19th Congress of the CPSU. XIX Congress - chronicles of observations of the surrounding absurdity. K. simonov. through the eyes of a man of my generation

Criticism of socialism Hayek persistently criticized economists - adherents of socialism. One of his opponents was Oskar Lange, a well-known Polish economist who developed plans for the economic development of India, Ceylon, Egypt and Iraq. Hayek's critical articles on

XXVIII Congress of the CPSU Ten days after the Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, on July 2, 1990, the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU opened in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. 4675 delegates were elected to the Congress. Among them were units of workers and peasants. For this reason, it was decided to invite

XIX Congress of the CPSU (b) - CPSU - the failed triumph of socialism In world history, we can find events that contemporaries considered outstanding, but in fact these events turned out to be passing, secondary. As an example, I can cite the proclamation of Louis Bonaparte

At the end of 1947, Comrade Stalin raised in the Politburo of the Central Committee the question of dividing the State Planning Committee of the USSR and organizing a new independent organization for the use and distribution of all the material resources of the state in all types of products, including means of production and consumption, including food products and consumer goods. This was due to the complication of the economic life of the country, especially after the war, and the management of the national economy - centralized and republican. The proposal was accepted by the Politburo, and the State Committee for the Material and Technical Supply of the National Economy of the USSR - Gossnab of the USSR was created. It was considered necessary to appoint a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and a member of the Politburo to this post. Given that I have experience in transport and heavy industry (and Gossnab was transferred to: Glavneftesbyt, Glavmetallosbyt, Glavuglesbyt, Glavlesosbyt, Glavkhimsbyt, Glavenergosbyt, Glavselkhozmashsbyt, etc.), we decided to appoint a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a member

Politburo Comrade Kaganovich L.M. chairman. of the newly created State Committee for the material and technical supply of the national economy - Gossnab.

I had to take on this difficult and “quarrelsome” business and crack through this hard nut as well. It was necessary to think over and establish the organizational structure of this new body - Gossnab, based on the content of its work, to organize this new state institution, and most importantly - to select personnel and start up this new machine, to which the Government transferred billions of material values ​​for the correct planned distribution and use.

I do not have the opportunity now to elucidate in detail all this difficult and complex work, but I dare to think that, although the initial structure and essence of the work have undergone significant changes, the foundation for the current Gossnab of the USSR was laid then, in the first period of the creation of the State Committee for Material and Technical supply of the national economy of the USSR. Therefore, if possible, I will cover in more detail the work of the Gossnab of that period in an expanded version.

As Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I was in charge of the work of the Mintyazhstroy, the Ministry of Construction Materials, the Committee for Architecture and others. To a special extent, I, the Chairman of the State Supply Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was engaged in logistics and all types of transport: rail, river, sea, automobile and aviation.

And as a member of the Politburo, I was engaged in nationwide, general party affairs, including traveling on behalf of the Politburo to the localities.

Back in August 1952, the Central Committee published a resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee on the convening of the 19th Party Congress in October 1952. The Central Committee simultaneously published the "Draft Directives of the 19th Party Congress on the Fifth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR for 1951-1955." and "Draft Charter of the CPSU(b)".

The Central Committee proposed to all Party organizations that they launch a broad discussion in Party organizations of these drafts and all questions of the congress. The congress was opened with a brief opening speech by Comrade Molotov. With the report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Secretary of the Central Committee Comrade. Malenkov. The report of the Central Committee showed what a Great Heroic period our Motherland went through under the leadership of its heroic party, its Central Committee, its leader Comrade Stalin and the Soviet government - the greatest historical victory over the fascist enemy was won.

The heroic efforts of the people to restore the national economy are widely shown, and new great tasks are set for the Party, the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the entire people. After a deep and broad discussion of the report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the XIX Congress adopted the following resolution: “Having heard and discussed the report of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Malenkov G.M. on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, decides: To approve the political line and practical work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. This decision was taken unanimously. Directives on the five-year plan, which Comrade reported to the congress. Saburov, were adopted with the amendments introduced by the congress delegates.

The congress approved the reported comrade. Khrushchev, the changes made by the Central Committee to the Charter of the CPSU (b).

The congress heard the report of comrade Kaganovich on the proposals of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the revision of the Party Program and adopted the following resolution: “The 19th Party Congress establishes that since the 8th Party Congress (1919), when the existing Party Program was adopted, there have been fundamental changes both in the field of international relations, and in the field of building socialism in the USSR, in connection with which a number of provisions of the Program and the tasks of the Party outlined in it, insofar as they have already been implemented during this period, no longer correspond to modern conditions and the first tasks of the Party. Based on this, the congress decides:

2) When revising the Program, be guided by the main provisions of Comrade Stalin's work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR."

The 19th Party Congress elected a commission chaired by Comrade Stalin to revise the Program and instructed the Central Committee to submit a new draft for consideration by the next congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Representatives of almost all communist and workers' parties of the world were present at the 19th Congress and took part in its work. All of them, in their speeches, warmly welcomed our party, its leadership and Comrade Stalin personally, and promised it every kind of revolutionary support. At the end of the congress, the leader of our party, Comrade Stalin, addressed them with a reply from our party, who first of all expressed gratitude on behalf of our congress to the fraternal parties and groups for the friendly greetings, for the wishes of success and for the trust. “It would be wrong to

mother, said Comrade. Stalin - that our party, which has become a powerful force, no longer needs support. This is not true. Our Party and our country have always needed and will continue to need trust, sympathy and support from the fraternal peoples abroad. The peculiarity of this support lies in the fact that any support for the peace-loving aspirations of our Party by any fraternal party means, at the same time, support for its own people in their struggle to preserve peace. It is clear that our Party cannot remain indebted to the fraternal parties and it must itself, in turn, support them, as well as their peoples, in their struggle for liberation, in their struggle to preserve peace. As you know, she does just that. Representatives of the fraternal parties, admiring the courage and successes of our party, awarded it the title of "Shock Brigade" of the world revolutionary and workers' movement. By this they expressed the hope that the successes of the "shock brigade" would ease the situation for the peoples languishing under the yoke of capitalism. I think that our Party justified these hopes, especially during the Second World War. Of course, it was very difficult to fulfill this honorable role while there was only one "shock brigade". Now, from China to Korea, to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new "shock brigades" appeared in the person of the people's democratic countries - now it has become easier for our party to fight, and the work has gone more cheerfully. Particular attention deserves those communist, democratic or workers' and peasants' parties that have not yet come to power and which continue to work under the heel of bourgeois draconian laws.

