ЪB TPDYOKH", FBN VSCHM RYЪPD, LPZDB PUFBCHYKUS CH TSYCHSHI UPMDBF CHSHCHIPDYF PE CHEUSH TPUF YЪ FTBOYEY Y UVBOPCHYFUS OEOPTNBMSHOSHCHN. ChPF DP UEZP DPCHPDYF UEMPCHELB LFB PVTBVPFLB PZOEN OBYI RPYGYK.

YuETE 45 NYOHF NSC OBUFPMSHLP VSCMY YJNPFBOSCH RETETSYCHBOISNY Y TBMYUOSCHNY NSCHUMSNY, LPFPTSCHE MEMY CH ZPMPCH, UFP DBTSE RPFETSMY DBT TEYUY. UNPFTEMY DTHZ ABOUT DTHZB, GET OUT AND NPMYUBMY. with UNPFTEM, RPNOA, ABOUT MYGB UPMDBF, SING VSHCHMY VMEDOSHNY Y NPE FPTS, OCHETOPE, FBLYN VSHMP. with RPMOPUFSHHA OE NPZH CHBN RETEDBFSH CHUE, UFP FPZDB NSCH RETETSYMY.

rPFPN PZPOSH PUMBV, Y LBL RP LPNBODE UOBTSDSC RETEMEFBMY YUETE GENERAL ZPMCHSC- OENGSH RETEOEUMY PZPOSH CHZMHVSH OBYEK PVTPPOSHCH, UFPVSH TBUYUUFYFSH UEVE RHFSH DMS BFBLY ABOUT OBU. RPNOA, CHSHCHRPM S Ch FTBOYEA, YUFPVSH HOBFSH PVUFBOPCHLH, Y HCHYDEM HTSBUOKHA LBTFYOH: RPMHTBTHYEOOSCHE FTBOYEY, CH RTPIPDE METSYF HVYFSHCHK UPMDBF, RTYUSCHRBOOSCHK ENMEK. oblbokhoe CHEYUETPN NShch TBZPCHBTYCHBMY U DCHNS UPMDBFBNY, GO GO FPYUOP H FBLPK OYYE, LBL NShch. NYOB RPRBMB RTSNP CH FTBOYEA, Y YI HVYMP. chDBMELE CH FTBOYEE UFPSM PYO UPMDBF Y VPMSHIE OILPZP - OH UMECHB, OH URTBCHB. CUFBM CH RPMOSHK TPUF, Y CH FP CHTENS KHUMSCHYBM LTYL OENGECH, LPFPTSHCHE RPYMY CH BFBLH. CHRETEDY RTPFELBMB ULPCHBOOBS MShDPN TEYULB vBTFB, CHUE VETEZB Y THUMP TEL RPLTSCHFSCH UMPEN UOEZB. s ABOUT NZOPCHEOYE RTYRPDOSM ZPMPCHH Y HCHYDEM YDHEYI CH GENERAL UFPTPOH OENGECH CH NBULIBMBFBI, UFTEMSAEYI YЪ BCHFPNBFPCH RP OBYYN FTBOIESN, RHMY PFLBMSCHCHBMY PF FTBOOY NEMLYE YUBUFYYGSCH EN. uFP DEMBFS? lBL RTBCHYMSHOP RTYUFHRIFSH CH FBLPK UIFHBGYY? y LBLPE RTJOSFSH TEYOYE? rPMPTSEOYE UMPTSOPE, OENGSH NPZKhF VSHCHFSH CH OBYI FTBOYESI WEURTERSFUFCHEOOP, OELPNKh PTZBOYCHBOOP PFTBTSBFSH BFBLH, OBYB REIPFB RPDBCHMEOB. idfy RP FTBOYEE Y CHUFTEFYFSH LPZP-FP, YuFPVSH HOBFSH PVUFBOPCHLH? s, RTPVSCCHCH ABOUT ZHTPOFE DCHB ZPDB, NOPZPE RPCHYDBM Y RETEOYU, B FFPF ZHTPOFPCHPK LRYPD CH NPEK TSOYOY UBNSCHK FTSEMSHCHK Y UFTBYOSCHK. CHUE, YuFP S RETETSYM, - OE RPVPAUSH CHSHCHULBFSH - LBL CHOPCHSH TPDYMUS.

uFP DEMBFS? vshchm vshch lfp tsdpn rpufbtye neos, nptsop vshchmp vshch urtpuyfsh, lbl vshch po rpufkhrym? pFIPDYFSH OBBD SOE YNEA RTBChB. dB Y RPFPN, LHDB PFIPDYFSH? rPBDY FTBOYEK PFLTSCHFBS NEUFOPUFSH, B RP PCHTBZH, UFP UMECHB CH MEUKH, RTPFICHOYL CHEDEF OERTETSCHOSHCHK NYOPNEFOSHCHK PZPOSH. rPDOSFSH ZPMPCH Y RPUNPFTEFSH, ZDE OENEG, OECHPЪNPTSOP, OP WITH CHUE-FBLY RPDOSM ZPMPCH ABOUT UELHODH Y RPUNPFTEM: OENGSHCH YMY. x OBU VSHMP DCHB BCHFPNBFB, X NEOS RYUFPMEF Y ZTBOBFB- CHUE, UFP NSCH NPTSEN UDEMBFSH Y YUEN BEIFYFSH UEVS. obYUBMUS CHFPTPK LFBR OBYEZP RETETSYCHBOYS NHL. GET OUT CH OYYE Y CDBMY UNETFY. RYYKH PV LFPN RTSNP Y YUEUFOP, B CHPF FERESH LBL VSCHOE RPRBUFSH CH RMEO, LFP IHCE UNETFY. NSC RTYUEMY CH FTBOYEE Y TsDEN. OP CHPF RPYUKHCHUFCHPCHBMY PVMEZYUEOYE Y RTEDIUKHCHUFCHYE OBDETSDSCH ABOUT URBUEOYE, LPZDB YUETEE OBBY ZPMCHSCH YKHTYB (FBLYE ЪCHHLY YIDBAF UOBTSDSCH) MEFSF GENERAL UOBTSDSCH. with PRSFSH CHUFBM Y U RTYRPDOSFCHN OBUFTPEOYEN UNPFTEM, ZDE TCHHFUS OBBYY UOBTSDSCH, B TCHFUS SING FBN, ZDE IDHF OENGSCHCH, S CHYTSH URMPYOPK PZPOSH OBYEK BTFYMMETYY Y NYOPNEFCH. oENGSCH RPDIPDYMY L VETEZH TEL, FP UPCHUEN VMYLLP PF OBU. oEPTSYDBOOP URTBCHB PF OBU TBCHOPNETOP VEI PUFBOPCLY OBTBVPFBM OBY RHMENEF "nBLUEN". x OBU LBL-FP UFBMP OB DHIE MEZUE, UYDYN OB LPTFPYULBI CH PTSYDBOYY, YuFP VHDEF DBMSHYE? with PFCHETOHM LPMRBYUPL X ZTBOBFSCH, YuEZP S OILPZDB OE DEMBM, Y DETTSBM HER H THLE, B H RTBCHPK - RYUFPMEF. with ChuFBM, RPUNPFTEM Y KHCHYDEM, UFP OENGSHCH UBMEZMY. rTPFICHOYL RETEOYU PZPOSH CHZMHVSH OBYEK PVPTPOSCH, NSC UMSCHYYN, LBL UOBTSSDCH MEFSF YUETE GENERAL ZPMPCCH Y TCHFUS UBDY OBU, B GENERAL MEFSF Y TCHFUS ABOUT UFPTPOE, ZDE OENGSHCH. NSC PYUKHFIYMYUSH CH OEKFTBMSHOPN RPME (OP LFP S UEKYBU RPDPVTBM PRTEDEMEOYE, B FPZDB VSHMP OE DP LFPZP). rPUME FPZP LBL OENEGLBS BFBLB ЪBZMPIMB, RTPFICHOYL CHOPCHSH RETEOY PZPOSH ABOUT GENERAL FTBOYEY. nSCH UOPCHB HLTSHCHMYUSH PF BTFPZOS CH UCHPEN HVETSYEE. h FBLPK PUFBOPCLE NSCHOE NPZMY RTEDRTYOSFSH OILBLYI PFCHEFOSHCHI NO, LTPNE LBL CHEUFY VPTSHVH OB CHSHCHTSYCHBOYE, TBUUYUYFSHCHCHBS FPMSHLP ABOUT HDBYUH. GENERAL UYUBUFSH VSCHMP CH FPN, UFP CH FFPF LCHBDTBFOSCK HYBUFPL ЪENMY, HERE NSCH GO OUT, OE VSCHMP RPRBDBOYS UOBTSDB YMY NYOSCH. rPJCE NSC HCHYDEMY, LBL LTHZPN OBYEZP PLPRB CHUS ENMS VSCHMB YЪTSCHFB CHPTPOLMNY.

CHUE TECE Y TECE UFBMY TCBFSHUS UOBTSDSCH, FPYuOP OE RPNOA CHTENS DOS. UCHEFMPE CHTENS YMP L LPOGH, B FP OBBYUF, RTPFICHOYL CH OBUFHRMEOYE OE RPKDEF. CHRECHSHCHE WE DO ABOUT ZHTPOFE, LBL CHCHCHPЪSF U RPMS TBOESHI ABOUT UPVBLBI- L HRTTSLE UPVBL VSCHMP RTYCHSBOP UFP-FP CHTPDE MPDPYuLY, LHDB HLMBDSHCHBMY TBOEOSCHI. tBDYUF OBLPOEG-FP UCHSBMUS RP TBGYY U LPNBODYTPN VBFBTEY. with ENH DPMPTSYM, YuFP NSCH CHUE TSYCHSHCH, Y PO ULBBM - LBL UFENOOEF, CHSHIPDYFE OB op. UPCHUEN UFENOOMP, CH OEVP FP Y DEMP CH'MEFBAF PUCHEFYFEMSHOSHOSCHE TBLEFSHCH, NSC UFPSMY CH FTBOYEE Y ZPFPCHIMYUSH HIPDYFSH, LBL UP UFPTPOSCH MEUB RP FTBOYEE RPLBBMYUSH FENOSH FYULY, RPIPTSIE ABOUT LBULY. nZOPCHEOOP H ZPMPCHE RTPNEMSHLOHMB NSHCHUMSH - OEKHTSEMY OENGSHCH? rPNOA LFH NSHCHUMSH CHSHCHULBBMY CHUE CHNEUFE Y LBL RP LPNBODE UICCHBFIMYUSH IB BCHFPNBFSCH, S - BY RYUFPMEF. MADY CH LBULBI HCE RPLBMYUSH CH UPUEDOEN LPOGE FTBOYEY. tBCHEDUYL PLTYLOHM "uFPK, LFP IDEF?" y Ch FFPF NPNEOF Yb-b RPCHPTPFB FTBOY RPLBBMUS OBY UPMDBF Y PFCHEFYM "UCHPY".

CHEUSH DEOSH NSC OBIPDYMYUSH CH FBLPN OBRTTSEOY, B FHF ZPMPU- "UCHPY" ... sing OBU FHF TSE URTPUYMY, LFP TSYCHSHE EUFSH? rPDPYMB ZTHRRRB UPMDBF, S YN PFCHEFYM, UFP NShch BTFYMMETYUFSHCH, B DBMSHYE RP FTBOYEE EUFSH UPMDBFShch Yb TPFShch. with URTPUYM, LFP SING? ULBBMY, Y ChFPTPZP LYEMMPOB. lPTPYUE ZPCHPTS, RMBO ЪBICHBFB HFETSOOPZP OENGGBNY HYUBUFLB, LPFPTSCHK NSCHK HOYI PFCHPECHBMY DCHB NEUSGB FPNKh OBBD, RTCHBMYMUS. bWEZBS CHRETED, ULBTSH, b FFPF HYBUFPL VPY VHDHF RTPDPMTSBFSHUS. obyb ЪBDBYUB - VMBZPRPMHYuOP RTYVSHCHFSH OB op. OBS P FPN, UFP RTPFICHOYL RETYPYYUEULY CHEDEF PVUFTEM CHUEI CHETPSFOSHCHI RPDIPDHR L RETEDOENH LTBA. fBL VSHMP Y CH FFPF TB - NSC VMBZPRPMHYuOP NYOPCHBMY RPYUFY CHUA OYJOYOH, LPFPTBS RTPIPDYMB PF UBNPK FTBOYEY, Y CHPF LPZDB CHSHCHIPDYMY YЪ OYYOSCH, NSC RPRBMY RPD PZOECHPK OBMEF. NSCH NZOPCHEOOP MEZMY ABOUT WUEZ. OP CH MEUKH YUBUFSH UOBTSDPCH Y NYO, OE DPMEFBS DP ENMY, CHTSCHCHBEFUS, OBDECHBS BL CHEFLY DETECHSHECH, Y HLTSCHFSHUS PF PULPMLPC OECHPNPTSOP! ChP CHTENS OBMEFB TBOYMP NPEZP TBCHEDYUYLB CH VPL, IPTPYP YUFP TBOEOYE VSCHMP LBUBFEMSHOPE. NSCH EZP H PHENOPFE LBL NPZMY RETECHSBMY Y NEDMEOOP, CHEDS EZP RPD THLY, CHSHCHIPDYMY YЪ POSHCH PVUFTEMB. pVYDOP VSHMP CHSHCHOEUFY Y RETETSYFSH FBLPE YURSHCHFBOYE FBN, CH FTBOYEE, B FHF, RPTsBMHKUFB - TBOEO. OH, UFP RPDEMBEYSH, FBN NPZMP VSHCHFSH Y IHCE. dPYMY DP op.

h ENMSOLE VSCHMP FERMP, Y FPMSHLP CH FARMPK YENMSOLE S CHURPNOYM, UFP GEMSCHK DEOSH OYUEZP OE EM. about UMEDHAEIK DEOSH S HOBM, UFP VBFBMSHPO, LPFPTSCHK OBBOINBM PVPTPOH, RPOEU VPMSHYE RPFETY, FPZDB ZPCHPTYMY- CH VBFBMShPOE PUFBMPUSH VPEURPUPVOSCHI 12-18 UPMDBF, NOPZP VSCHMP TBOEOSCHI. LPZBB RTIVSHMY about OR, Tevsfb Obn Ulbbmy, LBB POSTASUSED OUTSICHBMY, LPZB OBVMADBMY, HOUSENT INSHEDEMSHY FTBOIE, BSMBCHE, CHOSH OR UHMP ... FFPZP THVETSB PFCHEMY ABOUT CHFPTP RPMPUKH PVTPPOSHCH, FFP ABOUT FE RPYGYY LPFPTSCHE POB BOINBMB DP OBYEZP PUEOOOEZP OBUFHRMEOYS. чНЕУФП ОБЫЕК ДЙЧЙЪЙЙ ВПЕЧЩЕ РПТСДЛЙ ЪБОСМБ ДТХЗБС УФТЕМЛПЧБС ДЙЧЙЪЙС, ОПНЕТ ОЕ РПНОА, Б ОБДП ВЩ... ​​рЕИПФБ ОБЫЕК ДЙЧЙЪЙЙ ОБ ЧФПТПК ТХВЕЦ ПВПТПОЩ ПФПЫМБ, Б ОБУ, БТФЙММЕТЙУФПЧ, ПУФБЧЙМЙ ОБ РТЕЦОЙИ РПЪЙГЙСИ ДМС ХУЙМЕОЙС Й РПДДЕТЦЛЙ. LBL RTBCHYMP, ABOUT ZHTPOFE BTFYMMETYUFCH OE UOYNBMY U PZOECHSHI RPYGYK, FBL VSHMP. OBIY YUBUFY RETEYMY H ZMHIHA PVPTPOH, RP CHUENKH VSCHMP CHYDOP, UFP H VMYTSBKYEE CHTENS H OBUFHRMEOYE OBIY YUBUFY OE RPKDHF. ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE HUFBOCHIMPUSH URPLPKUFCHIE. LBL CHUEZDB TJOYOSH CH FBLPE CHTHENS O OR YMB PVSCHUOSCHN UETEDPN. NSCH CHEMY FEBFEMSHOPE OBVMADEOYE b RTPFICHOYLPN, CHCHSCHMSMY PZOECHSHCHE FPYULY Y ZPFCHYMY RP OIN BTF. DBOOSCHE.

obvmadbs h UFETEPFTKhVH, S OECHPMSHOP UNPFTEM ABOUT FP NEUFP, ZDE RTPIPDYF FTBOOYES, CH LPFPTPK NOE RTYYMPUSH UFPMSHLP RETETSYFSH, VSHCHFSH RPD PZOEN RTPFICHOYLB. iPTPYP VSCHMP CHYDOP, LBL GENERAL UPMDBFSCH CH OEK LPRPYYMYUSH, CHYDYNP, HLTERMSMY TBTHYEOOSCHE UFEOLY FTBOYEY. RETED with RPNOA, YUBUBNY WE GO BY B UFETEPFTKHVPK, OBVMADBS B RTPFICHOYLPN, RPMHYUBS PF LFPZP HDPCHPMSHUFCHYE Y CHSHCHRPMOSS UCHPK DPMZ. RP LFPNKH OYNOENKH READING, ABOUT OBIEN HYBUFLE ZHTPOFB (PVTPPOSHCH) VSMP UTBCHOYFEMSHOP URPLPKOP, DB (RMAU) LPNZHPTFOP YUKHCHUFCHHEYSH UEVS CH FERMPN VMYODBTSE. with IPTPYP PTYEOFYTPCHBMUS, YЪHYUBS NEUFOPUFSH CH PRFYUEULIK RTYVPT. rTPFICHOIL NEFPDYUOP CHEM RP OBN PZPOSH (RP PFDEMSHOSHCHN HYBUFLBN NEUFOPUFY). h IPTPYP PVPTKHDPCHBOOPN or Y FERMPN VMYODBTSE RPD FTENS OBLBFBNY NPTsOP VSCHMP VSCH ЪNPCHBFSH. oP ЪjNPCHBFSH DPMZP OE RTYYMPUSH.

ULPMSHLP MILKING RTPYMP U FPZP DOS, LPZDB NSC RPLYOKHMY FTBOYAY Y RTYYMY OB OR, SOE RPNOA, ZDE-FP 5-6 MILKING. i CHPF, PFUFHRMEOYE. lBL CHUEZDB, HFTPN OBL RTYOEUMMY IBCHFTBL DCHPE UPMDBF U PZOECHPK RPYGIY OBYEK VBFBTEY U DCHNS FETNPUBNY, FFP RTYNETOP PPLMP 9.00. h FP CHTENS ABOUT RETEDPPK VSCHMP URPLPKOP Y FYIP. SING CHPYMY L OBN H VMYODBTS, UOSMY U RMEYU FETNPUSCH, RPMPTSYMY ABOUT UFPM ZHMSTSLH UP YOBRUPN. y FHF RTPFYCHOYL PFLTSCHM HTBZBOOSCHK PZPOSH RP OBYN FSHMBN Y RP OBYN RPYGYSN UMECHB Y URTBCHB PF OBU. NS OBIPDYMYUSH CH GEOPTE LFPK RPDLPCHSHCH, BRP OBYYN FTBOYESN, LPFPTSHCHE RTPIPDYMY RETED TELPK vBTFB RTPFYCHOYL PZPOSHOE THAN. h FFPF NPNEOF CHUE DHNBMY, UFP CE DBMSHYE TsDBFSH? u- CHPF-CHPF PZPOSH RTELTBFIFUS Y NSC VKHDEN ЪBCHFTBLBFSH, OP... LPNBOYT DYCHYYPOB UBN RPCHPOYM ABOUT PR OBYEK 8-K VBFBTEY. уФБТЫЙК ПЖЙГЕТ ВБФБТЕЙ МЕКФЕОБОФ рЕФТПЧ ДПМПЦЙМ ПВУФБОПЧЛХ, Б ПОБ ВЩМБ ФБЛБС: Ч ТБКПОЕ ТБУРПМПЦЕОЙС ПЗОЕЧЩИ РПЪЙГЙК ДЙЧЙЪЙПОБ РТПФЙЧОЙЛ ЧЕДЕФ БТФЙММЕТЙКУЛЙК ПЗПОШ Й УРТБЧБ Й УМЕЧБ, ФБН ЗДЕ ТБУРПМБЗБЕФУС ОБЫБ ВБФБТЕС, УОБТСДЩ ТЧХФУС ЧВМЙЪЙ. LPNBODYT DYCHYYPOB ULBBM REFTPHCHH, YUFPVSHCH PO DETSBM UCHSH UP YFBVPN DYCHYYPOB, LPFPTSHK OBIPDYMUS RPBDY PR CH MEUKH.

th CHPF RTPFYCHOYL PFLTSCHM PZPOSH H OBYEN OBRTBCHMEOYY, UOBTSDSC MEFSF YUETE OR Y CHTSCHCHBAFUS ZDE FP UBDY, CH MEUKH. UCHSH FEMEZHPOOBS RTELTBFIMBUSH, LBL OY UVBTBMUS FEMEZHPOYUF KHUMSCHYBFSH RPJSCHCHOPK pr, Chue OBRTBUOP. TBCHEDUYL, LPFPTSCHK OBVMADBM CH UFETEPFTTHVH, DPMPTSYM FBLYN ZTPNLYN ZPMPUPN- OBYB REIPFB CHSHYMB YЪ FTBOYEY, PFIPDYF! uFP DEMBFS? LPNBODYT DYCHYYPOB ZPCHPTYF, RTYLBЪB OEF ABOUT PFIPD. rPLB UVBTBMYUSH UCHSBFSHUS RP TBDYPUFBOGYY, LFP-FP CHSHCHYEM YЪ VMYODBTsB Y LTYLOHM - OBYB REIPFB PLPMP OBU. with IPTPYP RPNOA, LPZDB S CHCHYOM YЪ VMYODBTsB, LBL TB H FFPF NPNEOF NYNP OBU H FSM YMB OBYB REIPFB, FBEB ABOUT UEVE rft. NSCHCHYMY CHUE YY VMYODBTsB Y UNPFTYN ABOUT RETEDOIK LTBC, PFLHDB HYMB OBYB REIPFB, B OENGSHCH HCE RETEYMY GENERAL FTBOYEY Y IDHF GERPYULPK CH GENERAL UFPTPOH. CHPF FHF-FP NSCH Y URPICHBFYMYUSH. LPNBODYT DYCHYYPOB CHEUSH DBTSE RPVMEDOEM, HOEZP MYGP VSHMP TSVPCHBFPE Y CHUE TPDYOLY ABOUT MYGE UMYMYUSH. PO RTYLBBM VSHCHUFTP PFIPDYFSH. lBLPE OETCHOPE UPUFPSOYE CH FFPF NPNEOF VSCHMP X OBU? yFP RETCHPE H NPEK ZHTPOPCHPK TSOYOY PFUFHRMEOYE, Y FBLPE RPUREYOPE ...

TBCHEDUYL CHSM UFETEPFTTHVH (LFP PUOPCHOPK RTYVPT OBVMADEOYS), FEMEZHPOOSCHK BRRBTBF, SCH RMBOYEF U OBFSOHFPK LBTFPK Y RPMECHHA UCHPA UHNLH. b CHUE, UFP VSCHMP CH VMYODBTSE, NSC PUFBCHYMY. BLCHFTBL CH FETNPUBI FBL Y PUFBMUS X CHIPDB CH VMYODBC. CHRPRSHIBI NSC DBTSE ZHMSTSLH UP YOBRUPN PUFBCHYMY ABOUT UFPME OEGBN. ChPF FBL NSC VSHCHUFTP UPVTBMYUSH Y CHUE VTPUIMY, ZTHRRPK, B OBU VSHMP DPCHPMSHOP NOPZP, 10 YuEMPCHEL. ffp LPNBODYT DYCHYYPOB, OBYUBMSHOYL TBCHEDDYCHYYPOB, TBCHEDYUYL, TBDYUF, FEMEZHPOYUF, LPNBODYT VBFBTEY Y S, Y FE DCHB UPMDBFB, LPFTSCHE RTYOEUMMY OBN VBCHFTBL. DP LFPZP DOS OEULPMSHLP DOK FPNKh OBBD S RETECYM OBUFPSEIK BD, OBIPDSUSH RPD PZOEN BTFYMMETYY. b FERETSCH RPRBM RPD DTHZPK HDBT- PFUFFHRMEOYE.

lBLPE POP, FFP PFUFFHRMEOYE? CHEDSHOE CHUEN TSER RTYYMPUSH CH UCHPEK ZHTPOFPCHPK TSOYOY PFUFKHRIFSH, BEUMY LPNKh RTYIPDYMPUSH, FP CHUEN RP-TBOPNKH. LFP URPLPKOP RP RMBOH PFIPDYM, B LFP RTPUFP VECBM. LFP PFIPDYM Y PFUFHRBM Ch PVPBI, LFP OB NBYOE, B LFP RTPUFP- ZDE VEZPN, ZDE RPMLPN. with DP LFPZP DOS OY FPZP, OY DTHZPZP ABOUT UEV OE YURSHCHFBM YOE OBM, LBL DEKUFCHHEF PFUFHRMEOYE ABOUT RUYYILKH YuEMPCHELB. with ChFPTPK ZPD ABOUT ZHTPOFE CH UPUFBCHE 204-K ud, Y OBYB DYCHYYS OY TBH OE PFUFHRBMB. CHRECHSHCHE WITH CHYDEM, LPZDB CHPECHBM ABOUT lHTULPK DHZE, YuEZP UFPIMP OBYN CHPKULBN CHSCHOHTSDEOOPE PFUFHRMEOYE RPD OBRPTPN CHPKUL RTPFICHOYLB. yOPZDB PF UFBTYI FPCHBTYEEK, PF UPMDBF UMSCHYBM, LBL YN RTYIPDYMPUSH PFUFHRBFSH CH RETCHSHCHE DOY CHPKOSHCH. VSHMP FBL: CHSHIPDYMY YY PDOPZP PLTHTSEOIS Y FHF-FP RPRBDBMY CH DTHZPE. CHSCHIPDYMY YY PLTHTSEOIS U VPSNY Y VEPCH, B ZDE - H PDYOPYULKH.

RPNOA, CHCHYEM Y VMYODBTsB Y RPCHETOHMUS, RPUNPFTEM CHOI ABOUT CHIPD CH VMYODBTS, LPFPTSHCHK VBCHEYEO VVM UETSHCHN FTPZHEKOSHCHN PDESMPN, Y UTBYH CHURPNOIM, YUFP CH VMYODBTSE PUFBAFUS OE FULPMSHLP- CBMLP. rTSNP ULBTSKH, U FBLYN HFERMEOYEN Y HAFPN ChPF UEKYUBU NSCH PLBBMYUSH CH RPMPTSEOYY, COBS FPMSHLP PDOP - OBDP VSHCHUFTP PFIPDYFSH, YUFPVSCH OE PLBBFSHUS CH PLTHTSEOYY. NSCH OBMY, LHDB, CH LBLPN OBRTBCHMEOYY OBDP PFIPDYFSH? CHPF FEVE Y PVUFBOPCHLB: UBDY FEVE CH URYOKH UFTEMSAF OENGSCH, B CHRETEDY - MEU, L LPFPTPPNKh RTYVMYTSBEFUS OBYB REIPFB, Y NSCH BY OEK. idfy RP UOEZKh VShchMP FSCEMB, OYNB VShchMB UOETSOBS. rPLB YMY URPLPKOP, OP VSHCHUFTP. with CHURPNYOBA, RPLB YMY, S UNPFTEM FP OBMECHP, FP OBRTBCP Y OBBD, OE RPLBBMYUSH MY OENGSCH? RETED CHIPDPN H MEU NSC UNEYBMYUSH U ZTHRRPK UPMDBF OBYEK REIPFSCH Y CH FP CHTENS OENEG PFLTSCHM RP OBN PZPOSH. CHUE UNEYBMYUSH - Y BCHFPNBFYUYLY, RHMENEFYUYLY FBEYMY ABOUT MSHCHTSBI UFBOLPCHSHCHK RHMENEF, YUHFSH RTBCHEE DCHPE UPMDBF OEUMY ABOUT RMEYUBI rft. uOBTSDSC TCHBMYUSH, IPFS OE RMPFOP, OP LTHZPN. fHF CHUE RPVETSBMY CH MEU CH OBDETSDE, UFP FBN VKhDEF HLTSHCHFYE. ч МЕУХ НЩ ВЩМЙ УЛТЩФЩ ПФ РХМШ, ОЕНЕГ ОБУ ОЕ ЧЙДЕМ, ОП ОБН РТЙЫМПУШ Ч МЕУХ ФСЦЕМП - ФБН ВЩМП НОПЗП УОЕЗБ, Б РПД УОЕЗПН - УХЮЛЙ Й РПЧБМЕООЩЕ ДЕТЕЧШС, ЛПФПТЩЕ НЕЫБМЙ ВЕЦБФШ... оЕНГЩ ВЕУРТЕТЩЧОП РП МЕУОПНХ НБУУЙЧХ ЧЕМЙ БТФПЗПОШ. FP Y DEMP RTYIPDYMPUSH RBDBFSH CH UOEZ. LFP-FP Y OBYI UCHSBMUS U PZHYGETPN RPDTBDEMEOYS OBYEK REIPFSCH, U LPFPTSCHN CHNEUFE TSDPN VETSBM. OBYB REIPFB PFIPDYF ABOUT CHFPTPK THVETS PVTPPOSHCH, CHETOEE, ABOUT RTETSOYK THVETS. FERETSH PDOB GEMSH - DPVTBFSHUS DP LFPZP THVETSB.

h PDOPN NEUFE CHCHYMY YY MEUB ABOUT BNET VPMPFP. dBMELP OBRTBCHP Y OBMECHP RTPUNBFTYCHBMPUSH POP, RP OENH YMYY Y VETSBMY OBBY UPMDBFSCH Y NSC. URTBChB, ZDE LPOYUBEFUS VPMPFP, F.E. PFLTSCHFBS NEUFOPUFSH, YJ MEUB CHCHYMY OENGSHCH- FBN EM VPK, OENGSH Y RP OBN CHEMY PZPOSH Y UCHPYI BCHFPNBFPCH. rHMY UCHYUFEMI NYNP OBYI HYEK. OBNOE VSCHMB YOYEMSH y BOZMYKULPZP UHLOB (bnyb), S RPFPN VOLUME OB YOYEMY DSHCHTLH PF PULPMLB Y UMEDSCH PF RKHMSh. VECBM S, YOYEMSH VSCHMB OBTBURBYLKH. rTPVETSBCH PFLTSCHFPE NEUFP, NSC UOPCHB CHPYMY CH MEU. with OBM, UFP IB LFYN MEUPN DPMTSOSCH RPLBFSHUS FTBOYEY OBYEK RETCHPK MYOYY PVTPOSCH. lPZDB VETSBM, VSCHMY FBLIE NPNEOFSHCH, LBCEFUS, VPMSHIE OEF UIM, CHPF-CHPF HRBDH. NSC CHUE, 10 YUEMPCHEL, VEI RPFETSCH DPVETSBMY DP OBYI RTETSOYI FTBOYEK. h rPNOA, FPMSHLP RETEUFKHRIM FTBOYEA Y FHF CE KHRBM ABOUT ENMA. METSB OB URJOE H VTKHUFCHETB PLPRB, DPMZP OE NPZ PFDSHYBFSHUS Y RTYKFY CH UEVS. h ZPMPCHE LTHFYFUS CHEUSH LPTPFLYK Y FTHDOSHK NBTYTHF, LPFPTSCHK BLPOYUYMUS. rPJCE S CHURPNOYM PDYO UMHYUBK, LPZDB NShch VETSBMY VPMPFP, TSDPN PLPMP NEOS VETSBM UPMDBF, Kh OEZP TBNPFBMBUSH PVNPFLB ABOUT OPZE, UNPFTA VETSYF HCE VE PVNPFLY.

with OE BOBA, LBL TBUGEOYMP CHSHCHYUFPSEEE LPNBODPCHBOYE GENERAL PFUFHRMEOYE. rPYENH UFTEMLPCHBS DYCHYYS, JBOYNBCHYBS PVPTPOH ABOUT LFPN HYBUFLE, FBL RPUREYOP PFUFHRYMB? DYCHYYS VSCHMB DTHZBS, OPNET HER, LBCEFUS, ABOUT GYZHTH 3...(FTYUFB), B LBLBS- OE RPNOA. OH MBDOP, CHYDYNP, ABOUT CHPKOY Y FBL VSCCHBEF, LPZDB PVUFBOPCHLB CHSCHOHTSDBEF PFIPDYFSH. UMECHB RP ZhTPOFKH OB OBYNY FTBOEESNY H TBKPE 100 NEFTCH NSCH BOSMMY op. OBN VSCHMP RTYLBBOP OENEDMEOOP RPDZPPFPCHYFSH VBFBTEA L CHEDEOYA PZOS. CHPF NPTSEFE RTEDUFBCHYFSH, CH LBLPN FSTSEMPN RPMPTSEOY NSCH PLBBMYUSH. fPMSHLP YUFP CHCHYMY Y RPMHPLTHTSEOIS Y WE RETEDSHHYLY, OE FETSS READING, NSC RTYUFKHRYMY OPYUSHA L PVPTKHDPCHBOYA op. ABOUT GENERAL UYUBUFSHHE, OBYEMUS UCHPVPDOSHK VMYODBTS, Y NSCH EZP BOSMY Y TBNEUFYMYUSH. rTBCHDB, LFB OPYUSH VSCHMB VE REYULY, Y VSCHMP YETFPCHULY IPMPDOP. pVPZTECHBMYUSH, LBL NPZMY, NPY UPMDBFSCH TsZMY LPUFET ABOUT RPMH VMYODBTsB. rTBCHDB, OB UMEDHAEIK DEOSH OBN RTYOEUHF U PZOECHPK RPYGYY REULH. HUFBOCHYMY MYUOSCHK LPOFBLF U LPNBODYTPN UFTEMLPCHPK TPFShch. FEMEZHPOYUFSH VSHCHUFTP CHPUUFBOCHYMY UCHSHSH U VBFBTEEK. LPNBOYT VBFBTEY OBN ULBBM, YUFP OE CHUE YY OBYYI RPDTBDEMEOYK UNPZMY CHSCHKFY YL LPFMB, Y YUFP SING VHDHF CHSHCHIPDYFSH OPYUSHA. h FPK UFPTPOE, ZDE NSC VSCHMY, OP MECHEE, RP ZhTPOFKH UMSCHYOB UFTEMSHVB, CHPDHI CHMEFBMY TBLEFSHCH. obyb BTFYMMETYS CHEMB PZPOSH RP HYBUFLH, UFPVSCH UDEMBFSH RTPIPD. OP NSCH OBMY, SING CHSHCHIPDYMY HERE-FP SWORD OBU. with RPNOA, VSHCHM TBZPCHPT, UFP FE PTHDYS, LPFPTSHCHE UFPSMY ABOUT RTSNPK OBCHPDL, CHSHCHCHEMY OE CHUE. MPYBDY VSHMY PFRTBCHMEOSCH CH FSHM, Y S RPOSM, OE CHUE PTHDYS KHUREMY CHSHCHCHEFY.

ABOUT CHPKOE CHUSLPE VSCCHBMP- Y HDBYUY, YOEHDBYUY. with PRYUSCHCHBA FP, UFP S CHYDEM Y UBN RETETSYM, B YuFP VSCHMP? LPOEYUOP, FSTCEMP CHURPNYOBFSH, DB EEE Y PFUFHRMEOYE. OP UFP RPDEMBEYSH, FBL VSHMP ABOUT UBNP DEME. h FFPN RYЪPDE S UBN HYUBUFCHPCHBM, CHUE CHYDEM YURSHCHFBM ABOUT UEVE CHUA FSTEUFSH CHSHCHOKHTSDEOOPZP PFIPDB. with CHYDEM, LBL CHUE YFP DEKUFCHHEF ABOUT RUYYILKH UPMDBF, YI MYGB, YI UPUFPSOYE, Y DTHZPE ... at LFYN RYYPDPN LPOYUEOP.