Answering the question why it would still not be so difficult for these parties to work in comparison with the Russian communists of the tsarist period, Comrade Stalin emphasized: “Earlier, the bourgeoisie allowed itself to be liberal. Now there is no trace left of liberalism. The principle of equal rights of people and nations has been trampled underfoot, it has been replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and lack of rights for the exploited majority of citizens. The banner of bourgeois-democratic freedoms has been thrown overboard. I think that you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties, will have to raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to gather the majority of the people around you. There is no one else to pick it up. There is every reason to count on the success and victory of the fraternal parties in the countries dominated by capital.”

This was the confident, wise Leninist direction of the entire policy, strategy and tactics of the fraternal parties in their struggle for factories.

the seizure of power by the working class, for a revolutionary victory over the rule of monopoly imperialist capital, which is striving for a new redivision of the world, for a new war. The 19th Congress warmly and enthusiastically greeted Comrade Stalin, who expressed the will and greatness of our Party, which had won great victories. The 19th Congress, by its decisions, by the speech of Comrade Stalin, which, unfortunately, was his last speech, strengthened our party as the Leninist "Shock Brigade" of the world proletarian socialist revolution! The delegates to the 19th Congress and representatives of the fraternal parties warmly greeted Stalin's speech with greetings to the fraternal parties. In this greeting, Stalin said: "You, comrades, must learn not only from our achievements, but also from our mistakes." This is a very important statement - it means that Stalin admitted that we had mistakes. I personally think that if Stalin had lived, he would have made a self-critical report. Some say that Stalin was already ill at the time of the 19th Congress. This, in my opinion, is incorrect. I saw that Stalin was in charge of the congress, that Malenkov's draft report was discussed at the Presidium under Stalin's chairmanship, and amendments were made several times. I remember when I asked Stalin why he himself did not make a report to the Central Committee, he told me that young people should be nominated, let them grow - here Malenkov, as secretary of the Central Committee, will make a report. He immediately added what he had said earlier to us, several members of the Presidium. “I,” said Stalin, “generally believe that after the age of 70, leading comrades should leave direct leadership; they may be advisors, but not stewards.” Immediately after the congress, Stalin directed the Plenum of the Central Committee and after it the work of the Presidium. He dealt with major issues of the recovery period. I remember how he called me and said: “We have colossal destruction, all our plans and promises will be frustrated if we do not solve the main task - to provide building materials. Cement factories, glass factories - they need to be restored, they need to be given glass, cement, roofing, bricks and so on. Therefore, I propose to appoint you Minister of Building Materials. How do you feel about this? Of course, I immediately replied that I agreed. There are many such examples.

Stalin, together with Molotov, invariably dealt with foreign policy issues. In connection with the invention in the West of a new atomic weapon, Stalin was especially concerned with mastering the production of these weapons here in the USSR. He placed all of us, members of the Politburo, at the service of this cause. It must be said that no

Beria, Pervukhin and others were engaged in the production. But Stalin personally led this business.

I am sure that every objectively thinking Soviet person will say, I must say that, despite the mistakes that took place, Stalin did so much Great for the growth of the power of the Soviet state created by Lenin that his representatives can negotiate with the Western capitalist states as equals with equals in upholding cause of peace among nations.

19th congress: the last party meeting of the leader

Vladimir Tolts: Today is another program dedicated to the half-century anniversary of the final of Stalin's rule.

It is attended by: Doctors of Historical Sciences Elena Yurievna Zubkova and Boris Semyonovich Ilizarov - Russian researchers of Stalinism. Professor Ilizarov is the author of the recently published monograph "The Secret Life of Stalin. Based on the materials of his library and archive. Historiosophy of Stalinism"). Elena is a historian of post-war Soviet society and (not without pride I note) - my co-author in the multimedia project "XX Congress" (we have already talked about it in our program and, since the work has already been completed, we will probably tell you more).

But today we will talk about something else. - About the last in the life of the party "leader of all times and peoples" open party meeting. - On the 19th Party Congress. About the "swan", according to Dmitry Shepilov, "song" of Joseph Vissarionovich.

In October 1952, when the 19th Party Congress began, Stalin (he did not know about this) had five months to live. In a month and a half, he intended to celebrate his official 73rd birthday. (As Boris already said, in fact the leader was somewhat older). And for many years, the congress, which was not assembled contrary to the party charter, was a kind of ("early", as it was then instituted) "gift" for this festive day for the entire Soviet people.

From a letter from communist Leonid Chelidze (Armavir) to his senior party comrade Joseph Stalin:

The entire Soviet people greets the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with great enthusiasm and with an unprecedented labor upsurge.

To tell the truth, the Communists and the non-Party Bolsheviks, in a word, the entire Soviet people, have been waiting for this congress for a long time. After all, more than thirteen years have passed between the 18th and 19th Party Congresses. And according to the Charter of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Congress of the Party of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was obliged to convene every 3-4 years.<...>

Therefore, I ask you to give an answer to the question: "Why did the 19th Congress of the CPSU (b) take so long to convene?"<...>

If an insignificant mistake is made, then it must be admitted at least in passing. Thus, there would be no place for “I can’t know” and “I don’t know”, and harmful rumors that no one needs, except for the enemies of the people, would spread that this congress was the last under Comrade Stalin, because it is getting old, etc. "

Vladimir Tolts: Similar letters came to the Central Committee. Individual communists (I emphasize: individual), like Leonid Chelidze, were interested in the reasons for the violation of the Charter of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the so-called "norms of inner-party democracy." But it seems to me that the significance of these curious people should not be exaggerated: during the years of the war and after it, the composition of the party changed and became somewhat younger. Unlike those who perished in the pre-war purges and the fire of the war, most of these people did not ask "unnecessary" questions.

So, why did the hero of our cycle, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, need the 19th Party Congress?

Elena Zubkova: The congress had to be held for several reasons, primarily for formal reasons. The fact is that in a country where lawlessness was actually elevated to some kind of such a norm of life, the authorities very carefully monitored that certain rituals of democratization were observed, elections were held to the Supreme Council, to party instances, and so on, and party congresses. So, when the congress was not held long enough, it began to worry ordinary communists and ordinary citizens. Beginning in 1945, letters were sent to the Central Committee of the Party and to the central press in general, when people were interested in why, in fact, the Party Congress was not convened. Therefore, the congress had to be held at least, as they later said, "meeting the wishes of the working people."

There was another reason, in my opinion, probably even more important, the reason, let's say, psychological. The war had just ended, a most difficult war, and people were also very hard and infinitely slowly drawn into this new peaceful life, but they really wanted to live well, to live in peace. And therefore, some attributes were needed, some signs of a peaceful life, which the war had taken away and which had to return to this new peaceful life: men who had already fought back enough, food, good clothes, and, well, party congresses.

There was another point connected with Stalin's plans for the congress. Here the question arises, why did he personally need the congress? Well, firstly, already for the reasons that I spoke about, to block unwanted questions and, along with them, undesirable public sentiments, and secondly, he, of course, had his own interest. The fact is that even during the war, Stalin conceived, and after the war began to vigorously carry out the renewal of the personnel, mainly the highest personnel. And a certain part of this renewal could be carried out, again following certain formal rules of the game, at the party congress, to renew the Politburo and other party bodies. Which, in fact, was done in the 52nd year. Therefore, to hold or not to hold a congress, here, in general, there was no question.

The question, as it seems to me, is different - why did the congress, in fact, take place only in 1952?

Vladimir Tolts: In the mouth of Elena Yuryevna Zubkova, who knows in detail the Soviet history of the post-war period, this question sounds rhetorical. In my opinion, among Russian and foreign researchers of that time, Lena is one of those who can answer this question in the most detailed and reasoned way.

Elena Zubkova: Why the congress was not held during the war is, in general, understandable. After the war, the congress was intensively prepared, in fact, even the program, that is, the agenda of this congress, was conceived in advance. In 1946, a commission was formed, it was headed by a prominent party functionary Andrei Zhdanov, the commission worked very intensively, energetically, and, in the end, proposed a draft of a new party program. This work was quickly completed, and already in February 1947, at a plenum of the Central Committee, Zhdanov reported that they were ready to present a program to a new party congress, and that the congress could be held at the end of 1947 or at the beginning of 1948. But the situation has changed and the program was not to the yard.

Vladimir Tolts: In the post-Stalinist historiography of the Soviet past in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s, it has long become commonplace to argue that the Stalinist repressive "strictness" of this time (it seems that there are no words to be softer) is associated, among other things, with the deterioration of the physical and mental state of the leader to the end of his life. Related to this is my question addressed to Professor Ilizarov:

How did the "father of all nations" feel at that time, in particular in 1952, who had already "reached the finish line"?

Boris Ilizarov: He was already a very middle-aged man, let's say, and not a very healthy person. And on this occasion, there are documents confirming that Stalin, however, as practically his entire conscious life, continued to suffer from serious illnesses, which were chronic, of course, but at the same time did not affect his mental and physiological abilities so deeply. He continued to experience very excruciating pains related to the stomach, he had problems with his lungs, he had problems with rheumatoid possible phenomena and so on. That is, it was an elderly, unhealthy person. But Iosif Vissarionovich, from my point of view, did not think about death.

Vladimir Tolts: Here is a short quote from the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev:

“In recent years, Stalin sometimes started talking about his successor. I remember how Stalin discussed our account in front of us: “Whom will we appoint after me Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR? Beria? No, he is not Russian, but Georgian. Khrushchev? No, he is a worker, but someone more intelligent is needed. Malenkov? No, he only knows how to walk on someone else's leash. Kaganovich? No, he is not Russian, but a Jew. Molotov? No, already outdated, will not pull. Voroshilov? No, old and weak in scale. Saburov? Pervukhin? These are suitable for secondary roles. Only Bulganin remains. Naturally, no one intervened in his thoughts aloud. Everyone was silent.

Well, so, Lena, what do you think, did Stalin have the problem of a political heir at the end of his life?

Elena Zubkova: - The problem of the heir, of course, stood before Stalin as before every leader, another thing is that Stalin saw and understood it in a rather peculiar way.

The Stalinist dictatorship, like any normal ordinary dictatorship, was personified. Stalin created it in accordance with his own interests and formed this system also for himself, although, like any dictator, he was no stranger to playing "cat and mouse" with his inner circle, from time to time offering them various candidates for the post of his successor, mentioning in this connections now with Molotov, then Voznesensky with Kuznetsov, and even after the 19th Congress in 1952, simply by complaining that, they say, he is old, and it would be good to find a younger one in his place. It is clear that in these statements of Stalin there were no longer so many real proposals, but rather it was probing the ground for loyalty. It seems to me that those whom Stalin mentioned as his heir were most afraid.

Vladimir Tolts: From the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan:

"It seems that it was already 1948. Somehow Stalin called everyone who was vacationing on the Black Sea in those parts to his dacha on Lake Ritsa. There, in front of everyone, he announced that the members of the Politburo were getting old (although most were a little over 50 years old and all were much younger than Stalin, by 15-17 years, except for Molotov, and even that was separated from Stalin by 11 years. Pointing at Kuznetsov, Stalin said that future leaders should be young (he was 42-43 years old), and in general such a person may someday become his successor in leadership of the party and the Central Committee.This, of course, was a very bad service to Kuznetsov, referring to those who could dream of such a role.

Everyone understood that the successor would be Russian, and in general, Molotov was an obvious figure. But Stalin did not like this, he was afraid of Molotov somewhere: he usually kept him in his office for many hours, so that everyone could see the importance of Molotov and Stalin's attention to him. In fact, Stalin tried not to let him work independently and isolate him from others.<...>Then he made a bet on Voznesensky in the Council of Ministers. As for Zhdanov, Stalin, especially before the war, began to treat him well. Zhdanov was generally a good man, but too weak ... "

Vladimir Tolts: By the time we are talking about in today's program, by the end of 1952, a lot has changed. Andrey Zhdanov died back in August 1948. In the early 50s, his death was used to promote the case of the "Kremlin doctors" - they were accused of killing Andrei Alexandrovich. On October 1, 1949, Alexei Kuznetsov was shot, whom Stalin had pointed out a year before as a possible successor. Three weeks after this secret execution, Nikolai Voznesensky was also arrested; he was shot in September 1950. Molotov's wife, arrested in January 1948, was in exile in Kustanai, and her re-arrest was being prepared. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich himself, who temporarily renounced his wife, despite this, in conversations with his inner circle, was accused by Stalin of "surrendering" to American imperialism and aiding the Jews. Stalin and Mikoyan were accused of capitulation; in his memoirs, he claimed that a month before his death, Stalin said that Mikoyan and Molotov were "almost American or British spies." The candidates for successors who remained at large (for example, Bulganin mentioned above) lived in fear of the uncertainty of their fate. But the problem of political continuity and, already in this connection, the problem of restructuring the organization of supreme power remained for Stalin.