CUFTEYUB oCHPZP 1945 ZPDB

oBUFHRBM OPCHSHCHK ZPD, ABOUT OBIEN HYBUFLE ZHTPOFB OBUFHRIMP ЪBFYYSHE. lBL LFP RPOINBFS? RETEDOYK LTBC RTPIPDYM RP RTETSOIN FTBOYESN, LPFPTSHCHE VSHMY DP PUEOOOEZP OBUFHRMEOYS. u OBYEZP OR VSHCHM CHYDEO NBUMPBCHPD, PLPMP LPFPTPZP OBIPDYMUS OBY RTETSOYK op. VSHCHMP CHYDOP Y LMBDVYEE, ZDE FERESH UOPCHB OENGSHCH. NSC OERMPIP PVPTKHDPCHBMY op, IPTPYP HFERMYMY ENMSOLH. REYULB VSCHMB FTPZHEKOBS, LPFPTHA FPRYMY UHIYNY DTPCHBNY, UFPVSCH NEOSHIE VSCHMP DSHNB. OBN RPUFPSOOP UFBMY DBCHBFSH LETPUYO. at PZOECHPK RPYGYY OBN RTJOEUMY ZYMSHJH-LPRFIMLH, RTY UCHEFE LPFPTPK NSC GO OUT H ENMSOLE Y ZPFCHYMYUSH L CHUFTEYUE oCHPZP ZPDB. рПНОА, РЕТЕД УБНЩН оПЧЩН ЗПДПН УЕТЦБОФ аУХРПЧ (ЛПНБОДЙТ ПФДЕМЕОЙС ТБЪЧЕДЛЙ) РПМХЮЙМ РЙУШНП ЙЪ З. пНУЛБ ПФ ДЕЧХЫЛЙ, ЛПФПТХА ЪЧБМЙ бОС, ПОБ ВЩМБ РПДТХЗПК ЛПНБОДЙТБ ЧЪЧПДБ ХРТБЧМЕОЙС МЕКФЕОБОФБ нЕУЛЙЮЕЛПЧБ, ПО РПЗЙВ Ч ВПСИ ABOUT UNPMEOEYOE. NEOS RPUFBCHYMY ABOUT LFH DPMTSOPUFSH CHNEUFP OEZP. POB RPDTBCHYMB OBU U OPCHSHCHN ZPDPN, OH Y FBN EEE UFP-FP. o r OBU VSHMP YuEFCHETP: S, UETTSBOF aUHRPC, TBDYUF Y TBCHEDYUYL. NSC CHUE GO OUT Y UPYOSMY PFCHEF BOY. RYUBM RYUSHNP aUHRPC, X OEZP VSCHM LTBUYCHSHCHK YETFETSOSCHK RPYUETL. EZP YOPZDB RTPUYMY UPMDBFSCH OBRYUBFSH BDTEU ABOUT FTEHZPMSHOYLE RYUSHNB, Y PO FFP DEMBM LTBUICHP. UPYOSM YN PFCHEF ABOUT RPMHYUEOOPE RYUSHNP PF OBLPNPK YMY RYUBM RYUSHNP, EUMY LFP-FP TEYIM RPOBLPNYFSHUS. OBRYYEF RYUSHNP FBL, UFP X OEE ZPMCHB BLTHTSYFUS. aUHRPC VSCHM CHYTFHP RJUBFSH RYUSHNB. chFPTPK TBI OPCHSHCHK ZPD NOE RTYIPDYMPUSH CHUFTEYUBFSH ABOUT ZHTPOFE, CH PVPTPOE. with HCE PRYUSCHCHBM, LBL CHUFTEYUBM OPCHSHCHK ZPD 1944-K RPD ZPTPDPN chYFEVULPN.

uFP ffp bbfyyshe ABOUT ZHTPOFE, P LPFPTPN S HRPNSOKHM? with ULBTSH FBL ... oENGSCH OBU PUPVP OE VEURPLPIMY, LTPNE LBL CHEMY PZPOSH Y FTSEMSCHI PTHDYK RP OBYN FSHMBN, DB PZOECHCHNY OBMEFBNY ​​RP RETEDOEK RPMPUE PVTPOSCH. NS FPCE RETYPDYUEULY CHMY PZPOSH RP PZOECHSHCHN FPYULBN RTPFICHOYLB Y FP UP UFTPZYN TETSYNPN MYNYFB ABOUT UOBTSDSCH. yMY RPUMEDOYE YOUBUSHCH HIPDSEEEZP ZPDB, UFP S RPNOA PV FFPN? uFPSMB FYIBS NPTPOBS OPYUSH, HFP CHTENS CHUE FPRIMY REYULY, OVERCHETOP, Y OENGSH FPTS. uBNBS VPMSHYBS OBZTBDB OYNPK ABOUT ZHTPOFE DMS UPMDBFB- FFP FERMP. lBLBS FHF CHUFTEYUB oCHPZP ZPDB? dB EEE ABOUT RETEDPPCHPK - YUYUFP UINCHPMYUEULY! OP HYUYFSHCHBS, YuFP NSCH OBIPDYMYUSH RPBDY FTBOYY Y PFDEMSHOP CH UCHPEN VMYODBTSE, NSCH NPZMY LBL-FP PFNEFYFSH Y CHUFTEFYFSH. LBL PVSCHYUOP, OBN RTJOEUMMY HTSYO, B U OIN - ABOUT LBTsDPZP RP 100 ZTBNN, DB UFBTYOB OBN RTYUMBM MHLPCHYGH. x NEOS VSHMB VBOBL LPOUECHCHCH PF PZHYGETULPZP RBKLB. lPZDB NSCH HTSYOBMY, LPOEYUOP, CHPDLH, F.E. UCHPY VPECHSCHE 100 ZTBNN, NSC CHSHCHRYMY ЪBTBOEE, RPDTBCCHMSS DTHZ DTHZB U OBUFHRBAEIN OPCHSHCHN ZPDPN. yuBUFP CHSHCHIPDYMY YY VMYODBTSB Y CHUNBFTYCHBMYUSH CH FENOPFKH, LPFPTKHA LPE-ZDE PUCHEEBMY, CHMEFBS, TBLEFSHCH, OP VSCHMP URPLPKOP. osophhrymp 24.00, NSHE ChUE CHUSHEMY YU VMYODBCB, RPNOA, OEVP VSHMP KODEDOP, CMEFBMY TBOPZP HCHFB TBLEFSHSH, LPE-KPDHEA RPMEFEMI OIFAI RHMSHEYSHEYA, Skashnyshchchevo YFFPROSHECHECHE. FP VSHCHM UBMAF ABOUT ZHTPOFPCHPK RPMPUE CH YuEUFSH oCHPZP 1945-ZP ZPDB. with FPCE PFUBMAFPCHBM, CHSHCHOHM YЪ LPVKhTSCH UCHPK RBTBVEMMHN Y CHSHCHRHUFYM CH UFPTPOH OENGECH CHUA PVPKNKH. fBL OBYUBMUS RPUMEDOYK ZPD CHPKOSHCH, RTBCHDB, NSC FPZDB OE OBMY, UFP PO RPUMEDOYK, OP DHNBMY Y LBCDSCHK IPFEM DPTSYFSH DP LPOGB CHPKOSHCH. chPDLH RYMY Y UPMDBFULYI BMANYOYECHSCHI LTHTSEL. OBEFE, W LBLYN RTYCHLHUPN POB RSHEFUS Y FYY LTHZEL? ChSh RPRTPVKhKFE LBL-OYVKhDSH. x aUHRPCHB VSCHMB FEFTBDSH U REUOSNY Y NSCH YI REMY. pUPVEOOP FPZDB ЪBRPNOYMYUSHNOE UMPCHB "B DP UNETFY YEFSCHTE YBZB". LBLIE RTBCHYMSHOSHCHE UMPCHB OBRYUBM CH REYOE RPPF, Y DECUFCHYFEMSHOP LFP VSCHMP FBL, Y SOY VSCHMY DMS FEI LFP OERPUTEDUFCHEOOP UPRTYLBUBMUS U RETEDOIN LTBEN (RETEDPCHPK). uFP RPMHUBEFUS? CHSCHYEM YЪ VMYODBTsB, FEVS RPDUFETEZBEF RHMS UOBKRETB YMY PULPMLY TBBPCHBCHYEKUS NYOSCH. oby LPNBOYT VBFBTEY L-O TsYFOIL CHSHCHYEM YY VMYODBTSB ABOUT OR - Y FHF TBBPTCBMBUSH NYOB Y ON RPZYV. ChPF FEVE YEFSCHTE YBZB...

obfprymy h VMYODBTS REYULH, FBL, UFP UFP UFBMP DHYOP Y TsBTLP Y NSC YUBUFP CH LFH OPYUSH CHSHCHIPDYMY YЪ VMYODBTsB ABOUT UCHETSYK CHPDHI. with IPTPYP RPNOA LFH NPTPJOKHA OPCHPZPDOAA OPYUSH. OBUFKHRIM 1945-K ZPD. h LPOGE SOCHBTS OBN UFBMP Y'CHEUFOP, YuFP NShch DPMTSOSCH RPKFY CH OBUFHRMEOYE Y CHOPCHSH PRSFSH U CHSHIPDPN L TELE vBTFB. PUCHPVPTsDBFSH CHUE, UFP PUFBCHYMY CH DElbVTE ... obufkhrbfsh VKhDEF OE OBYB DYCHYYS. NSC UFBMY L LFPNH ZPPFPCHIFSHUS. ABOUT PZOECHSHCHE RPYGYY OBN RPDCHEMY UOBTSDSCH, UBRETSC ZPFCHYMY RTPIPDSHCH CH NIOOSHI ЪBZTBTSDEOYSI. about UMEDHAEIK DEOSH DP TBUUCHEFB OBN RTJOEUMY BCCHFTBL, RP 100 ZTBNN Y UHIPC RBEL. with MYUOP CHPDLH OE RIM. NSCHUFTP RPBCHFTBLBMY Y RPLYOKHMY UCHPK OR, RPYMY CH FTBOYEA, VSCHMP EEE PHENOP. rPYENH S OE RYM? rP NOOYA NOPZYI,- UOBYUBMB UZTECHBEF, B YUETE OELPFPTPPE CHTENS OBJOYOBEF FEVS KOPVYFSH. UFPYYSH H NETMPK FTBOYEE ABOUT PFLTSCHFPN CHPDHIE, FEVS POBOE UZTEEF. chPDLH CHSHCHDBCHBMY DMS RPDOSFIS DHIB Y OBUFTPEOYS.

with PV LFPN RYUBM. lPZDB S PFDSCHIBM H DPNE PFDSCHIB RTY ZPURYFBME RPD ZPTPDPN chYFEVULPN, FBL FE UPMDBFSCH, LPFPTSCHE VSHCHMY TBOEOSCH CH RPMPUFSH LYYEYUOILB,- FFP DEFINING CHTBYU ZPCHPTYMY - VSCHMY FSTCEMP TBOEOSCH. RETED VPEN OBDP NEOSHIE EUFSH. chPDLB, LPOEYUOP, RPDOYNBEF OBUFTPEOYE, LPZDB FSH EE CHSHCHRSHEYSH, OP PDOCHTENEOOP POB FEVS MYYBEF CHPNPTSOPUFY RTYOSFSH RTBCHYMSHOP TEYOYE CH UYUYFBOOSCHE UELHODSCH. fsch DPMTSEO YMY NZOPCHEOOP MEYUSH, YMY YULBFSH HLTSHCHFYE - FPP OB LBTsDPN YBZKH, TEYBEFUS CHPRTPU TSOYOY. with VSHCHM FPZDB NPMPD Y L YOBRUKH OE RTYCHSHL, Y YUBUFP UCHPA DPMA PFDBCHBM. h LFPN CHPRTPUE IPTPYP Y RTBCHYMSHOP TBUUKHTSDBM NPK TBCHEDYUYL, TSDPCHPK bVTPUYNPC, PO CHPECHBM U RETCHSHCHI DOEK CHPKOSHCH. nSCH, NPMPDSHCHE, CH FPN YUYUME YS, RTYUMHYYCHBMYUSH L YI TBZPCHPTTBN. pVSCHUOBS PVUFBOPCHLB RETED OBUFHRMEOYEN - ЪBFYYSHE, LPNBODYT VBFBTEY NOE RTYLBBM DETTSBFSH UCHSHSH U LPNBODYTPN TPFSCH. nSCH PUFBCHYMY UCHPA FERMHA ENMSOLKH, CH LPFPTPK CHUFTEYUBMY OPCHSHCHK ZPD, Y RPYMY CH FTBOYEA. tPFB ZPFCHYMBUSH L OBUFHRMEOYA, DP TBUUCHEFB CHUE TsDBMY - CHPF-CHPF OBJUOEFUS BTFRPDZPFPCHLB! CHUEZDB YUIPD OBUFHRMEOYS BUCHYUEM PF BTFPZOS, F.E. PVTBVPFLY FTBOYEK Y PZOECHSCHI UTEDUFCH RTPFYCHOYLB. CHPF NSCH OBIPDYMYUSH CH FTBOYEE TSDPN U UPMDBFBNY TPFSCH Y TsDBMY. рПНОА, ОБУФХРЙМ ТБУУЧЕФ, С РПУНПФТЕМ Ч УФПТПОХ ОЕНГЕЧ, ХЧЙДЕМ ФПМШЛП ПДЙО УОЕЗ, Й ОЙЛБЛЙИ РТЙЪОБЛПЧ РТЙУХФУФЧЙС ФБН ОЕНГЕЧ, ЛТПНЕ ФПТЮБЭЙИ ЛПМШЕЧ У ЛПМАЮЕК РТПЧПМПЛПК, ДБЦЕ ОЕ ПРТЕДЕМЙЫШ, ЗДЕ Х ОЙИ РТПИПДСФ ФТБОЫЕЙ. ChP CHTENS LFPZP PTSYDBOYS CHUSLYE NSHCHUMY CH ZPMCHKh MEKHF. oEPTSYDBOOP OBTHYMB FYYYOH BTFYMMETYKULBS LBOOPOBDB, OBYB BTFYMMETYS OBYUBMB PVTVBFSHCHBFSH RETEDOIK LTBC RTPFICHOYLB. RP Uyzobmkh LTBOOPK TBLEPHSH Reipfb Cheshmb Yu Phtiboya y ieeneglein Ftboyynyn veh puffbopchl, s cutting tumor boncs, b-qmhvyoye, rytnotop Youth, RTPFILM PTZBEPPHBOPPHEPPHEPPHEPPHEPPHEPPHEPPHEPPP bchsbmyush vpy, REIPFB bbmezmb. NSC RPRBMY RPD NYOPNEFOSHCHK Y BTFYMMETYKULYK PZPOSH. lTHZPN FPMSHLP UOEZ, CHUE SNLY Y HLTSCHFYS ULTSCHFSCH RPD UOEZPN, PDOP HLTSCHFYE URBUBEF FEVS - LFP ZMHVPLYK UOEZ. YuETE OELPFTPE CHTENS REIPFB RTPDCHYOHMBUSH CHRETED Y UOPCHB GBMEZMB.

NSC PRSFSH RPRBMY RPD PVUFTEM, OP OBN RPCHEMP, NSC HLTSCMYUSH H VMYODBTSE, VMYODBC VSCHM CHSHTSCHF OBYNYNY UPMDBFBNY EEE PUEOSHA, LPZDB NSCH VSCHMY FHF, DP PFUFHRMEOYS. vMYODBTS OENGSHCH O YURPMSHЪPCHBMY Y ON VSCHM ЪBMYF ZTHOFPPK ChPDPK. pF MShDB DP RPFPMLB CHSHCHUPFB VSCHMB RTYNETOP 600-700 NN. chMEEFSH H VMYODBC NPTsOP VSCHMP FPMSHLP ABOUT LPMEOSI. UOEZ, LPFPTSCHK VSCHM ABOUT MSHDKH, NSCH CHZTEVMMY THLBNY, Y RPMKHYUMPUSH OBUFPSEEE HLTSCHFYE U CHIPDPN-OPTPK. CHURPNYOBA FFP, METSYYSH ABOUT MSHDH Y THLBNY DPUFBEYSH DP OBLBFB- LBL H RBUUBTSYTULPN CHBZPOE ABOUT UBNPK CHETIOK RPMLE. ZPMPCHH RPDOYNBEYSH Y CHYDYYSH DSHCHTH CHIPDB, PFLHDB RBDBEF UCHEF. PHENOYMP, CHYDOP VSHMP, OBN RTYDEFUS CH FFPN VMYODBTSE LPTPFBFSH OPYUSH. lPOEYUOP, RP UTBCHOEOYA U RPYGYEK ABOUT PFLTSCHFPN CHPDHIE, FFP IPTPYEE HLTSHCHFYE. eUMMY VSCHOE FFPF VMYODBTS, FP OBN VS RTYYMPUSH UYDEFSH RPD ЈMLPK - FFP FPYUOP! chshch NPTSEFE RTEDUFBCHYFSH H LBLPN RPMPTSEOY PLBBMYUSH UPMDBFSCH UFTEMLPCHPK TPFSCH? oBUFHRYMB OPYUSH, TBDYUF HUFBOCHYM UCHSHSH U LPNBODYTPN VBFBTEY. LFP-FP Yu NPII UKMDBF RTYOOOU CHIFPLE TBCEZH LPUFET ON MSHDH, YuFPVSH ONOPTSLP Oztefsh ChPSh, OP PF LPUFTB RTYYMPUSHUSHUS-Y-BCHBMPSUPSH. UPMDBFSCH OBMPNBMY U EMLY MBROYLB Y UDEMBMY OBUFYM, RPMHYUYMUS NBFTBU YEMLY, CHUA OPYUSH OBIPDYMYUSH CH FFPN VMYODBTSE. FFPF RYJPD ZHTPOFPCHPK TSOYOY BRPNOYMUS FEN, UFP S METSBM CH VMYODBTSE OB OBTBI, LBL PVSHCHUOP, B ABOUT MSHDH, RPD UMPEN LPFPTPZP VSCHMB CHPDB. oENOPTSLP OBU RPFTSIYCHBMP, LPZDB RPVMY'PUFY TCHBMYUSH UOBTSDSCH. rPNOA, METSYN Y CHEDEN TBZPCHPT P FPMEYOE MShDB, UVBTBMYUSH PRTDEMYFSH, OP FBL YOE PRTEDEMMYMY. op LFP-FP ULBBM, OE RPNOA LFP, EUMY UOBTSD RPRBDEF Ch VMYODBC, MED FTEUOEF PF HDBTOPK ChPMOSHCH, Y NSC VKhDEN RMBChBFSH. ABOUT UMEDHAEIK DEOSH RPUME LPTPFLPK PZOECHPK (BTFYMMETYKULPK) RPDDETSLY REIPFB UFBMB RTPDCHYZBFSHUS CHRETED, Y NSC RPLIOHMY UCHPE HLTSCHFYE Y RPYMY U LPTPFLNY PUFBOPCHLBNY REIPK ЪB. rTY DCHYTSEOY OBN RTYYMPUSH HLTSCCHBFSHUS PF PZOS RTPFYCHOYLB CH TPCHILBI, FBLTS OBMYFSHCHI CHPDPK, B YI VSCHMP RP RHFY OBLPRBOP NOPZP, Y POY OBU UDPTPCHP URBUBMY.

yFBL, L LPOGH DOS OBYB REIPFB ЪBOSMB RPYGYY, LPFPTSHCHE POB PUFBCHYMB DCHB NEUSGB FPNKh OBBD RTY PFIPDE. obyb DYCHYYS 204-S UD OBIPDYMBUSH ABOUT CHFPTPK RPMPUE PVTPPOSHCH. b OBU BTFYMMETYUFCH OBYEK DYCHYYY PUFBCHYMY CH RETCHPK RPMPUE, RPDDETSYCHBFSH DTHZHA DYCHYYYA 3-9 YMY 8 ... (OPNET bvschm). LPNBOYT VBFBTEY RETEDBM RP TBDYPUFBOGYY, YUFPVSH NSC RTYVSHMY FHDB, PFLHDB KHYMY, F.E. H GENERAL ENMSOLH. with FHF TSE UCHSBMUS U LPNBODYTPN UFTEMLPCHPK TPFSCH Y UPPVEYM ENH P UCHPEN HIPDE ABOUT CHFPTPA RPMPUH PVTPPOSHCH. chsch RTEDUFBCHMSEFE, LPZDB NSCH RTYYMY CH UCHPK VMYODBTS, LPFPTSCHK RPLYOKHMY ABOUT DCHPE UHFPL, FP HCHYDEMY CHUE, UFP OBNY VSCHMP PUFBCHMEOP! CHUE ABOUT NEUFE, DBTSE CHIPD H VMYODBTSE BLTSCHF PDESMPN! RP RTBCHDE ULBBFSH, ABOUT CHPЪCHTBEEOYE CH FFPF VMYODBTS NSHCHOE TBUUYFSHCHCHBMY OE DKHNBMY, OP UHDSHVB RPCHETOHMB CH GENERAL RPMSh. CHPF Y FBL VSHMP!

h ZHECHTBME NEUGE GENERAL DYCHYYA CHSHCHCHEMY H FSM DMS LPTPFLPZP PFDSHIB Y RPRPMOEOIS MYUOSCHN UPUFBCHPN. h LPOGE ZHECHTBMS OBU RETEVTPUYMY ABOUT DTHZPK HYUBUFPL ZHTPOFB- FFP INCLUDED FPZP NEUFB, HERE NSC VSCHMY. UCHETYCH NBTY NSC RTYVCHMY CH TBKPO Z. rTYELHME. fBN GENERAL YUBUFY CHEMY VPI CH TBKPOE ZPTPDB. ZDE-FP H OBYUBME NBTFB DYCHYYS SBOSMB VPECHCHE RPYGYY, B NSCH BOSMY PZOECHSHCHE RPYGYY, ZDE RPDZPFPCHYMY PTHDYS L UFTEMSHVE Y OBVMADBFEMSHOSHCHK RHOLF. RETED OBNY OBIPDYMBUSH PLTBYOB ZPTPDB - LBL TB PLPMP CEMEЪOPDPPTTSOPZP HMB Z. rTYELHME. rPNOA, NSC CHEMY OBVMADEOYE BA RETEDOIN LTBEN, Y YOPZDB CHYDEMY RBTPCHP. OP FPMShLP RP DSHCHNH PF OEZP, B RBTPCHP OE VSCHM CHYDEO.

obyb BCHYBGYS VPNVIMB OENEGLIE FSHMSCH. vPY VSHCHMY HRPTOSHCHE- RTPDCHYZBMYUSH CHRETED NEDMEOOP. YMY BY B REIPFPK, LPFPTBS RPYUENKh FP CHUEZDB PLBSCHCHBMBUSH UPCHUEN TSDPN U OBYYN op. CHYDYNP, PVUFBOPCHLB VPS CH YuETFE ZPTPDB OE FBLBS, LBL CH PVSCHUOSHI RPMECHSCHI HUMPCHYSI, ZDE CHIDOSCH FTBOYEY YMY PLPRSC - Y OBIY, Y RTPFICHOYLB. ABOUT PLTBYOH ZPTPDB REIPFB CHPYMB L CHEYUETH. NSC OBOSMY OR CH DPNE ABOUT CHFPTPN LFBCE. CHEUSH CHEEUT Y OPYUSH YMB OERTETSCHCHOBS RHMENEFOBS Y BCHFPNBFOBS UFTEMSHVB. yFP VSHMP RETCHPE NPE HYBUFYE CH VPA CH YuETFE ZPTPDB, FBL LBL ULPTP ZPTPD VKhDEF OBY, NSCHCHKDEN bb EZP RTEDEMSCH. TSDPN, ABOUT UPUEDOK HMYGE, ABOUT RETELTEUFLE PLPMP DPNB VSCHMP RPUFBCHMEOP 76-NN PTHDYE Y NPEZP CHCHPDB, LPFPTSCHN S LPNBODPCHBM CH 7-K VBFBTEE. PTHDYE H VPSI bB ZPTPD RPDBCHYMP OEULPMSHLP PZOECHSCHI FPYUEL, CHLMAYUBS PDOP PTHDYE Y UBNPIPDOHA HUFBOPCHLH.

at TBUUCHEFPN REIPFB NEDMEOOP U VPSNY RPDCHYZBMBUSH PF DPNB L DPNKh. OP CHPF OB PH HMYGH, ZDE UFPSMP GENERAL PTHDYE, OB RETELTEUFPL CHCHEIBM OENEGLYK FBOL "fYZT" YMY "rBOFETB", FPYuOP OE RPNOA, Y UFBM CHEUFY PZPOSH CHDPMSH HMYGSCH, RETREODILHMSTOPK FPK, ZDE UFPSMP OBE. with IPTPYP RPNOA FFPF FBOL, Y NSCCHYDEMY UP UCHPEZP or, LBL PO UFTEMSM RP OBYEK REIPFE, Y CHYDEMY, LBL RP LFPNH FBOLCH CHEMY OBY PZPOSH PTHDYS U DTKhZPK HMYGSCH, OP NSCH OE VBOBNE BOBMY, U LBLOBMY CHYDOP VSCHMP, LBL VTPOEVPKOSHK UOBTSD PFMEFBEF PF FBOLB Y LTBUOPK FPYULPK MEFIF (FTBUUET) MEFIIF CHCHETI. vSCHMP UDEMBOP EEE OEULPMSHLP CHSHCHUFTEMPCH RP FBOLKh, Y FPF UFBM TBCHPTBYUYCHBFSHUS HVYTBS UCHPK VPL. lPZDB PTHDYKOSHCHK TBUYUEF HUFBOBCHMYCHBM PTHDYE, S RTPIPDYM NYNP, Y CHYDEM- PTHDYE UFPSM RTSNP ABOUT DPTPZE (KHMYGE), YOE VSCHMP PLPMP OEZP PVSCHYUOSCHI TPCHYLPCH DMS HLTSCHFYS, LTPNE DCHHI SEYLPCH UP UOBTSDBNY. with U TBCHEDUILPN RPYEM VMYCE L REIPFE. fBOL ULTSCHMUS. NSCH HOBMY RPJCE Y TBUULBJPCH OBYI FPCBTIEEK P FPN, UFP RTPYYPYMP. ъБ ОБЧПДЮЙЛБ Х ПТХДЙС ЧУФБМ УБН УФБТЫЙК ПЖЙГЕТ ВБФБТЕЙ, УФБТЫЙК МЕКФЕОБОФ тПНБОПЧ ХУРЕМ ЧЩРХУФЙФШ ФТЙ ВТПОЕВПКОЩИ УОБТСДБ, Й ЧПФ ЛПЗДБ ЕНХ ЛТЙЮБМЙ ЙЪ ПЛОБ ДПНБ: «фПЧБТЙЭ МЕКФЕОБОФ, ОЕНЕГЛЙК ФБОЛ ТБЪЧЕТОХМУС!», жЕДС ЬФП УБН Й ХЧЙДЕМ Й ХУРЕМ ФПМШЛП УЛБЪБФШ: «с EZP UEKYUBU RPDLBMYVETOSHCHN ... "bTSTSBAEYK DPUMBM UOBTSD CH LBEOOIL, B JEDS UNPFTEM CH RBOPTBNH Y OBCHPDYM PTHDYE, Y CH FFPF NPNEOF "fYZT" CHSHCHUFTEMYM RETCHSHCHN. chTBTSEULYK UOBTSD (PULPMPYUOSCHK) RPRBM CH CHETIOAA YUBUFSH EIFB PTHDYS, UTBYCH OBUNETFSH UFBTYYEZP MEKFEOBOFB tPNBOPCHB, Y FSTCEMP TBOYCH BTTSBAEEZP. fBL ZEPYYUEULY RPZYV NPK VPECHPK FPCHBTIE JEDS tPNBOPC, U LPFPTSCHN CHNEUFENOE RTYYMPUSH RPMKHYUYFSH VPECHPE LTEEEOYE ABOUT lHTULPK DHZE, CHNEUFE RTPKFY U VPSNNY PF unPMEOEYOSCH DP CHYFEVULB. JEDS VSCHM NKhTSEUFCHEOOSHCHN Y UNEMSHCHN PZHYGETPN - FP VSCHM OBUFPSEIK UYVYTSL. tPDPN BY VSCHM Ъ fPNULB YMY Ъ fPVPMSHULB. with OE RPNOA, X NEOS RPUME CHPKOSHCH HLTBMY RPMECHHA UHNLH, PYUEOSH UPTsBMEA PV LFPN. with VSCHM UCHIDEFEMEN EZP TSEOIFSHVSCH ABOUT VBFBTEKOPK OBYEK FEMEZHPOYUFLE, ЪCHBMY HER obds. vSCHMB POB TPDPN U HLTBYOSCH ZPCHPTYMB U BLGEOFPN HLTBJOULYN. oEBDPMZP DP EZP ZYVEMY POB VSCHMB PFRTBCMEOB DPNPK TPTsBFSH. NOOE RTYYMPUSH U OIN RTPUFYFSHUS, S VSHCHM ABOUT DTHZPK PLTBOYE ZPTPDB, FBN OBUFHRBMB REIPFB. rPIPTPOYMY JEDA ABOUT LMBDVYEE Z. rTYELHME. cBMLP VSHMP FPCHBTYEB Y DTHZB. y PZHYGETPCH CH VBFBTEE, U LPFPTSHNYE RTYYMPUSH CHNEUFE CHPECHBFSH ABOUT lHTULPK DHZE, PUFBMUS S PYO.

NSCHUE YUHCHUFCHPCHBMY VMYYPUFSH TBZTPNB ZHBYYNB, LPOEG CHPKOSHCH. OP FPMSHLP YUKHCHUFCHPCHBMY, YMY VPI Y NSC FETSMMY MADEK. oBUFHRIMB CHEUOB 1945 ZPDB. iPTPYP, LPZDB OBD FChPEK ZPMPPK CH OVE OE CHYUSF "AOLETUSH" Y "NEUUETSCH", LBL LFP VSHMP CH 1943 ZPDKh ABOUT lKhTULPK DKhZE. yMY VPY ЪB ZPTPDPN, KhTSE OE VSCHMP OY RPUFTPEL, OH DPNPC ... NSCH PUFBCHBMYUSH ABOUT OEVPMSHYPK CHPCHSHCHYEOOPUFY, PFLHDB IPTPYP RTPUNBFTYCHBMBUSH NEUFOPUFSH. REIPFB RTPDCHYZBMBUSH NEDMEOOP, EE RPDDETSYCHBMY GENERAL FBOLY, RP IPDH OBYEZP RETEDCHYTSEOIS CHEDE METSBMY HVYFSHCHE UPMDBFSCH- Y OBYY, Y RTPFICHOYLB. REIPFB ЪBMEZMB, FBOLY PUFBOPCHYMYUSH CH OYYOE.

NPE PFDEMSHOPE CHPURPNYOBOYE

h FP CHTENS ABOUT OBYEN HYBUFLE ZHTPOFB VSCHMB VPMSHYBS OBUSHEEEOOPUFSH OBYI CHPKUL. LBL OBN FPZDB ZPCHPTYMY, L OBN RTYVSHMY CHPKULB U DTKHZYI ZhTPOFCH. pDOB DYCHYYS UNEOSMB DTHZHA. CHTENS OBUFHRMEOYS ULBRMYCHBMPUSH FBL NOPZP RPDDETSYCHBAEYI REIPPHKh LPNBODOSCHI RHOLFCH, YUFP VSCCHBMP DBTSE OZDE CHSCVTBFSH ABOUT NEUFOPUFY or. chPKUL VSCHMP NOPZP, B RTPDCHYTSEOYE NEDMEOOPE. rPNOA, OE KHUREMY IPTPYP PUNPFTEFSHUS, F.E. PRTEDEMIFSH PVUFBOPCHLKH, LBL OBBY FBOLY NEDMEOOP RPYMY CHRETED, B BY OYNY OBYB REIPFB, B BY REIPFPK CHUMED Y NSC. oENEG CHEM PZPOSH YUCHPYI YEUFYUFCHPMSHOSHI NYOPNEFCH, NSCH YI RTPЪCHBMY "ULTYRHIY". rTPDCHYZBMYUSH RETEVETSLBNY PF PDOK SNSC YMY CHPTPOLY DP DTHZPK. ChPTPOPL PF NYO Y UOBTSDPCH RPRBDBMPUSH NOPZP, OP POY OEZMHVPLIE, CH CHPTPOLE PF "ULTYRHIY" NPTsOP HLTSHCHFSH ZPMPCH Y FEMP, B OPZY OEF. NSC METSBMY H CHPTPOLE, OBVMADBS b RTPPDCHYTSEOEN REIPFSCH Y FBOLPCH. GENERAL FBOLY CHCHEIBMY ABOUT FTBOYOY OENGECH, LPFPTSHCHE RTPIPDYMY RP CHPCHSHCHIEOOPUFY, YCH FP CHTENS OENEG PFLTSCHM RP FBOLSN PZPOSH RTSNPC OCHPDLPK. uOBTSDSC PFMEFBMY TYLPYEFPN PF VTPOY FBOLB Y PF ENMY, YODBCHBS YCHHL "ZHSHCHT-ZHSHCHT", RTPMEFBS YuETE OBBYY ZPMPCSCH LHDB-FP OBBD. uHFSH RTBCHEE PF OBU ЪBZPTEMUS RETCHSHCHK OBY FBOL. rTSNP ABOUT OBYI ZMBBI UOBYUBMB RPSCHYMUS UETOSCHK DSHCHN, B RPFPN SHCHLY RMBNEOY. fBOL VSHCHM PLHFBO LMHVBNY UETOPZP DSHNB Y UPDATE VSHMP CHYDOP, LBL URBUBMYUSH OBBY FBOLYUFSHCH. RETED OBNY, ZDE OBUFHRBM OBY UFTEMLPCHSCK VBFBMSHPO, VSCHMY RPDVIFS EEE DCHB FBOLB, POI UFPSM RETED OBNY Y VSCHMP IPTPYP CHIDOP, LBL CHSCHMEEBMY, URBUBSUSH, Y ZPTSEESP FBOLB GENERAL FBOLYU- WITH CHYDEM YUETOSHCHK DSHCHN Y FBOLB Y NPNEOF PFLTSCHFIS MAlb VBYOY, Y LBL LMHVSH YUETOPZP DSHCHNB CHNEUFE U OYNY CHSHCHTSCHCHBAFUUS OBTCHTSH. NSCH DBTSE UYUYFBMY, ULPMSHLP FBOLYUFPCH Y ZPTSEEEZP FBOLB UNPZMY URBUFYUSH. fBOLY, PYASFSHCHE YUETOSHCHN DSHNPN, ZPTEMY, Y CH OII CHATSHCHBMYUSH UOBTSSDCH Y RBFTPOSHCH. PUFBMSHOSHCHE FBOLY URHUFIMYUSH OBBD, CH OYYOKH, CH HLTSCHFYE. pVYDOP VSHMP OBN UNPFTEFSH ABOUT GENERAL ZPTSEIE FBOLY Y FBOLYUFCH. OP NSCH, ZMSDS ABOUT CHUE LFP, FPTS METSBMY RPD PZOEN RTPFYCHOILB Y TsDBMY, UFP VKhDEF DBMSHYE?

urtpuyfe MAVPZP ZHTPOPCHYLB, CHYDEM MY PO UCHPYNY ZMBBNY FP, UFP NSCH CHYDEMY? lPOEYUOP, VSCHMY ZHTPOPCHYLY, LPFPTSHCHE Y FFP FPTSE CHYDEMY. op... FBLYI NBMP.

with RPJCE UBN ABOUT UEVE RPYUKHCHUFCHPCHBM, UFP OBBYUYF, UIDEFSH CH FBOLE, LPZDB RP FEVE UFTEMSAF VTPOEVPKOSHCHNY UOBTSDBNY.