Professor Boris Ilizarov argues about the model according to which Stalin supposed to solve the problem of restructuring the system of supreme power for himself.

Boris Ilizarov: It seems to me that in this case, Stalin repeated the scheme that Lenin tried to reproduce in his time. Lenin, too, however, there were other motives, other times, other people, but, nevertheless, he also tried to create some kind of collective body, over which he would, as they say, rise, which he would control and at the same time he would retain all the power and influence in the country. I think that it was with these thoughts that Stalin approached the 19th Congress. It is unlikely that he thought that he would die soon, that he should leave a successor, that he should continue his personal business. And these, it seems to me, are the reasons that dictate his desire to create such a collective body. On the one hand, to remove all those influential members of the Politburo, whom he also raised, and whom he had been feeding and educating for a long time. These were his people - Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and so on. But in this environment, which he brought up, there were several people whom he even before this congress, until these times, named as successors, especially Molotov. All this continued until 1947-48, but then everything suddenly changed dramatically, and Stalin changed his idea of ​​​​the changes that he intended to make in the government of the country. Therefore, it seems to me that the main reason for the 19th Congress was connected precisely with the reorganization of management, but the reorganization, as he himself conceived.

Vladimir Tolts: Unlike Elena Zubkova, Boris Semyonovich is inclined to liken the reorganization and "purge" of the highest echelon of power planned by Stalin to the purge of the 1930s.

Boris Ilizarov: With this, Stalin took and very simply, I would say formally, put out of the brackets some of the most influential members of the Politburo. It. Of course, there was Molotov, there was Mikoyan, it was Voroshilov, and these three figures gradually began to turn into something very strange, and Stalin always did it masterfully, as if they began to get a different quality, these were his best representatives of the Politburo. (Just as was the case with Bukharin, Rykov, and other communist party leaders and leaders). He knew how - I think it was an absolutely enormous skill - to turn people from very positive, significant people, turn them into insignificance, turn them into enemies.

How could it be from a person who was the most devoted to Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin - Molotov, from a person who was slavishly submissive - Mikoyan, from a person who simply constantly wrote historical novels such as how Stalin led the Red Army during the civil war - I mean Voroshilov - how can they be made "English spies" or "accomplices of imperialism" and so on? But he gradually did it. Of course, they all felt why this was happening, they understood that, in general, the situation of 1938 was beginning to repeat itself...

Vladimir Tolts: I confess that, just like Elena, I am not inclined to completely liken the personnel reform initiated by Stalin in the finale to the purge of the late 30s. Proposed by Zubkova in our joint project, the analytical division of the highest Stalinist echelon into "groups of interests and potentials" ("CORE", "OLD GUARD", "RESERVE") allows us to see in the last organizational measures of the Leader of the Peoples not just naked terror of the 38th model, but rather its symbiosis with what political scientists of our time call "the system of checks and balances."

Elena Zubkova: The "old guard" is gradually being pushed into secondary roles, and the "reserve" is being pulled up to the highest echelons of government.<...>Members of the "core" then occupy leading positions, although here, too, Stalin inspires various conflicts: either he removes the Leningrad group led by Zhdanov, Zhdanov dies of natural causes, headed by Kuznetsov or Voznesensky, or creates some competition for the influence of Beria, Malenkov on the one hand, and Bulganin, Khrushchev - on the other hand ...

The members of the "core" are the first people to crowd out the leadership of the "old men". In this regard, the fate of Bulganin is very indicative - his rise is almost synchronous with the decrease in the influence of positions in the leadership of such figures as Molotov and Mikoyan. It all starts in March 1949, and already at the beginning of 1950, Bulganin actually takes Molotov's place in the leadership, becomes the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. And in the future, this figure really makes a colossal career breakthrough and enters the ruling four, which, in fact, will determine the configuration of power after the departure of Stalin himself in March 1953.

Vladimir Tolts: We continue another program dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the end of Stalin's rule. Doctors of historical sciences Elena Yurievna Zubkova and Boris Semyonovich Ilizarov are participating in it together with me in Moscow.

"There has been no Party congress for 13 years. And now the great victory in the most difficult war and the grandiose successes in socialist construction have created an atmosphere of joyful and solemn elation at the congress."

This is from the memoirs of Dmitry Shepilov, a participant in the 19th Congress.

Molotov opened the congress with an introductory speech. They honored the memory of the dead: Shcherbakov, Kalinin, Zhdanov. Bashirov, Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kuusinen, Malenkov, Molotov, Stalin, Khrushchev and several other secretaries of large party organizations were elected to the Presidium of the congress.

A storm of applause greeted the congress every time the name of Stalin was mentioned. The hall greeted the leader many times while standing. The name of Stalin did not leave the mouths of speakers. Already in his opening speech, Molotov set the tone in this respect. He ended his speech with the words:

Long live and live for many years our dear great Stalin!

Vladimir Tolts: Stormy applause and toasts of health did not add to the old man. Having already set the date for the congress, he dragged on with the definition of the agenda - to whom to read the main report (he himself was already beyond his strength ...).

The same question tormented his inner circle - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin.

Khrushchev recalled:

“We wondered who he could entrust to make a report? We thought that if he did not take the report upon himself, feeling that he was physically weak and unable to stand for the right time on the podium, then perhaps he would hand out the text in writing and would not read out<...>

When Stalin finally set the agenda, he said that we would entrust the reporting report to Malenkov, about the charter - to Khrushchev, and about the five-year plan - to the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Saburov.

Vladimir Tolts: But the great master of his own "PR" Stalin would not have been Stalin, if so, easily, gave his main role to others. He thought of everything.

Dmitry Shepilov, a participant in the 19th Congress, recalled:

"Stalin, by a number of his actions, tried to demonstrate his "master's" position in the party and at the congress. Thus, a few days before the congress, Pravda published all the works of Stalin, which amounted to<...>his latest book, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. This act, as it were, made it clear that not the political report of the Central Committee, but the new work of Stalin should be taken as the basis for discussion at the congress. In fact, that's what happened."

Vladimir Tolts: Against this background, the report of the Central Committee looked like a secondary formality. Stalin himself was of little interest to him.

“During the entire many hours of Malenkov’s report, he stared indifferently and almost without movement into space. Malenkov drove his report at an incredibly fast pace, from time to time glancing askance at Stalin, like an intelligent horse at its old rider. Like an eternal approximate, knowing the habits of Stalin, Malenkov trembled inwardly: suddenly Stalin would make his impatient movement, well known to all courtiers, or take out his gold Longines watch from his trouser pocket. This means that he is dissatisfied, and then, in order not to arouse anger, he will have to crumple up the report and finish it at any stage .

But everything went well. Stalin listened to the report.

Vladimir Tolts: The same was done with Khrushchev's report on the new party statute, from which the "fictional" lengths were thrown out in advance - an imitation of the style of the deceased Zhdanov. Khrushchev meekly submitted. The charter, which was adopted at the "feed" of the future anti-Stalinist, is impressive even in comparison with the previous toughening of Stalin's draconity.

Elena Zubkova: There are interesting passages in this new charter, for example, if earlier a party member had the right to signal to party authorities about some shortcomings, malfunctions, and so on, now he is obliged. And if he hides the truth, then this, following the line of the statute, should be understood as a crime against the party. And the most curious and very symptomatic: the new version of this charter actually elevates denunciation to the rank of law. I can say right away that not all party members accepted this new position, there were protests, but there were a lot of people who absolutely agreed. That's what the party congress is for. That is, he had his own task - the adoption of a new party charter, and, of course, Stalin himself had a task - he conceived and carried out another large-scale and, as the development of subsequent events showed, a far-reaching reshuffle in the highest personnel echelon.

Vladimir Tolts: All participants in the congress were anxiously awaiting this reshuffle. Especially her future victims. And, perhaps, more sharply than others, politically sensitive Mikoyan, who managed on the eve of the congress to anger Stalin by keeping silent when other Kremlin officials loudly and excitedly admired the last essay of the Leader on the economic problems of socialism.

As Anastas Ivanovich himself recalled, Stalin did not hesitate to answer this:

"A few days before the opening of the congress, members of the Politburo gathered to exchange views on the opening of the congress. The question of the composition of the presidium came up. Usually, the presidium was elected from 27-29 people at the congress. As always, members of the Politburo and senior officials of the territories, republics and main regions Stalin this time proposed a presidium of 15 people. It was surprising and incomprehensible. In this way, he deprived many party leaders of entering the presidium of the congress, and they fully deserved it. Stalin himself personally named names, saying at the same time that "it is not necessary to introduce to the presidium of Mikoyan and Andreev, as inactive members of the Politburo".

This aroused the laughter of the members of the Politburo, who took Stalin's remark as an ordinary joke: Stalin sometimes allowed himself to joke good-naturedly. I also thought it was a joke. But laughter<...>irritated him. "I'm not joking," Stalin said harshly, "but I'm offering it seriously." Laughter immediately stopped, everyone present<...>no longer objected."

Vladimir Tolts: At the congress, Mikoyan tried to win back: in his speech, he praised the last work of the Leader with all his might. But he did not appease Stalin, and no one paid much attention to these praises - everyone praised ...

And the attention of party members was focused on something completely different.

Memoirs of Dmitry Shepilov:

Everyone was looking forward to Stalin's speech. It was hard to believe that Stalin would leave the palace without saying a word to the delegates and foreign guests who spoke with such warmth to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, on the last day of the congress, October 14, Stalin made a short speech. It is difficult to convey what was going on in the hall when the chairman, K. Voroshilov, uttered the long-awaited phrase: "The floor is given to Comrade Stalin."

The whole room rose. Thunderous applause shook the building of the palace. Standing on the podium, Stalin outwardly looked indifferently into space. I cannot say how long the squall lasted. But at last the delegates sat down in their places, and Stalin was given the opportunity to speak. He spoke, as always, very quietly, inexpressively, as if he did not care at all about the impression he and his speech made on the audience.

Stalin spoke publicly very rarely: in some periods once every few years. Therefore, to get to his speech, to listen and see Stalin alive was considered the greatest rarity and happiness. And any person who got to Stalin's speech tried not to utter a single sound.

At the same time, for three decades, all the press, radio, cinema, all means of oral propaganda and art inspired the idea that every word of Stalin is the highest revelation, it is absolute Marxist truth, a storehouse of wisdom, knowledge of the present, prediction of the future.

That is why the audience was always under the hypnosis of all this and listened to Stalin spellbound. The colorless form and emotional coldness of his speeches were dissolved under the scorching rays of these hypnotic forces. But at the same time, Stalin understood the meaning of not only every word, but every shade of it. And he carefully prepared for each speech and thoroughly weighed the effect of each word.

Stalin expressed one thought: the bourgeoisie has become reactionary. Not a trace of her former liberalism remained. No more so-called. "freedom of the individual". The principle of equal rights of people and nations has been trampled on. The banner of bourgeois-democratic freedoms has been thrown overboard. The banner of national independence and sovereignty has also been thrown overboard.

This banner, said Stalin, will have to be raised by you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties. There is no one else to pick it up.

Stalin called on the revolutionary parties of the capitalist countries to learn from the mistakes and successes of the Soviet country and the people's democratic countries.

He ended his speech with toasts in honor of the fraternal parties and their leaders:

Long live peace among peoples!

- Down with warmongers!

This was the last open, public speech of Stalin, his swan song ... "

Vladimir Tolts: In fact, Stalin performed his "swan song" two days later. And on this day, October 14, 52, the weakening old man, like a child, rejoiced at his success (survived!) And primitive expressions of slavish love.

From the memoirs of Khrushchev:

"He finished his speech, left the podium<...>and the members of the Politburo went to the room of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Stalin tells us: "Look, I can still do it!" He stayed on the podium for about seven minutes and considered it his victory. And we concluded how physically weak he already was, if it turned out to be an incredible difficulty for him to give a speech for seven minutes. And he believed that he was still strong and could well work.

Vladimir Tolts: It seems to me that Nikita Sergeevich was mistaken: Stalin did not think that he "could work quite well." A day later, he said so (I quote the entry of the Kremlin apparatchik Leonid Efremov): "I ask you to relieve me of my duties as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. I am already old. I do not read papers. Choose another secretary for yourself." There was, of course, the insidious cunning of the dictator in this. But there was also a realistic reproduction of what was. This is confirmed by Boris Ilizarov.

Boris Ilizarov: I must say that indeed Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin by the end of his life can be said to be simply mired in the petty affairs of management. In what sense? In the memoirs of him, it seems to me, they say very clearly on this occasion that they simply sent documents to Stalin in bags, state acts that he had to sign, but he sometimes didn’t sign them for years, they were lying around with him, especially at the dacha, in different places, unopened packages. And constantly one of the members of the Politburo came to him and said: Joseph Vissarionovich, such and such a question needs to be resolved, there is such and such a decision of the government, there is such and such a decision of the party, it is necessary to sign it and so on. Then, according to my recollections, I literally convey, then Iosif Vissarionovich began to look for these acts, found them, by the way, that is, after all, he had a certain order, pulled out, began to read carefully, if there were no questions, he immediately signed if there were questions, such a bureaucratic mill began to spin again. In short, he is mired in these constant bureaucratic affairs.