UCHEFMPE CHTENS BLPOYUMPUSH, OBUFKHRIMY UHNETLY. bFBLB OBYEK REIPFSCH BIMEVOHMBUSH ... REIPFB BOSMMB OENEGLIE FTBOYY Y DBMSHY OE RPYMB. ftboyey RTPIPDYMY RP CHPCHSHCHYEOOPUFY, ABOUT LPFPTPK Y UFPSMY GENERAL RPDVIFSCHE FBOLY. NSC RPFETSMY CH FFPF DEOSH OEULPMSHLP FBOLCH Y UBNPIPDOSHHI PTHDYK. DEOSH LPOYUBMUS, B FBOLY CHUE EEE DSHNYMYUSH- TSHFLPE ЪTEMYEE. RPYENH RPMHYUYMPUSH, UFP OENGSCH UNPZMY FBL MEZLP RPDVYCHBFSH GENERAL FBOLY? с ВЩМ УМЙЫЛПН НПМПД ДЕМБФШ ЧЩЧПДЩ Й ТБУУХЦДБФШ ПВ ЬФПН ФПЗДБ... рП ЛБТФЙОЕ ВПС ЧЙДОП, ЮФП Х ОЕНГЕЧ ФБН, ЪБ ФТБОЫЕЕК Ч ОЙЪЙОЕ, ВЩМЙ ЧЛПРБОЩ РТПФЙЧПФБОЛПЧЩЕ ПТХДЙС Й ФБОЛЙ, ЛПФПТЩЕ Й ЧЕМЙ РТЙГЕМШОЩК ПЗПОШ. yI NSCHOE NPZMY CHYDEFSH, FBL LBL SING VSHMY CH OYYOE. sing HGEMEMY Y OE VSCHMY RPDBCHMEOSCH OBYEK, S VSC ULBBM, UMBVPK, LPTPFLPK BTFRPDZPFCHLPK. CHURPNOYMYUSH VPI ABOUT lHTULPK DXZE, ZDE ZPTEMY OENEGLIE Y OBY FBOLY, OP CHPF ЪDEUSH, RPD LPOEG CHPKOSHCH ... fPMSHLP GENERAL - Y PYUECHIDGSCH VSCHMY NSC CHUE ...

chPKOB VMYYYMBUSH L LPOGH, B VPI RPYUENKH-FP VSCHMY FTSEMSHCHNY. xTsBUOBS LBTFIOB LFPZP VPS IPTPYP ЪBREYUBFMEMBUSH CH NPEK RBNSFY. with RPNOA, DEOSH VSHCHM RBUNHTOSCHN, CHPDHI OBUSHCHEEO ZBTSHA PF ZPTSEYI FBOLPCH, TBTSCHCHCHCH UOBTSDPCH, ABOUT DHYE VSHMP NTBYOP. UOBTSSDCH TCHBMYUSH CHEDE, Y PUPVEOOP NOPZP FBN, ZDE UFPSMY GENERAL FBOLY Y ZDE RTPIPDYMY FTBOYEY OBYEK REIPFSCH. LPNBOYT VBFBTEY NOE RTYLBBM CHSHCHDCHYOHFSHUS CHRETED Y RPLBBM THLPK- ChPO ABOUT FH CHPCHSHCHYOOPUFSH, ZDE S DPMTSEO ЪBOSFSH OR U BDBYUEK UCHSBFSHUS U LPNBODYTPN TPFSCH Y PRTEDEMIFSH PZOECHSHCHE UTEDUFCHB RTPFYCHOYELB RETED OBYNY FTBOYESNY. LBL TB H FFP CHTENS ABOUT FFK ChPCHSHCHIEOOPUFY TCBMYUSH WOBTSDSCH. oEDBMELP PF OBU OBIPDYMUS LPNBODYT UFTEMLPCHPZP VBFBMShPOB, S HOBM X OEZP TBURPMPTSEOYE OHTSOPK NOE TPFSCH.

rPUMEDOIK VPK CHEUOPK 1945 ZPDB

UBVEZBS CHRETED, S IPYUKH RPDYUETLOHFSH, UFP CH NPEK RBNSFY UPITBOYMYUSH OEULPMSHLP RYJPDPH P VPSI OB LFPN OEVPMSHYPN HYBUFLE. yFBL, RPMHYUYM RTYLB, OBDP YDFY... fPMSHLP RTYZTEMY NEUFP, METSB CH CHPTPOLE, LPFPTBS VSCHMB NEUFPN HLTSHCHFIS,- OBDP RPLYDBFSH. dBCE Y Y FBLPZP HLTSCHFIS OE PUPVP RTYSFOP CHSCHMEEBFSH Y YDFY FHDB, ZDE ENMS RPDOINBEFUS PF TBTSCHCHCHCH. s, TBCHEDUYL Y FEMEZHPOYUF U LBFHYLPK LBVEMS RPVETSBMY H FPN OBRTBCHMEOYY, ZDE OBIPDYMBUSH TPFB. VETSBMY NSCH VSHCHUFTP, OE RTYZYVBSUSH, KOBS P FPN, UFP OENEG OBU OE CHYDYF. NSC DPMTSOSCH LBL NPTsOP VSHCHUFTEE RTEPDPMEFSH HYBUFPL NEUFOPUFY, RP LPFPTPNH RTPFYCHOYL RETYPDYUEULY PFLTSCHCHBEF PZPOSH. rp RHFY OBYEZP RETEDCHYTSEOIS CHUS ENMS VSCHMB YЪTSCHFB UOBTSDBNY, FPMSHLP RTPVETSBMY FFPF PRBUOSCHK HYBUFPL, B UBDY OBU HCE TCHFUS UOBTSDSHCH. LBL IPFYFE, OP FFP GENERAL WHAT! vKhDSH CHSHCH FBN, CHSH VSHCH UPZMBUIMYUSH UP NOPC, UFP OBN RPCHEMP. RP RHFY NSC CHUFTEYUBMY KHVYFSHCHI OBYI UPMDBF. DPVETSBMY DP OYJOYOSCH, CH LPFPTPK UFPSMY GENERAL FBOLY, UPCHUEN TSDPN CHRETEDY VSCHMY CHYDOSHCH FTBOYEY OBYEK REIPFSCH, UPCHB OBULTYREMY "ULTYRHIY", UOBTSDSHCH OBYUBMY TPCHBFSHUS CH OYYOYOYOE, ZDE NSHCHYOE h FP CHTENS UELHODSCH TEYBAF CHUE - UNPFTYYSH, LHDB HLTSCHFSHUS, LTHZPN TPCHOBS ENMS, YЪTSCHFBS CHPTPOBNY. h FYI OEVPMSHYYI Y OEZMHVPLYI CHPTPOLBI ZPMCHKh OE HLTPEYSH. MEZMY VOLUME, OYUEZP UPDATE PUFBCHBMPUSH DEMBFSH, LBL MEUSH. LFP VSCHM ABOUT ZHTPOFE, Y LPNKh RTYIPDYMPUSH OBIPDYFSHUS RPD PZOEN "ULTYRHIY", FPF OBEF LBLPK TEELP CHATSHCHCHBEFUUS FFPF UOBTSD. oEDBMELP UFPSM OBY FBOL, S ULBBM TEVSFBN - RPMEN L FBOLKH, CHUE-FBLY FBN ZHUEOIGSCH Y LBFLY - LFP LBLPE-FP HLTSCHFYE RPD FBOLPN. rPDRPMY L FBOLCH, MAL CHPDYFEMS VSCHM OENOPTsLP RTYPFLTSCHF, FBOLYUF HCHYDEM OBU Y LTYLOHM - DBCHBK L OBN! ON PFLTSCHM SMALL, RETCHSHCHN RPME NPK TBCHEDYUYL, B S OB OIN. RPNOA, CHMEBA CH FBOL, B CH LFP CHTENS UPCHUEN TSDPN TB'PTCHBMUS UOBTSD Y S YUKHCHUFCHHA, LBL RP NPEK ЪBDOYGE UFHYUBF LPNShS ЪENMY. OH, DKHNBA, IPTPYP, UFP OE PULPMLY, B FP BD NPK VSCHM VSCH CH DShCHTBI. op FHF S VSHCHUFTP OSHCHTOHM H FENOPFH Y UFHLOHMUS ZPMCHPK PVP YUFP-FP FCHETDPE, B H FBOLE LTHZPN NEFBMMYUEULIE LPOUFTHLGYY, CHPF RPYUENKh FBOLYUFSHCH CHUEZDB CH YMENBI. h FBOLE OBU UPVTBMPUSH YuEFCHETP, B CHPF RPYUENKh OE VSCHMP FTEFSHEZP Yumeob llyrbtsb, S Ulbbfsh oe NPZH. FEMEZHPOYUF U LBFHYLPK PUFBMUS RPD FBOLPN, CHOKHFTSH OE RPME.

NEW CHRECHSHCHE ABOUT ZHTPOFE RTYYMPUSH HLTSCCHBFSHUS CH FBOLE. CHUE CH FBOLE OERTYCHSHCHUOP, OE FBL, LPZDB FSH HLTSCCHBEYSHUS CH NBFHYLE-ENME. eUMY VSCHOE OYNOSS YBRLB, OCHETOP, CHUS ZPMCHB VSCHMB VSCH CH UYOSLBI. lPZDB HLTSCCHBEYSHUS H YENME, FP PULPMLY NYOHAF FEWS, MEFSF OBD FPVPK, B FHF PHEEOOYE DTHZPE- UIDYYSH OBD ENMEK Y UMSCHYYSH, LBL P VTPOA HDBTSAF PULPMLY. th OBDP VSHMP URPLPKOP UIDEFSH RPD ЪBEYFPK VTPOY Y UMHYBFSH FFP! fBOLYUF ЪBLTSCHM SMALL, YCH FBOLE OBUFKHRIMB FENOPFB, OYUEZP OE CHIDOP, FPMSHLP RPVMEULYCHBAF HЪLYE RTPUCHEFSCHCH UNPFTCHSCHI EEMSI. NS VEURPLPIYUSH IB FEMEZHPOYUFB, BLCHBMY EZP NYFS, LPFPTSCHK METsBM RPD FBOLPN. fBOLYUF RTYPFLTSCHM SMALL, Y NSCH ENKH LTYLOHMY, TSYCH MY FS? CHUE PVPYMPUSH RPLB VMBZPRPMHYuOP. GENERAL RTEVSCHCHBOYE CH FBOLE VSHMP LPTPFLYN. pZOECHPK PVUFTEM LPOYUYMUS Y NSC RPVETSBMY L FTBOIESN, OP RP RKHFY PRSFSH BLMEZMY, PLYOKHCH CHZMSDPN, ZDE TSE NPTsOP VSCHMP CHSHCHVTBFSH HLTSCHFYE? obKFY NEUFP DMS op, PFLHDB NPTsOP VSHMP VSHCHYDEFSH RTPFICHOYLB. rTEDUFBCHSHFE - TPCHOPE PFLTSCHFPE NEUFP, OEF OY VHZTB, YOY LHUFYLB. unNPFTA, RETED OBNY PLPMP FTBOYY UFPYF RPDVIFSCHK OBY FBOL, F.E. UBNPIPDOPE PTHDYE uh-85. rPDRPMY L OENH U FSHMShOPK UFPTPOSCH. rTPFICHOIL OBU OE DPMTSEO CHYDEFSH, RPFPNKh UFP RPBDY EZP MECHPZP VPTFB VSHCHM HLMPO CH GENERAL UFPTPOH. tEVSFBN S ULBBM - DBCHBKFE bb uh LPRBFSH HLTSCHFYE-KHVETSYEE. with EEE OYYUEZP OE ULBBM P OBIEN URBUBFEMSHOPN PTHDYY - MPRBFE. x LBTsDPZP REIPFYOGB EUFSH UBRETOBS MPRBFB, BX OBU CHNEUFP OEE PVSCHYUOBS YFSCHLCHBS MPRBFB U HLPTPYUEOOOSCHN YuETEOLPN. at LFPC MPRBFPK NSCH OE TBUUFBENUS OILPZDB, Y CHPF UEKYBU POB VSCHMB H TBCHEDYUYLB, LPFPTSCHK EE OPUIM LBL CHFPTPK BCHFPNBF. teVSFB METSB CHSCHLPRBMY RPLB OEZMHVPLHA EEMSH CHDPMSh VPTFB PLPMP ZHUEOIGSCH, UFPVSH UUEUFSH ABOUT LPTFPYULY Y HLTSCHFSHUS PF PULPMLPC. UCHEFMPZP READING PUFBCHBMPUSH NBMP Y OBUFHRBMY UHNETLY, OP NSC HTS H HLTSHCHFIY Y DSHCHIBFSH OBN UFBMP MEZUE. FERETSH VKhDEN TsDBFSH TBUUCHEFB, YUFPVSCH PTEDEMYFSH NEUFP, PFLHDB VKhDEN CHEUFY OBVMADEOYE b RTPFICHOYLPN.

UBNPIPDLB UFPSMB RPBDY OBYI FTBOYEK, ZDE OBIPDYMBUSH REIPFB CH 10 NEFTBI, RTBCHSHCHN VPLPN L OBN. UPCHUEN UFENOMP, Y UFBMP OENOPPZP URPLPKOEE, RTPFICHOYL NEOSHIE PVUFTEMYCHBM OBU. RETCHPE, UFP NSC DEMBMY- HZMHVMSMY EEMSH, OE ЪBVSCHCHBS, UFP LFP UBNBS RETEDPCHBS ABOUT ZHTPOFE, LPFPTBS OERPUTEDUFCHEOOP UPRTYLBUBEFUS U RTPFYCHOYLPN, Y FHF BLPOSH PUPVSHCHE Y UHTTPCHSHCHE. UPMDBFSCH VE CHUSLYI RPOHLBOYK VSHCHUFTP HZMHVYMY EEMSH, LPFPTBS PLBBMBUSH RPD MECHPK ZHUEOYGEK UBNPIPDLY. FEMEZHPOYUF RPUFBCHYM BRRBTBF, B UBN RPFSOKHM FEMEZHPOOSCHK LBVEMSH (OYFLH - FBLPK VSCHM FETNYO) OB OR LPNBOYTB VBFBTEY, YUFPVSCH HUFBOPCHYFSH U OIN UCHSHSH. PUFBMYUSH CHDCHPEN, UIDEFSH H UCHETSECHSCHTSCHFPK FTBOYEE VSCHMP RTPIMBDOP. h CHPDDHI CHMEFBAF PUCHEFYFEMSHOSHOSCHE TBLEFSCH, Y OBIY, Y OENEGLIE, PUCHEEBS NEUFOPUFSH RETED UCHPYNY FTBOYESNY. with RTYOYNBA TEYOYE - PUNPFTEFSH uh-85 Y RPRSHCHFBFSHUS RTPOILOHFSH CHOHFTSH FBOLM. ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE BLPOSHCH CHPKOSHCH DBCE OPYUSHA - PUPVSHCHE, Y YUHCHUFCHHEYSH UEVS OEURPLPKOP. b FHF OBDP CHSHCHMEBFSH J FTBOYEY Y CH RPMOSHCHK TPUF PUNBFTYCHBFSH uh. rPNOA, RPDPYMY L MALKH, ZDE CHPDYFEMSH, B FHF CH CHPDHI U YIREOYEN CHMEFEMB TBLEFB, J NSC FHF CE PYUKHFYMYUSH ABOUT ENME, NSC KHUREMY MEYUSH DP RPMOPZP CHPZPTBOIS. METSBMY Y UNPFTEMY ABOUT uh, RPLB ZPTEMB TBLEFB.

CHUE NPY CHPURPNYOBOYS, ZHTPOPFCHCHE RYYPDSHCH VSCHMY UCHSBOSCH U RETEDPPKPK, CHPF Y UEKYUBU S RPDTPVOP PRYUSCHCHBA CHUE UMHYUYCHYEEUS UP NOPK RPD LPOEG CHPKOSHCH. yuyfbfsh y ryubfsh uekyubu mezlp, b with OBUBM RJUBFSH P UEVE, P ZHTPOFE H 1970 ZPDH- 35 MEF FPNKh OBBD.

OBU YOFETEUPCHBMP, PFLTSCHF MY SMALL CHPDYFEMS, B PO VSHCHM BLTSCHF. FERETSH OBDP TEYBFSH DTHZHA OBDBYUH - LBL OBN RTPOILOHFSH CHOHFTSH YUETE CHETIOYK SMALL, B YI VSCHMP LBCEFUS 2 YMY 3. oP LBL LFP UDEMBFSH? LBL FPMSHLP TBLEFB RTELTBEBEF ZPTEFSH (UCHEFYFSH) ​​OBUFHRBEF LTPNEYOBS FSHNB, LTPNE MEFSEYI LTBUOSCHI FPYUEL FTBUYTHAEYI RHMSH, LPFPTSHCHE RTPOYSHCHCHBAF UCHPYNY GERPYULBNY FSHNH. FPMSHLP NSC RPDOSMYUSH U ENMY, B TBCHEDYUYL UFBM ЪBVYTBFSHUS ABOUT VTPOA, LBL CH FFP CHTHENS NYNP OBU, YUKHFSH OE BDECHBS, UP UCHYUFPN RTPMEFEMB FTBUUYTHAEBS PUETEDSH. oENEG CHEM PZPOSH Y RHMENEFB n.zB. CHYDYNP, BY OBNEFIM OBU, YMY LFB YBMSHOBS RHMENEFOBS PYUETEDSH? OP RTSNP ULBTSH, OBIE UPUFPSOYE VSCHMP ABOUT RTEDEME. lTHZPN FENOPFB, B FEVE OBDP RPDOSFSHUS CH RPMOSHCHK TPUF Y ЪBVTBFSHUS ABOUT HUFBOPCHLH. fPMSHLP OEKFTBMSHOBS RPMPUB TBDEMSEF OBU U RTPFICHOYLPN DB FENOBS OPYUSH, LPZDB NYNP FEVS RTPMEFBEF RHMENEFOBS PYUETEDSH - H FFPF NPNEOF UFBOCHYFUS TSHFLP Y UFTBYOP. h FBLHA UYFKHBGYA ABOUT ZHTPOFE WITH RPRBM CHRECHSHCHE. rTBCHDB, VSCHMY UMHYUBY TBOSHIE, LPZDB S RPRBDBM RPD RKHMENEFOSHCHK PZPOSH, OP LFP VSCHMP DOEN, B FHF PYUETEDSH U LTBUOSCHNY PZPOSHLBNY CH RPMOPK FENPFE. iPTPYP VSCHMP OBVMADBFSH ЪB RPMEFBNY ​​FTBUU-PYUETEDY, TBUFSOKHCHKYEKUS OIFSHHA ZDE FP H UFPTPOE PF FEVS, LBL RTBCHYMP, CHUEZDB UPRTCHPTsDBEYSH YI RPMEF CHZMSDPN. PUNPFTEFSH UBNPIPDLKh OBN NEYBMY PUCHEFYFEMSHOSHCHE TBLEFSHCH. CHUE-FBLY NSCH CHSHVTBMY NPNEOF Y TBCHEDUYL RETCHSHCHK CHME CHOHFTSH. uOBYUBMB NShch VPSMYUSH, YuFP FBN NPZHF VShchFsh FTHRSHCH, OP FBN LFPZP OE VShchMP, S FPTS VBVTBMUS Ch HUFBOPCHLH. with OE RPNOA, YUEN NSCH PUCHEEBMY CHOKHFTY, OP YUFP-FP ЪBTSYZBMY URYYULBNY ... about DOE RPD OPZBNY VSCHMP NOPZP CHUSLPZP NHUPTB Y CEMEEB. rBIMP ZBTSHA Y ZPTEMPK TEJOPK. with OBM TBOSHIE, CH FBOLE ABOUT UMHYUBK BCHBTYY CH DOYEE EUFSH BCHBTYKOSHCHK SMALL. RETCHSHCHN DAMPN OBU YOFETEUPCHBM BCHBTYKOSHCHK SMALL - EUFSH MY PO CH uh-85? eUMY NSCH EZP OE OBKDEN, FP OBN BCHFTB OEPFLHDB VHDEF CHEUFY OBVMADEOYE b RTPFICHOYLPN. LPTRKHU UBNPIPDLY EEE RPMOPUFSHHA OE PUFSCHM Y PFDBEF FARM. tBZTEVMY NKHUPT, OBYMY SMALL, ON VSCHM DEZHPTNYTPCHBO, OP NSCH EZP UNPZMY PFLTSCHFSH. x LTSCHYLY MAlb REFMY VSCHMY UPTCHBOSHCHP CHTENS RPTSBTB Y CHTSCHCHCHCH VPERTYRBUCH Y LTSHCHYLB RTPUFP PFDEMSHOP BLTSCHCHBMB SMALL. NSCH EZP PUFBCHYMY PFLTSCHFSCHN, B UBNY CHSHCHMEMMY YY UBNPIPDLY, BLTSCHCH OB UPVPK CHUE CHETIOYE MALY. FERETSCH OBN PUFBEFUS L MALH RTPTSCHFSH MB PF OBYEZP HLTSHCHFIS, LPFPTPE OBIPDYMPUSH RPD ZHUEOYGEK. RETCHBS OPYUSH RPD FBOLPN, FP EUFSH uh... nshch OE UNPZMY Y OE KHUREMY b UCHEFMPE CHTENS UFP-FP RPDSHULBFSH Y RPMPTSYFSH RPD UIDEOYS, TBICHEDUIL UFP-FP OBFBULBM, ChTPDE RTEMPZP UEOB, Y NSC, UYDS CH UFP HLTSHCHFYY, YBDTEN. yOPZDB CHUFTSIYCHBMP PF VMYЪLP TBTSCHCHBAEEZPUS UOBTSDB, OP CH OBDETSOPN HLTSHCHFIY OBU YFP PUPVP OE UFTBYMP. about RETEDPCHPK NSC OE OBMY, UFP FBLPE CHUFBCHBFSH TBOP YMY RPDOP. ZMBB PFLTSCHCHBMYUSH, LBL FPMSHLP OBJOYOBEF UCHEFBFSH - EUMY POY VSHCHMY UPNLOHFSHCH. DP TBUUCHEFB PLPMP FTBOYEY CHUEZDB LBL-FP RP PUVPPNKh PTSYCHMEOOP, FHF UMSCHYYSH ZMHIPK UFHL LPFEMLPCH Y RTYZMHYEOOKHA TBZPCHPTOHA TEYUSH. DP OBUBMB TBUUCHEFB UFBTYOB TPFSCH DPMTSEO OBLPTNYFSH MADEK, Y PO TSE RTYCHPYF OHTSOSCHE VPERTYRBUSCH. rPLPTNYF Y VSHCHUFTP PVTBFOP HETZBEF CH FSHM. eUMMY VSH LFP CHUE CHYDEMY OBLY LYOPTETSYUUETSCH, FP SING VSC, OCHETOP, MHYUYE Y RTBCHYMSHOEE VSC RPLBBMY H UCHPYI LBTFJOBI, LBL NSC RTPYMY YUETEI CHUE YFP.

UPMDBFSCH OBFBULBMY RTEMPK UPMPNSCH Y RPUFEMYMY EE ABOUT DOP PLPRB, Y X OBU RP PVUFBOPCLE CH PLPRE UFBM MALU- RPSCHIMBUSH Y RETYOB Y RPDHYLB, FERETSH NPTsOP Y RTYMEYUSH. FP S FBL CHURPNYOBA RP IPDH, ABOUT CHPKOE RTYIPDYMPUSH RTPSChMSFSH Y UNELBMLH. h ZHTPOFPCHPK TSOYOY Y CH VPA RTYIPDYMPUSH PLBSCCHBFSHUS CH FBLYI UNEYOSCHI, RPTPK VECHSHCHIPDOSHCHI RPMPTSEOISI, UFP UPMDBFH OBDP HNEFSHOE FPMShLP UFTEMSFSH, OP Y CHSCTSYCHBFSH, YuFP NShCH Y.

VSHMP FENOP, RPUSCHMSHOSHCHK U OBYEK VBFBTEY, LPFPTSCHK RTOYEU OBN EDH, VOLUME OBU RP FEMEZHPOOPNKH LBVEMA. xCHYDEM GENERAL HVETSIE RPD uh Y ULBBM - CHPF LFP KHUFTPIYMYUSH!.. hFTPN S UCHSBMUS U LPNBODYTPN TPFSCH, LPFPTSCHK NOE ULBBM - VHDEN RTPDPMTSBFSH OBUFHRBFSH. LPNBOYT VBFBTEY RP FEMEZHPOKH RTYLBBM PF REIPFSCH OE PFUFBCHBFSH. rPUME LPTPFLPK BTFRPDZPFPCHLY REIPFB CHSHYMB Y FTBOYEK Y RPYMB CHOY RPD HLMPO. NShch FPCE CHSHCHMEY YY UCHPEZP HLTSHCHFIYS Y RPYMY PE CHEUSH TPUF b OEK. YMY NEDMEOOP, WITH CHUE UNPFTEM RPD OPZY - OEF MY NYO. UCHEFYMP UPMOGE, CHPLTKhZ RTPUFPT, ULPMSHLP CHPDHIB Y UCHEFB - NPTsOP VSC LFPNKh RPTBDPCHBFSHUS, OP... LFP OE RTPZKhMLB, B CHPF-CHPF VKhDEF CHUFTEYUB U CHTBZPN, ChTBZ NPTsEF PLBEFPVSHUS RET. th CHUEZDB, LPZDB YDEYSH CH OBUFHRMEOYE, LFY NSCHUMY FEVS OE RPLYDBAF. zhBYUFSHCH PFLTSCHMY RP OBN PZPOSH YJ NYOPNEFPCH Y YY PTHDYS RTSNPC OBCHPDLPK. REIPFB ЪBMEZMB, U TEELYN CHTSCHCHPN TCBMYUSH UOBTSDSCH, PF RTSNPC OBCHPDLY OBEFFE, LBLPE NPTBMSHOPE CHPDEKUFCHIE ABOUT REIPPHH, LPZDB RP FEVE RPYUFY CH HRPT UFTEMSEF PTHDYE! uOBTSDSC TCHFUS RPYuFY PDOPCHTENEOOP U CHCHUFTEMPN PTHDYS. FP OE RHMS, LPFPTBS MEFIF NYNP, B WOBTSD. with UBN RHYLBTSH, Y FPTS OE PDYO UOBTSD CHSHCHRHUFYM Y UCHPEZP PTHDYS RTSNPK OBCHPDLPK RP OENGGBN, B FERETSH UBN RPRBM RPD PZPOSH RTPFYCHOYLB. oEULPMSHLP UOBTSDPCH TBIPTCHBMYUSH CH CHPDHIE, PFMEFBS PF ENMY TYLPYEFPN. REIPFB MEZMB, Y NSC MEZMY CH OEPPMSHYPK CHPTPOLE, LPZDB NSCH YMY, FP CHRETEDY WITH HCHYDE CHIPD CH ENMSOLKH, F.E. LBLPE-FP HLTSHCHFYE. x NEOS HCE CHSHCHTBVPFBMBUSH RTYCHSHCHULB - LPZDB YDEYSH YMY VETSYYSH, CHUEZDB UNPFTYYSH, OEF MY CHRETED LBLPZP-OYVHDSH HLTSHCHFIS, CHPPVEE NZOPCHEOOP PLYDSCHCHBEYSH CHZMSDPN CHUE LTHZPN. uFP ffp b hltshchfye? POP OBIPDYMPUSH CHRETEDY OBU RTYNETOP CH 20-30 NEFTBI, FBN, ZDE UBMEZMB OBYB REIPFB. NPK FEMEZHPOYUF PUFBMUS RPD FBOLPN. b NSCH U TBCHEDUILPN RPYMY ЪB REIPFPK. tBCHEDYUYLKH S ULBBM, LPZDB NShch METSBMY Ch CHPTPOLE, OBDP VETSBFSH ChPO Ch FP HLTSCHFYE, UFP CHRETEDY OBU, Y RPLBBM THLPK. with RETCHSHCHK CHUFBM Y RTYZOHCHYUSH RPVETSBM, LPZDB VETSBM, FP CHYDEM - DCHB REIPFYOGB PFRPMBAF OBBD. fPMSHLP DPVETSBM, Y EEE OE HUREM RTSCHZOHFSH CH RTPIPD ENMSOLY, LBL OBD ZPMPPK RTPMEFEM UOBTSD Y FHF CE ZDE-FP RPBDY NEOS TBBPTCBMUS. with DBCE OE HUREM RTYTSBFSHUS L ENME, OP NZOPCHEOOP PVETOHMUS Y RPUNPFTEM CH FH UFPTPOH, ZDE PUFBMUS NPK TBCHEDUYL - UOBTSD TBBPTCHBMUS CH UFPTPOE PF OEZP. ChVETSBCH CH RTPIPD YENMSOLY, S PVETOHMUS L TBCHEDYUYLH Y LTYLOHM ENH, NBIOHM THLPK, NPM, PFIPDY OBBD. h OEVPMSHYPK YENMSOLE, PUFBCHMEOOOPK OENGBNY (YMY YFP VSCHM YI VMYODBTS?) VSCHMY 3-4 YuEMPCHELB, YY OYI VSCHM PDYO MEKFEOBOPH. xCHYDECH NEOS, BTFYMMETYUFB, PO RTEDUFBCHYMUS Y ULBBM, UFP PO LPNUPTZ UFTEMLPCHPZP VBFBMShPOB, B S ENH PFCCHEFYM, UFP NPS VBFBTES RPDDETSYCHBEF CHBY UFTEMLPCHHA TPFF. with EEE OE OBM, UFP NSCHUE PLBMYUSH CHRETEDY UCHPEK REIPFSCH, Y UFP REIPFB PFIPDYF ABOUT RTETSOYK THVETS. MEKFEOBOPH NOE ULBBM - CHYDYYSH REIPFB OEUEF VPMSHYE RPFETY Y PFIPDYF, B NSC FERETSH PLBBMYUSH CHRETEDY OEE. MEKFEOBOPHNOE ZPCHPTYF, H OENGECH CH OYYOE CHLPRBOSCH FBOLY Y PTHDYS, Y YI OBDP RPDBCHYFSH (HOYUFPTSYFSH) ​​PZOEN BTFYMMETYY Y RPNPYUSH REIPFE. with ENH FPZDB ULBBM, S RPOSM CHUE, OP OILBL OE RPKNKh, LBL CE FBL, S FPMSHLP UFP CHYDEM, LPZDB VETSBM, - REIPFB CHRETEDY, B CHSH ZPCHPTYFE - PFPYMB? fBL NSC CHUE PLBBMYUSH CHRETED REIPFSCH, Y, LBL NSC FPZDB ZPCHPTYMY, ABOUT OEKFTBMSHOPK RPMPUE. MEKFEOBOF-REIPFYOEG VSHCHM UFBTY NEO OB 3-4 ZPDB, OB OEN VSHMB UETBS UPMDBFULBS YOYEMSH Y PFMYYUYFSH EZP PF UPMDBF NPTsOP VSCHMP FPMShLP RP RPZPOBN. with ENH ULBBM, TBD RPNPYUSH, OP FSCH CHYDYYSH, UFP S PDYO, X NEOS OEF UCHSHY U LPNBODYTPN VBFBTEY. NPI MADY PUFBMYUSH RPBDY Y FERETSCH CHNEUFE U REIPFPK PFIPDSF.

CHURPNYOBS FFPF RYJPD, B YI VSHCHM OE PYO, CHPF Y FBL CHPECHBMY, UFP OBDP VSHCHMP UCHSBFSHUS RP TBGYY Y UPPVEYFSH ABOUT LPNBODOSHK RHOLF Y DPMPTSYFSH PVUFBOPCHLH, B UCHSHOEF. NEOS YUBUFP LBL LPNBODYTB CHCHPDB HRTTBCHMEOYS RPUSCHMBMY CH TPPH, B TBDYPUFBOGYY UP NOPC, LBL CHUEZDB, OEF. POB CHUEZDB POFBEFUSE RTY LPNBODY VBFBTEY. pDOB OBDETSDB ABOUT FEMEZHPOOKHA UCHSHSH, LPOEYUOP EA RPMShPCHBFSHUS NPTSOP Y HDPVOP, LPZDB OBIPDYYSHUS CH PVPTPOE. OP RTY DCHYTSEOYY, LPZDB REIPFB U LPTPFLYNY PUFBOCHLBNY RTPDCHYZBEFUS CHRETED,- RRPTPVHK KHUREFSH OBCHEUFY RTPCHPDOKHA UCHSHSH! vshchchbmp Y FBL, REIPFB ЪBDETSBMBUSH, ЪBChSbMUS VPK - NShch FHF CE OBYUOBEN RTPLMBDSCHBFSH UCHSHSH, OE KHUREMY OBCHEUFY UCHSHSH, B REIPFB RPYMB CHRETED. FEMEZHPOYUFSHCH UPCHB OBYOBAF UNBFSCHCHBFSH FEMEZHPOOSCHK LBVEMSH, FBL YUBUFP VSCCHBEF. йОПЗДБ, ЛПЗДБ ФТЕВПЧБМПУШ, ТБДЙПУФБОГЙА РЕТЕДБЧБМЙ Ч НПЕ ТБУРПТСЦЕОЙЕ, Б ЛПНБОДЙТ ВБФБТЕЙ Ч ЬФП ЧТЕНС ОБИПДЙФУС У ЛПНБОДЙТПН ДЙЧЙЪЙПОБ, Х ЛПФПТПЗП ВЩМБ ТБДЙПУФБОГЙС Й ЛПНБОДЙТ ВБФБТЕЙ ЙНЕМ УЧСЪШ У ВБФБТЕЕК Й ТХЛПЧПДЙМ УФТЕМШВПК.

rPRBM YS Ch FBLPE RPMPTSEOYE, YuFP NEOS OEMSHЪS PFMYUYFSH PF REIPFYOGB. ChPF Y CHURPNYOBEYSH UEKYUBU, UFP OBBYUYF VSHCHFSH CH REIPFE, LPFPTBS CHUEZDB CHUFTEYUBEFUS U ChTBZPN RETCHPK. h REIPFE, LBL RTBCHYMP, CH VPA CHUE TBCHOSCH. vPK NPTSEF VSHCHFSH KHUREYOSCHN YMY OEHDBYUOSCHN, B FP VSCCHBEF H FEYUEOYE DOS. th RPRTPVHK CH LFPK NBUUE MADEK, DPRHUFYN, CH TPFE, CHSHVETY PFMYUYCHYIUS RPUME UPU! rPUME UPU PDOB OBZTBDB DMS UPMDBFB- PUFBMUS TSYCH. FP NPE NOOEOYE, Y UFP WITH CHYDE ABOUT RETEDPPKPK - YuEUFOP PV FFPN RYYKH.

CHNEUFE - REIPFYOGSHCH YS, BTFYMMETYUF, - RPRBMY CH FTSEMPE RPMPTSEOYE, UYDS ABOUT OEKFTBMSHOPK RPMPUE CH OENEGLPN VMYODBTSE. CHEDEN NETSDH UPVPK TBZPCHPT - OBDP UFP-FP RTEDRTYOSFSH. x OBU VSHCHM PYO CHSHIPD - TsDBFSH UHNETEL YMY RTPVYTBFSHUS OBBD RP PFLTSCHFPK NEUFOPUFY. OP LBL? rTPFICHOYL CHUA NEUFOPUFSH DP UBNSHCHI FTBOYEK RTPUNBFTYCHBM. eEE Y EEE TB PVUHTsDBMY, LBL OBN VSHCHFSH Y UFP RTEDRTYOSFSH? with OE BOBA, OBM MY LPNBODYT VBFBMSHPOB, UFP LPNUPTZ (YMY RBTFPTZ), EZP LPNBODYT, PUFBMUS CH MPCHHYLE? p FPN, UFP S ЪDEUSH, NPY MADY OBAF, Y POY LFP CHYDEMY, UFTBYF PDOP - OEF UCHSKY Y TSDPN OENGSCH, Y OILBLPZP RTYLTSHCHFIS. uFP CE LBUBEFUS OBYEZP TBZPCHPTTB U MEKFEOBOPFPN REIPFSCH, SOE NPZKh CHUE RTYRPNOYFSH. obdp RTPVYTBFSHUS OBBD L UCHPYN, OP LBL? with TEYIM PUNPFTEFSH CH VYOPLMSH NEUFOPUFSH, ZDE TBURPMBZBMUS RTPFYCHOYL, CHCHYEM YЪ ЪENMSOLY CH RTPIPD, B RTPIPD PVTBEEO RPYUFY CH UFPTPOH OENGECH. uOBYUBMB S RPUNPFTEM OBBD, F.E. FHDB, LHDB OBDP OBN RTPVYTBFSHUS. mekfeobof-reipfyoeg PRSFSH OBRKHUFYMUS ABOUT OBU, BTFYMMETYUFCH, YNOE UFBM ChSCHZPCHBTYCHBFSH, YUFP NSCH OE UNPZMY RPDBCHYFSH PZOECHSHCHE UTEDUFCHB OENGECH, YY-YB YuEZP VBFBMShPO RPOEU VPMSHYE. “UFP FSCHCHULBJSCHCHBEYSH NOE OEDCHPMSHUFCHP? with FBLPC CE, LBL Y FSH: NOE ULBBMY NPY LPNBOYTSCH YDFY CHNEUFE U REIPFPK, Y ChPF, CHYDYYSH, LHDB NSC U FPVPC RTYYMY? - PLBBMYUSH ABOUT OEKFTBMSHOPK RPMPUE". with ENH, RPNOA, FPCE RPYUFY CH FBLPN CE FPOE PFCHEFYM - NPM, FS NOE OE CHSHCHULBSCCHBK, B ZPCHPTY FPNKH, LFP RPDBM LPNBODH REIPFE YDFY CH BFBLH.