Vladimir Tolts: But Stalin did not consider himself weak, politically weak! And he demonstrated this also on October 16th.

From the memoirs of Shepilov:

"On October 16, the first plenum of the newly elected Central Committee took place. We gathered (which has already become a long-standing tradition) in the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin. At exactly the appointed time, members of the Politburo of the previous composition came out of the inner rooms. Stalin walked ahead. When he appeared, part of the members of the Central Committee ( apparently newcomers) stood up and began to applaud. Stalin immediately waved his hand and said something like: "Never do this here."

It turns out that Stalin and his associates took for granted all cult ceremonies (everyone standing up, applause, slogans, etc.) at any celebrations and meetings. But this was not practiced at the plenums of the Central Committee and the Politburo.<...>

The main issue of the plenum was the formation of the executive bodies of the Central Committee - the Presidium and the Secretariat, as well as the approval of the chairman of the Party Control Commission. As I already mentioned, when forming the governing bodies, Stalin made a challenge to himself, which, of course, was not supported. Stalin hopelessly waved his hand - do what you want, they say. But every single person in the hall understood that it really could not be otherwise, and that Stalin himself would not even allow the thought that someone else would be the Secretary, that is, the head of the Politburo (Presidium).

But the further course of the discussion on the formation of the leadership was completely unexpected and made a painful impression, in any case, on me.

Vladimir Tolts: According to the recording of Efremov, already mentioned by me, it is possible to restore what so painfully impressed Shepilov. Here is what Stalin said:

“So, we held a party congress. It went well, and it may seem to many that we have complete unity. However, we do not have such unity. Some express disagreement with our decisions.<...>

They ask why we dismissed ministers, prominent party and state figures from important posts. What can be said about this? We dismissed the ministers Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others and replaced them with new workers.<...>As for the prominent political and statesmen themselves, they remain prominent political and statesmen. We transferred them to work as deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. So I don't even know how many deputies I have now."

Vladimir Tolts: Here again, Joseph Vissarionovich was cunning. Both he himself and his comrades-in-arms, who found themselves in public disgrace, understood that this speech was the beginning of their end. However, with regard to Molotov and Mikoyan, Stalin did not really try to hide this.

“Molotov is a man devoted to our cause. Call, and I have no doubt that he will not hesitate to give his life for the party. But one cannot ignore his unworthy deeds.

Comrade Molotov, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, being under "chartreuse" at a diplomatic reception, gave his consent to the British Ambassador to publish bourgeois newspapers and magazines in our country.<...>This is Comrade Molotov's first political mistake.

And what is Comrade Molotov's proposal to transfer the Crimea to the Jews worth? This is Comrade Molotov's gross mistake. Why did he need it? How can this be allowed? On what basis did Comrade Molotov make such a proposal? We have Jewish autonomy. Isn't that enough? Let this republic develop. And Comrade Molotov should not be a lawyer for illegal Jewish claims to our Soviet Crimea. This is Comrade Molotov's second political mistake.<...>

It is clear that such behavior of a member of the Politburo is unacceptable.

Now about Comrade Mikoyan. You see, he objects to the increase in the agricultural tax on the peasants. Who is he, our Anastas Mikoyan? What is not clear to him? The man is in our debt. We have a strong alliance with the peasants. We have assigned the land to the collective farms forever. They must repay their debt to the state. Therefore, one cannot agree with Comrade Mikoyan's position.

Vladimir Tolts: Mikoyan tried to justify himself. But Comrade Stalin was implacable: "he's confused<...>and wants to confuse us on this clear, principled issue." Molotov began to justify himself and assure that "he was and remains a faithful disciple of Stalin." Stalin slyly but firmly objected:

"Nonsense! I don't have any students. We are all students of the great Lenin."

Judging by the memories, everyone present was frightened. Even the "four" closest to Stalin tried on the fate of the disgraced. Well, the new members of the presidium could not understand what was happening at all.

Shepilov's memories:

“I, then a newcomer to this hall, who was not fired upon, listened with bated breath to Stalin. And the feeling was as if a piece of ice had been put on my heart. I looked from Stalin to Molotov, Mikoyan and again to Stalin. Molotov sat motionless at the presidium table. He was silent, and not a single muscle trembled on his face.Through the glasses of his pince-nez, he looked straight into the hall and only occasionally made such movements on the cloth of the table with three fingers of his right hand, as if crushing a crumb of bread.

A. Mikoyan was very nervous. His speech was very shallow and dishonorable. He, too, defending himself from fantastic accusations, did not fail to kick Molotov, who allegedly constantly communicated with Voznesensky, this was already a terrible crime in itself (...) "

Vladimir Tolts: It is understandable why, both in the minds of those present at the plenum (the same Shepilov), and in the perception of historians, this episode evokes a shadow of the repressions of the past.

Boris Ilizarov: The scenario was largely repeated in the 38th year. If you remember, the day before, the process of investigating the activities of the then all-powerful Avakumov, who was at the head of the punitive bodies, had just begun. He was under arrest at that time and, as far as I can imagine, it seemed to me that Stalin was preparing approximately the same scheme, that is, it should have been somewhere around 57-58. By the way, this is an additional argument in favor of the fact that he did not think that any changes would happen to him, that he would die or become seriously ill, and so on.

It seems to me that he was preparing a new round, perhaps the most terrible in the history of our country, which was to be repeated around the 1937-38s. He failed to fully repeat the 47-49th years, although there was also an attempt to do so. That is, every ten years the anniversary of the Great October Revolution, his personal anniversary, his next decade, associated with his birthday. And every ten years there were very sharp turns in the history of the country.

Vladimir Tolts: Well, these are still a few of the realm of conjectures ... And besides them, it is important for us to realize today that the plenum on October 16, 1952 was not only another round of the endless spiral of Stalinist terror, but also one of the stages of the multi-stage post-war reform of the country's governance , the division of functions between the two highest structures - the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Elena Zubkova: He organizes the management of these two structures with the help of triplets. The first troika, which Stalin puts on the Central Committee of the party, is headed by Malenkov, and Bulganin and Khrushchev are given to help him, and the second troika, led by Beria, who is assisted by Pervukhin and Saburov, was supposed to manage the Council of Ministers. What is fundamentally new in this reorganization? Prior to that, as a rule, each member of the Politburo also had a certain state post at the same time, there were exceptions, but they were really exceptions. For example, Zhdanov, being a member of the Politburo, did not simultaneously hold any state post. Or the same Khrushchev, he, of course, worked as chairman of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine, but he never joined the Union Council of Ministers, except for just a few days, for 13 days in 1952 Stalin included him in the Bureau of the Central Committee Presidium, and then I took it from there and left it only at work in the Central Committee. That is, Stalin creates some new structure, some kind of two-center. And, one might say, after his departure, what will later be called a collective leadership is created, such a collective heir.

Vladimir Tolts: Stalin never finished his "swan song" of the reorganization of power. After the 19th congress and the plenum on October 16, he had 4 and a half months to live. But during this time, his "collective heir" and millions of his subjects had to tremble more than once in anticipation of a terrible fate and uncertainty ...

SPEECH AT THE XIX CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

Comrades!

Allow me to express gratitude on behalf of our congress to all fraternal parties and groups whose representatives honored our congress with their presence or who sent greetings to the congress, for friendly greetings, for wishes of success, for trust.

This confidence is especially valuable to us, which means readiness to support our Party in its struggle for a brighter future for the peoples, in its struggle against war, in its struggle for the preservation of peace.

It would be a mistake to think that our party, which has become a powerful force, no longer needs support. This is not true. Our Party and our country have always needed and will continue to need trust, sympathy and support from the fraternal peoples abroad.

The peculiarity of this support lies in the fact that any support for the peace-loving aspirations of our Party by any fraternal party means, at the same time, support for its own people in their struggle to preserve peace. When the British workers in 1918-1919, during the armed attack of the British bourgeoisie on the Soviet Union, organized a struggle against the war under the slogan "Hands off Russia", it was support, support, first of all, the struggle of their people for peace, and then support for the Soviet Union. Union. When Comrade Torez or Comrade Togliatti declare that their peoples will not fight against the peoples of the Soviet Union, that is support, first of all, support for the workers and peasants of France and Italy, who are fighting for peace, and then support for the peace-loving aspirations of the Soviet Union. This feature of mutual support is explained by the fact that the interests of our Party not only do not contradict, but, on the contrary, merge with the interests of the peace-loving peoples. As for the Soviet Union, its interests are generally inseparable from the cause of world peace.

It is clear that our Party cannot remain indebted to the fraternal parties, and it must itself, in turn, support them, as well as their peoples, in their struggle for liberation, in their struggle to preserve peace. As you know, she does just that. After our party seized power in 1917, and after the party had taken real measures to eliminate capitalist and landlord oppression, representatives of the fraternal parties, admiring the courage and successes of our party, awarded it the title of "Shock Brigade" of the world revolutionary and workers' movement. By this they expressed the hope that the successes of the "Shock Brigade" would alleviate the situation for the peoples languishing under the yoke of capitalism. I think that our Party justified these hopes, especially during the Second World War, when the Soviet Union, having defeated the German and Japanese fascist tyranny, delivered the peoples of Europe and Asia from the threat of fascist slavery.

Of course, it was very difficult to fulfill this honorary role while the "Shock Brigade" was the only one and so far it had to fulfill this advanced role almost alone. But it was. Now it's a completely different matter. Now that from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary new "shock brigades" have appeared in the form of people's democracies, now it has become easier for our Party to fight, and the work has gone more cheerfully.

Particular attention deserves those communist, democratic or workers' and peasants' parties that have not yet come to power and which continue to work under the heel of bourgeois draconian laws. They are, of course, harder to work with. However, it is not as difficult for them to work as it was for us Russian Communists during the period of tsarism, when the slightest movement forward was declared the gravest crime. However, the Russian communists persevered, were not afraid of difficulties and achieved victory. The same will happen with these parties.

Why, after all, will it not be so difficult for these parties to work in comparison with the Russian communists of the tsarist period?

Because, firstly, they have before their eyes such examples of struggle and success as are available in the Soviet Union and the people's democratic countries. Consequently, they can learn from the mistakes and successes of these countries and thus make their work easier.

Because, secondly, the bourgeoisie itself - the main enemy of the liberation movement - has become different, has changed in a serious way, has become more reactionary, has lost ties with the people and thereby weakened itself. It is clear that this circumstance should also facilitate the work of the revolutionary and democratic parties.

Previously, the bourgeoisie allowed itself to be liberal, defended bourgeois-democratic freedoms and thus created popularity among the people. Now there is no trace left of liberalism. There is no more so-called "freedom of the individual" - individual rights are now recognized only for those who have capital, and all other citizens are considered raw human material, suitable only for exploitation. The principle of equal rights of people and nations has been trampled underfoot, it has been replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and lack of rights for the exploited majority of citizens. The banner of bourgeois-democratic freedoms has been thrown overboard. I think that you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties, will have to raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to gather the majority of the people around you. There is no one else to pick it up.

Previously, the bourgeoisie was considered the head of the nation, it defended the rights and independence of the nation, putting them "above all." Now not a trace of the "national principle" remains. Now the bourgeoisie is selling the rights and independence of the nation for dollars. The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. There is no doubt that you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties, will have to raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to be patriots of your country, if you want to become the leading force of the nation. There is no one else to pick it up.

That is how things stand at the present time.

It is clear that all these circumstances should facilitate the work of the communist and democratic parties that have not yet come to power.

Consequently, there is every reason to count on the success and victory of the fraternal parties in the countries dominated by capital.

Long live our fraternal parties!

May the leaders of the fraternal parties live and prosper!

Long live peace among nations!

Down with warmongers!

On October 5, 1952, the 19th Congress of the CPSU opened in Moscow. It was the first congress after 1939. It was decided to rename the CPSU (b) into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in connection with which changes were made to the Party Charter. In addition, the Directives on the five-year plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-1955 were approved at the congress, and guests from other countries for the first time demonstrated the entire socialist system that had developed.

The Commission of the Central Committee on Foreign Policy, consisting of 7 members, as well as the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, played an important role in the day-to-day leadership of the country. At the XIX Congress, the Politburo was replaced by a more numerous Presidium of the Central Committee, however, the Bureau of the Presidium immediately stood out in it, consisting of only a few people.