CHURPNYOBS FFPF RYJPD, ULBTSH- DB, DEKUFCHYFEMSHOP GENERAL LPNBODPCHBOYE RPDPYMP OEPUNPFTYFEMSHOP - VEY FEBFEMSHOPK TBECHEDLY PZOECHSCHI UTEDUFCH RTPFICHOYLB. y, LBL RTBCHYMP, CHUEZDB RTEDCHBTYFEMSHOP ZPFCHYMYUSH L OBUFHRMEOYA. dPMTSOB VSHCHFSH BTFYMMETYKULBS PVTBVPFLB RETEDOEZP LTBS Y KHOYUFPTSEOYE PZOECHSCHI UTEDUFCH RTPFICHOYLB, B LFPZP OE RPUMEDCHBMP, Y, LBL CHYDYFE, TEEKHMSHFBF - CHUE PZOEHSCHE UTEDUFCHOY RTPFYSHCHOY. bTFRPDZPFPCHLB RP READ VSCHMB LPTPFLPC. with OE RPNOA, RPYENH VSCHMB FBLBS UREYLB? CHEDSH OBLBOHOE NSC RPOEUMY VPMSHYE RPFETY CH FBOLBI, PV LFPN OBN OBRPNYOBEF RPDVYFSHCHK uh, RPD LPFPTSCHN NSCH OBYMY HLTSCHFYE.

yFBL, WITH CHCHEM H RTPIPD VMYODBTsB, YUFPVSCH PUNPFTEFSH NEUFB OBIPTSDEOYS OENEGLYI YFHTNPCHSCHI PTHDYK Y PRTEDEMIFSH NEUFB, ZDE TSE PLPRBMBUSH OENEGLBS REIPFB, Y CHPPVEE PUNPFTEFSHMETSBTSBTSHCHA. h TEDLPN LHUFBTOYLE CHYDOP VSCMP Yuete ZPMSHCHE CHEFLY LHUFBTOYLB OENEGLPE RTPFYCHPFBOLCHPE PTHDYE, LBL UEKYUBU RPNOA, ABOUT PTHDYKOPN EIF VSCHMY CHYDOSH UMEDSCH VEMPK LTBULY- PUFBFLY OYNOEK NBULYTPCHLY. SWORD AND DBMSHIE ABOUT PRYLE MEUB UFPSM OENEGLYK FBOL, ORPMPCHYOKH CHLPROOSCHK. KHUMSCHYBM CHSHCHUFTEM Y FHF TSE RPYUKHCHUFCHPCHBM TEELIK HDBT. oP LPZDB RTYYEM CH UEVS, RPOSM, UFP S TsYCHPK, Y METSKH CH RTPIPDE VMYODBTSB, FBN ZDE FPMSHLP UFP UFPSM, OBVMADBS CH VYOPLMSH. CHEUSH BUSHCHRBO ENMEK, CH ZPMPCHE YKHN Y CHPO, CH KHYBI LBLPC-FP ZKHM. with RPOSM, UFP S TsYCH, OP OYUEZP OE NPZH UPPVTBTSBFSH. pLPMP NEOS, UNPFT, RTYZOKHCHYUSH, UFPSF DCHB UPMDBFB Y MEKFEOBOF. y ChPF ChPRTELY FPNKh, UFP UMHYUMPUSH, S, OE UPPVTTBTSBS, CHSCHYEM Y RTPIPDB Y ChP CHEUSH TPUF RPVETSBM OBBD, L UCHPYN FTBOIESN. UMSCHYKH CHUMED NOE LTYUBF NPY FPCHBTYEY: "FPCBTIE MEKFEOBOBF, LHDB ChSCH?" nPTSEF YOE OBDP VSCHMP FBL TYULPCHBFSH, B PUFBFSHUS ABOUT OEKFTBMSHOPK RPMPUE DP FENOPFSHCH. RPNOA, RPVETSBM RTYZOKHCHYUSH, YUFP VSCHMP UIM, OE PVTBEBS CHOYNBOIS O KhVYFSHCHI OBYI UPMDBF, NYNP LPFPTSCHI VETSBM. ZPMCHB UPPVTBTSBMB PDOP - OBDP LBL NPTsOP VSHCHUFTEE DPVETSBFSH DP UCHPYI FTBOYEK. lPZDB DPVETSBM Y RTCHZOHM CH FTBOYEA, UPMDBFSCH, HCHYDECH NEOS, PREYMYMY, U HDICHMEOYEN URTPUIMY: “b FSh PFLHDB, MEKFEOBOF?” BRSHCHIBCHYUSH, S YN PFCHEFIM OECHOSFOP, YOILBLOE REFINERY RTIKFI CH UEVS. rPLBBM THLPK CH FH UFPTPOH, PFLHDB RTYVETSBM, Y ULBBM - FBN H VMYODBTSE PUFBMUS PDYO MEKFEOBOF, LPNUPTZ CHBYEZP VBFBMShPOB, Y DCHPE UPMDBF.

with VE CHUSLPK NBULYTPCHLY Y PUFPPTTSOPUFY TEYM PUNPFTEFSH CH VYOPLMSH CHRETEDY METSBEHA NEUFOPUFSH. b ZHBYUFSHCH, CHYDYNP, Y ЪBUELMY OBU, LPZDB NSCH CHVETSBMY CH YI VMYODBTS. SING CHSHCHUFTEMYMY YY PTHDYS RTSNPK OBCHPDLPK. uOBTSD TBBPTCBMUS RETED UBNSCHN RTPIPDPN, RETED OBUSCHRHA, FBL GENERAL VTHUFCHETPN, ZDE WITH UFPSM, Y VMBZPDBTS LFPNH VKHZTH LEMMY PULPMLLY PF TBTSCHCHB RTPMEFEMY CHCHSHCHCHIE NPEK. eUMY VSCHOE FFPF URBUIFEMSHOSCHK VKhZPT ЪENMY, SVSH PV FFPN UEKYUBU OE RYUBM. LBL Y UFP UMHYUMPUSH U FENY, LFP PUFBMUS CH OENEGLPN VMYODBTSE ABOUT OEKFTBMSHOPC RPMPUE, SOE BOBA, CH FP CHENS NOE VSCHMP OE DP LFZP. b FP, UFP NEOS LBUBEFUS CH FFPN RYЪPDE, FP S CHURPNOIM, NOE RPCHEMP, B NPZMP VSHFSH Y IHCE.

LFP VSCHM ABOUT ZHTPOFE Y ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE, FPF FPMSHLP Y NPTCEF UEVE RTEDUFBCHYFSH, UFP OBBYUF CH UCHEFMPE CHTENS NBSYUYFSH RETED FTBOYESNY ABOUT ZMBBI X RTPFICHOYLB. NPTsOP TsDBFSH Y RHMA UOBKRETB, Y RHMENEFOHA PYUETEDSH CH URYOKH. th OB FFPF TB NEOS VPZ, OBCHETOPE, RPNYMPCHBM. h FTBOYEE X REIPFSCH SOE ЪBDETSBMUS, J RP IPDH UPPVEEOIS, LPFPTSHCHK YEM H FSHM OEEBNEFOP PF RTPFYCHOYLB, DPVTBMUS DP uh. yFBL, S PRSFSH PYUHFIIMUS RPD NEFBMMYUEULPK LTSCHYEK. fBN NEOS CHUFTEFYMY NPY DCHPE UPMDBF Y FHF CE UVBMY URTBYCHBFSH, LBL CE CHSC, FPCHBTYE MEKFEOBOF, UNPZMY DOYEN CHSCVTBFSHUS? OPNOE VSHMP OE DP YI TBUURTPUPCH, FPMSHLP, RPNOA, PDOP- CH ZPMPCHE YKHN, CH KHYBI ЪCHPO. SING CHYDEMY NPE UPUFPSOYE, WITH VSCHM VMEDEO, LET'S GO UPZOHCHYUSH, DETTSB ZPMCHKH THLBNY, Y TBUURTPUSCH GO RTELTTBFIMY. DPMZP RPUME LFPK LPOFKHYY SOE REFINERY RTYDFY CH UEVS, OH, BCHPO CH ZPMPCHE FBL Y RP UEK DEOSH UPITBOYMUS, Y NEO OE RPLYDBEF. rPCHTETSDEO UMHIPPCHPK OETCH, FFP PRTDEDEMIMY HCE CH ZPURYFBME.

lPOYUIMUS NBTF 1945 ZPDB, OBUFKhRBM BRTEMSH, OP OPYUSHA VShchMP IPMPDOP. vMBZPHUFTPYMY NSCH UCHPK OR, UCHPE HLTSCHFYE. NSCH PFTSCHMY DPRPMOYFEMSHOSHCHK IPD, YUFPVSCH NPTsOP VSCHMP HDPVOP CHMEEBFSH CH LPTRHU uh. UPMDBFSCH RTJOEUMY UPMPNSCH, FERETSCH X OBU OBUFPSEBS NSZLBS RETYOB. about OPYUSH MPTSYMYUSH ABOUT DOP PLPRB, HLTSCCHBMYUSH FTPZHEKOSCCHK PDESMPN Y UPMDBFULPK RMBE-OBLYDLPK. RPNOA, MEYUSH NPTsOP VSCHMP FPMSHLP DCHPYN, B FTEFIK DPMTSEO UYDEFSH Y DETSHTYFSH U FEMEZHPOOPK FTHVLPK ABOUT ZPMPCHE. CHUA OPYUSH FEMEZHPOYUF Y TBCHEDUYL RP PYUETEDY DETSKHTYMY, UNEOSS DTHZ DTHZB.

UBVEZBS CHRETED, IPYUKH ULBBFSH, LFP VSCHMP RPUMEDOEE CH NPEK ZHTPOFPCHPK TSOYOY NEUFP HLTSCHFIS ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE. s, LPOEYUOP, OE RTEDRPMBZBM, OP RPMKHYUMPUSH FBL...

yuHCHUFCHPCHBMPUSH RP CHUENKH- VMYYFUS LPOEG CHPKOSHCH. CHURPNYOBA CHUYE, YUFP VSHMP, Y LBL S RETETSYM LFY RETCHSHCHE CHEUEOOYE DOY 1945 ZPDB. x OBU ChPOYLMB RTPVMENB, LBLYN PVTBPN NSC VKHDEN CHEUFY OBVMADEOYE y uh? rPNOA, ЪBMEЪMY CH FBOL, CH LPFPTPN UFPSMMB FENOPFB, UCHEF CHOHFTSH RPRBDBM FPMSHLP CH HOLIE RPMPULY UNPFTCHSCHI EEMEK. oERTYCHSHCHUOP VSHMP UYDEFSH CH FENOPFE, BL VTPOEK UCHEFIF UPMOGE, B X OBU PHENOP. h HLIE UNPFTCHSHCHE EEMY OBVMADBFSH VSCHMP OEHDPVOP, B UBNPE ZMBCHOPE, OEMShS VSCHMP RPMSh'PCHBFSHUS VYOPLMEN. h VBYOE VSCHMY RETYULPRSHCH DMS LTKhZPCHPZP PVPTTB, OP POY VSCHMY YURPTYUEOSCH, LPZDB FBOL ZPTEM. th CHPF H VPLCHPK VTPOE NShch PVOBTHTSYMY UFP-FP RPIPTS ABOUT PLOB, LPFPTSCHE VSCHMY BLTSCHFSCH. NSC YI PFLTSCHMY VE FTHDB (EUMY RBNSFSH NOE OE YNEOIMB), OP FFP VSCHMP FBL. NSC RTPFPMLOHMY OBTHTSH NEFBMMYUEULIE RTPVLY ABOUT HERPULE. GERPYULKH RPFSOEN PE CHOKHFTSH - Y PLOP BLTSCHCHBEFUUS. NSCH EZP OBCHBMY "ZMBBL". CHOKHFTY ABOUT RPMH VSHCHM NHUPT PF UZPTECHYEK BTNBFHTSCH, UPMDBFSCH UFP NPZMY, HVTBMY. h FBOLE RBIMP ZBTSHA, DMS RTYFPLB CHEUEOOEZP CHPDHIB NSC RTYPFLTSCHMY SMALL CHPDYFEMS. h FY PLOB NSC FEBFEMSHOP RTPUNBFTYCHBMY CHRETEDY METSBEKHA NEUFOPUFSH. pVPT VSCHM IPTPYK. nSCH PVOBTHTSYMY NOPZP GEMEK RTPFYCHOYLB. RETCHPE, UFP VTPUYMPUSH H ZMBB, LFP CHLPRBOOPE 75-NN YFHTNPCHPE PTHDYE, P LPFPTPN S HCE RYUBM, FP FP PTHDYE, LPFPTPE WITH CHYDEM YЪ VMYODBTsB Y LPFPTPE, RP OBCHETOP. pTHDYE UFPSM Ch LHUFBTOYLE, RETED PTHDYEN IPTPYP CHYDOB PZPMEOOBS PF CHCHUFTEMB ENMS. рТЙНЕТОП Ч 800-1000 НЕФТБИ ПФ НЕОС ЮХФШ МЕЧЕЕ РП ЖТПОФХ УФПСМ МБФЩЫУЛЙК ИХФПТ, ПДЙО ОЕВПМШЫПК ДПНЙЛ У ОЕУЛПМШЛЙНЙ УБТБСНЙ (УФТПЕОЙСНЙ), Й ЧПФ ЙЪ-ЪБ ДПНБ ЧЙДЕО ВЩМ ДХМШОЩК ФПТНПЪ ПТХДЙКОПЗП УФЧПМБ ОЕНЕГЛПЗП ФБОЛБ. fp vshchm fbol "rbofetb" fpp rptedemym rp pVP CHUEI PVOBTKHTSOOOSCHI GEMSI Y PVP CHUEN, UFP NSC HCHYDEMY ABOUT CHRETEDY METSBEEK NEUFOPUFY, S DPMPTSYM LPNBODYTH VBFBTEY UFBTYENH MEKFEOBOPH MBRFECHH, PO OBIPDYMUS ABOUT OR LPNBODYTB DYCHYYPOB. YuETE OELPFTPE CHTENS NOE RPCHPOIM IBN. ЛПНБОДЙТБ ДЙЧЙЪЙПОБ ЛБРЙФБО бВТБНСО Й УЛБЪБМ, ЮФП ПО ИПЮЕФ РТЙКФЙ ОБ НПК РЕТЕДПЧПК ор, ЮФПВЩ ОЕРПУТЕДУФЧЕООП ПЪОБЛПНЙФШУС У ПВУФБОПЧЛПК ОБ РЕТЕДОЕН ЛТБЕ - РТСНП ЙЪ ФТБОЫЕЙ, ФБЛ ЛБЛ ЮБУФШ НЕУФОПУФЙ ОЕ РТПУНБФТЙЧБМБУШ У ор ЛПНБОДЙТБ ДЙЧЙЪЙПОБ Й ГЕМЙ, ЛПФПТЩЕ НЩ ПВОБТХЦЙМЙ, ЙН ЙИ ОЕ ЧЙДОП . with ULBBM, LBL DP OBU DPVTBFSHUS, F.E. LBLYN RHFEN DPKFY OEEBNEFOP PF RTPFYCHOYLB. pTYEOFIT - OBYB uh.

OBUFHRIMY FARMSHCHE UPMOEYUOSCHE DOY, UPMOGE RTYZTECHBMP, Y UPMDBFSCH UFBMY CHSHCHMEBFSH Y FTBOYEK Y B OBYEK UBNPIPDLPK HUFTBYCHBFSH RETELHTSCH Y, LPOEYUOP, ZTEFSHUS ABOUT UPMOSHCHYLE. ENMS EUFSH ENMS, CH FTBOYEE USCTP Y IPMPDOP, B FHF YN VB VTPOEK FERMP Y OBDETSOP. oELPFPTSHCHE UPMDBFSCH UFBMY RTEOEVTEZBFSH ULTSCHFOPUFSHHA. with ABOUT REIPPHH UFBM TKhZBFSHUS: “ChSh YUFP FHF TBUIPDYMYUSH, CHEDSH X OBU DEUSH OBVMADBFEMSHOSHCHK RHOLF!” UUBDY CH OYYOE UFPSMY OBBYY uh-152, FTSEMSHCHE UBNPIPDOSHCHE HUFBOPCHLY. lPZDB SING WADB RTIEIBMY? yMY OPYUSHA, YMY POI VSHMY U NPNEOFB PUFBOCHLY OBYEZP OBUFHRMEOYS. rPDPYMY FBOLYUFSHCH, MEKFEOBOPH Y UETSBOF, Y URTPUIMY H NEOS, EUMY MY GEMY PVOBTHTSEOIS, S ULBBM, DB EUFSH, Y RTEDMPTSYM YN ЪBMEЪFSH CH UBNPIPDLH, PFLHDB POY YI YIKHYUMY. OBNEFICH UEVE GEMY, PRTDEDEMYMY DP OII TBUUFPSOYE Y ULBBMY, UFP VHDHF CHCHETSBFSH ABOUT UCHPYI uh-152 ABOUT RTSNHA OBCHPDLKH Y KHOYUFPTSBFSH YI. SING HYMY, B S PUFBMUS CH FBOLE PYO. th CHPF, S UMSCHYKH, LBL UPCHUEN TSDPN RTPMEFEM UOBTSD, YODBCHBS ЪCHHL "ZHTTT". noe FFPF ЪCHL YЪCHEUFEO LBL BTFYMMETYUVH- LFP RTPMEFEM VTPOEVPKOSHCHK UOBTSD (LBL NSC YI OBSHCHCHBMY, VPMCHBOLB). uOBTSD UDEMBO RPMOPUFSHHA Y LTERLPZP NEFBMMB Y URPUPVEO FPMSHLP RTPVYCHBFSH VTPOA FBOLPCH. with FPZDB UTBYENH RPOSM, UFP OENEG CHEDEF RTYGEMSHOSHCHK PZPOSH RP OBYENH uh, ZDE S OBIPDYMUS. uOBTSD RTPMEFEM YMY CHCHYE, YMY UVPLKh, SOE NPZKH ULBBFSH, Y S FHF CE RPOSM - OBDP OENEDMEOOP URHULBFSHUS CH EEMSH, F.E. RPD FBOL. FPMSHLP URHUFYMUS, OE KHUREM ЪB UPVPK BDCHYOHFSH LTSCHYLH MALB, LBL FHF CE RPMHYUYM UYMSHOEKYK HDBT. LPTRKHU UBNPIPDLY DTPZOHM, YEEMEK DOYEB ABOUT OBU RPUSCHRBMYUSH NHUPT Y RSHCHMSH. h FFP CHTENS RPD FBOLPN OB VSCHMP FTPE - S, TBCHEDYUYL Y FEMEZHPOYUF. NShCHMY URPLPKOSHCH, OBBS P FPN, UFP OBD ZPMPPK NBUUB NEFBMMB Y EZP OE RTPVYFSH, FBL LBL Y NYOSCH, Y UOBTSDSH MEFSF L ENME ACCOUNT. bB DCHB ZPDB CHPKOSHCH H NEO CHRECHSHCHE FBLPK UMHYUBK, LPZDB OBVMADBFEMSHOSHCHN RHOLFPN NOE UMHTSYMP GENERAL UBNPPDOPE PTHDYE uh-85. th CHPF FBL TSE CHCHEChCHE S umshchykh, LBL RTPMEFBEF NYNP NEOS UOBTSD, CHSHCHRHEOOOSCHK OENEGLYN PTHDYEN, y umshchykh FPMShLP RPFPNH, UFP ON RETCHSHCHN UOBTSDPN OE RPRBM Ch uh. OH, BEUMY VSC RPRBM, FP, OCHETOP, S PV LFPN UEKYUBU VSCH OE OBRYUBM. rPUME RPRBDBOYS UOBTSDB CH LPTRHU uh FBN UFP-FP BUFHYUBMP Y BUCHEOEMP Y VSHCHUFTP CHUE UFYIMP. NS URPLPKOP GO OUT Y UFTSIYCHBMY U UEVS RSHCHMSh. NECDH UPVPK CHEMY TBZPCHPT Y ZBDBMY, LHDB RPRBM UOBTSD, CH CHETIAOAA YUBUFSH LPTRHUB YMY CH NPFPTOHA YUBUFSH? NOE TBCHEDUYL ZPCHPTYF, FPCHBTYE MEKFEOBOF, EUMY UOBTSD RPRBM CH CHETIAA YUBUFSH LPTRHUB, FP FBN, OCHETOP, VHDEF DSHTB Y OBN CH OEE VHDEF HDPVOP CHEUFY OBVMADEOYE CH VYOPLMSH. URPLPKOP UYDYN Y TBUUKHTSDBEN - TBI RPRBM, OBBYUF, UFTEMSFSH VPMSHIE OE VKhDEF. y CHPF PRSFSH TELYK HDBT - LPTRHU UBNPIPDLY CHODTPZOHM. x NEOS H ZPMPCHE RPUME LPOFKHJY UFPYF URMPYOPK YKHN Y ChPO, B FHF PRSFSH TELLYK HDBT H ZPMPCHKh.

y FHF UMHYUMPUSH OECHETPSFOPE - NOE ABOUT LPMEI ACCOUNT OF RBDBEF OBUFPSEYK OENEGLYK UOBTSD, PDOCHTENEOOP ABOUT OBU RBDBAF PULPMLY PF VTPOY, POI VSHMY UYOEZP GCHEFB, GCHEFB BLBMEOOPZP NEFBMMB. with PREYM, TBDCHYOHM OPZY, Y UOBTSD KhRBM NETsDH OPZ ABOUT DOP OBYEZP TPCHYLB, FHF NSCHUFTP UFBMY PUCHPPVPTSDBFSHUS PF PULPMLPC, LPFPTSCHE KHRBMY BY CHPTPF Y PVTSYZBMY YEA. GO URPLPKOP TsDBMY, B YuFP DBMSHYE VHDEF? b with OENOPZP RTYYEM CH UEVS Y TEYYM PUNPFTEFSH UOBTSD, PO VSCHM ZPTSUYK, VTBFSH EZP CH THLY OEMSHЪS. rPUME FPZP, LBL ON PUFSCHM, S CHSM H THLY, B ON EEE VSCM ZPTSUYK, GCHEF UOBTSDB VSCHM UYOECHBFSHKK, LBL RPUME BLBMLY, ZPMPHOBS YUBUFSH UOBTSDB PFLPMPFB. with PRTEDEMYM LBMYVT - 75 NN, ABOUT FSCMSHOPC YUBUFY UOBTSDB FPTYUBM FTBUUET. ChMEЪ CH FBOL (S FBL VKHDKh PVPOBYUBFSH uh) Y RETCHPE, UFP S KhCHYDEM, - RTPVPYOKH CH RTBCHPN LPTRKHUE CHOYEKH, UFBM YULBFSH CHFPTKHA RTPVPYOKH, CHEDSH RP FBOLKh RPRBMY DCHB UOBTSDB. chFPTPK RTPVPYOSCH ABOUT RTBCHPN VPTFH S OE PVOBTKHTSYM - UOBTSD, CHYDYNP, RPRBM RP FBOLCH, OP VTPOA OE RTPVYM Y PFTYLPYEFYM PF OEE. lBL CE RPMHUYMPUSH, UFP WOBTSD TEACHING ABOUT LPMEOY? with PVOBTHTSYM CHFPTKHA RTPVPYOKH ABOUT MECHPK UFPTPOE VPTFB. th ChPF UOBTSD, RTPVYCH UOBYUBMB RTBCHSHCHK VPTF, B RPFPN, RTPVYCH MECHSHCHK VPTF, HDBTYMUS P LBFPL Y HCE PVEUUYMEOOOSCHK UCHBMYMUS UOBYUBMB ABOUT FTBL ZHUEOIGSCHCH, B RPFPN CHOY, OB NEOS. rPMHYUBMPUSH, WOBTSD RTPVIM PVE UFEOLY FBOBL. h OITSOEK YUBUFY LPTRHUB VSCHMB VTPOS OE FPMEE 20 NN, CHPF ON PVE UFPTPOSCH LPTRHUB Y RTPVYM. with FHF OYUHFSH OE RTEKHCHEMYYUYCHBA, B RYYKH LBL VSCHMP. LFP VSCHM ABOUT ZHTPOFE, RPKNEF, UFP NOE RTYYMPUSH RETECYFSH. CHOYKH, CH OYYOE UFPSM uh-152, Y PLPMP FBOLYUF, Y S ENKH RPLBJSCHCHBA, DETTSB CH THLE UOBTSD, DEULBFSH, RPMHYUYM ZPUFYOEG PF ZhTYGB. PO RPDPYEM, YS ENKH TBUULBBM, LBL Y YuFP RTPYYPYMP, RPYUENKH H NEO FFPF UABTSD Ch THLBI. ON NOE FPZDB ULBBM: "NSCH PFPNUFYN OB OBYI FPCHBTIEEK". NSHMADBMYA, LBBLE FSMESCHEY UH-152 Nedmeoop otmayophmy on veneo-Oopuffh (yi vhhchmp by nyosch), veneuibch y Khltshfys, RTGEMICHYSHPDS 2-3 RTPPDS, in vocabula with ЪOBM, POI DPMTSOSCH KHOYUFPTSYFSH FBOL, LPFPTSCHK UFPSM ЪB DPNPN; "JETDYOBOD", LPFPTSCHK UFPSM ABOUT PRYLE MEUB, YYFHTNPCHPE PTHDYE, FP, LPFPTPPE CHAMP PZPOSH RP OBYENH uh. with LET'S GO H FBOLE Y CH OBVMADEOYE BL YI UFTEMSHVPK. with ЪOBM, EUMYNOE RBNSFSHOE YЪNEOYMB, H LBMYVTB 152 NNOE VSCHMP UREGIBMSHOSHCHI VTPOEVPKOSHCHI UOBTSDPCH. x OII VSHCHMY PULPMPYUOSCHE, VEFPOPVPKOSHCHE, LPFPTSHCHE URPUPVOSHCH UCHPEK NBUUPK TBYFSH MAVPK FBOL, B FBLTS VSCHMY UOBTSSCH LHNNHMSFYCHOSCHE, LPFPTSHCHE, RPRBDBS CH FBOL, RTPTSYZBAF VTPOA. retchshchk CHSHCHUFTEM UDEMBMY RP FBOLH, LPFPTSHCHK UFPSM, HLTSHCHYUSH b DPNPN, S IPTPYP CHYDEM, LBL LFPF FSTSEMSHCHK UOBTSD RPRBM CH DPN Y Yuete DPN RPRBM CH FBOL. chFPTS uh CHSHCHRHUFYMB OEULPMSHLP UOBTSDPCH RP FBOLC, LPFPTSCHK UFPSM ABOUT PRYLE MEUB. oENGSCH PFLTSCHMY RP OBN PZPOSH YЪ NYOPNEFPCH Y PTHDYK, PF OEULPMSHLYI ЪBMRCH "ULTYRHI" ENMS UOPCHB ЪBZHDEMB, UOBTSDSC Y NYOSCH TCHBMYUSH UPCHUEN TSDPN. uh-152 GENERAL OBIPDYMYUSH OB OBNY CH OYYOE Y, LBL ZPCHPTYFUS, CHUE YYYLY VSCHMY OBBYY. zhBYUFSHCHYDEMY, PFLHDB GENERAL uh CHCHETSBMY, Y CHEMY PZPOSH RP OYYOYOE YUFP RPBDY OBU, Y POBOE RTPUNBFTYCHBMBUSH UP UFPTPOSCH RTPFYCHOYLB. rTPFICHOIL PFLTSCHM PZPOSH RP ЪBTBOEE RPDZPFPCHMEOOOSCHN PZOECHCHNY FPYULBN.

lPYNBTOSCHK DEOSH LPOYUYMUS, L CHEYUETH CHUE IBFYIMP. ABOUT UMEDHAEIK DEOSH OBUFHRYMP URPLPKOPE HFTP, Y UPMDBFSCH Y FTBOYEK RTYYMY OB OBY FBOL, ZDE SING LHTYMY Y ZTEMYUSH ABOUT UPMOGE. b LP NOE DPMTSEO VSCHM RTYKFY DMS PJOBLPNMEOYS U PVUFBOCHLPK ABOUT RETEDOEN LTBE U OBEZP or bbn. LPNBOYTB OBYEZP DYCHYYPOB LBRYFBO bVTBNSO. PO RTYYEM PYO, S RPLBBM ENKH SMALL, YUETE LPFPTSHK NSC RTPOILBMY CH UBNPIPDLH. with RPME RETCHSHCHK, B ON CHFPTPK ... ON VSCHM OECHSHCHUPLPZP TPUFB Y ENH VSCHMP OEFTHDOP CHMEEFSH Y FBN UPFPSFSH CH UBNPIPDL. with ENH RPLBBM, ZDE ABOUT NEUFOPUFY RTPIPDSF OENEGLIE FTBOYEY Y FE GEMY, LPFPTSHCHE NSC PVOBTTHTSYMY.

th FHF RPCHFPTYMPUSH! with KHUMSCHYBM CHSHCHUFTEM Y FHF TSE BCHL RTPMEFECHYEZP NYNP UOBTSDB (ZHTTTT). with ULBBM? "fPCHBTYE LBRYFBO, VSHCHUFTP URHULBKFEUSH CHOI, OENGSH RP OBN PRSFSH CHEDHF PZPOSH RTSNPC OBCHPDLPK". BY URHUFYMUS, ЪB OYN YS, OP OE KHUREM BDCHYOHFSH LTSCHYLPK SMALL, FHF TELLYK HDBT RPFTSU GENERAL uh. bVEZBS CHRETED, ULBTSH, FFPF UOBTSD HZPDYM CH NPFPTOHA YUBUFSH uh. l-O bVTBNSO VPMSHIE OE TEYYMUS CHMEYBFSH C uh Y KHYYEM LUEVE OB OR DYCHYYPOB. CHPF FEVE Y VEEPRPBUOPE NEUFP DMS op! б НЩ ТБУУЮЙФЩЧБМЙ ОБ ВПМЕЕ ОБДЕЦОПЕ ХЛТЩФЙЕ, Б ПЛБЪБМПУШ ОБПВПТПФ... пВЩЮОП РПЮФЙ ЧУЕЗДБ ДМС ор НЩ УППТХЦБМЙ ХЛТЩФЙС Ч ЧЙДЕ ЪЕНМСОЛЙ ЙМЙ ВМЙОДБЦБ, ЗДЕ НЩ УПЗТЕЧБМЙУШ Й ПФДЩИБМЙ Й, ЛБЛ РТБЧЙМП, Ч ИПМПДОПЕ ЧТЕНС УФБЧЙМЙ РЕЮЛХ. OP CHPF ЪDEUSH RPD UBNPIPDLPK OEF OY LTSCHY, OY REYULY. CHPDHI VSHCHM USCHTPK Y RTPIMBDOSHK (IPMPDOSHK), URBFSH RTYIPDYMPUSH ABOUT DOE TPCHYLB, UPMDBFSCH OBFBULBMY RTMPK UPMPNSCH Y HMPTSYMY RPDUFYMLH, OH, B LTSCHYEK UMHTSYMB OBN ZHUEOYGB uh.

rPNOA, MYYSH UNPFTYYSH OB OYI Y DKHNBEYSH, ULPMSHLP LFY ZHUEOIGSHCH RTPEIBMY RP OBYEK ENME? dBCHYMY Y ZOBMY ZHBYUFCH, B FHF ABOUT LFPN NEUFE ZHBYUFULYK UOBTSD PUFBOCHYM YI. CHYUSF ZHUEOIGSHCH OBD GENERAL ZPMPCHBNY VE DCHYTSEOIS, Y OILPZDB VPMSHIE OE VHDHF UMHTSYFSH OBN. ChPF DBTSE CHUE SUEKLY FTBLPC ZHUEOIG ЪBVYFSCH ENMEK, LPFPTBS FBL Y PUFBMBUSH CHRTEUUPCHBOOPK Y ЪBUPIYEK FBN.

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As you know, the plan "Barbarossa" provided for the simultaneous application of crushing blows in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. At the same time, the capture of Leningrad and the mastery of the coast of the Baltic Sea was considered as the most important goal of the offensive of the Wehrmacht.

The Nazi leadership, seeking to seize the "cradle of the Russian revolution", took into account not only the strategic, but also the enormous political and economic importance of the city on the Neva. Here were the leading factories of the most important industries, including machine-building, aircraft engine, radio engineering, shipbuilding, tank, electromechanical, optical and others. Approximately 75% of manufactured products were for the defense complex. In addition, Leningrad was also the largest transport hub. Success in this direction allowed the Germans to achieve dominance in a vast region from the Baltic to Scandinavia, provided sea routes for the export of Swedish ore and Finnish nickel to the Reich, and established contact on the land theater with a potential ally in the war - Finland.

For the attack on Leningrad in East Prussia, Army Group North was deployed under the command of Field Marshal Ritter Wilhelm von Leeb as part of the 18th and 16th field armies and the 4th tank group. Group "North" had 29 divisions, including 3 tank and 3 motorized divisions, in which there were 787 thousand personnel, 8348 guns and mortars, 679 tanks and assault guns. The actions of the ground forces were to be supported by 830 aircraft of the 1st Air Fleet of Colonel-General Keller, including 203 fighters and 271 bombers. Directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940, von Leeb's troops were tasked with destroying the Red Army units located in the Baltic States and, having captured the ports of the Baltic Sea, Leningrad and Kronstadt, deprive the Soviet fleet of strongholds. As part of this task, Army Group North delivered the main blow in the direction of Dvinsk (Daugavpils), pushing its reinforced right wing as quickly as possible to the area northeast of Opochka in order to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic. Part of the forces of Army Group Center deployed in East Prussia were also involved in delivering the initial strike in the northwestern direction: two army corps of the 9th Field Army and the 3rd Panzer Group.

The entire German grouping, concentrated on the border of Lithuania, consisted of 43 divisions, including 7 tank and 6 motorized, over 13 thousand guns and mortars, about 1500 tanks and more than 1000 aircraft.

On the Soviet side, Army Group North was opposed by the troops of the Baltic Special Military District under the command of Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, who until 1941 did not command anything higher than the regiment, who made up the North-Western Front with the beginning of the war. In his 8th, 11th and 27th armies there were 25 divisions, including 4 tank and 2 mechanized, 1 rifle and 3 airborne brigades - 440 thousand people, 7467 guns and mortars, 1514 tanks, 1814 aircraft.

Three groups were deployed on the territory of Eastern Finland: the German army "Norway", the Finnish South-Eastern and Karelian armies. The Germans were supposed to advance in the Ukhta, Kandalaksha and Murmansk directions, and the Finns - on the Karelian Isthmus and to the north of it, in order to connect with the troops of Army Group North in the Leningrad region and on the Svir River. The Finnish units were also entrusted with the liquidation of the Soviet base on the Hanko Peninsula and the cover of the army "Norway" from the south. In total, 21.5 settlement divisions were concentrated in Finland, in which there were 407.5 thousand people, 3084 guns and mortars, 192 tanks and 424 aircraft of the 5th air fleet and the Finnish Air Force (however, the participation of the Finns in the war against the Soviet Union was still standing questionable).

Thus, the German command expected to capture Leningrad with a double blow: from the north - by Finnish troops, from the south - by the forces of the German Army Group North. At the same time, the German General Staff understood that the available forces of the Wehrmacht might not be enough for successful operations at once in all strategic directions. Since Hitler considered the capture of Leningrad an "urgent task", the Barbarossa plan included the idea of ​​​​stopping the offensive of Army Group Center at the turn of the Dnieper and transferring part of its forces to the north for the victorious completion of the operation to capture the northern capital of the USSR. The attack on Moscow - the dream of the German generals - was not planned before the capture of Leningrad.

The defense of the “city named after the great Lenin” from land, primarily from encroachments by “fascist” Finland, was to be provided by the troops of the Leningrad Military District under the command of Lieutenant General M.M. Popov. They numbered 15 rifle divisions, the average staffing of which was 12 thousand people and was significantly higher than in other border districts. The artillery units of the rifle formations were fully equipped with personnel and military equipment. On the eve of the war, the district had 436 thousand soldiers and commanders, 9599 guns and mortars, it included the 1st and 10th mechanized corps. The armored forces in June 1941 numbered 1857 tanks and 514 armored vehicles, and the air force - 2104 aircraft. In addition, 656 aircraft of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet (including 172 bombers and 353 fighters) and 115 aircraft of the Northern Fleet were in the northwestern direction. Six artillery regiments of the 2nd Air Defense Corps, covering Leningrad, were armed with about 600 new 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. Two fighter divisions (3rd and 54th), allocated for the air defense of the city, consisted of 200 aircraft. On June 19, the formation of the 7th Air Defense Air Corps began from parts of fighter aviation.

The Baltic Fleet included 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 leaders, 21 destroyers, 66 submarines, 6 minelayers, 33 minesweepers, 7 patrol ships, 48 ​​torpedo boats and a number of auxiliary vessels. In coastal defense, there were 424 large-caliber guns. The air defense system of the fleet had 352 guns. All this economy was led by Vice Admiral V.F. Tributs, who stepped from the bridge of the destroyer to the position of commander of the fleet during two years of purge in the armed forces, “along the way” was noted at headquarters posts, is the fourth flagship in four and a half pre-war years. Comrade Stalin was not afraid to boldly put forward new cadres, however, as well as to push them without hesitation.

In general, our forces were considerable, and the stories of Soviet marshals about the quantitative superiority of the enemy are fairy tales for Soviet citizens, from whom the above figures were hidden for half a century as the greatest state secret. For this reason, the former Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky could speak authoritatively about "whole armadas of fascist aviation" and the threefold superiority of the Army Group "North" with 679 tanks and 830 aircraft over the Baltic district, which had 1514 tanks and 1814 aircraft. It was necessary to somehow explain why the beginning of the war for the troops of both the North-Western Front and the entire "invincible and legendary" was marked by a series of catastrophic defeats.

By the end of June 22, 1941, the Germans, having advanced 20-70 km, captured the crossings over the Neman. The Soviet defense was broken through in several directions, the communication system was broken, and centralized command and control of troops was lost. The troops of General F.I. Kuznetsova, who were not oriented in the real situation and did not interact with each other, tried to implement pre-war plans to liberate foreign proletarians from the oppression of the local capitalists and landowners. Aviation, instead of supporting ground forces, carried out raids on targets in East Prussia and, in the conditions of a well-organized enemy air defense system, suffered heavy losses. The mechanized corps were ordered to launch a counterattack in the zone of the 8th Army, Colonel-General P.P. Sobennikov along the Siauliai-Tilsit highway. In a three-day oncoming battle with the 41st motorized corps of General Georg Reinhardt (1st and 6th tank, 36th motorized, 269th infantry divisions - about 400 tanks), the Soviet 12th and 3rd mechanized corps, operating without the support of infantry, aviation, logistics and communication with each other, they were defeated, losing almost 1300 tanks. The report of the head of the armored department of the North-Western Front on July 2 stated: “The 3rd mechanized corps does not exist. The remnants of the 12th mechanized corps and the remnants of the personnel of the 3rd mechanized corps must be led together, placing them in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Luga for a new formation.

Having defeated the Soviet units, Reinhardt threw his corps to the Dvina.

Divisions of the 11th Army, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov also could not withstand the concentrated impact of armored fists. The army, having suffered heavy losses and cut into two parts, began to roll back to the northeast. The direction of Kaunas, Dvinsk turned out to be practically without cover. The 8th Panzer and 3rd Motorized Divisions from the 56th Corps of General Erich von Manstein, numbering about 200 tanks, wedged here.

Under pressure from the formations of the 4th Panzer Group, supported by bomber aircraft, the troops of the North-Western Front retreated in divergent directions: divisions of the 8th Army - to Riga, parts of the 11th Army - to Sventyany, Diena. It was necessary to carry out urgent measures to organize defense on the Western Dvina River and eliminate the breakthrough in the central sector of the front.

It was decided to organize the defense at the turn of the Dvina by the forces of the army of General Sobennikov and the 27th Army advanced from the depths under the command of Major General N.E. Berzarin. According to the order of the front commander, the 8th Army, which included the remnants of the 10th, 11th rifle corps and the 202nd mechanized division, were to take up defensive positions on the line from Riga to Livani. To the left from Livani to Kraslava, formations of the 16th Rifle Corps retreated. In order to combine the actions of these formations, the front commander decided to push forward the command of the 27th army with service units. The headquarters of General Berzarin moved by car to the Rezekne region and, on the evening of June 28, took command of units in the Daugavpils direction. From the Moscow Military District, the Headquarters transferred here the understaffed 21st Mechanized Corps, Major General D.D. Lelyushenko - "only" 175 tanks and 129 guns. However, General Berzarin did not have time to organize the defense before the enemy approached.

Already on the morning of June 26, on the fourth day of the war, the 8th Panzer Division of General Brandenberger, having overcome about 400 km, broke through to Daugavpils, captured two large bridges across the Western Dvina intact and occupied a bridgehead on the right bank. The next day, the 3rd motorized division of General Yan crossed the river. On June 28, the Germans successfully repulsed the counterattack of Lelyushenko's corps and the 5th Airborne Corps thrown into the "infantry battle", pushing them 40 km from Daugavpils. General Manstein tried with all his heart to continue the dashing raid on the Soviet rear, but the commander of the tank group ordered him to stop. Gepner feared that the 56th motorized corps, separated from the main German forces by 100–130 km, might be surrounded, and therefore decided to wait for the troops of the 16th Army, Oberst General Ernst Busch and the Reinhardt Corps, to reach the Dvina.

In the defense zone of the 8th Army until June 29, the enemy did not conduct active hostilities, pulling troops to the Western Dvina. Separate Soviet units broke through to the east, in particular, the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps, which still had about 40 tanks, retreated across the river in the Riga area. The corps headquarters, which had lost contact with the high command and its own units, was surrounded that day in the forests south of Borisel and destroyed by the Germans. Corps commander Major General N.M. Shestopalov was taken prisoner and died of his wounds on August 6 in a prisoner of war camp in Siauliai.

On June 29, the 41st Motorized Corps crossed the Dvina near Krustpils. And on June 30, the forward detachment of the 26th Army Corps of the 18th Army, Oberst General Georg von Küchler, captured the bridges in Riga. All this extremely complicated the position of the 8th Soviet Army, which retreated to the right bank more slowly than the enemy advanced. On July 1, the Germans occupied Riga.

In the period from June 29 to July 1, the command of the Army Group "North" accumulated forces on the bridgeheads for the subsequent offensive and put the formations in order. According to the order of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces (OKH), formations of the 4th Panzer Group were to lead a swift offensive through Rezekne in the direction of Ostrov and Pskov in order to cut off the Soviet troops' retreat south of Lake Peipus. Manstein's corps during this time was completely concentrated in the Daugavpils region, including the third motorized formation - the SS division "Dead Head"; Reinhardt Corps - in the Krustpils area. At the same time, the infantry of the 18th and 16th armies pulled up to the Dvina. In total, at the end of June, there were 25 divisions in Army Group North, including 3 security divisions that were part of the 101st rear corps.

It would seem that the command of the North-Western Front had the opportunity to strengthen their positions and organize a strong defense behind the water barrier. Manstein feared this most of all: “... six days have already passed since the sudden raid of the corps on Daugavpils. The enemy had time to overcome the shock that he received when German tanks appeared on the eastern bank of the Dvina. However, the Soviet command made one mistake after another. At first, the troops of the 24th and the 41st rifle corps allocated from the reserve of the Headquarters on June 29 were ordered to concentrate in the areas of Vilyaka, Ostrov, to be understaffed and to be ready to launch a counterattack on Daugavpils in order to restore the defense of the 27th army along the Western Dvina. The next day, this decision was canceled and another was adopted. Kuznetsov gave the order to withdraw to the Pskov, Ostrov and Sebezh fortified areas. The troops began to carry out this order. Apparently, this was the most correct decision in this situation.

On July 1, the Germans did not conduct active hostilities. Soviet front-line intelligence reported that the number of enemy troops on the Daugavpils bridgehead was about an infantry division reinforced with tanks. Upon learning of this and taking into account the requirements of the Stavka to eliminate enemy bridgeheads, General Kuznetsov canceled his order of June 30 and again ordered the troops to prepare for the offensive, which was to begin on July 2. Nine hours were allotted for preparation, the starting position for the strike had to be taken by 10 o'clock in the morning. The 8th Army was to eliminate the Krustpils bridgehead, the 27th - to destroy the enemy in the Daugavpils area.

In the armies, first of all, they took measures to stop the withdrawal of troops and return units to the line of the Western Dvina in the areas previously occupied by them. On the morning of July 2, the troops of the front were still on the move and were not ready either for the offensive or for defense. At 5 o'clock in the morning, with the support of all aviation, the Germans struck. As a result, the Soviet armies did not manage to gain a foothold at the turn of the Western Dvina River, their remnants with rearguard battles retreated in divergent directions: the 8th Army - to Estonia, the 27th - to the east, to the Velikaya River, the 11th - in the area Nevel. The complete defeat of the North-Western Front was coming to an end. A gap appeared in the direction of Pskov, into which the 4th Panzer Group rushed. By the end of the day, German mobile formations, moving along the Daugavpils-Ostrov highway, reached the area 20-25 km south of Rezekne and occupied the city the next day.

Following the development of events in this direction, on June 29, the Headquarters of the High Command instructed to organize defenses at the turn of the Velikaya River in advance and firmly close the direction to Leningrad. She ordered to concentrate in the areas of Pskov, Ostrov, Porkhov 22, 24, 41st rifle and 1st mechanized corps. Relying on fortified areas, these formations were to prepare a solid defense in the Leningrad direction.

1st mechanized corps, commanded by Major General M.L. Chernyavsky, was fully equipped and initially had 1039 tanks. However, by the time of the deployment of hostilities in the Pskov-Ostrov direction, it was torn apart and lost its importance as a large mobile unit. His 1st Red Banner Tank Division was transferred to the Northern Front, and the 163rd Mechanized Division was reassigned to the command of the 27th Army. In fact, General Chernyavsky had only the 3rd Panzer Division of Major General I.M. Kuznetsova, located in the forests 20 km northwest of Pskov, but from its composition one tank and one mechanized regiment were transferred to the 41st Rifle Corps.

41 Corps under the command of General I.S. Kosobutsky, consisting of the 90,111,118 and 235th rifle divisions, from July 1, began to unload at the stations of Pskov, Karamyshe-vo, Cherskaya. At the end of the concentration, he was supposed to take the Staro-Pskov, Novo-Pskov and Ostrovsky fortified areas. All his divisions were fully staffed, but, like the vast majority of Red Army formations, they did not have engineering equipment and communications, in any case, there were not a single radio station. The 22nd Rifle Corps was concentrated in the Porkhov area, the 24th - in the Ostrov area.

On the evening of July 3, General Sobennikov unexpectedly received an order with a motorcyclist to take command of the North-Western Front. The 8th Army was received from him by Lieutenant General F.S. Ivanov. On the same day, Lieutenant General N.F. was appointed to the post of chief of staff of the front. Vatutin. The former command perished in the encirclement, and nothing was known about its fate. Later it turned out that Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov survived and at the end of July got out to his own.

In the meantime, Göpner's tank group split up: Manstein's corps, having transferred the 3rd motorized division under the command of General Reinhardt, sharply turned in the direction of Sebezh, Opochka; The 41st motorized corps struck at the Island. The Germans won at a pace: the defense in the Ostrovsky region was occupied only by the 154th separate machine-gun battalion and the 398th rifle regiment of the 118th division, which did not have artillery, grenades, anti-tank mines. The 235th Rifle Division was supposed to arrive here, but its trains, following from Ivanovo, were delayed on the way. Meanwhile, on the morning of July 4, Lieutenant General Kirchner's 1st Panzer Division reached the southern outskirts of Ostrov, crossed the Velikaya River on the move, and captured the city by evening. The maneuver was greatly facilitated by the fact that the Russians again did not have time to blow up the road and railway bridges captured by German motorcyclists. The Soviet units, which entered the battle from the wheels, were unable to resist the enemy and hastily left their defensive positions. At that time, the 56th motorized corps, with difficulty overcoming the swampy terrain, advanced towards the Sebezh fortified area, in which parts of the 21st mechanized corps of General Lelyushenko were entrenched.

Assessing the situation, Sobennikov ordered the commanders of the 41st Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps to destroy the German units in the Ostrov area at dawn on July 5 and restore the defense along the Velikaya River. General Vatutin warned General Kosobutsky in a telephone conversation: “Keep in mind that the liquidation and destruction of the enemy are assigned personally to you, under your personal responsibility. You are responsible for the execution of this order with your head. To solve the task, the 468th rifle regiment of the 111th division and the 3rd tank division with heavy vehicles KV-1 and KV-2 were allocated.

At 16.00, Soviet tankers broke into the city, putting the enemy to flight. The next day, the fighting in the Ostrov region flared up with renewed vigor and became even more fierce. However, according to the habit that has already become a tradition, the red commanders did not organize interaction, as a result of which they fought in isolation from each other. That is, tanks without infantry, infantry without tanks, and each on its own. Therefore, they failed to consolidate their success. Twice tankers broke into Ostrov, lost 140 combat vehicles in the attacks, but could not hold it without the support of infantry formations. The Germans, pulling up additional forces, broke the resistance of the bloodless Soviet units on July 6 and forced them to withdraw. The 1st Panzer Division began to move quickly towards Pskov, and the 6th towards Porkhov.

In a memorandum addressed to a member of the Military Council of the North-Western Front, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent M. Kosarev wrote: “... the commander of the 5th tank regiment, Posenchuk, spoke about the battle for the Island. From his story it follows that the Germans have very few forces in the Ostrov direction and that the capture of the city by our units failed only because the 111th Infantry Division shamefully deserted from the battlefield, its commanders fled first, arguing buttonholes and removing insignia. There are a lot of our forces under the Island, but they all act separately, without any interaction.

After leaving the Island, our divisions retreated to Pskov. On July 7, German tanks managed to break through the battle formations of the Kosobutsky corps and rapidly advance to the southern outskirts of the city. To eliminate this breakthrough, the Soviet command on the morning of July 8 ordered the 41st Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps to launch a counterattack and destroy the enemy. However, while they were preparing for a counterattack, the German troops resumed their offensive at 12 noon. Formations of the 41st Motorized Corps collapsed on parts of the 41st Rifle Corps, which were forced to randomly retreat across the Velikaya River. By this time, the artillery of the Soviet rifle divisions was left without ammunition, the personnel were demoralized by the sight of the rear of the 8th and 27th armies retreating east through their battle formations and often arbitrarily left their positions, joining the fugitives. The situation was aggravated by impunity for the actions of enemy aircraft. The remnants of the 1st mechanized corps retreated to Porkhov.

The Germans perpetrated this entire pogrom with the forces of three divisions!

True, they failed to break into Pskov on the move. This time, the Russians managed to blow up the bridges over the Velikaya River and its tributaries, without even waiting for the departure of their units. The units of the 118th, 111th rifle divisions and the 25th fortified area that remained on the western bank, abandoning all their equipment, crossed the river using improvised means. There could no longer be any talk of any organized defense.

On July 8, General Sobennikov ordered the troops of the front to go over to a stubborn defense at the line of the Pskov fortified area - the Velikaya River - the Cherekha River - Opochka. At the same time, he demanded the creation of groupings on the flanks of the Porkhov direction to launch a counterattack in order to destroy the enemy that had broken through. Such maneuvers in Soviet military science were called "active defense". General V.I. Morozov, who had already lost all the troops of the 11th Army, was ordered to arrive at Dno on July 9 and unite the efforts of the 41st, 22nd Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps under his command.

And again the Germans were ahead. By the evening of July 9, Reinhardt's motorized corps bypassed Pskov from the east and began to develop an offensive on Luga. The uncontrolled troops of the 41st Soviet Corps fled. Its disparate units, which had lost contact with higher headquarters, were discovered by the command only on July 13 near Struga Krasny and Luga.

Moreover, the troops of the North-Western Front retreated with such enviable speed that the thoughtful enemy perceived their actions as a well-thought-out and well-practiced maneuver. General Erhard Raus wrote:

“Usually, when the Russians were defeated on a wide front, they restored their lines only by retreating a considerable distance. They moved very quickly, even if they retreated in large numbers ... When they decided to retreat, they did it in one jerk, and then immediately switched to active defense. When our panzer divisions broke through the front and began pursuit along the roads, the Russians very skillfully disappeared in rough terrain. Stepping back, they broke away and quickly gathered together again. Therefore, the Russians can be considered masters of retreats. For example, south of Leningrad, the 6th Panzer Division captured several prisoners from the same regiments of the 125th Rifle Division, which we first encountered when we crossed the border at Taurog. The Russians managed to retreat 500 miles!”

However, the high Soviet authorities did not appreciate the "mastery of the retreat" of their troops. General I.S. Kosobutsky and the commander of the 118th Infantry Division, Major General N.M., who was in charge of the defense of Pskov. Glovatsky "for cowardice, inaction of the authorities, the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons to the enemy without a fight and the unauthorized abandonment of military positions" went under the tribunal - to respond with his head.

By this time, it became clear that Manstein with two divisions could not break through the Sebezh fortified area, and his troops were transferred back to the Ostrov region.

The fall of Pskov meant that the Army Group North had successfully completed the first half of its strategic mission, invading mobile formations within the boundaries of the Leningrad Region. The battle in the Baltic, in which 40 Soviet divisions took part, including 7 tank and 4 mechanized, was lost outright by the Red Army. Its losses amounted to almost 90 thousand people (mostly prisoners), 2523 tanks (140 vehicles per day), 3651 guns and mortars, 990 combat aircraft. Soviet troops retreated 400-450 km, the ships of the Baltic Fleet were forced to relocate from Libava and Ventspils to Tallinn.

On July 8, 1941, a meeting of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) was held at the Fuhrer's Headquarters, at which one of the main issues discussed was the Wehrmacht offensive against Leningrad and the start of the Finnish offensive from the north. Hitler approved the plan of further action proposed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Franz Halder, while emphasizing the need to cut off Leningrad from the east and southeast by the forces of General Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group. It was at this meeting that the Fuhrer announced his firm decision "to level Moscow and Leningrad to the ground in order to prevent the population that we will have to feed in the winter to remain there." The destruction of the two capitals of Russia, according to Hitler, symbolized the victory of the "superior race" and was supposed to inflict an irresistible moral and psychological blow on the hearts of the "subhumans", cause "a national disaster that will deprive the centers not only of Bolshevism, but of Russians in general."

In the face of the immediate threat of the enemy's exit to Leningrad, the Soviet Headquarters decided to enlist part of the forces of the North to protect the southwestern and southern approaches to the city. front. July 4, General M.M. Popov was ordered to organize a defense in depth along the Luga River from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ilmen. The Headquarters demanded that a foreground 10-15 km deep with solid barriers be created at this line, leaving only the escape routes for the troops of the North-Western Front. By July 10, the 177th and 191st rifle, 24th tank divisions, the 1st separate mountain rifle brigade, the Leningrad rifle and machine gun and infantry schools and almost all the artillery regiments of the RGK, united in the Luga operational group during the led by the deputy front commander, Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev. According to the memoirs of Marshal of Artillery G.F. Odintsov, Konstantin Pavlovich Pyadyshev - "a talented military leader strictly adhered to the Suvorov principles of training troops, possessed an exceptional gift of intuition and foresight, which are so important in battle", - having advanced forward detachments to the Plyussa River, he immediately began to create strong barriers on the Kiev highway and on both sides of the Warsaw railway.

The Luga group also included units of the 41st Rifle Corps retreating to the north. In order to centralize the combat activities of aviation, the air forces of the Northern and Northwestern Fronts, the Baltic Fleet and the 7th Air Defense Air Corps were subordinated to a single command in the person of General A.A. Novikov.

Since July 10, the leadership of the military operations of the Northern, North-Western Fronts, the Baltic and Northern Fleets has been carried out by the High Command of the North-Western Direction, headed by "First Marshal" K.E. Voroshilov. The headquarters of the direction was hastily put together mainly from the teachers of the academies.

As early as June 27, 1941, the Military Council of the Northern Front adopted a resolution on the involvement of the inhabitants of Leningrad and its suburbs in labor service. Each Leningrader of "both sexes" not associated with military production was sent to the construction of defensive structures. About 150 thousand people worked daily. Evasion of labor service was punishable by six months in prison or a fine of up to 3,000 rubles.

The main burden in the creation of fortifications fell on the shoulders of women. They dug trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches and scarps, arranged forest blockages.

German pilots scattered leaflets over them: “Ladies! Don't dig holes! All the same, our tanks will pass! According to the memoirs of the party propagandist A.D. Okorokov, the leaflets caused laughter. So the commissar-general spats straight away: women who have left their children at home are digging an anti-tank ditch with shovels and picks. Near Leningrad. In shoes. German planes fly over them, sometimes they drop leaflets, more often bombs. The defeated Soviet divisions are passing by, fleeing from the German "tanochki". Everyone is having fun: “Under Luga, laughing women surrounded me ... I, too, could not help laughing.”

Barricades were erected on the streets, all civil construction projects were curtailed in order to direct human and technical resources to the creation of military engineering structures, primarily the Luga defense line. Krasnogvardeisky and Slutsko-Kolpinsky fortified areas were built on the near approaches to the city from the south-west and south, and the Karelian UR was improved in the north. A belt of fortifications with knots of resistance was also created along the Peterhof-Pulkovo line.

Along with the conscription of those liable for military service, from June 29, an accelerated creation of a people's militia of 200 thousand people was launched to help the personnel units of the Leningrad Army. The military council of the front initially asked for 100,000 "physically hardy and politically reliable" volunteers aged 18 to 35. Leningrad party leader and member of the Military Council of the direction A.A. Zhdanov, with his own hand, doubled the "quota", and the age up to 50 years. Being well informed, he learned the price of the combat readiness of the Red Army and the slogan about the victory with "little bloodshed" in the Finnish campaign. Soviet commanders in the 30s were brought to commendable obedience and uniformity, brought up in boundless devotion to the cause of Lenin and Stalin, but they possessed only one tactic - to pour the enemy with the blood of the Red Army up to the very nostrils.

The Military Council and the headquarters of LANO were organized. Major General A.I. was appointed commander of the army. Saturday. On July 4, they decided to form 15 divisions of the people's militia with a quantitative composition of 12 thousand people and immediately send them to the front. The responsibility for the selection of volunteers was assigned to the district committees of the party. By July 10, 110 thousand people were recruited. Most of the militia were workers of enterprises, representatives of the intelligentsia and students. 80 Leningrad writers and composer D.D. joined the volunteers. Shostakovich. In a short time, the first three divisions with a total strength of 31 thousand people and 15 separate artillery and machine-gun battalions - about 15 thousand people were formed in the Kirovsky, Moscow, Dzerzhinsky, Kuibyshev and Frunzensky districts.

The haste with which these formations were created could not but affect their quality. The militias had almost no heavy weapons, the number of machine guns in the units was much lower than the standard, since the territorial regions that formed the divisions themselves, by virtue of their capabilities, provided them with equipment, weapons and military equipment. The fighters received Canadian-made rifles stale in warehouses, sometimes training ones with a drilled breech, sometimes nothing at all. In principle, this did not matter, since there was nowhere to get cartridges for them on the front line.

The personnel, demonstrating exceptionally high morale, did not have any military training, many did not serve in the army and never held weapons in their hands (60% of the 1st division of the people's militia consisted of storekeepers and people who did not have military training; in 2 th division of "ordinary untrained" was 3894 people, junior commanders - 205; in the 3rd division, up to 50% of the personnel had no military training at all). Training had to begin with the correct winding of footcloths and the ability to eat rye crackers without turning the mouth into a bleeding wound, but even this art was mastered on the way to the front line. For example, the 1st DNO Major General F.P. The motherland was formed from July 4 to 10, and the very next day it took up defense on one of the sections of the Luga line; The 2nd DNO of Colonel N. Ugryumov completed the formation on July 12, a day later she arrived at the front and took up positions along the Luga River in the Porechie, Ivanovskoye, Sabek area. The overwhelming majority of the commanders of the militia divisions came from the reserve and were poorly prepared to lead the conduct of hostilities, for example, in the 3rd division there were six regular commanders.

As the former fighter of the Izhora battalion S.V. Sorokin:

“... we, the fighters of a small factory detachment, went to war, where death is at every step, where you have to beat the enemy yourself. How to beat - we ourselves did not know. Beat and all. Even with a fist, even with a rifle, but only beat! And in fact, what could we then oppose to the enemy? Your military knowledge? We didn't have them. Combat experience? He wasn't there either. Weapon? At first it was very deplorable for us. What then? Breast! And we set her up."

On July 10-14, the 1st Kirov, 2nd Moscow and 3rd Frunzenskaya divisions of the people's militia were transferred to the Luga operational group and "dropped out to the battle lines." Somewhat later, the 4th DNO was completed under the command of Colonel P.I. Radygin, numbering 4267 people, which was also called the "light rifle" or "lightweight division in terms of armament and strength." What this means can be easily imagined, or can be read in the memoirs of P.A. Chugai, a former driver of the 84th tank battalion: “The militiamen of the 4th division approached the 3rd or 4th. Their appearance was deplorable: many without uniforms, only the eldest had a rifle, the rest had nothing.

In the second half of July, the formation of four guard divisions of the people's militia began. The honorary name, according to Zhdanov and Voroshilov, was supposed to mean that these divisions were equipped with a “genuine guard of the working class” (isn’t this idea prompted Stalin to revive guard units in the Armed Forces?). It is alleged that the workers' guards were "slightly better armed", but the main weapon was still the chest.

Over time, the matter with weapons was corrected, the divisions of the people's militia were renamed into rifle divisions, but the principles for the formation of new formations did not change. By the end of 1941, the Germans defeated and destroyed 186 Soviet divisions - this is 109% of those available on June 22. No more than 8% of the personnel of the Red Army remained. New divisions were “molded” in batches - only in 1941 419 divisions and 305 brigades were formed - and immediately rushed to the fronts, where the commanders were just carrying out another very, very important operation, promising Comrade Stalin without fail to defeat some “scoundrel Guderian” or take Kyiv on the anniversary of the proletarian revolution, while complaining about the lack of its forces and the exorbitant power of the enemy and demanding from the Supreme replenishment, replenishment, replenishment. Again, freshly baked soldiers already in echelons learned to wind footcloths, for the first time they learned about the existence of a military Charter, went into battle and died without having time to remember the name of their immediate superior. Since the losses with this method were huge, combat experience was saved and accumulated for a painfully long time. This practice continued until the Victory itself. In this sense, the entire Red Army during World War II can be called the People's Militia Army.

In addition to the divisions of the people's militia in Leningrad in July - August, other volunteer formations were also created: fighter and partisan detachments, worker battalions.

Seven partisan regiments were also formed with a total number of 6,600 people, which, in addition to civilian volunteers, policemen, and NKVD officers, included about 1,000 border guards. Six such suicide regiments were transferred behind enemy lines already in the first half of July. It was an ill-conceived adventure, doomed to a natural ending. Firstly, the bulky formations, which did not have camouflaged bases and means of communication, were deprived of maneuverability and secrecy, did not know how and did not have the opportunity to use guerrilla tactics, and were easily detected by the enemy. Secondly, the tasks they were given were completely non-partisan, namely “the fight against parts of the enemy army.” As a result, the regiments, armed only with small arms, militarily poorly trained, operated mainly in the front line, where the saturation of the German troops was maximum, entered into open battle with regular enemy units using tanks, artillery and aircraft, and were quickly destroyed, not bringing special benefits. It is characteristic that then they were called not partisan, but fighter regiments. Later, from their remnants, who returned to Leningrad, separate sabotage and reconnaissance groups were created.

In order to prepare the necessary reserve of the city's defenders, on July 13, a decree was adopted on the military training of all men aged 17 to 55 years. Compulsory military training of the population was introduced. As part of all volunteer formations from Leningrad, about 160 thousand people went to the front.

In accordance with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of July 8, a rationing system for food distribution was introduced in the city, as well as throughout the country. Workers received 800 grams of bread a day, employees - 600 grams, dependents and children - 400 grams each. According to the cards, the established norms of cereals, meat, fats and confectionery were also issued. Many types of goods were still freely sold in stores at fixed state prices, and some basic products could be purchased at commercial prices.

For most of the townsfolk, the war still seemed something far away and not terrible: “They expected quick victories for our army, invincible and the best in the world, as they constantly wrote about it in the newspapers. During the first days of the war, a peculiar festive atmosphere developed in the city. The weather was clear, sunny, the gardens and squares were green, there were many flowers. The city was adorned with incompetent posters on military themes. The streets came to life. A number of recruits in brand new uniforms busily scurried along the sidewalks. Singing was heard everywhere, the sounds of gramophones and harmonicas: the mobilized were in a hurry to get drunk for the last time and celebrate their departure to the front.

Despite the fact that the course of the war no longer clearly fit into the plot of the military-patriotic utopias of the writers P. Pavlenko and N. Shpanov, the Soviet people believed that the “big day” was about to come and “our steel regiments will bring freedom and happiness to all working mankind ".

On this day, German and Finnish troops simultaneously launched strikes in the Luga, Novgorod and Staraya Russian directions, in Estonia and Eastern Karelia.

On the Onega-Ladoga Isthmus, the Karelia army went on the offensive.

The Fuhrer of the German nation in the matter of the speedy capture of Leningrad had high hopes for the "brave people" of Finland, "full of the desire for revenge." Although no formal agreement was signed with the Reich, and the Finns did not promise anything specifically to the Germans. However, after the fall of Norway and France, the country of Suomi, with a population of four million, found itself between the German hammer and the Soviet anvil, with all its desire, had no chance of maintaining neutrality.

The bitter experience of the "winter war" of 1939/40, the continuous political pressure and threats from the Kremlin, unceremonious interference in internal affairs only strengthened the conviction of the Finnish people in the hostility of the USSR. The Finns began to look for political support wherever it could be found. An indelible impression was also made by the occupation and annexation of the "happy family of Soviet peoples" of the independent Baltic republics, carried out by the Red Army in the summer of 1940. The Finnish government saw with its own eyes the future prepared for the country. In addition, rumors reached the Finns about the demands regarding Finland made by Molotov during the November visit to Berlin.

And Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, discussing with Hitler the delimitation of spheres of interest “on a global scale” and plans for access to the Indian Ocean, stubbornly insisted that at first the Kremlin would like to receive everything that is due under the secret protocol of 1939, which was not fulfilled on all counts: "The Finnish question still remains unresolved ... The Soviet government considers it its duty to finally settle the Finnish question."

Moreover, the Kremlin dreamers interpreted the "settlement" unequivocally - occupation, Sovietization and the "voluntary" accession of Finland to the USSR. No matter how the Fuhrer persuaded the Soviet premier to enter into the position of Germany waging war and economically interested in Finnish and Swedish supplies, no matter how he asked to wait at least a year or six months before the conclusion of peace, Molotov was adamant, expressing a decisive incomprehension: why on earth should the Soviet Union "should postpone implementation of their plans for six months or for a year”? In fact, it has been two months since document No. 103203 - "Considerations on the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the Case of a War with Finland" - was signed.

On November 25, 1940, Molotov conveyed to Berlin the conditions on which the Soviet Union was ready to join the Tripartite Pact to participate in a joint German-Italian-Japanese-Soviet project to redraw the world map. The first paragraph in this document is the recognition of Moscow's right to privatize Finland .

On the same day, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko sent a directive to the command of the Leningrad District on the preparation of a war with the "Finnish booger." The directive set the task of "defeating the Armed Forces of Finland, seizing its territory" and reaching the Gulf of Bothnia. Helsinki was supposed to be "liberated" on the 25th day of the operation.

The Finns feared that the unconditional neutrality they had previously adhered to would only lead to a war against both Germany and the USSR at the same time. It was preferable to choose one of the sides in time. The prospects for friendship with Stalin loomed quite clearly, and the vast majority of the “White Finns” categorically did not want to repaint themselves as “Reds”. Supreme Commander Marshal K.G. Mannerheim said in an interview that, from the point of view of the Finns, going over to the side of the Soviet Union would mean “the same thing as defeat”: “There was nothing surprising in the fact that the mood among the people was distinguished by deep distrust of the Soviet Union. Could we trust such a neighbor who started a war in order to subjugate our country and who, after defining the basic conditions for a peace agreement, began to make new demands?

The Western powers could do nothing to help. At the same time, Germany itself extended its hand, offering to conclude a transit agreement and organize the supply of military equipment. Since the autumn of 1940, the Finns have taken a course towards rapprochement with the Reich. “Everyone understood,” recalls Mannerheim, “that Germany's interest in Finland was for us the straw that a drowning man grabs at, although no one knew how she could withstand us. The German initiative gave Finland a long-awaited respite after more than half a year of continuous pressure on it. For a while, the demands of the Russians stopped.”

Even closer cooperation between the two countries was facilitated by the actions of the Soviet leadership, which suddenly and unilaterally broke the trade agreement and deprived the Finns of the supply of grain, fuel and raw materials. Soon, more than 90% of Finnish imports came from Germany.

At the end of May 1941, Finnish-German military consultations were held in Salzburg, during which the Germans hinted at the possibility of an armed conflict between Germany and the USSR. As General Dietmar points out, according to the developers of the Barbarossa plan, “the decisive prerequisite for conducting operations against Leningrad from the north, as well as the operation to seize the Murmansk railway, was the entry of Finland into the war on the side of Germany. The Soviet Union itself contributed to this. The war started under a trifling pretext in the winter of 1939/40, the harsh conditions of the Moscow peace that ended it, and the almost open threats to the very existence of Finland from the Soviet Union caused the Finnish people to feel such despair and anxiety that joining the then strong at the zenith of its power, Germany seemed to the Finns the only way out of the situation.

However, the Germans did not put pressure on the Finns, did not share specific plans, conversations were held in the subjunctive mood, and Finland was in no hurry with assurances of allied loyalty, avoiding any obligations. In June, an agreement was reached on the movement of German troops from Norway to the Finnish Arctic, as well as on the joint conduct of hostilities in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union on Finland. At the same time, President Risto Ryti emphasized that Finland intends to remain neutral until she herself becomes a victim of aggression. Hitler was not particularly worried about this, having no doubt that the "aggression" would take place. Marshal Mannerheim also knew about this: “The field for maneuver in foreign policy, if one could talk about any field at all, was very limited,” Mannerheim continues. - In fact, one could say that everything depended, including the independence of Finland, on relations with Germany ... The choice between Germany and the Soviet Union led us to a dead end ... Finland did not have the opportunity to freely control its own destiny. In practical terms, there was no way to stay away from the approaching conflict.”

On June 15, the Finnish government received a telegram from Field Marshal Keitel saying that war with the USSR was inevitable. Two days later, a general mobilization was announced. The neutrality of Finland by this time was in question, which was facilitated by the transfer of German troops to Lapland, the permission for German minelayers to take refuge near the Finnish coast, and the Luftwaffe bombers to land on June 22 at the airfield in Kuovola.

On the first day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, Russian planes attacked Finnish warships and coastal fortifications. The artillery batteries of the Soviet base on the Hanko peninsula began shelling Finnish territory, and our valiant border guards violated the border in several places. The Finns, in a hopeless attempt to maintain neutrality, endured these outrages for three days. The army was ordered to "avoid any action that might give the Russians a pretext for provocation." Diplomats in all capitals protested and explained their government's position. As a result, on June 24, both London and Berlin recognized Finland as a neutral country. Moscow was not satisfied with the peaceful resolution of the situation.

Despite Finland's military preparations, the massive Soviet bombardment that began on June 25, 1941 became the reason for the start of the war. Of course, without declaring war. It was the governments of the landlords and capitalists who were obliged to adhere to the norms of international law, and the world's first "republic of workers" did not fight with anyone, but only provided assistance to the "oppressed classes".

The history of the Leningrad Military District proudly reports: “On June 24 (the Finnish ambassador at that time was trying to find out from Vyacheslav Molotov whether Finland could consider itself a neutral state) the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR informed the Military Councils of the Northern Front, the Northern and Baltic Fleets that on German troops and aircraft are concentrated on the territory of Finland to strike at Leningrad and capture Murmansk and Kandalaksha. To forestall their attack, at dawn on June 25, Soviet aviation, at the direction of the Headquarters, attacked eighteen enemy airfields, making 487 sorties. 30 enemy planes were destroyed on the ground and 14 were shot down in air battles. Attacks on enemy airfields continued in the following days.

At the same time, they successfully bombed Finnish cities and villages, including Helsinki and Turku.

Hundreds of tons of bombs hit bridges, roads, factories, railway stations and residential areas across the country. Moreover, judging by the memoirs of Air Chief Marshal A.A. Novikov, who spoke about the "first in the history of Soviet aviation" multi-day air operation, everything was even bigger:

“Last preparations, clarification of data, short negotiations with the commanders of air formations, and engines roared at the airfields. An air armada of 263 bombers and 224 fighters and attack aircraft rushed to the enemy ... The raid lasted several hours, one group succeeded another. For the first time in the history of our Air Force, such a quantity of military equipment was involved in simultaneous actions, and on the entire front: from Vyborg to Murmansk.

The Finns credited themselves with 26 downed bombers flying on combat missions, as a rule, without fighter cover. It is noteworthy that literally three days before Stalin was still “afraid” of all kinds of provocations. And now the “wonderful Georgians” are bombing their neighbor, not really knowing anything about the plans to “capture Murmansk and Kandalaksha”. But on the other hand, he still firmly believed that the Red Army would transfer military operations to foreign territory with mighty blows.

On the Soviet-Finnish border, the 1st and 10th mechanized corps (about 1,500 tanks) have already turned around and, “sparkling with the brilliance of steel”, have frozen in anticipation of an order, which began to advance to their starting lines on June 17, 1941!

On the same evening, at a meeting of the Finnish parliament, it was announced that the war begins with the same thing as the "winter war" - with an attack by the USSR. On June 26, President Ryti announced on the radio a state of war between Finland and the Soviet Union, and Finnish troops were allowed to open fire on border violators.

However, according to the Soviet interpretation of events, Finland acted as the aggressor:

“The Soviet government and the High Command, not wanting to give the Finnish army a reason to open hostilities, ordered their troops not to open fire until the Finnish ground units went on the offensive ... On June 23 and 24, Finnish aviation tried to bombard Leningrad, Kronstadt and the cities Karelian-Finnish SSR".

However, the fact remains that the Finns did not “suddenly” attack us, and Leningrad was not bombed even once during the entire war. A special order to the air force categorically forbade even flights over the city.

The main goal of Talvisota (continuation war) was declared to be the return of the territories lost as a result of the Moscow Peace, then everything depended on the course of the war and the desire of the Germans to share what they had acquired with their “brothers in arms”. The campaign plan provided for three stages: an offensive north of Ladoga and access to the Svir River and Lake Onega, the "liberation" of the Karelian Isthmus and entry into Karelia. Since the Finnish General Staff did not have any offensive plans before, it took him three weeks to develop operations and regroup troops. The army mobilized "all the human resources of the country, including recruits of the oldest ages."

To solve the first task, a 100,000-strong group was concentrated under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, which included the 6th and 7th Army Corps, as well as the “O” group led by Major General Oinonen - a total of 5 infantry divisions , 1 cavalry and 2 infantry brigades.

They were opposed by the 54th, 71st and 168th rifle divisions, the 26th (Sortavala) fortified area and the 55th mixed air division, which were part of the 7th army of Lieutenant General F.D. Gorelenko. The Soviet troops that advanced to the line of the state border did not expect any special surprises from the Finns, they did not prepare defensive lines, they had no information about the enemy, they did not notice the concentration of the strike force along the only railway line in the area. And who to fear, the Finns, or what?

Comrade Stalin, as always, correctly pointed out that the white-eyed chukhna does not really know how to fight. “Fools,” said the greatest strategist of all times and peoples, summing up the results of the “winter war,” “they sit in the pillboxes and don’t go out, they think that they can’t cope with the pillboxes, they sit and drink tea ... And the Finnish offensive is not worth a penny. In three months, do you remember at least one case of a serious mass offensive by the Finnish army?

On July 10, the army of General Heinrichs went on the offensive, with the immediate goal of reaching the northeastern coast of Lake Ladoga, and in the future to develop success in Petrozavodsk and Olonets. The main blow at the junction of the 71st and 168th divisions was delivered by Major General Hägglund's 6th Corps, reinforced by an infantry brigade. The troops of General Gorelenko, stretched out on a wide front (for example, the 71st division “held” 125 km of the border with a cordon), failed to repel the blow and began to retreat in eastern and southeastern directions. Through the gap that had formed, the enemy advanced to the Loimola station and on July 14 cut the only railway communication in the 7th Army zone. On July 16, the Finns captured Pitkyaranta and reached the shores of Ladoga, and the 1st Infantry Brigade of Colonel Lagus, who followed in the forefront, reached the Tuloks River. Gorelenko's army was divided into two parts. The Sortavala group - the 168th rifle division, the 74th separate reconnaissance battalion, one regiment of the 71st rifle division and its reinforcement unit - was cut off from the main forces and on July 21 was subordinated to the 23rd army. The Finns continued to develop the offensive in three directions: Petrozavodsk, Olonets and Sortaval.

In the current situation, the Military Council of the Northern Front reinforced the 7th Army with one regiment of the 198th mechanized division, a regiment of the 36th anti-tank brigade, two mountain rifle battalions, two tank companies and an armored train. To eliminate the enemy breakthrough, two operational groups were formed from units and subunits sent to the Onega-Ladoga Isthmus: Petrozavodsk under the command of Lieutenant General M.A. Antonyuk and the southern lieutenant general V.D. Tsvetaeva. These groups, with strikes from the east and southeast, were supposed to destroy the enemy units that had broken through to the Vedlozero and Salmi area and subsequently capture the Loymola station.

On July 23, the troops of the 7th Army, after artillery preparation, launched a counteroffensive. Parts of the Petrozavodsk operational group in two days of fighting managed to move several kilometers to the west. The troops of the southern group could not move forward, and on July 24 they were driven back to the eastern bank of the Tulox River.

In order to assist the Tsvetaev group, two battalions from the 4th Marine Brigade of Major General B.N. Nenasheva. The landings landed in a hurry, without preparation, without fire support and without operational interaction with General Tsvetaev, for whose help all this was started. True, which is a rarity in itself, preliminary air and ground reconnaissance was carried out, but she did not find the enemy on the islands. Although he was there, he managed to equip a coastal battery on Lunkulunsariya, which was connected to the mainland by a dam, and one of the reconnaissance groups disappeared without a trace. On July 24, the Marines landed on the island of Mantinsari, on the 27th - on Lunkulunsari. However, the Finns had the opportunity to freely build up their forces, and the paratroopers did not receive any support. The historians of our fleet omit further details, but, of course, "the landing forces pulled back part of the enemy forces", and in the 4th brigade there were two fewer battalions.

By the end of July, the front line had stabilized at the turn of the Tuloxa River.

The Northwestern Front in mid-July had 23 rifle, 5 tank, 4 mechanized divisions, 1 rifle and 3 airborne brigades. True, in 22 divisions, losses in personnel and equipment amounted to more than 50%. In total there were about 300 thousand people.

Von Leeb had 23 divisions at his disposal for operations in Estonia and attacking Leningrad, including 3 tank and 3 motorized. Army Group North was supposed to use the right flank of the 4th Panzer Group to cut off Leningrad from the east and southeast. Consolidation of the success of the strike force was assigned to the 16th Army. Von Küchler received the task of cutting off and destroying Soviet troops in Estonia, capturing the Moonsund Islands and the main naval base of the Baltic Fleet - Tallinn.

Without an operational pause from the line of Pskov, the Velikaya River, German motorized corps rushed to Luga and Novgorod.

Formations of the 56th motorized corps advanced in the direction of Porkhov, Shimsk, Novgorod, aiming to cut the Moscow-Leningrad railway line in the Chudovo region. For a deep detour, Manstein had only two divisions - the 8th Panzer and the 3rd Motorized. They had to overcome a heavily swampy and wooded area, unfavorable for the actions of armored vehicles. But already on July 10, the 3rd motorized division took Porkhov in a fierce battle, and the 8th tank division was moving towards Soltsy. The 22nd Rifle Corps (180th and 182nd Rifle Divisions), which was defending in this direction, failed to detain the enemy. The corps was Estonian, and a significant part of the commanders and Red Army soldiers from its composition went over to the side of the enemy.

The 41st Corps of Reinhardt, having broken through the defenses of the Soviet troops northeast of Pskov, rolled out to Struga Krasnye with three divisions.

All this time, the forces of Leningraders, the local population and advancing troops on the northern bank of the Luga River were building a defensive line stretching from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ilmen, consisting of two lanes about 175 km long and 10–15 km deep. Mines were laid in front of the front line and in the depths, anti-tank ditches, scarps were dug, forest blockages were arranged. Simultaneously with the defensive work, the troops of the Luga Operational Group were intensively preparing for the upcoming battles, and some units had already been fighting in the foreground since July 12. In order to buy time to prepare the defense on the Luga line, the Military Council of the Northern Front created several barrage detachments and sent them to the Luga-Pskov highway. These detachments included infantry, artillery and engineering units. Here, the formations of the 11th Army retreated with battles.

Supported by active air operations and a strong artillery grouping, the Soviet units put up stubborn resistance to the 41st Motorized Corps, which was forced to operate exclusively along the only road to Luga due to the rugged and swampy terrain. On July 12, the frontal German offensive, having lost surprise and maneuver, got stuck in the Plyussa area. This forced General Göpner to abandon a direct breakthrough to Luga and turn Reinhardt's main forces to the northwest, leaving only General von Leiser's 269th Infantry Division near Luga.

German tankers, having made a 170-kilometer forced march along forest roads, which we considered impassable for vehicles (however, one of the participants in the raid also described the route passed as a quagmire of the “most heinous nature”), on the night of July 13-14 secretly went to the river in the areas of Ivanovsky and Sabek, 20–25 km southeast of Kingisepp. Although the bridge at Sabek was destroyed before the approach of the 1st Panzer Division, it managed to seize a bridgehead here. Thanks to the actions of the sabotage units of the Brandenburg regiment, the 6th Panzer Division of General Franz Landgraf occupied the crossings at Ivanovsky intact and also moved to the opposite bank. However, it was not possible to develop an offensive from the bridgeheads. A monumental Soviet study claims that saboteurs from the Brandenburg regiment worked here. In fact, the two bridges near Ivanovsky went to the enemy safe and sound thanks to the suddenness of his actions and the carelessness of the guards.

“The offensive of the German mobile units was stopped by the stubborn and active defense of the troops advancing from Leningrad,” the Russian historian reports. Although, to be precise, it was quite the opposite. Having crossed Luga, Reinhardt found himself in the same situation as Manstein near Dvinsk: there was practically no serious enemy ahead, Leningrad lay in two crossings, the "Panzers" were waiting for the order to attack, but von Leeb considered it too risky business. The main forces of the Army Group "North" and almost all aviation, in accordance with the plan of deep flank coverage of the enemy from the southeast, were aimed at Lake Ilmen and Novgorod. General Reinhardt received a stop order.

This allowed the Soviet command to bring additional forces to the bridgeheads, which were unloaded from the echelons right in front of the Germans. It was the Leningrad divisions of the people's militia who arrived at the war. They were immediately thrown into battle by K.E., who personally rushed from Novgorod. Voroshilov. Soviet planes dominated the skies, and aircraft from the Baltic Fleet and the 7th Air Defense Fighter Corps were brought in to attack the crossings.

“The 1st rifle division of the people’s militia,” recalled General Erhard Raus, who was in charge of the defense of the bridgehead (the general confuses the numbers of the Soviet divisions), “accompanied by tanks, appeared in front of us in the morning, rapidly advancing on Ivanovskoye along the road leading to the village from the west. She intended to capture both Luga bridges on the same day. Sudden fire from well-hidden German batteries forced the Russian infantry to retreat. Although the enemy tanks first halted in confusion, they soon moved forward again in short bursts. The inexperienced Russian infantry followed them, urged on by officers and commissars, who threatened the soldiers with pistols. The tanks, gradually picking up speed, were rolling in a wedge formation and were already threatening to break through the German line, when our 88-mm and 105-mm guns suddenly began to speak, opening fire from ambushes from a distance of no more than 500 meters. After each shot, a cloud of smoke rose, marking hits. Meanwhile, our artillery and machine guns were mowing down the ranks of the Russian infantry following the tanks. The Russian attack ran out of steam... Meanwhile, the 3rd volunteer division of the people's militia, advancing from the village of Yurki, gathered at its starting positions on the edge of a dense forest approaching Ivanovsky from the east. This attack, carried out without artillery support, began in the late afternoon. The Russians advanced in several waves on both sides of the road and ran towards the dam through completely open country. Our artillery, which used to bombard the areas of concentration, now brought down a barrage of fire on this yellow-brown mass. Machine guns and tank cannons opened furious fire, bombarding the enemy with deadly projectiles. The attack bogged down in just a few minutes, and the result of this senseless act was only a terrible massacre. But even after this, the attacks were repeated three more times until the evening and each time ended in failure. During the attacks, the Russians suffered horrendous losses, but did not capture an inch of land.

Things got to the point that, under the marshal’s abuse, the commander of the Northern Front himself climbed into the tank and rushed to reconnoiter the enemy, but the “thirty-four” was quickly knocked out, and General Popov, who miraculously escaped, immediately received a wick “for reckless prowess.” Although the Marshal of the USSR himself had nothing to do there, he could not lead the war on the map, the man was not of that temper.

“The style of Voroshilov’s activity was, of course, influenced by the attachments and ideas of the period of the civil war, during which he was formed as a mature and major Soviet military leader,” says the former commander of the 23rd Army, General A.I. Cherepanov. - Even then, we know this, he did not sit out in headquarters and did not bow to bullets. But then the nature of the battle was different. And even now, under the new conditions, he was drawn to the troops, to the battlefield, although, of course, it was not possible to see, to grasp here the whole large-scale picture of what was happening, but only a small part of it. The words from the song “the first marshal will lead us into battle” Kliment Efremovich took literally. From here, a whole Voroshilov epic was born in the Red Army:

“They say that in 1941, Voroshilov, in order to prevent the withdrawal of some of our units in the direction of the main attack of the Germans, rushed with a group of officers to cut across the retreating ones and thereby restored the situation, preventing a breakthrough of the front.”

In a report for this period, the commander of the 41st Motorized Corps wrote:

“For the units at the bridgeheads, the time has come for a stubborn struggle associated with heavy losses. The enemy began to continuously attack them. Then for four weeks the soldiers of the main divisions, accustomed to rapid attacks and breakthroughs, waged here, deeply buried in the ground, a positional war.

Therefore, it would be more correct to say that Reinhardt's two divisions "stubborn and active defense" managed not only to hold, but also, having repulsed all attacks, to expand the captured bridgeheads.

And not even the divisions, whose main forces still continued to force the swamps and pave many kilometers of gati, but their forward detachments. So, for the first six days, on the bridgehead near Ivanovsky, several times a day, the battle group of Colonel Raus, in which there were 1,500 soldiers, 36 howitzers and field guns, 9 anti-tank guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns of 88 mm caliber, fought off attacks several times a day, destroying 78 Soviet tanks. , 26 anti-aircraft guns, 230 machine guns and 60 light tanks, mostly Czech 35(1).

Voroshilov and Zhdanov quickly appointed the culprits: the commander of the Luga task force, the "talented military leader" K.P. Pyadyshev was first removed from his post for inept leadership of the troops, indiscipline and "lack of initiative", and then he was arrested and put on trial for "counter-revolutionary statements" and "disbelief in our strength" (in Khrushchev's time, the death of the general was incriminated by the "Beria clique"). Colonel N.S. Ugryumov was removed from command of the 2nd DNO.

The 36th motorized division of Lieutenant General Ottenbacher, clearing the eastern coast of Lake Peipsi from Soviet troops, reached the Gdov combat site, which did not resist for long.

General Manstein, who, as a result of Hoepner's planned maneuver, found himself in an even more isolated position, still continued to advance. His troops broke through to the Luga line west of Shimsk.

The situation here has deteriorated sharply. In an order to the troops of the North-Western Front dated July 14, the commander-in-chief of the direction emphasized that a direct threat of invasion loomed over Leningrad and demanded that the unit commanders “establish military order at the front and in the rear, put an end to lack of will, indecision and slowness in actions, not stop before extreme measures, destroy cowards and alarmists on the spot ":

“...While the troops of the Northern Front courageously fight with the brutalized fascist-shutskor hordes on the line from the Barents Sea to Khanko and Tallinn, they heroically defend every inch of our native Soviet land, the troops of the North-Western Front, not always giving a proper rebuff to the enemy, often they leave their positions without even engaging in a decisive battle, which further encourages the insolent enemy. Separate alarmists and cowards not only arbitrarily leave the battle front, but also sow panic among honest and staunch fighters. Commanders and political workers in a number of cases not only do not stop panic, do not organize and do not lead their units into battle, but by their shameful behavior sometimes further increase the disorganization and panic on the front line.

The insolent enemy continues to move forward. I have given instructions to conduct the strictest investigation of all criminal cases of unauthorized abandonment of the front by individual units, commanders and fighters and all those responsible, regardless of ranks and old merits, be brought to trial by field tribunals with the most severe punishment, up to and including execution.

Since the “impudent” German 16th Army was advancing south of Lake Ilmen in the direction of Kholm and Staraya Russa, a gap of 200 kilometers formed between its formations and the 56th Motorized Corps.

The Soviet command decided to use this gap to disrupt the enemy offensive on Novgorod and defeat the enemy formations that had broken through to Shimsk. In the period from July 14 to 18, on the orders of Marshal Voroshilov, several formations of the 11th Army prepared and carried out a counterattack from the north and south on the flanks of Manstein's troops in the Soltsy area. From the air, the operation was supported by 235 aircraft from four air divisions and a long-range bomber air corps. The German 8th Panzer and 3rd Motorized Divisions were practically surrounded and cut off from their communications. From the Soviet side, 3 rifle divisions and the 21st tank division of Colonel L.V., transferred from the Karelian Isthmus, tried to destroy them. Bunin. In addition, the operation of the 11th Army from the south was provided by the 202nd mechanized division, from the west by the 182nd rifle division. Manstein recalled: “It cannot be said that the position of the corps at that moment was very enviable ... The next few days were critical, and the enemy tried with all his might to maintain the encirclement.” Fierce fighting lasted five days, on other days the Germans repelled up to seventeen attacks a day. Manstein's troops, receiving supplies by air, managed to hold out until July 18, when the SS division "Dead Head" arrived in time to help them. The encirclement ring was broken, the front was restored at the bottom line. Nevertheless, the Germans were thrown back 40 km, the danger of their breakthrough to Novgorod was temporarily eliminated.

“Puffy enemy,” Marshal Vasilevsky rejoices; seemingly a major military leader, but he describes the situation at the level of a company political officer, he was forced to retreat somewhat, and the remnants of his motorized formations fled in a panic.

On July 19, the German command ordered the troops of the Army Group "North" to suspend the offensive against Leningrad and resume it only after pulling up the formations of the 18th Army to the Luga line and putting in order the units of the 4th Panzer Group, which by this time had lost up to 50% of the materiel . At the end of July, Manstein complained to the Chief Quartermaster of the OKH, General Paulus, that as a result of the misuse of tank troops on unsuitable terrain, the losses in men in his three divisions "in the past" had reached "already 600 people." It is not clear what period of time the tank general had in mind, but it is known that the troops of the North-Western Front lost up to 2 thousand people killed, wounded and captured daily.

By forcing the enemy to stop the offensive at the turn of the Luga River, the Soviet troops won almost three weeks to organize defense on the near approaches to Leningrad, as well as to pull up fresh forces to this direction.

In Estonia, the 8th Army under the command of General F.S. Ivanova, transferred by order of Voroshilov on July 14 to the Northern Front, successfully repelled the attacks of two enemy infantry divisions from the 26th Army Corps at the turn of Pärnu, Tartu with two battered rifle corps. To assist the Soviet troops and provide lake communications, by order of July 3, the Chudskaya military flotilla was formed with the main base in Gdov. The basis of its combat power was five training wheeled and screw steamers of pre-revolutionary construction, which belonged to the Dzerzhinsky Naval School. There were also several boats and tugboats. On July 10-12, two 76-mm Lender guns and nine "forty-five" guns taken from the Aurora cruiser were installed on the vessels. As a result of such modernization, the Narova, Issa, Embakh, Plussa gunboats and the Uku messenger ship were received.

General F.S. Ivanov, not having information about the grouping and intentions of the enemy, speculatively came to the conclusion that the Germans would rush to Tallinn with all their might. Therefore, he concentrated two-thirds of the army on his right flank. The enemy decided otherwise. On July 22, having brought up three more infantry divisions, he resumed the offensive in Estonia, striking at the junction of the 10th and 11th corps in the direction of Pyltsam, Mustve. From an operational point of view, this direction was considered “important”, the road to Narva and further to Leningrad opened beyond the Estonian towns. But our troops were not there. Rapidly advancing eastward, encountering virtually no resistance, the Germans reached the western coast of Lake Peipus in the Mustve region on July 25, cutting off the 11th Rifle Corps from the main forces. The command of the Northern Front sent an enlightening cipher telegram to the Military Council of the 8th Army:

“In front of the front of your army, divisions of the reserve 26th Corps are operating, having extremely extended and empty rears. The enemy acts boldly, impudently, coming out in small parts to your communications, creating only the appearance of an environment.

This adversary, with skillful active leadership, can and must be destroyed. However, instead of active actions, the command of all levels reacts extremely painfully to the appearance of small enemy groups in its rear and withdraws troops, instead of organizing them to actively defeat the enemy coming to the rear ...

I order:

1) Cease the unjustified withdrawal of troops, prevent defense by cordons and proceed to active operations by strike groups along the flanks and rear of the breaking enemy.

2) Create an attack group in the 10th sk sector to counteract enemy breakthroughs and decisively suppress it.

On the same day, four German fighters from cannons and machine guns fired at the ships of the Chudskaya flotilla. Several sailors were killed, and even the deck was pierced on the Narova. This raid made such an indelible impression on the commander of the flotilla, Captain 1st Rank N.Yu. Avraamov that he requested permission to sink the ships. A categorical refusal followed from Leningrad, but the activity of the flotilla was still paralyzed. One after another, the panicked crews threw the "gunboats" aground and scattered through the forests. The remnants of the 11th Rifle Corps by July 30 made their way from the encirclement to the north along the shore of the lake and tried to gain a foothold at the turn of the Mustve River.

Generala F.S. Ivanov was replaced as commander-8 by Major General I.M. Lyubovtsev, who "ruled" for exactly a week. Despite the arriving marching reinforcements and equipment, the fresh 268th rifle division and the 4th division of the people's militia, the army continued to retreat. By the end of August 7, the Germans reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland. The 8th Army was divided into two isolated parts, the 10th Rifle Corps of Major General I.F. Nikolaev (10th, 16th and 22nd rifle divisions) rolled back to Tallinn. The newly appointed army commander, Lieutenant-General P.P. Pshennikov, was given the task of forming a strike force, "destroying and defeating the enemy in front" and restoring the situation. But instead, he withdrew the remnants of the army, which received the name of the “eastern group” in combat orders, to the eastern bank of the Kunda River.

The success of our offensive in Belarus forced the German command to transfer in late June and early July to Army Group Center a significant number of formations from other sectors of the Soviet-German front, including eight infantry and one tank division from the Baltic. At the same time, the 122nd Infantry Division and the 330th Assault Gun Brigade were transferred from the Narva OG to Finland. This created favorable conditions for the expansion of the front of the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops and, in particular, the commissioning of the Baltic and Leningrad fronts in order to defeat the enemy in the areas of Narva, Pskov, Rezekne, to prevent the further transfer of his divisions to Belarus and Finland and to capture the Rakvere line, Tartu, Gulbene, Rezekne, Daugavpils. In the future, it was meant to develop an offensive in the direction of Riga with the forces of the 2nd and 1st Baltic Fronts in order to cut off the main forces of Army Group North from the rest of the German army. The 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver the main blow to Vilnius, liberate the capital of Lithuania, and then go to the Neman.

By July 10, when our offensive began in the Baltic direction, the Leningrad, 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts had 67 rifle divisions and 6 fortified areas, one tank corps, four separate tank brigades, 9 artillery divisions, 17 separate artillery and mortar brigades and 9 air divisions. They were opposed in the strip from the Gulf of Finland to the Diena River by 30 divisions of Army Group North.

The offensive of our troops in the Baltic resulted in a series of successive frontal strikes. On July 10, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front were the first to go on the offensive, on July 17 the 3rd Baltic Front joined the offensive, and on July 24, the troops of the Leningrad Front.

The unfolding operations of the fronts proceeded at a slow pace. The enemy, using the very favorable conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, offered stubborn resistance to the advancing troops, who did not have enough artillery of medium and large caliber. There was also a shortage of ammunition.

In the southern regions of Lithuania, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in the Vilnius-Kaunas direction. Already on July 13, they liberated the capital of the Lithuanian SSR, the city of Vilnius, from the German invaders, and Kaunas on August 1, and later reached the border of Lithuania with East Prussia.

The main events in the Baltic during July-August unfolded in the offensive zones of the three Baltic fronts. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, advancing in the Siauliai and Riga directions, reached the eastern border of Lithuania from July 7 to 9, crossed the Daugavpils-Vilnius railway and laid the foundation for the liberation of the Soviet Baltic. By mid-July, the troops of the front liberated a significant part of the Lithuanian SSR, repulsing strong enemy counterattacks on the approaches to Daugavpils and Panevezys between July 15 and 19, where the command of the North group transferred part of its forces from the Pskov region and to the south. On July 20, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front resumed their offensive and began to move rapidly towards Riga and Siauliai. On July 27, the large Lithuanian city of Siauliai was liberated, as a result of which the Riga-Siauliai-Kenigsberg railway, which was important for the enemy, was cut. On July 31, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps of the 1st Baltic Front reached the Gulf of Riga in the Tukums area, which led to the Germans temporarily losing the land communications of Army Group North, which connected it with East Prussia.

Thus, already at the end of July, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front were on the near approaches to Riga from the south and southwest. The armies of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts continued to fight with the stubbornly resisting troops of the 18th and 16th German armies on the lines 150-250 km from Riga. In such a situation, an expedient decision suggested itself - to strengthen the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, castle part of the forces of the 2nd Baltic Front in its zone on the left bank of the Western Dvina River and deliver the most powerful blow to the enemy from there in order to consolidate the success achieved by the 1st Baltic Front in the Riga area. However, no such decision was made by the Supreme Command at that time. The troops of all three Baltic fronts continued to carry out their tasks in the previous grouping of forces and advance in converging directions towards Riga, pushing the enemy out of the Baltic.

The German command was feverishly looking for ways out of the difficult situation in which Army Group North found itself. Hitler dismissed Colonel General Frisner from the post of commander of Army Group North, as he had failed to organize the defense of the Baltic states. Instead, on July 24, Colonel-General Scherner was appointed.

In August, the most acute situation developed in the zone of the 1st Baltic Front. The enemy command, having concentrated six infantry, six tank divisions and two brigades against the Soviet troops that had broken through to the sea, launched a strong counterattack from the areas west of Riga and Siauliai. The enemy managed to push back the troops of the front from the coast of the Gulf of Riga and restore communication between Army Groups "North" and "Center".

At this time, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts were successfully advancing in the Riga direction. The 2nd Baltic Front resumed hostilities on August 1. During the first ten days, advancing along the swampy swampy lowland, he advanced 60 km. On August 13, the city of Madona was liberated. By August 28, the troops of the front, having reached the line of Gulbene, Gostini, were 90 km from Riga. During the crossing of the Aiviekste River and in subsequent offensive battles, the soldiers of the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps showed high combat skill and mass heroism. The Soviet command highly appreciated the combat successes of the Latvian soldiers. 1745 soldiers and officers of this corps were awarded government awards.

The 3rd Baltic Front, having launched the Tartu operation on August 10, successfully advanced in the direction of Tartu and Valga. On August 25, the Estonian city of Tartu was liberated and the Tartu-Valga railway was cut, which was the link between the Narva Task Force, which was in Estonia, and the rest of the forces of Army Group North. By the end of August, the troops of the front reached the line from Lake Vyrts-Järv to Valga.

To prevent the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front from breaking through to the rear of the Narva group and to strengthen the front near Valga, the command of Army Group North concentrated about six infantry divisions here. In late August - early September, it launched a series of unsuccessful counterattacks to push our troops south of Tartu and restore communication on the Valga-Narva railway. Having not achieved success, the enemy on September 6 was forced to stop counterattacks.

The offensive actions of the Leningrad Front, which took place in August with the aim of clearing the Narva Isthmus of the enemy, did not produce the expected results. Nevertheless, they did not allow the enemy to carry out the transfer of formations from this sector, which contributed to the success of the Tartu operation of the neighboring 3rd Baltic Front.

So, the successive strikes inflicted on the enemy in the Baltic direction during July-August led to the following results. The solid defense prepared in advance by the German command on the approaches to the Baltic was crushed on a 300-kilometer front from Pskov to Polotsk. Soviet troops advanced more than 200 km in places. The enemy suffered significant losses, which, according to German data, in August alone amounted to over 70 thousand soldiers and officers.

An important political outcome of the Soviet summer offensive in the Baltics was the liberation of most of Lithuania, a large part of Latvia and some of Estonia. The offensive of our troops in the Baltic led to the expansion of the common front of the strategic offensive of the Red Army. It pinned down large enemy forces in the Baltic direction and thus helped the troops of the Belorussian fronts to complete the defeat of Army Group Center in Belarus.

In a new, more favorable environment, the offensive took place in the Baltic states in September-October 1944.

During the three summer months, the army of Nazi Germany suffered a series of major defeats on the Soviet-German front. At the same time, in the West, German troops were forced to repel the offensive of the Anglo-American armies that landed in June 1944 in northern France. Under the crushing blows of the Red Army, the coalition of pro-Nazi states almost completely collapsed. The leaders of Germany took every measure to keep in their hands as long as possible such important political, economic and strategic territories as the rest of the Baltic, East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

In an effort to retain the territory of the Baltic states, the enemy significantly expanded the construction of defensive lines and strengthened the grouping of his troops operating there. Already in August, eight divisions (including three tank divisions) were transferred from Germany, as well as from other sectors of the Soviet-German front, to the Baltic states. The number of infantry divisions was increased to 8-9 thousand people by replenishing them with personnel from aviation, navy, rear units and institutions, as well as by mobilizing the elderly and minors. By September 1, the enemy had 56 divisions (including 7 tank and motorized) and 3 motorized brigades in the zone from the Gulf of Finland to the Neman. In addition, there was a significant number of various SS and security units and subunits. The total number of the enemy grouping was more than 700 thousand people. It was armed with about 7 thousand guns and mortars and more than 1200 tanks and assault guns; from the air, her operations were supported by 300–400 aircraft of the 1st and 6th Air Fleets.

By the end of August, the enemy had prepared a number of defensive lines. In the Tallinn direction, the strongest defense was created on the isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus. The defense of the German command, which was especially highly developed in terms of engineering, was prepared in the Riga direction - on the front from the southern tip of Lake Vyrts-Järv to the Mitava region. A deep and highly developed defense was also created in the Memel direction.

In the current situation, the Soviet troops operating in the Baltics were faced with the task of defeating Army Group North and completing the liberation of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics.

The concept of the new offensive, which went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War under the name of the Baltic operation, provided for strikes by three Baltic fronts in converging directions on Riga in order to cut off Army Group North from the rest of the troops of the German army, dismember and destroy its main forces - the 18th and 16th Army and complete the liberation of Latvia and Lithuania. The elimination of the enemy grouping in Estonia and the liberation of the Estonian SSR was planned to be carried out by the forces of the Leningrad Front, which, interacting with the Baltic Fleet, was supposed to deliver one powerful blow in the Tallinn direction. The coordination of the actions of the troops of the three Baltic fronts was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. The Headquarters retained leadership of the actions of the Leningrad Front, whose troops were to advance in the coastal direction.

The Baltic strategic offensive operation included four front-line operations - Riga (from September 14 to 27), Tallinn (from September 17 to 26), Moonsund (from September 30 to November 24) and Memel (from October 5 to October 22). Thus, the operation began on September 14 and ended on November 24, 1944.

In the period from August 26 to September 2, the Headquarters issued directives to the fronts to conduct operations. The Leningrad Front, having regrouped its troops on the isthmus between Lake Peipus and Lake Vyrts-Jarv, was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 2nd shock army (commanded by Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky) from the Tartu region on Rakvere and together with the troops of the 8th 1st Army (commanded by Lieutenant General F. N. Starikov), operating from the Narva region, to surround the enemy's Narva grouping. Subsequently, the troops of the front were to develop an offensive against Tallinn, liberate it and reach the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet, commanded by Admiral V.F. Tributs, was entrusted with the task of assisting the offensive of both armies of the Leningrad Front with the fire of the ships of the 25th separate brigade of river boats and ships of the fleet in the Gulf of Finland.

The 3rd Baltic Front was to deliver the main blow from the area south of Lake Vyrts-Jarv with the forces of the 67th and 1st shock armies (army commanders Lieutenant General V. Z. Romanovsky and N. D. Zakhvataev) in the direction of Valmiera, Cesis . The second blow was delivered by the 54th Army (Army Commander Lieutenant General S. V. Roginsky) on Smiltene. The 61st Army, which arrived from the Stavka reserve (Army Commander, Colonel-General P. A. Belov), was planned to enter the battle west of Smiltene in the general direction of Riga.

The 2nd Baltic Front received the task, in cooperation with the 3rd and 1st Baltic Fronts, to defeat the enemy grouping north of the Western Dvina and capture Riga. The main blow was ordered to be delivered in the center of the front from the area west of Madona by the forces of the 42nd and 3rd shock armies (army commanders Lieutenant General V.P. Sviridov and M.N. Gerasimov) along the right bank of the Western Dvina in the general direction of Nitauri, Riga . The second blow was delivered on the right wing of the front by the troops of the 10th Guards Army (army commander, Lieutenant General M. I. Kazakov) in the direction of Dzerben, towards the blow of the 54th Army of the 3rd Baltic Front.

The 1st Baltic Front delivered one blow from the Bauska area with the forces of the 43rd and 4th shock armies (army commanders Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov and P.F. Malyshev) along the left bank of the Western Dvina in the direction of Riga, having the task of reaching the coast of the Gulf of Riga in the Riga area and preventing the retreat of the troops of Army Group North towards East Prussia. In order to ensure the most reliable encirclement of enemy troops in the Baltic States, the Stavka ordered the preparation of an offensive in the center of the front by a strike force consisting of the 51st, 5th Guards Tank Armies (army commanders, Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer and Lieutenant General of Tank Forces V . T. Volsky) and the 1st tank corps. On the fifth day of the operation, the troops of this grouping were to go on the offensive from the area west of Mitava in the direction of Temeri, defeat the enemy grouping operating south of Tukums, cut the Riga-Tukums railway and highway and reach the coast of the Gulf of Riga northwest of Riga.

Assessing the general plan of the Stavka to conduct the Baltic operation and the tasks assigned to the fronts, it should be noted that the correct idea of ​​​​encircling and destroying the main forces of Army Group North in the Baltic states by cutting them off from the rest of the troops of the German army and pressing them to the sea was not ensured by an appropriate distribution of forces . In the direction of the main attack, that is, in the offensive zone of the 1st Baltic Front, only two armies of this front were to operate. Both other Baltic fronts were still aiming at Riga from the east and northeast, which not only hampered the possibility of maneuver, but also inevitably led only to pushing the enemy's Riga grouping. It must be assumed that it would be more expedient to regroup a significant part of the forces of the 2nd Baltic Front to the left, south of the Western Dvina, and aim them to strike at Riga from the southeast, together with the troops of the 1st Baltic Front. The 61st Army, sent by the Headquarters from its reserve to the 3rd Baltic Front, should also be transferred to the latter.

Preparations for the operation continued until mid-September. By the beginning of the offensive, the four fronts had 14 combined arms, one tank and four air armies, four separate tank and one mechanized corps, 129 rifle divisions and six fortified areas. Soviet forces in the Baltics numbered 912 thousand people, about 20 thousand guns and mortars (of all calibers), over 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 3.5 thousand combat aircraft.

However, the situation on the Leningrad front in late August - early September 1944 began to change, and not in favor of the Soviet troops. On September 10, he received a sharp rebuff to the Commander’s request to the Stavka on September 10: “The Stavka considers your report unfounded both about the sharp deterioration in the situation in the Tartu region and about the violation of the plan of the upcoming operation in connection with this. The enemy has only 2 infantry divisions, 8-9 battered regiments and battle groups and 50-60 tanks on the entire front, 70 km from Lake Peipsi to Lake Vyrts-Jarve ... The forces of the Leningrad Front in the Tartu region, not counting the 3 weak divisions you indicated , make up 11 rifle divisions and, in addition, you can use 3 more divisions in this direction, transferred from the Karelian Isthmus ... The Headquarters orders: 1. Stop unnecessary correspondence and start preparing troops for the upcoming operation. Further, advice-instructions were given on the order of actions of the troops of the Leningrad Front. But the offensive was allowed to be delayed for three days.

By the beginning of the operation, the four fronts of the Soviet grouping had 900 thousand people, up to 17,500 guns and mortars, more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, over 2600 aircraft (together with long-range aviation and naval aviation - about 3500 aircraft). From the sea, the operation was supported and participated in by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

On September 14, the Baltic operation began with the simultaneous transition to the offensive of the troops of the three Baltic fronts in the Riga direction. Three days later, the Leningrad Front also joined it.

The first day of the operation was marked by the success achieved by the troops of the shock group of the 1st Baltic Front, which crossed the Memele and Lielupe rivers and broke through the defenses to a depth of 14 km. In the next two days, the troops of the front advanced 50 km. The width of the breakthrough increased to 80 km. Only 25 km remained to Riga.

The enemy made desperate efforts to hold back the further advance of the troops of the front, which threatened with grave consequences. Not only all reserves were thrown into the battle, "but also numerous sapper, construction units and various consolidated detachments." On September 15, Colonel General Scherner, assessing the situation in the Baltic states as very serious, reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces: “Yesterday Army Group North entered into a decisive defensive battle, which forces me to draw certain conclusions ... In a number of sectors, the enemy significantly wedged in the location of our troops (especially near Bauska), which is fraught with the danger of a breakthrough to Riga. I can no longer talk about organized defense or a solid front line ... I urgently ask the high command today to give the order for Operation Aster (the operation to withdraw the troops of Army Group North to East Prussia. - Note. ed.). I beg you, do it urgently!.. Now is the last opportunity to leave. In addition, if the Russians still come out at Tartu, then we may be cut off.

The German headquarters, which previously did not even allow the thought of leaving the territories of the Soviet Baltic states, was forced to agree with Scherner and on September 16 gave permission to begin the withdrawal of the troops of Army Group North along the entire front from the Gulf of Finland to the Western Dvina. The troops of the Narva group were the first to begin the withdrawal from Estonia, the formations of which were meant to be used to strengthen the front in the Valga region or to strengthen the defense south of Riga. In the future, it was supposed to withdraw the troops of the 18th and 16th armies. The latter, before the passage of the rest of the troops of Army Group North through Riga, had to stubbornly defend the front south of Riga in order to prevent the exit of Soviet troops to the coast of the Gulf of Riga.

In the first three days of the operation, the offensive in the zones of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts developed much more slowly than on the 1st Baltic Front. Here, our troops were able to break through only the main strip in a number of sectors and advance only 5-6 km. The reasons for this were the weak strength of the initial strikes, as well as the presence of significant shortcomings in the use of artillery and tanks, which were allowed during the organization of front-line and army operations.

On September 17, the Leningrad Front joined the operation. Just what the command of the "North" group feared most of all happened - a powerful blow was brought down on the enemy from the Tartu region. Despite the dangers, the 2nd shock army advancing there successfully broke through the enemy defenses west of Lake Peipus on the first day and advanced 18 km. This created a threat of encirclement of enemy formations defending on the Narva Isthmus. The German command had to start the withdrawal of the Narva task force from Estonia a day earlier. In the offensive zone of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts, the enemy sought to hold the occupied lines until the Narva group formations were withdrawn.

The command of the Army Group "North", seeing that the greatest danger threatens from the area south of Riga, took all measures to delay the advance of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the Riga direction and ensure the withdrawal of forces located north of the Western Dvina. To defuse the difficult situation that had arisen south of Riga, it launched two strong counterattacks: one from the area southwest of Mitava, the other from the Baldone area. The purpose of the first counterattack, which involved units of five tank divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army (up to 380 tanks and assault guns in total), was to cut off the Mitavian ledge, clear the road necessary for the withdrawal of troops, and divert the main forces of the 1st Baltic front from the Riga direction. Having launched a counterattack on September 16, the enemy was able to advance only 5 km within seven days and on September 23 was forced to go on the defensive. And although the counterattack did not reach the goal, the enemy still managed to delay the advance of the 1st Baltic Front.

The second strike was delivered with the task of preventing the further advance of Soviet troops to Riga from the south. Six divisions took part in it. In the period from 19 to 21 September, the troops of the 43rd Army not only repulsed all the attacks of this enemy grouping, but also, having pushed the enemy to the north, captured the city of Baldone. Now they were only 16 km from Riga.

The offensive of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts north of the Western Dvina developed slowly. Using the favorable conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the German troops put up stubborn resistance, trying to ensure the withdrawal of the Narva task force from Estonia. Only on September 23, the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front were able to proceed to the pursuit of the troops of the 18th Army, which, fearing that the formations of the 2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front would reach its communications, began to hastily retreat to the Sigulda line. The German troops resisted especially stubbornly in the direction of the main attack of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front. However, by September 22, the enemy defense at the Cesis line was also broken through. In the following days, until September 27 inclusive, the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts advanced to the Sigulda defensive line prepared in advance, where they were stopped by the enemy. The troops of both fronts were now 60-80 km from Riga.

The fighting to repel German counterattacks was heavy. Here is what Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky reported about this to the Headquarters: “On the front of the 6th Guards Army of Chistyakov south-west of Dobele, the enemy launched an offensive in the east direction on the morning of 17.09 with the forces of the 5th, 4th tank divisions and motorized Division "Grossdeutschland" In total, about 200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. Before we approached the area of ​​operations with the necessary tank and anti-tank weapons, the enemy managed to penetrate our defenses from 4 to 5 km. Further advance of the enemy is suspended. During the day of the battle, up to 60 tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy were knocked out and burned ... From 10.00 18.09 the enemy resumed the offensive. Until 13.00 all his attacks were repulsed.

At a time when the troops of the three Baltic fronts fought intense battles in the Riga direction, the troops of the Leningrad Front launched a successful offensive in Estonia. By September 26, they cleared the entire territory of the Estonian SSR from the enemy, with the exception of the islands of Ezel and Dago.

As a result of the ten-day September offensive of four fronts in the Baltics, our troops liberated the entire mainland of Estonia, most of Latvia and pushed the enemy back to the Sigulda line. At this stage of the strategic operation, it was not possible to cut off Army Group North from East Prussia and disrupt its connection with Army Group Center. The task of dismembering the Baltic group of Germans was not solved either. The enemy, due to the withdrawal of the Narva group and the 18th Army, concentrated a large grouping of his forces in the area of ​​​​the Riga bridgehead.

Among the main reasons for the failure to fulfill the tasks of the first stage of the Baltic operation should be attributed, first of all, the weak force of the initial strikes of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts, as a result of which the combat operations of the first operational echelon took on a protracted character and were in the form of “gnawing through” the defensive line. There were also significant shortcomings in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance by front-line means. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not achieve the proper coordination of frontal strikes, due to which the enemy was able to maneuver forces on a large scale. The fact that the Headquarters did not make a timely decision to regroup forces from the offensive zones of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts to the direction of the strike of the 1st Baltic Front, where a major success was indicated in the first days, should be attributed to the shortcomings of the management.

At the end of September, a significant territory of the Soviet Baltic, as well as the islands of the Moonsund archipelago, were still in the hands of the enemy. The main forces of Army Group North were concentrated on a narrow front in the area of ​​the Riga bridgehead. 17 divisions were located north of the Western Dvina and 14 divisions were located south of the river (up to Auce). On the Memel direction, in the sector from Auce to the Neman, at that time there were no more than 7–8 divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army, reassigned from September 21 to Army Group North. Taking this circumstance into account, on September 24, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to transfer the main efforts to the Memel direction in order to cut off Army Group North from East Prussia and subsequently destroy it. At the same time, it was decided to launch operations with the aim of liberating the Moonsund Islands in order to block the enemy's exit from the Gulf of Riga.

On September 24, preparations for the Memel operation began. It was to be carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front (army commander - Lieutenant General I. I. Lyudnikov). In order to strike at the Memel direction, the 1st Baltic Front needed to regroup all its forces in the Siauliai region and prepare a new front-line offensive operation. The troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts were also to regroup their forces and resume the offensive with the task of liberating Riga and clearing the coast from Riga to Libau of the enemy.

The German High Command also developed a new plan of action. On September 28, at a meeting with Hitler, where the commander of Army Group North was also present, it was decided to conduct a counteroffensive in the Riga area at the end of October with the forces of 16 divisions. However, the enemy did not manage to carry out his operation. On October 5, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front delivered a powerful blow that was unexpected for the enemy command in the Memel direction. The main grouping of the front, deployed northwest of Siauliai, included the 6th Guards Army (commanded by Colonel General I. M. Chistyakov), the 43rd and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The second blow was delivered on the left wing of the front from the area southwest of Shauliai by the troops of the 2nd Guards Army (commanded by Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze). In the second echelon of the front, the 51st Army deployed from the depths to build up efforts. On the very first day of the offensive, the enemy defenses were broken through. On the morning of the second day, the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the gap, which was rapidly advancing towards the coast of the Baltic Sea. On the same day, the 39th Army launched an offensive, striking at Taurage.

Seeing the danger that arose as a result of the breakthrough of our troops in the Memel direction, on October 6, the enemy command began to withdraw troops from the Riga region along the coast of the Baltic Sea to East Prussia. The retreat of the enemy was timely discovered by the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts, and they immediately began to pursue.

On October 10, formations of the 1st Baltic Front reached the coast of the Baltic Sea north and south of Memel and blockaded the city from land; part of the forces of the front reached the border with East Prussia in the Taurage region. In these battles, which completed the liberation of the entire Lithuanian SSR, the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division under the command of Colonel A.I. Urbshas successfully operated as part of the 2nd Guards Army. An example of the high military skill and heroism of the soldiers of the division is the feat of Corporal G.S. Ushpolis, who repelled several German counterattacks with well-aimed gunfire, knocked out three enemy tanks and an armored personnel carrier. For his military feat, Corporal Ushpolis was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The troops of the 39th Army, having captured Yurburg and Taurage by October 10, crossed the border with East Prussia. By October 22, they completely cleared the right bank of the Neman from the enemy from the mouth to Yurburg.

As a result of the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the coast of the Baltic Sea, the plan of the German leadership to withdraw Army Group North to East Prussia was thwarted. She had to retreat to the Courland Peninsula.

The troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts, continuing to pursue the retreating enemy, by October 10 reached the outer Riga defensive bypass. A period of direct struggle for the capital of the Latvian SSR began. By decision of the commanders of the fronts, five combined-arms armies were involved in capturing Riga, which were to strike in converging directions. As part of the 3rd Baltic Front, the city was attacked north of the Western Dvina by the 67th, 61st and 1st shock armies introduced from the second echelon. In the 2nd Baltic Front, the 10th Guards Army and the rifle corps of the 22nd Army were to launch an offensive against the capital of Latvia from the southeast, along the left bank of the Western Dvina.

Starting to break through the Riga city bypass on the morning of October 11, the advancing troops overcame its first line of defense and by the end of October 12 they reached the second line. Fighting began directly on the outskirts of the city. The enemy, expecting the main blow of our troops southeast of Riga, somewhat weakened the defenses off the coast of the Gulf of Riga, which allowed the 67th Army to cross the lake area northeast of the city on the night of October 12-13 and deploy battles for the right-bank part Riga. By the morning of October 13, this part of the city was liberated from the enemy. At the same time, the 10th Guards Army continued to wage intense battles on the southern approaches to the city. Her attempts during October 13 and 14 to capture the left-bank part of Riga were unsuccessful. On October 14, when the army troops were still fighting intense battles on the outskirts of the city, the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps cut the Riga-Mitava road. On October 15, the enemy's resistance was finally broken, and the Soviet troops completely liberated the capital of Latvia. The liberation of Riga essentially completed the expulsion of the German invaders from the Soviet Baltic. In the battles for Riga, the 245th and 212th rifle divisions under the command of Major General V. A. Rodionov and Colonel V. G. Kuchinov especially distinguished themselves. Parts of these divisions were among the first to break into the city from the north and east.

On October 16, the 3rd Baltic Front was disbanded, and the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, in cooperation with the right-flank armies of the 1st Baltic Front, continued to pursue the retreating enemy in the directions to Tukums and Saldus. By October 21, they reached the Tukums defensive line, behind which the divisions of the 16th and 18th armies of the North group withdrew.

Simultaneously with the advance of the Baltic fronts, the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet carried out a landing operation from September 29 to October 15, as a result of which they captured the islands of Vormsi, Muhu, Dago and most of the island of Ezel. The Baltic operation was thus completed. More than 30 divisions that escaped defeat during the offensive of the Soviet troops (from 26 to 38 according to various sources, of which two tank divisions - the 14th and 16th, as well as two brigades of assault guns - the 202nd and 912th. - Note. ed.) of the Baltic grouping of the enemy were pressed to the sea, where they were until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.

From September 13, 1944 to May 8, 1945, German troops defending on the Courland Peninsula survived 6 large-scale offensives of the Red Army. And all of them were not very successful. A decisive 7th offensive was planned for the second ten days of May, but because of the end of the war it was not necessary to carry it out.

Since May 9, along the roads of the peninsula, among the forests and swamps, huge columns of German soldiers were stretched, heading to the prisoner of war camps.

One of the columns stretched for several kilometers along the highway. Behind the backs of the soldiers stuck heavy, tightly stuffed duffel bags. Practical Germans, before the last campaign, dismantled new overcoats, boots, blankets from warehouses. Dejectedly wandered, rank after rank, gray, dusty soldiers of the defeated Reich.

The commander of the Leningrad Front reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that by May 31, 1945, the troops of the front had captured the headquarters of the Courland Army Group, the 16th and 18th field armies, and seven army corps; 18 infantry, 2 security and 2 tank divisions, 2 battle groups, a motorized brigade "Kurland", 50 separate battalions, 28 artillery formations (of which two brigades of assault guns: 202nd and 912th. - Note. ed.), as well as special parts. 36 thousand horses, a large amount of weapons and equipment were transferred to the Soviet troops: about 145 thousand rifles and machine guns, almost 7 thousand machine guns, 930 mortars, 2450 guns of various calibers, 478 tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, 269 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, more than 18 thousand cars, 675 tractors and tractors, 496 motorcycles, 153 aircraft, 1080 radios.

Among the prisoners were generals from the command of the Kurland army group: commander - infantry general Gilpert, generals Ferch and Rauser, commanders of the 16th and 18th field armies, generals Volkamer and Bege, commander of the 1st air fleet, lieutenant general Pflugbeil, commanders army corps and divisions.

Of the SS formations in Courland was the 19th Guards Division of the SS troops (2nd Latvian) under the command of Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the SS troops Bruno Streckenbach. She was part of the 6th SS Corps of the 16th Wehrmacht Army. After the surrender of the unit, the German SS men were sent to prisoner of war camps, and the Latvians, as citizens of the Soviet Union, who had betrayed their homeland and took part in the destruction of the Jewish population of Latvia, were overwhelmingly shot.

Now consider the issues of the partisan movement.

The struggle of the Baltic peoples against the German invaders, as in other union republics temporarily occupied by the enemy, was led by various forces - both communists and anti-fascists. The most active form of this struggle was the partisan movement. The activities of the partisans, which began after the Nazi repressions against the civilian population, especially intensified after the creation of the republican headquarters of the partisan movement, which was led by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The secretaries of the Central Committee of the communist parties of the Baltic republics were directly connected with partisan commanders and commissars, with party organs working behind enemy lines: in Lithuania - A. Yu. Snechkus, in Latvia - N. E. Kalnberzin, in Estonia - N. G. Karotam.

Together with the organized underground, spontaneously organized detachments, which appeared under the influence of circumstances, also fought against the Germans. Thus, in Lithuania there was a significantly high percentage of the Jewish population, who, in order to avoid extermination, had to take up arms. In addition, the Germans did not classify the Lithuanians as the "superior race" even after Germanization, which provoked (unlike Latvia and Estonia, where the population decided to be Germanized. - Note. ed.) the growth of the underground struggle. Therefore, there were no Lithuanian SS formations - the Germans did not allow the non-Nordic people to create them.

Carrying out combat missions, the Baltic partisans showed great courage and heroism. The working people of Latvia well remember the exploits of the courageous underground partisan, leader of the Riga underground, Hero of the Soviet Union I. Ya. Sudmalis. The combat operations and sabotage carried out under his leadership stunned the invaders with their audacity. Despite police surveillance, the fearless patriot traveled around Latvia, established contacts with underground fighters, partisan detachments, and prepared new sabotage and operations. Only with the help of provocateurs did the Germans manage to get on the trail of the Riga underground organization and capture Sudmalis. In May 1944, the Nazis executed the glorious son of the Latvian people. A partisan detachment led by a brave twenty-year-old Lithuanian girl Maria Melnikaite won military glory. On July 8, 1944, while performing a combat mission, the fearless partisan, along with five of her comrades-in-arms, was surrounded by punishers. Fighting off them, the young patriot destroyed seven enemy soldiers. But the forces were too unequal. She was captured by the Nazis and subjected to inhuman torture, and then executed on July 13 in the square of the town of Dukshtas. Standing in front of the gallows, Maria Melnikaite proudly shouted: "I fought and die for Soviet Lithuania! .." By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M. Yu. Melnikaite was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The offensive of the Red Army in the Baltic States lasted almost four months - from the beginning of July to the end of October 1944. The troops of five front-line formations and one fleet took part in it. By its nature, the strategic offensive in the Baltic direction was a series of interconnected operations of fronts and groups of fronts, consistent in depth and front. The offensive was carried out on a 1000-kilometer front, to a depth of over 450 km. During July-September 1944, each of the fronts involved in the offensive on the territory of the Soviet Baltic states carried out three front-line offensive operations.

The offensive of the Red Army in the Baltic direction led to major political and strategic results. The most important political result was the liberation of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics from the Nazi occupation. The plans of the German political and military leadership to retain this politically, economically and strategically important territory collapsed.

A major strategic result of the Red Army's offensive in the Baltic direction was the heavy defeat of Army Group North. Of the 59 formations that took part in the hostilities, 26 were defeated. The rest of the forces were isolated on the Courland Peninsula in the northwestern part of Latvia and blockaded in Memel (Klaipeda). Thus, Army Group North lost its strategic importance and could no longer exert a significant influence on the further course of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front. The enemy lost the freedom of action of his fleet in the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland and in other areas of the eastern part of the Baltic Sea.

As a result of the liberation of the Baltic states, the length of the front line was reduced by 750 km, which allowed the Soviet command to release significant forces and use them in the winter of 1945 for an offensive in the main strategic direction, moving deep into the Reich.

Noting the positive results of the offensive of the Red Army in the Baltic direction, it should be noted at the same time that the goal of the Baltic strategic operation was not fully achieved, although this operation cost a lot of human casualties and significant material costs. The Soviet troops failed to achieve the final defeat of Army Group North - this large strategic enemy grouping on the Soviet-German front. Although she suffered a severe defeat, she still managed to retreat to the Tukums line and gain a foothold on the Courland Peninsula, where she fettered significant forces of the Red Army until the end of the war. The most important reason for the incompleteness of the Baltic operation, as already mentioned, should be considered the weak force of the initial strikes of the fronts, as a result of which a decisive defeat was not inflicted on the enemy in the tactical and immediate operational depth. The weakness and low effectiveness of the initial strikes were explained by the low manning of rifle divisions, the small ammunition limit, the clearly insufficient number of tanks allocated for direct support of the infantry, poor knowledge of the grouping and nature of the enemy’s defense, and shortcomings in planning and conducting artillery support in the fronts. There were some other reasons of a subjective order that had a negative impact on the development and final results of the Baltic operation.

In the offensive on the territory of the Baltic states, Soviet troops acquired a new variety of experience in organizing and carrying out large and complex operational regroupings both during the preparation of operations and in the course of hostilities. In this regard, the most instructive is the regrouping of the 1st Baltic Front from the Riga direction to the Memel one. Within ten days, five armies were regrouped at a distance of 120-140 km, including one tank (more than 50 divisions in total), one mechanized and four tank corps and all reinforcement artillery. This was a rare example of a skillfully and covertly carried out regrouping of such a large number of forces and means in the course of an offensive operation in order to transfer the main efforts to a new operational direction.

The offensive in the Baltics was characterized by joint actions of the ground forces and the forces of the fleet, both in the offensive on the coastal flank and in the implementation of the landing operation. In the course of operations, the advancing troops had to repeatedly cross rivers, operate in difficult conditions of wooded-swampy and lake areas, pursue the retreating enemy, while breaking through a number of intermediate defense lines in its operational depth, and also often repel strong counterattacks.

The offensive in the Baltic States once again demonstrated the high morale and combat qualities of Soviet soldiers, their increased military skill, and mass heroism. The Headquarters and the State Defense Committee highly appreciated the combat successes of the troops in the offensive in the Baltic states. Over 332 thousand soldiers of the Leningrad and three Baltic fronts were awarded military orders and medals.

In the battles for the Baltic states, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, also “suffered”. Somehow in the evening he was driving from the command post from Eremenko to Bagramyan (from the command post of the 2nd Baltic to the command post of the 1st Baltic Front. - Note. ed.). A Willis jumped out to meet the marshal's cars, rushing at great speed. An officer was driving. He crashed into Vasilevsky's car, and everyone sitting in it head over heels scattered in different directions. The marshal got up, his head and side ached badly. The drunken violator, the commander of the front-line reconnaissance group, handed Vasilevsky a pistol and offered to shoot himself. But everything worked out, and the denouement came in a characteristic national style: the marshal broke two ribs and spent 10 days lying in his group’s office, they wanted to bring the senior lieutenant to trial by a military tribunal, but after the intercession of the injured Vasilevsky, they changed their minds - everyone in our Fatherland drinks. Moreover, this officer with a combat group again went behind enemy lines, brilliantly completed a combat mission and soon became a Hero of the Soviet Union.

The fighting for the liberation of the Baltic states is one of the largest and most complex sets of operations. In the organization and conduct of these operations, along with positive experience, significant shortcomings were also revealed. It must be admitted that over the past years, the offensive operations of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states in 1944-1945 have not yet been fully developed. Many questions of military art require further careful study. Remembering the liberation of the Baltic states, the author hopes that the presented work will cause a new upsurge in the study of these interesting events of the Great Patriotic War from the point of view of military art.

Liberation of capitals

The most important step in the liberation of a particular national territory is the establishment of control over its capital. This part of the book is connected with operations to capture the main cities of the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union: Vilnius, Tallinn and Riga. The liberation of the capitals of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by the Red Army was a landmark event for each of the republics - the German occupation ended, a new life began.

Battles for Vilnius

The German invaders occupied Lithuania and other Soviet Baltic republics for three years. Trying to implement the Ost plan developed by the Nazis, they sought to turn Lithuania, like the entire Baltic, into their colony, resettle part of the Lithuanians, Germanize the Latvians and Estonians, and destroy those who resist. The German invaders shot, burned and tortured about 700 thousand citizens of the republic, which accounted for more than a quarter of the population of Lithuania. Only in the town of Paneriai, near Vilnius, the Nazi invaders exterminated 100 thousand people. In the ninth fort of the Kaunas fortress they killed 80,000 people. Similar bloody traces were left by the inexorable occupiers in many other cities and villages of the Baltic.

Many citizens of Lithuania from the first days of the war rose to fight against the German troops. In 1944, 67 partisan detachments and groups fought in Lithuania. With the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army in the summer of 1944, the population of the republic sharply intensified the fight against the invaders, helping the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, who liberated the Lithuanian SSR, in every possible way.

The defeat of the main forces of the Army Group "Center" and the liberation of a significant part of Belarus opened the way for the Soviet troops to the capital of Lithuania - Vilnius.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front (front commander, General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky), pursuing the enemy, crossed the border of the Lithuanian SSR on July 6. The 277th Rifle Division of the 5th Army was the first on the front line to enter the land of Lithuania, liberating the village of Podverzhizhna that day (4 km southeast of Podbrodze).

The most intense battles on the territory of Lithuania unfolded for the capital of the republic.

The German command took into account the advantage of defending the line along the rivers Viliya and Vileyka with such an important administrative and political center as the city of Vilnius. It sought to defend this line to cover the approaches to East Prussia. Fresh forces from the depths of the Reich were hastily thrown here. The garrison of the city consisted of more than 15 thousand troops from different parts of the 3rd Panzer Army. In addition, in the course of our offensive, the enemy grouping in the Vilnius region was strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements. She had 270 guns, about 60 tanks and self-propelled artillery, up to 50 armored personnel carriers. A large number of units and formations involved in the defense of Vilnius testified that the enemy was trying to reorganize the troops defeated in previous battles and create a defense at the turn of the Viliya and Vileyka rivers, the key point of which was Vilnius. Our aerial reconnaissance established the advancement of reserves to the Vilnius region from the north and west.

It was necessary to immediately defeat the Vilnius grouping of the enemy. This was not an easy task, requiring great effort from the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, who were tired and weakened during the long offensive.

Another important fact should be noted. If the troops did not show maximum tension, the city of Vilnius could be turned by the enemy into a strong fortress, which would significantly complicate the advance of our troops to the west. Even in the limited time available to the enemy, Vilnius was prepared for defense. The Viliya River, cutting through the northern part of the city and then passing along its western outskirts, was a great obstacle to the advancing troops. Yes, and Vileyka complicated the maneuver of troops in the eastern part of the city. Churches, monasteries and stone buildings, adapted by the enemy for all-round defense, were strong strongholds. The streets of the city were not visible from our side, and the enemy could freely use them to maneuver troops.

Troops of the 5th Army (commanded by Colonel General N.I. Krylov) together with the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps (corps commander by Lieutenant General of Tank Troops V.T. Obukhov) advanced on Vilnius from the northeast, and from the south east - the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov). On July 7, our troops broke through the defenses and bypassed Vilnius from the north and south.

The advanced units of the 65th and 72nd Rifle and 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps approached the eastern outskirts of Vilnius. From that moment, street fighting began. On July 8, the 277th Rifle Division of the 72nd Corps, hiding behind part of the forces at the Mal. Reshe, Novosady, attacked the enemy troops on the northwestern outskirts of Vilnius with the main forces. The 215th division of this corps, reinforced by the 153rd tank brigade, fought fierce battles on the eastern outskirts of the city and drove out enemy troops from there in the afternoon.

In view of the neighbor's lagging behind, the right flank of the 5th Army turned out to be open, and it was necessary to immediately take measures to secure it, since, according to air reconnaissance, the enemy advanced a strong grouping of infantry and tanks from the north. Ensuring the right flank of the army was entrusted to the formations of the 72nd Corps. They took up defensive positions in the Podvilyany, Varna sector with a front to the north and northwest. In addition, the advancement of infantry and tanks from the area of ​​​​Koshedara (Kaysadoris) was discovered. To cover this direction in the sector of the front north of the settlement of Bukhta and northwest of Dolna, the commander of the 5th Army advanced the 184th Rifle Division and one regiment of the 97th Rifle Division. At this time, the troops of the 65th Rifle Corps, fighting fierce street battles, slowly moved towards the central part of the city. By the end of July 9, the city was completely surrounded. Trying to save their garrison, the German command launched a strong counterattack with infantry, reinforced by 150 tanks and self-propelled guns from the Maishegala and Evie areas. But the enemy troops stumbled upon the timely organized defense of the divisions of the 72nd Rifle Corps, which did not allow them to connect with the city garrison. So, thanks to the advancement of barriers to the north, northwest and west of Vilnius, German attempts to come to the aid of their encircled garrison in the city were successfully eliminated. Simultaneously with the liquidation of the encircled enemy garrison, the commander of the 5th Army decided to go on the offensive in the general direction to Kaunas, and to use the 45th Rifle Corps, which was in the second echelon, to participate in the liquidation of the encircled enemy.

The 45th Rifle Corps (159th, 184th and 338th Rifle Divisions), commanded by Lieutenant General S. Poplavsky, before the start of the fighting for the capital of the Republic of Lithuania, having made a march, concentrated 60 km east and southeast of Vilnius. It was supposed to give the personnel a well-deserved rest in order to start the next march the next day. However, at about 2 pm on July 8, an order was received to raise the corps divisions on alarm, move to the southeastern outskirts of Vilnius and be ready to take part in the assault on the city from the morning of July 9. Although the soldiers and officers were very tired, they met the order that the capital of the fraternal Lithuanian SSR was to be liberated with great enthusiasm. An hour later, everything was in motion. Vehicles and horse-drawn carts were used to speed up the march. Local residents offered carts for the transfer of troops. The 60-kilometer crossing was completed ahead of schedule.

On the afternoon of July 9, our air reconnaissance established the advance of a large column of infantry with tanks from the west in the direction of Evie. The enemy tried to come to the aid of the encircled garrison.

The 159th and 338th divisions, reinforced by anti-tank artillery, occupied the lines indicated by them in a timely manner to repel counterattacks from the west and northwest. The enemy was late with the advancement of reserves to assist the encircled garrison in Vilnius. Therefore, despite his fierce attacks on the sectors of the front occupied by the 159th and 338th divisions, he failed to break through to the city. Having lost many tanks and self-propelled guns, the German command abandoned counterattacks.

The 184th division of the 45th corps, having crossed to the northern bank of the Viliya southwest of Vilnius, together with the formations of the 65th and 72nd rifle corps, began to destroy the enemy surrounded in the city.

Unsuccessful with attacks from outside, the German leadership tried to reinforce the blockaded garrison by dropping paratroopers. On the afternoon of July 10, it dropped 600 paratroopers in the Vilnius region. However, thanks to timely measures taken, units of the 65th Rifle Corps destroyed almost half of the paratroopers upon their landing, and the rest during the next day. Simultaneously with the landing in the city, the Germans launched a second counterattack from the Evie region with the aim of deblocking the Vilnius garrison. At first, 40 tanks with infantry advanced successfully, but were met by the anti-tank reserves of the 5th Army, which were promptly advanced to this direction. Having lost half of the tanks, the enemy withdrew. Stubborn fighting in this area continued until July 13.

To speed up the liquidation of the encircled troops in Vilnius, on July 11, our assault units were reinforced with flamethrower anti-tank weapons, knapsack flamethrowers and one assault battalion. The storming troops captured the central part of the city, and by the end of July 12, the encircled group was cut into two centers isolated from each other: one in the prison area, and the other at the observatory. During July 12, these pockets were subjected to intense air bombardment, but the Germans continued to resist. Then, on the night of July 12-13, artillery, mortars and other means were additionally brought up to the centers of resistance.

At dawn on July 13, the Vilnius garrison of the enemy made a desperate attempt to break out of the encirclement. During the fighting, a group of up to 3,000 soldiers and officers managed to break out of the encirclement in the observatory area and through the western part of the city to go into the forest southeast of Rykonta. Here, this group, which suffered heavy losses during the breakthrough, connected with enemy units advancing from the Evie region to assist the Vilnius garrison.

On July 13, 1944, after a three-year German occupation, our troops completely liberated the capital of the Lithuanian SSR, once again demonstrating high skill in the struggle for large settlements.

The enemy garrison was completely destroyed. Only prisoners were captured about 5200 German soldiers and officers, guns of various calibers - 156, mortars - 48, tanks and self-propelled gun mounts - 28, more than 1100 vehicles, many warehouses and other military property.

The liberation by Soviet troops of Vilnius, the ancient capital of Lithuania, the cradle of statehood and culture of the Lithuanian people, was greeted with rejoicing not only by the inhabitants of this city, but also by the population of other Lithuanian cities and villages, Estonians, Latvians and all the peoples of the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian people intensified their fight against the German invaders, helping the advancing troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts in every possible way. By the beginning of August 1944, most of the territory of Lithuania was liberated from the enemy.

Way to Tallinn

The liberation of Estonia began after the defeat of the Germans near Leningrad and Novgorod, when the troops of the Leningrad Front in early February 1944 reached Narva and immediately began forcing it. In fierce battles in the first half of February, our units captured small bridgeheads on the western bank of the Narva River, entering the territory of the Estonian SSR. Preparations began for the battle for the river. Narva.

The town of Narva was psychologically significant for both warring parties. It was from here that the "dog-knights" of the Teutonic Order began their campaigns against Russia. The castle of one of the masters of the order, Hermann von Saltz (the tank and reconnaissance battalion of the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland" bore his name. - Note. ed.), was located on the western bank of the Narva, and a little further downstream is the ancient Russian fortress Ivangorod - the frontier of Orthodoxy and Russian Eastern European culture. At this point, our ancestors in ancient times met foreign invaders, from this point the campaigns of Russian troops began to liberate the peoples of the Baltic states from German and Swedish rule.

To protect the Narva line of defense, the German command formed a grouping of German forces, consisting of several formations of the SS troops and units of the Wehrmacht. The most powerful of them was the 11th Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division of the SS Nordland. The regiments of this formation received numbers and names: 1st "Danmark", 2nd "Norge". Both regiments were of three battalions, while the artillery regiment consisted of four divisions (three batteries each). On October 22, 1943, during the general change of numbers in the SS troops, the regiments of divisions received new numbers: Norwegian - 23, Danish - 24, and all special units and divisions of the division (11th tank battalion, 11th regiment of self-propelled artillery, 11 11th anti-aircraft artillery battalion, 11th field artillery battalion, 11th anti-tank battalion, 11th tank sapper battalion, 11th communications battalion, etc.) - number 11. 11 SS pgd in that period was commanded by Brigadeführer and Major General of the SS troops Fritz von Scholz.

Together with the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland", the 4th SS Panzergrenadier Brigade "Netherland" was also formed under the command of SS Oberführer Jungen Wagner.

As part of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps, both of these formations were sent to the Soviet-German front and included in the 18th Field Army of Army Group North, immediately falling into the "thick" of hostilities (in the area of ​​​​the settlement of Kozhanovo in In January 1944, the 11th SS PgD lost the first battalions of the 23rd and 24th regiments, which were no longer restored. Note. ed.). In the first days of February 1944, the SS formations of the 3rd SS TC withdrew to the Narva region. To the north of the city on the right bank of the river were the positions of the sapper battalion of the Netherlands brigade, between the Narva River and the village of Lilienbach - the motorized infantry regiments De Ruyter and General Seyfardt and the SS infantry brigade Netherlands. The southern approaches to the city were covered by the 24th Motorized Infantry Regiment "Danmark" of the 11th Pgd "Nordland". On the western bank of the river, from north to south, the 54th SS artillery division of the “Netherlands” brigade, the main forces of the SS “Nordland”, the 11th SS self-propelled artillery regiment and the 23rd motorized infantry regiment “Norge” were deployed. The “bloody meat grinder” near Narva began on February 3, when a Soviet assault detachment captured a bridgehead on the left bank of the river, but was overturned by the 11th SS Panzer-Reconnaissance Battalion “Hermann von Salza” from the Nordland division. The struggle for the crossings continued with varying success until February 12, when the assault groups of the Red Army managed to capture and expand several bridgeheads and bridgeheads. The attempt of the Soviet command to land an amphibious assault east of Sillamäe on the coast of the Narva Bay ended in failure, but to the south, near Krivasso, our troops seized a bridgehead and, continuously feeding it with reinforcements, began to expand it in a southwestern direction. However, for the Soviet command, these were only local operations.

Attaching great importance to the speedy liberation of Soviet Estonia, on February 22, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the Leningrad Front with the forces of three armies (8th, 59th and 2nd shock) to break into the enemy defenses on the Narva line and subsequently develop the offensive: with one army on Pärnu, cutting off the escape route to the south of the Tallinn group of German troops, and two armies - to Tartu, Valga.

During the fierce battles that unfolded from February 24, 1944, the troops of the Leningrad Front expanded the bridgehead on the western bank of the Narva to 35 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth in a week. However, the task of liberating the Estonian SSR in the winter of 1944 proved too much for the Leningrad Front. The troops were very tired from the previous one and a half months of uninterrupted offensive battles in the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain and had significant losses in personnel and equipment. In February 1944, the Soviet command could not allocate additional forces to the Leningrad Front, since at that time all the reserves of the Red Army were used in operations in Right-Bank Ukraine. As already mentioned, on March 1, 1945, the troops of the Leningrad Front were forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive at the turn of the Narva River, Lake Peipus and Pskov. German troops, on the orders of the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal V. Model, also retreated to the Panther defensive line and prepared to occupy the Tannenberg defensive line.

Since the beginning of March 1944, the German grouping on the Panther line (now it has become known as the Narva Task Force. - Note. ed.) was reinforced by the 20th Estonian SS Volunteer Division (it was hastily reorganized from the 3rd Estonian SS Volunteer Brigade, which was transferred to Estonia from Belarus. - Note. ed.). The formation was commanded by Oberführer Franz Augsberger. A little later, the 5th SS Volunteer Brigade "Wallonia" under the command of SS Standartenführer Leon Degrel and the 6th SS Volunteer Assault Brigade "Langemark" under the command of SS Obersturmbannführer Konrad Schellong appeared on the theater of operations. The 15th and 19th Latvian SS Volunteer Divisions fought in the Pskov region from March 1944. From February 26 to mid-July 1944, the 15th SS division was commanded by SS Oberführer Nikolaus Hellmann, and in the 19th division, as many as three commanders changed in three months: until March 15, 1944, Brigadeführer and Major General of the SS troops Hinrich Schuldt, with March to April 13, 1944 - SS Standartenführer Friedrich-Wilhelm Bock, and from April 1944 - Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the SS troops Bruno Streckenbach.

Having gathered such significant forces, the German command hoped that with the help of a system of defensive lines it would be possible to repel the attacks of the Soviet troops for a long time, which, in principle, succeeded. Positional battles in the Narva region, and in other sectors of Army Group North, continued until mid-July 1944.

In the plans for the defense of the Baltic States, the enemy paid the greatest attention to Estonia, which had a major military and political significance. The loss of it would lead to a sharp deterioration for Germany in the situation in the Baltic Sea. The German leadership continued to keep significant forces here in order to repel a possible offensive by the Red Army.

Such were the calculations of the enemy. But they turned out to be untenable and were decisively overturned in the summer of 1944 during the Belarusian operation. Our troops liberated Belarus, most of Lithuania, a significant part of Latvia, went out on a broad front to the borders of East Prussia. The German Army Group North was driven back to the north and surrounded by Soviet troops from the east, south and west. Favorable conditions have developed for the complete liberation of the territory of the Soviet Baltic states.

During the Belarusian operation, the troops of the Leningrad Front carried out the Narva operation, as a result of which on July 26 they liberated the city of Narva and a number of regions of North-Eastern Estonia. The operation began on June 24, 1944, its purpose was to pincer the enemy. The northern sting of ticks rested on the renamed 20th SS Grenadier Division (Estonian No. 1) and forced it to withdraw beyond Narva. On the same day, the SS units, still located on the eastern bank of the Narva, quickly left the bridgehead and, leaving for the city, blew up the bridges behind them. By the end of the next day, all German troops had left Narva. However, during the retreat to the Tannenberg Line, the Dutch regiment General Seyfardt was cut off from the main forces and destroyed. On July 26, the assault on the German positions at Tannenberg began. And this time, the enemy held out for a long time, despite the fact that the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front in August cleared the southeastern part of Estonia with the cities of Tartu, Elva, Vyru and captured a bridgehead in the Tartu region on the northern bank of the Emajõgi River. But the bridgeheads on the Narva and Emajõgi rivers captured by the Soviet troops later played a big role in the Leningrad Front's offensive operation to drive the invaders out of the Estonian SSR.

For the final defeat of the German Army Group "North" and the completion of the liberation of the Soviet Baltic states, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in late August - early September 1944 set the troops of the Leningrad, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Baltic fronts the task of inflicting a series of strong simultaneous attacks on the enemy grouping from the purpose of its dismemberment and destruction in parts. The main efforts of the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts were concentrated in the Riga direction. The Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were entrusted with the task of defeating the enemy Task Force Narva and liberating the Estonian SSR.

The commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov, decided to conduct the Tallinn operation in the second half of September 1944 with the forces of the 8th, 2nd shock and 13th air armies in close cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

At the first stage of the operation, it was planned to strike by the troops of the 2nd shock army from the Tartu region in the general direction on Rakvere with the aim of defeating, in cooperation with the 8th army, which went on the offensive from the Narva bridgehead, the main forces of the enemy operational group "Narva", defending Estonia from the east and south. Subsequently, our troops were to develop an offensive against Tallinn.

In preparation for the operation, the command of the Leningrad Front carried out a complex regrouping of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army. In ten days (from September 3 to September 13), she made a 300-kilometer transition and was advanced from the Narva bridgehead to the Tartu region. The 30th Guards Rifle Corps (45th, 63rd, 64th Guards Rifle Divisions), the 8th Estonian Corps (7th and 249th Estonian Rifle Divisions), the 108th Rifle Corps (46th, 90th, 372nd sd), a number of tank and artillery units and formations (300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2040 guns and mortars). With the completion of the concentration of the 2nd shock army in the Tartu region, the 116th rifle corps (86th, 321st, 326th rifle divisions) was transferred to its structure from the 3rd Baltic Front, defending in the Tartu region along the Emajygi River.

On September 14, the offensive of the three Baltic fronts began in the Riga direction, which created favorable conditions for the offensive operation of the Leningrad Front in order to liberate the territory of Estonia.

On the morning of September 17, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army went on the offensive from the area east and north of Tartu. On the site of the 8th Estonian Corps and the 30th Guards Rifle Corps, the offensive began at 8 o'clock. 20 minutes. from crossing the Emajõgi river. The success of the crossing was largely ensured by carefully planned and skillfully executed artillery actions, supplemented by strikes by the 277th and 281st assault aviation divisions against manpower and artillery firing positions on the northern bank of the river.

On the Tartu bridgehead, units of the 108th Rifle Corps under the command of Lieutenant General V.S. Polenov went on the offensive at 8 o'clock. 40 min. The actions of the corps troops were supported by the 276th bomber aviation division, which delivered powerful bombing strikes against enemy defense facilities.

Having successfully crossed the Emajygi River, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army broke through the defenses of the German 2nd Army Corps on a 30-kilometer front, inflicted heavy losses on its formations, and on the first day of the operation advanced from 3 to 18 km. Particularly successful was the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps under the command of Lieutenant General L. A. Pern. Parts of this corps formation, formed in 1942, had considerable combat experience gained in the battles near Velikiye Luki, Novosokolniki and Narva. Estonian soldiers, burning with hatred for the German enslavers, sought to liberate their native land from them as soon as possible. The 7th Estonian Rifle Division (commander - Colonel K. A. Allikas), advancing through difficult wooded and swampy terrain, defeated the 207th enemy security division and advanced 18 kilometers in a day.

The command of the operational group "Narva", given the heavy losses in the 2nd Army Corps on September 17 (3,000 killed and wounded, 690 prisoners), decided to withdraw its formations to the north.

It should be noted that in a quick breakthrough of the German defense, an important role was played by delivering the main blow where the enemy did not expect it. The enemy command believed that our main blow would be delivered from the bridgehead on the Emajõgi River. But the 2nd shock army launched an offensive with the forces of the 30th guards and 8th Estonian rifle corps in another sector, east of the bridgehead. The enemy's attempts to eliminate the penetration of our troops by counterattacks turned out to be too late.

Having broken the resistance of the enemy troops in the tactical defense zone, the troops of the 2nd shock army launched an offensive in the general direction on Rakvere. To increase the pace of the offensive, the commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant-General I. I. Fedyuninsky, on September 18, created two mobile groups. Group No. 1 received the task of advancing in the zone of the 108th Rifle Corps, capturing the Yygeva road junction and holding it until the approach of the main forces of the corps.

The second mobile group was to develop the offensive in the zone of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General N.P. Simonyak.

On September 18, formations of the 2nd Shock Army advanced 28 km, and the breakthrough front expanded to 45 km. Introduced into the breakthrough on the night of September 18 from the second echelon of the 8th Estonian Corps, the 249th Infantry Division under the command of Major General I. Ya. Lombak advanced 30 km, crossed the Kyapa River on the move and captured a number of settlements on its northern bank . The 108th and 30th Guards Rifle Corps also successfully advanced. The army mobile groups operating in their zones advanced 25-28 km in a day and captured the large settlements of Roela and Voldi.

The successful offensive of the 2nd shock army in the rear of the formations of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps, which was defending on the Narva Isthmus, as well as the unfavorable situation in the Riga direction, forced the enemy to begin withdrawing his troops from Estonia on the evening of September 18. Fearing encirclement, the German command decided to transfer the main forces of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps to Riga by motor vehicles. To cover the withdrawal of the 3rd Panzer Corps, the enemy created the Gerok battle group, which included marine battalions defending the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, corps tank destroyer units, as well as motorized units of the 11th and 20th infantry divisions. This group was to retreat to Tallinn, consistently putting up resistance on prepared defensive lines. Subsequently, the troops of the Gerok group were meant to be evacuated by sea to the Moonsund Islands. 24 vehicles were concentrated in Tallinn, which could evacuate up to 40 thousand people. The broken formations of the 2nd Army Corps were withdrawn to the prepared line of Pärnu, Viljandi, Lake Vyrts-Jarv. It was supposed to take them in the future to the Riga region.

Anarchy was established in Tallinn. The situation was decided to take advantage of the so-called supporters of the "third way" - nationalists who dreamed of the revival of the state independence of Estonia. Their interests were expressed by the National Committee formed in the spring of 1944, which united all the forces of Estonia, except for the Nazis and the Communists. On September 18, 1944, the government of Estonia was formed in Tallinn, headed by Prime Minister in the duties of President Jüri Uluots and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Otto Tiif, who, shortly before the events described, in August, was elected Chairman of the National Committee. After that, Uluots evacuated to Sweden in order to be out of danger as the holder of the highest constitutional power, while the practical work was entrusted to O. Tiif.

Tiif's government did everything possible to legalize it. Several issues of the State Herald were published with a government declaration, a list of its composition and the appointments of senior officials, as well as the army commander. Most of the Estonians who fought on the German side, as well as the fighters of the 200th Estonian Infantry Regiment who returned from Finland in August (the return of Estonian soldiers to their homeland to create their own armed formations took place on the initiative of Estonian nationalists and was the result of their negotiations with Germany and Finland; Estonian soldiers returned without weapons and without a Finnish uniform, received an amnesty from the Germans for the previous evasion of mobilization and were enlisted in the German military units, but due to the retreat of the Germans from the "Estonian bastion" all these fighters were no longer available to the National Committee. - Note. ed.) retreated with the Germans. The few volunteers who were ready to continue the struggle for an independent Estonia were scattered throughout the country, without clear instructions and unified leadership. Only in Tallinn did the supporters of the National Committee manage to prevent the destruction that the Germans were preparing and raise the Estonian blue-black-and-white flag on the Pikk Hermann tower instead of the German red flag with a swastika. There were also several armed skirmishes with the retreating Germans. But that's where it all ended.

Due to the weak activity of the reconnaissance of the 8th Army and the Leningrad Front, the start of the withdrawal of the formations of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps from the Narva defense sector was established only at 2 am on September 19, that is, six hours late, which allowed the main forces of this corps to break away from our troops for 30-40 kilometers.

Having established the beginning of the withdrawal of enemy troops from the line of Narva, the formations of the 8th Army under the command of Lieutenant General F.N. Starikov began the pursuit. At 2 am on September 19, the advanced battalions of the 125th and 120th rifle divisions of the 117th rifle corps went on the offensive, and in the morning the main forces of the 8th Army went on the offensive. By the end of September 19, they had advanced up to 30 kilometers.

To increase the pace of the pursuit, the commander of the Leningrad Front created a mobile front group. It was concentrated 15 km north of Tartu in readiness for an offensive in the zone of the 2nd shock army in the direction of Voldi, Tapa, Tallinn. In addition, two mobile groups were created in the 8th Army. Each of them consisted of one tank regiment, one self-propelled artillery regiment and one rifle battalion in vehicles.

For two days of pursuit (September 19 and 20), in difficult wooded and swampy terrain, the formations of the 8th Army advanced up to 70 km, and on September 20 its mobile groups captured the city of Rakvere, an important stronghold on the outskirts of Tallinn. On the same day, the troops of the 8th Army joined north of Lake Peipus with the divisions of the 2nd Shock Army, which advanced 90 km in four days and expanded the breakthrough to 100 kilometers.

The capture of the city of Rakvere by the 8th Army and the connection with the troops of the 2nd Shock Army ended the first stage of the operation. In the course of it, the Soviet troops achieved major results. Under the influence of the successful offensive of the Baltic fronts in the Riga direction and the 2nd shock army on Rakvere, the enemy was forced to leave strong defensive lines on the Narva Isthmus and hastily transfer formations of the 3rd Panzer Corps to the Riga area.

The command of the Leningrad Front, assessing the situation in Estonia by September 21, believed that the enemy continued to withdraw its troops to Tallinn in order to keep the outer defensive bypass of the city and ensure the evacuation of their troops by sea. The withdrawal of enemy troops to Pärnu was considered by our command as its desire to cover the left flank of the 18th German army. In reality, only the combat groups "Gerok" and "Hofer" and the remnants of the 11th and 20th infantry divisions retreated to Tallinn; the main forces of the operational group "Narva" retreated to the southwest through Pärnu.

Based on this assessment of the enemy's intentions, the command of the Leningrad Front continued to focus on the Tallinn direction. The 8th Army, reinforced by the 8th Estonian Corps and mobile group No. 2, transferred to it from the 2nd shock army, and the mobile front group were aimed there with the task of liberating Tallinn by the end of September 22. The 2nd shock army, after reaching the Tamsalu region (25 km southwest of Rakvere), it was decided to turn to the southwest for an attack on Pärnu, Viljandi.

On the morning of September 21, our mobile troops launched a rapid pursuit of the enemy in the Tallinn direction. Having crossed the Jagalaiygi River on the move and shot down enemy cover detachments on the Piritaiygi River, by 11 o'clock on September 22, the mobile groups, having advanced more than 100 kilometers in a day and a half, approached Tallinn. The first to break into the city was the 2nd company of the 27th separate tank regiment of the 8th army, led by senior lieutenant Ya. M. Lobov. By two o'clock in the afternoon, she reached the southwestern outskirts of the city. At the same time, the advance detachment of the 8th Estonian Corps came out to the city from the southeast, having made a 100-kilometer transition from the Märi region (30 km south of Rakvere) on the night of September 22.

Three mobile groups of the 8th Army and the advance detachment of the 8th Estonian Corps, which had come out to Tallinn, having organized close interaction among themselves, boldly attacked the remnants of the German troops in the city. The enemy tried to organize at least some kind of defense of Tallinn with the forces of the Gerok combat group in order to evacuate the retreating troops and material assets by sea. But these enemy plans were thwarted by the decisive actions of our troops, who quickly broke the resistance of the Germans on the outer defensive bypass of Tallinn and entered the city from several sides.

The advance detachment of the 8th Estonian Corps broke into Tartumante Street. On the majestic tower of Vyshgorod, the victorious red flag again flew up, raised by an officer of the Estonian corps, Lieutenant I. T. Lumiste. The tricolor banner of the nationalists was removed. The forward detachments of the 8th Army broke through to the center of Tallinn. Warriors V. Vyurkov and N. Golovan hoisted a red flag on the building of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.

The working people of Tallinn greeted the troops of the Red Army with approval. The sons of all the peoples of the USSR, together with the valiant Estonian soldiers, cleared the capital of Estonia and most of the territory of the republic from German invaders. The complete liberation of Soviet Estonia was approaching.

By two o'clock in the afternoon on September 22, the capital of the Estonian SSR, an important naval base and a major port on the Baltic Sea - the city of Tallinn was liberated from the German invaders. The 117th Rifle Corps under the command of Major General V.A. Trubachev, as well as the 7th and 249th Rifle Divisions of the 8th Estonian Corps, which came up behind the mobile units, quickly eliminated scattered pockets of resistance from small enemy groups.

Together with the nationalist resistance, the Soviet soldiers, with their swift offensive, saved the capital of Estonia from destruction. The Nazis were preparing to blow it up. They brought tens of tons of tol there, laid time bombs in the houses. But the enemy only succeeded in blowing up the telephone center and destroying several residential buildings. Soviet sappers, with the help of residents, quickly cleared the city of mines. To save Tallinn and its industrial enterprises, the local residents of Tallinn also did a lot. Groups of German soldiers who tried to undermine factories and public buildings were met with powerful fire by armed work detachments.

Together with the troops of the 8th Army, the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet took part in the liberation of Tallinn. On September 22, eight torpedo boats with a marine landing force left Loks towards the city. At 1 hour 30 min. On September 23, having overcome the main barriers in the Tallinn Bay, torpedo boats landed troops in the Mine Harbor and assisted the troops of the 8th Army in the liberation of the Tallinn port.

It was said above that it was planned to introduce the mobile group of the front into the battle in the Tallinn direction. But since the forces of the 8th Army operating here turned out to be quite enough to liberate Tallinn, the need to bring in a mobile group disappeared. This powerful formation, which had 319 tanks and self-propelled guns, was more expedient to use in the direction of Viljandi, Ainazi to pursue the retreating formations of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps and the 2nd Army Corps, in order to prevent their retreat to region of Riga.

After the liberation of Tallinn, the troops of the 8th Army continued to pursue the retreating remnants of the defeated formations in the direction of the ports of Paldiski and Haapsalu; The 2nd shock army, having deployed its troops in a southeast direction, successfully advanced on Pärnu, Viljandi, Ainazi. On September 26, formations of the Leningrad Front reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland and Riga from Tallinn to Ainazi, completing the liberation of the entire territory of the Estonian SSR, with the exception of the islands of the Moonsund archipelago. South of Ainazi, the 67th Army of the 3rd Baltic Front approached the coast of the Gulf of Riga.

The head of the Estonian nationalist government, as well as some of his cabinet members, was soon arrested. O. Tiif himself, after serving a 10-year term in the camp, continued to live in Estonia, and died on March 5, 1976 in Tartu.

With the completion of the liberation of the mainland of Estonia, on September 25, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet the task of expelling the enemy from the islands of the Moonsund archipelago and depriving the enemy Army Group North of the sea route from the Gulf of Riga through the Irben Strait.

To conduct the Moonsund landing operation, by decision of the commander of the Leningrad Front, the 109th rifle corps under the command of Lieutenant General I.P. Alferyev and the 8th Estonian corps under the command of Lieutenant General L.A. Pern were allocated from the 8th Army. From the forces of the Baltic Fleet, the 1st brigade of torpedo boats and the 260th brigade of marines participated in the operation.

Combat operations to liberate the islands of the Moonsund Archipelago began immediately after the entry of our troops to the western coast of Estonia. On September 27, the 1st brigade of torpedo boats landed troops from the 260th marine brigade on the island of Vormsi. Supported by the fire of ships and military artillery from the coast of Estonia, the landing force broke the resistance of the enemy and by the end of the day completely cleared the island of enemy troops.

Following the island of Vormsi, on September 29–30, the island of Muhu (Moon) was cleared. The 249th Estonian Rifle Division participated in its liberation, the landing of which was carried out by 12 torpedo boats and 90 amphibious vehicles.

On October 2, landing on the island of Khiuma (Dago) began from the 109th Infantry Division under the command of Major General N. A. Trushkin. Parts of the division quickly defeated the enemy garrison of three separate battalions and on October 3 completely cleared the island. Only one island, Saaremaa (Ezel), remained in the hands of the enemy, the largest and most important militarily, since it controlled the exit from the Gulf of Riga through the Irben Strait. Up to two divisions of enemy troops were concentrated on the island.

To liberate the island of Saaremaa, the commander of the 8th Army allocated the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps (7th and 249th divisions) and the 131st Rifle Division of the 109th Rifle Corps. After careful preparation, the landing began on October 5. Two regiments of the 131st Infantry Division under the command of Major General P. A. Romanenko were put on ships in the port of Haapsalu and landed on the northern coast of the island. The third regiment of the division from the island of Khiuma (Dago) also landed here. Formations of the 8th Estonian Corps landed from the island of Muhu (Moon) through a narrow strait to the eastern coast of the island of Saaremaa.

In fierce battles, by October 9, Soviet troops cleared almost the entire island of the enemy. The Germans, retreating to the narrow Syrve Peninsula, carefully prepared for defense, put up stubborn resistance to our troops. The battles for the Syrve Peninsula were completed on 24 November.

The liberation of Estonia by the troops of the Leningrad Front and the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was of great political and strategic importance. The long-suffering Estonian people, who had been languishing under the yoke of the bloody Nazi regime for three years, were finally released.

During the battles for the liberation of Estonia, the enemy suffered significant losses. Only in the period from September 17 to September 26, the troops of the Leningrad Front defeated four infantry divisions, five artillery regiments, and fifteen separate various battalions. In addition, two infantry divisions, the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland", and the 4th SS Panzergrenadier Brigade "Netherlands" suffered heavy losses. Enemy losses from 17 to 26 September amounted to 30 thousand killed and wounded, 17 thousand prisoners, not counting the losses inflicted by our aircraft and fleet during the evacuation of German troops by sea.

The liberation of the naval bases and ports of Estonia radically changed the conditions for basing the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The entry of our fleet into the expanses of the Baltic Sea significantly increased its role in supporting the offensive operations of Soviet troops in the Baltic direction from the sea in the autumn of 1944 and in the first half of 1945.

The successes achieved by the troops of the Leningrad Front were the result of good preparation of units and formations for offensive battles, large-scale regroupings in a short time and, thanks to this, the creation of significant superiority over the enemy in the chosen directions of the main attacks of the armies. Carefully designed and successfully implemented at the first stage of the operation, the interaction of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation made it possible to break through the enemy defenses at a high pace.

In the course of the pursuit, aviation provided great assistance to the ground forces. The 13th Air Army, inflicting powerful blows on retreating enemy columns, ports and road junctions, assisted rifle formations and especially army mobile groups in inflicting significant losses on retreating enemy units.

The troops of the Leningrad Front, deeply aware of their historical mission as liberators of the fraternal Estonian people from the Nazi occupation, honorably fulfilled the task entrusted to them.

On the outskirts of Riga

In the liberation of Riga, the capital of the Latvian SSR, one of the most important roles was played by the 67th Army under the command of Lieutenant General V. Z. Romanovsky.

The most intense fighting on the outskirts of the capital unfolded after the capture of Tartu, when the 67th Army (111th, 112th and 122nd Rifle Corps) was turned southwest towards Riga. Together with other armies of the 3rd Baltic Front, she had to break through the first of two defensive lines created by the enemy on the outskirts of the Latvian capital. About four infantry divisions and up to five separate enemy battalions defended in the army zone.

September 14, our troops went on the offensive. The enemy defense was broken through on the entire front, but heavy fighting ensued in its depths. Often in some areas it even came to hand-to-hand fights. In the first two days of the Red Army's offensive, the enemy infantry, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, launched furious counterattacks, trying to stop the advancing units. However, all counterattacks were successfully repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy.

Due to the fact that the neighboring 2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front operated north of Lake Vyrts-Jarvi, a rather significant gap formed between the two armies during the offensive, reaching 40 or more kilometers. Having received information that large forces of the German task force, including formations of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps, were withdrawing from Estonia to the south, our command naturally had to take measures to ensure an open flank. It transferred part of its forces there in order to fend off a possible enemy strike, which could affect the success of the offensive not only of the 67th Army, but also of the 1st Shock Army, which was adjacent to the left. On September 23, General of the Army I.I. Maslennikov, Commander of the Front, arrived at the command post of the 67th Army. The army commander indicated the situation of the front and the tasks assigned to the troops of the army the next day. General Maslennikov, with a displeased look, remarked to Romanovsky: "You did not understand the tasks of the army, and therefore you created the group incorrectly." Romanovsky was very surprised. Without showing any sign, Commander-67 began to justify in detail the need to create such a grouping in the army. After listening to him, Maslennikov said: “Your justification convinces me even more of your misunderstanding of the task. Your army was given the task of breaking through the enemy defenses and, developing the offensive, to ensure the main grouping of the front from enemy counterattacks on the right. In accordance with this task, you should have the main grouping on the left flank of the army, closer to the main grouping of the front. Cancel your orders to the troops. Set new tasks and regroup troops towards the left flank. Otherwise, you will disrupt the entire front-line operation.

Lieutenant-General V. Z. Romanovsky several times tried to prove to him that the 67th Army needed to reinforce not the left, but the right flank, in order to resist the enemy’s fresh forces with a stronger grouping, that the regrouping he proposed would slow down our offensive. However, all attempts by the commander to convince General Maslennikov were unsuccessful. Romanovsky had to click his heels like a soldier, put his hand to his headdress and say: “Yes! I obey! Will be done!" Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov was very pleased with this answer and said: “That's good. Act!” I got into my car and drove off to my headquarters.

Colonel P. Ya. Mordvintsev, head of the operational department of the army headquarters, who was present at this conversation, turned to the commander of the 67th Army with an alarming question: “What should we do now? After all, we will not be able to turn over to the left flank without stopping the offensive. If we follow the order of the front commander, then we must stop the offensive for at least a day, or even two, but they will ask us for this? Romanovsky answered him that, since “the operation is proceeding normally, we will not rush to regroup, because we cannot discount the enemy troops approaching our right flank. I take full responsibility for this. We will develop the offensive in the previous grouping, we will quickly go to the sea, and then everything will be in order.

It must be said that by not following the instructions of General Maslennikov, Commander-67 was taking a considerable risk. But he would have to bear even greater responsibility if the enemy struck at the weakened open flank and disrupted the offensive.

On September 26, units of the 377th Rifle Division of the 111th Rifle Corps occupied the city of Limbazi, and the next day they reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga. Since the army carried out the task successfully, General Maslennikov never once asked what grouping it was operating in.

Our offensive along the coast of the Gulf of Riga developed successfully. The troops acted in a coordinated manner: at night, specially detached units knocked the enemy out of position, and by morning, the main forces pursued his retreating units.

On October 4, a directive was received from the front commander, in which the 67th Army was ordered by the end of October 5 to take the strip from the 1st shock army to the Gauja River and go over to a tough defense, reliably covering the directions of Limbazhi and Valmiera with one division. According to the directive, the 122nd Rifle Corps was withdrawn from the 67th A and, instead, the 119th Rifle Corps was included in the army. It took two days to complete the directive. The army command regrouped, led reconnaissance and organized a firefight with the enemy.

In connection with the withdrawal of the enemy, the front commander on October 8 set a new task for the army: continuing to develop the pursuit, reach the outer defensive bypass along the Gauja River, force it and advance on the northern part of the city of Riga.

Since the offensive zone of the army narrowed as it approached Riga, it was decided to carry out the offensive, having all three corps in one echelon. The 111th Rifle Corps of General B.A. Rozhdestvensky was tasked with crossing the Gauja River and developing an offensive on Vecaki (north of Riga); The 112th Rifle Corps of General F. Ya. Solovyov to break through the defenses, cross the Gauja River and develop an offensive on Jaunciems, and the 119th Rifle Corps of General N. N. Nikishin to break through the defenses on the western bank of the Gauja River and develop an offensive on Tiš-ezers. Meanwhile, hiding behind the rearguards, the enemy withdrew troops across the Gauja River and to the outer perimeter of the city of Riga. By October 10, its units were shot down from an intermediate line, and our troops approached the Gauja River.

Here, on the banks of the River Gauja, strong battles broke out. When crossing the river, our soldiers fought heroically. Among the first with his crew to cross to the opposite shore was the machine gunner of the 4th Infantry Regiment of the 89th Infantry Division, Junior Sergeant P. M. Moskvin. He installed an easel machine gun on the shore and ensured the crossing of the units with fire. With the fire of his Maxim, communist P. M. Moskvin destroyed more than twenty enemy soldiers. In another section, a platoon of the 546th Infantry Regiment of the 191st Infantry Division under the command of V.I. Burmistenko was the first to cross the river and boldly attacked the enemy from the rear. At the same time, Burmistenko's platoon captured an enemy battery and captured twenty enemy soldiers and officers.

On the night of October 12, our formations approached the last line before Riga, which ran along the western shores of the lakes Tish- and Juplas-ezers. The commander of the army, Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky, with the head of the operational department of the army headquarters, Colonel Mordvintsev, and the head of the intelligence department, Colonel A.P. Kostrov, racked their brains for a long time: how to take Riga? It must be said that Lake Tish-ezers was a very serious obstacle. Its width reached 3 km, and its length - 8 km. It almost completely blocked the offensive zone of our two corps. There was not enough strength, mainly artillery, to break the strong defenses on the isthmuses between the lakes. Having learned from intelligence that the main enemy forces were concentrated near the isthmuses, and not on the western shore of Lake Tish-ezers, that he had few troops and weak fortifications, Colonel Mordvintsev suggested trying to force the lake at night with forward detachments in amphibious vehicles.

The commander went to the 112th and 119th corps to consult with their commanders on this issue. They joined the common plan. Leaving, Romanovsky instructed them to strictly observe camouflage when approaching the lakes, to remove all troops further into the forest, to leave only observation on the shore and organize reconnaissance well.

It was decided to give the 119th Rifle Corps a battalion of amphibians, on which the first throw across the lake would be made. To mislead the enemy on the isthmuses, it was planned to conduct artillery fire, creating the appearance that here we would “tear” the enemy’s defenses during the day.

By the morning of October 12, the decision to force was finally ripe. Lieutenant Colonel P. I. Kiselev, commander of the 285th amphibious vehicle battalion, having received the necessary orders, ensured the battalion's exit to the area indicated to him that same night.

In the morning, Colonel P. Ya. Mordvintsev reported to the commander that the troops had begun preparing for the crossing. According to the reports of the corps commanders, the enemy offered very strong resistance on the isthmuses between the lakes, but on the western shore of Lake Tish he behaved calmly. Only a few patrols were marked there. This is exactly what our troops needed. The army headquarters moved closer to the troops of the first echelon at the Mangali manor. An observation post for the commander and a small group of staff officers was prepared in the Baltes area, in the sector of the 374th rifle division.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 67th Army went to the command post of the commander of the 119th Corps to check on the preparations for the crossing. The corps commander, General N. N. Nikishin, together with the commander of the 374th division, Colonel B. A. Gorodetsky, the commander of the 1244th rifle regiment, which was supposed to cross the lake in the first echelon, Lieutenant Colonel I. M. Tsarev and the commander of the 285th battalion amphibious lieutenant colonel V.I. Kiselev, bending over the map, developed a forcing plan.

The 285th amphibious vehicle battalion had 75 Ford GPA vehicles. It was calculated that 450 people would be able to land on these machines in the first echelon in one flight (6 people per car, although according to the technical design norm it was allowed to take 4 people). It was assumed that for night operations, and in case of a surprise attack, it would still be a solid group that would be able to do a lot.

It was also decided to divide the first echelon into two detachments. The first detachment was assembled from the personnel of the 1244th Infantry Regiment. It was supposed to include machine gunners, machine gunners, armor-piercers, sappers and mortars. The detachment was allocated fifty cars. The detachment commander, Lieutenant Colonel I.M. Tsarev, was tasked after landing on the shore to expand the bridgehead towards Mezhaparks, and with one battalion to strike at the flank and rear of the enemy defending the isthmus in the northern part of the lake.

The second detachment consisted of one reinforced battalion of the 1250th Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain D.P. Maksimov. They made a dash across the lake in 25 cars. This detachment was to go ashore in the area of ​​​​Suzha manor, the southeastern part of Mezaparks and advance in the direction of Chekurkalis, striking at the flank and rear of the defending enemy troops on the isthmus between Tish and Yuglas lakes.

At 7 pm, as soon as it got dark, both detachments, stretching along the coast for four kilometers, went into the water. Artillery fired mainly at the battle formations of the enemy defending the isthmuses, and with individual batteries - in front of the front of the crossing units, indicating to them the direction of movement and landing. At 19.30, a report was received that the first echelon of the landing force had landed on the enemy coast. His units began to advance to the rear of the German troops defending the inter-lake isthmuses. When the landing detachments approached the isthmuses, units of the 98th and 377th rifle divisions of the 112th rifle corps, as well as the 245th rifle division of the 119th corps, concentrated in inter-lake defiles, went on the offensive. As the captured Germans later said, the night strike of our landing forces from the rear was unexpected. The enemy, who was defending the defile, had the impression that he was surrounded. The Germans began to retreat in panic.

As a result of the decisive actions of the landing, supported by a general offensive on the entire front, the troops of the 67th Army captured the northern part of Riga by midnight. Success in clearing the right-bank part of Riga from enemy troops was ensured primarily by surprise and careful preparation.

When the enemy was driven out from the inter-lake isthmuses, the 119th, 112th and 111th rifle corps went over to the general offensive. At the same time, the right-flank divisions of the 61st Army (12th, 75th Guards and 212th Rifle Divisions of the 123rd Rifle Corps) also went on the offensive. By morning, the eastern part of Riga was also cleared.

The blow was so overwhelming for the enemy that only eighteen tanks, fourteen guns of various calibers, twelve mortars, 31 machine guns, 26 vehicles, 11 boats on the canal and many other weapons and property were captured by landing detachments in the Mezhaparks area.

The prisoners later said that they did not expect the advance of the Soviet troops across the lake. “The continuous roar of engines,” they said, “machine-gun fire and artillery cannonade created the impression that amphibious tanks were advancing across the lake in a wide front. And there was nothing we could do. Moreover, your troops simultaneously launched an offensive on the isthmuses.

Having cleared the northern and northeastern parts of the city of the enemy and pulled up their forces, the army troops, not allowing the enemy to come to his senses, on the night of October 14 crossed the Western Dvina River north of the city. The main forces of the front were developing an offensive against Riga from the south. On October 15, the capital of the Latvian SSR was completely cleared of the enemy.

The offensive of the Red Army in the Baltic States (July-October 1944)

The territory of the Baltic, liberated by the Red Army in 1944

Map of military operations of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Vilnius region

Combat operations of the troops of the Leningrad Front to liberate the territory of Estonia

Notes:

History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945, vol. 4. M., Military Publishing House, 1962, p. 339.

Directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to the Leningrad, 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts of 4.7.1944 and 6.7.1944

Only the 2nd shock and 8th combined arms armies were taken into account.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were commanded by General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, members of the Military Council were Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov and Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service I. S. Khokhlov, Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General A. P. Pokrovsky .

"Military History Journal" No. 7, 1964, p. 42–46.

The commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front at that time was General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan, members of the Military Council of the front were Lieutenant General D.S. Leonov and Major General V.N. V. Kurasov.

Commander of the 2nd Baltic Front - General of the Army A. I. Eremenko, members of the Military Council of the Front - Lieutenant General V. N. Bogatkin and Major General S. I. Shabalin, Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General L. M. Sandalov .

This corps, advancing as part of the 22nd Army of the 2nd Baltic Front, included two Latvian rifle divisions - the 308th and 43rd Guards. The combat path of the Latvian soldiers began near Moscow. The 201st Latvian Rifle Division, along with other Soviet formations, fought on the outskirts of our capital. Later, she took part in the liberation of Naro-Fominsk and Borovsk, and in October 1942 was transformed into the 43rd Guards Rifle Division. The soldiers of this division bravely fought in the battles near Staraya Russa and Velikiye Luki. The 308th Latvian Rifle Division, formed on the basis of the 1st Reserve Latvian Rifle Regiment, began combat operations in the second half of July 1944.

The troops of the 3rd Baltic Front were commanded by General of the Army I. I. Maslennikov, members of the Military Council of the front were Lieutenant General M. V. Rudakov and Major General F. V. Yatichkin, the chief of staff was Lieutenant General V. R. Vashkevich.

The group included: the 1st tank brigade, the 221st tank and 397th guards self-propelled artillery regiments, a rifle battalion in vehicles, an anti-tank artillery regiment, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, one engineer battalion, one guards mortar division.

It included the 152nd tank brigade, the 26th tank regiment, the 1294th self-propelled artillery regiment, one fighter artillery regiment, a mortar division, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a guards mortar division, a cannon artillery division, a sapper company and a rifle battalion.

It included the 30th and 220th tank brigades, the 226th, 124th and 27th guards tank regiments, the 351st guards self-propelled artillery regiment, the 1st separate armored battalion, the 283rd motorized amphibian battalion, one rifle regiment of the 86th rifle division, 17th assault engineering brigade, 33rd anti-tank artillery regiment, 1387th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, one division of the 18th guards mortar regiment.

For decisive actions and personal courage shown in the battles for the liberation of Tallinn, Senior Lieutenant Ya. M. Lobov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The forward detachment of the 8th Estonian Corps consisted of the 45th tank regiment, the 952nd self-propelled artillery regiment and one rifle battalion of the 249th rifle division.

The Baltic strategic defensive operation is the name adopted in Soviet historiography for the defensive operation of the Red Army and the USSR Navy carried out during the Great Patriotic War in Lithuania, Latvia, the northwestern regions of the RSFSR and the Baltic Sea from June 22 to July 9, 1941. As part of the strategic operation, the Border Battle in Lithuania and Latvia and the Counterattack in the Siauliai direction were carried out.

During the operation, neither side fully achieved its goals; more precisely, the armed forces of the USSR did not fulfill their goal at all and were defeated, however, the armed forces of Germany did not fully realize the plan for the operation.

Of course, it is impossible to deny the successes of the German armed forces - the territorial acquisitions were great, especially in the eastern direction from the border. Moreover, if two stages of the operation were planned (from the standpoint of the territory) - the first stage was to take place to the Western Dvina, and only then the second - to the south and then east of Lake Peipus, then the plan at the first stage was overfulfilled, the German troops, advancing at the highest speed among all the army groups that launched the offensive, after three days they went beyond the Western Dvina and were ready to continue the offensive further. Soviet troops consistently failed to gain a foothold on the borders of the Neman, Western Dvina, and Velikaya rivers. At the same time, the North-Western Front was cut, and it was also cut off from the Western Front by a blow from the northern flank of the Center group. In addition, the Courland coast of the Baltic Sea was completely cleared. But at the same time, the main task of the German troops: to surround and destroy the troops of the USSR in the Baltic states, was not fulfilled.

There were several reasons for this: both the resistance of the Soviet troops, and, in some places, a systematic and organized withdrawal, and, curiously, the backlog in the deployment of Soviet troops on the border. There were few troops directly on the border, the approaching Soviet troops deployed already behind the Western Dvina, where the remnants of the Soviet border units quickly retreated and where a new defense front was organized. The Chief of the General Staff, General Halder, even made the following assumption: “The exception is, perhaps, the area in front of the front of Army Group North, where, apparently, a withdrawal across the Western Dvina River was indeed planned and prepared in advance.” The counterattacks of the Soviet troops on the flanks of the groupings forced the German troops to allocate forces to repel them - which could be used to form an encirclement ring and force the offensive. Of course, in heavy fighting on the border and beyond, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, but such an encirclement that took place in Belarus - with a concentration of troops near the border there - was avoided. The Soviet troops managed to organize a defense north of the Western Dvina in southern Estonia, sufficient for the German command to eventually, after the end of the operation, had to withdraw units from the main Pskov direction in order to destroy the grouping of Soviet troops in Estonia. And although this did not help to keep Pskov and the surrounding areas, the German troops were forced to stop for a while, because in order to continue the offensive in Estonia, to the north, along the eastern shore of Lake Peipsi (to completely cut off the USSR troops in the Baltic), and to the north- east, a regrouping of troops was necessary.

A short pause in the offensive in the future made it possible to organize the Luga line of defense and the defense of Tallinn. To capture Tallinn, the German command was also forced to allocate units that could continue the offensive to the east along the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland in the general direction of Narva - Leningrad.

As for the left flank of the front, he was forced to retreat deeply under the onslaught of units of Army Group Center, losing a huge territory, and, perhaps most importantly, opening the northern flank of the Western Front, which made it possible to quickly encircle him. But nevertheless, the gap was closed by the formations advanced from the reserve, and the German troops stretched along the front were unable to continue the active offensive between Idritsa and Polotsk.

According to the team (from among the prominent military leaders of the Wehrmacht) of the authors of the book “The Protracted Blitzkrieg”: “Despite such success, Army Group North failed to encircle and destroy any large enemy forces anywhere.”

In general, the following consequences can be distinguished, negative for the USSR, respectively positive for Germany, or vice versa (it is clear that in the latter case we are talking about the fact that at least something was saved):

Negative consequences
1. Loss of a significant territory (Lithuania, Latvia, parts of Estonia, part of the north-west of the RSFSR);
2. Significant losses of personnel and weapons;
the loss of the Courland coast of the Baltic and the naval bases in Riga and Libau;
3. Loss of influence in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, creating prerequisites for the loss of influence in the sea in general;
4. Surrounding parts of the Western Front from the north;
5. Breakthrough of a fortified defensive line on the Russian-Lithuanian border, creation of a bridgehead for an attack on Leningrad;
6. Large losses in aviation and tanks; heavy losses of troops and weapons of the 11th Army.

Positive Consequences
1. Preservation of a significant part of Estonia, the Moonsund Islands, the naval base in Tallinn;
2. Preservation of the Baltic Fleet;
3. A certain gain in time to strengthen the approaches to Leningrad;

The totality of all the facts allows us to assert that the result of the operation was the operational victory of the German armed forces.

Back to date June 22

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