Concentrating in his hands all the key positions of power in the country, he gradually lost his former activity, age and illness affected. In 1949, his 70th birthday was magnificently celebrated, which was attended by many foreign guests, incl. Leader of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong. At the 19th Party Congress, Stalin did not make a report, confining himself to a brief speech on international issues. By that time, he had ceased to trust his old associates L. Beria, K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan, V. Molotov, opposing them to younger ones: A. Zhdanov, G. Malenkov, N. Khrushchev, who advanced in power structures only in 1930 years were, according to Stalin, more devoted to him and the party line. At the congress, Stalin sharply criticized the work of Molotov and Mikoyan, who were not included in the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee. However, already in March 1953, literally at the time of his death, these politicians were returned back, and the composition of the Presidium was reduced to the size of the former Politburo, easily ignoring the decision of the XIX Congress.

And behind the scenes of the congress between the "old" and "new" associates of the leader, as well as within these groups, an increasingly fierce struggle for influence over Stalin, and then for the role of his successors, gradually flared up. Until the death of Zhdanov in August 1948, on whose side Voznesensky was, Malenkov, supported by Beria and Kaganovich, waged a behind-the-scenes fight against him. After the death of Zhdanov, Voznesensky was removed from office and sentenced to death. Molotov, then Zhdanov, and, finally, Malenkov could claim the role of a potential successor to Stalin (although the latter, obviously, was not going to die or transfer his power functions to anyone). However, Beria, Khrushchev and other leaders had their own ambitions.

It was at the 19th Party Congress that L.I. Brezhnev. They say that when Stalin saw him at the congress, he said: "What a handsome Moldavian!" It is obvious that the leader at that time was looking for support from young leaders, opposing them to the "old" guard. After the death of Stalin, Brezhnev initially occupied a not so high position as deputy head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, but soon his career went up again. He is sent to Kazakhstan to develop virgin lands. Memories of the years of the war, post-war reconstruction, development of virgin lands were left by Brezhnev in the trilogy "Small Land", "Renaissance", "Virgin Land", written with the help of professional writers. Khrushchev's support in the fight against the "anti-party" group turned into Brezhnev's appointment in 1957 as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

IMPACT Brigade

From the speech of I.V. Stalin onXIX Congress of the CPSU

“After the seizure of power by our party in 1917 and after the party took real measures to eliminate capitalist and landowner oppression, representatives of the fraternal parties, admiring the courage and successes of our party, awarded it the title of “Shock Brigade” of the world revolutionary and workers' movement. By this they expressed the hope that the successes of the Shock Brigade would ease the situation for the peoples languishing under the yoke of capitalism. I think that our Party justified these hopes, especially during the Second World War, when the Soviet Union, having defeated the German and Japanese fascist tyranny, delivered the peoples of Europe and Asia from the threat of fascist slavery. (Stormy applause.)

Of course, it was very difficult to fulfill this honorary role while the “Shock Brigade” was the only one and so far it had to fulfill this advanced role almost alone. But it was. Now it's a completely different matter. Now that from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary new “shock brigades” have appeared in the person of the people's democratic countries, now it has become easier for our party to fight, and the work has gone more cheerfully.

K. SIMONOV. THROUGH THE EYES OF A MAN OF MY GENERATION

“At the 19th Party Congress, I was among the guests with a ticket to all meetings, with the exception, of course, of the closed one, at which a new composition of the Central Committee was elected. On the evening of that day, the writer Babaevsky called me at home and, completely unexpectedly for me, congratulated me on the fact that I was chosen as a candidate member of the Central Committee. If someone else called me, I might not have believed it at all, I would have considered it a joke and would have scolded the speaker, but Babaevsky was a delegate to the congress, a person with whom we were very far away, and I had no reason don't believe him. I thanked him for the congratulations, called one of my congress delegates and checked with him whether this was really the case, and, making sure that it was so, I thought that, obviously, I was among the candidates for members of the Central Committee as editor-in-chief " Literary newspaper. The guess was correct, and so it later turned out. Simultaneously with me, also for the first time in my life, Tvardovsky, at that time the editor of Novy Mir, and Surkov, at that time the editor of Ogonyok, were elected to the revision commission of the Central Committee. For some reason it seems to me that in all three cases it was Stalin's initiative, although maybe I'm wrong.

At a dinner given by the Central Committee in honor of the delegations of the Communist Parties, which took place almost on the same evening as the congress closed, I found myself sitting next to Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who, like me, had been chosen as a candidate member of the Central Committee. There was no doubt that this happened at the initiative of Stalin - there could be no other reasons at that time. This change in Zhukov's fate pleased and surprised many at the same time. I was surprised, probably less than others, because I remembered what Stalin said about Zhukov two years ago in connection with the discussion of Kazakevich's novel Spring on the Oder. Now, during this dinner, sitting next to Zhukov, I not only remembered that conversation about him that took place at the Politburo, but also considered myself entitled to tell Georgy Konstantinovich about him. I sensed through the restraint that never betrayed him that he was in a very good mood that evening. I think that the election to the Central Committee was a surprise for him. The stronger, perhaps, was the impression that this made on him. However, his self-respect did not allow him even once, not a word, to touch on this topic, which undoubtedly worried him most of all during the few hours that we sat next to him. Voroshilov led dinner and toasted it. And Stalin, who was sitting at the head of the table, but a little further from its center, spent almost the entire dinner talking with those sitting - one very close to him, and the other close to him - (inaudible) and Torez. His attention to both of them was even felt as emphasized, and, obviously, this was not accidental - so, in any case, it seemed to me.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF KHRUSHCHEV

The year 1951 was ending, or, it seems, 1952 began, I don’t remember exactly what month, Stalin gathered us at his place and expressed the idea that it was time to convene a congress of the CPSU (b). We didn't need to be persuaded. We all considered it an incredible event that the Party Congress had not been convened for 12-13 years. Plenums of the Central Committee of the party, party activists on an allied scale, and other large meetings of party workers were also not convened. The Central Committee did not take any part in the collective management of the affairs of the USSR, everything was decided solely by Stalin, in addition to the Central Committee. The Politburo of the Central Committee signed the documents sent to it, and Stalin often did not even ask the opinion of its members, but simply made a decision and ordered it to be published.<…>When Stalin finally set the agenda, he said that we would entrust the reporting report to Malenkov, about the charter - to Khrushchev, and about the five-year plan - to the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Saburov. This is how the agenda of the congress was adopted. As Stalin told us, they wrote it down, no comments arose.<…>The question is why Stalin did not instruct Molotov or Mikoyan to make a report, who historically occupied a higher position in the CPSU (b) than Malenkov and were well-known figures? Here's why. If we, the people of the pre-war period, used to consider Molotov as that future leader of the country who would replace Stalin when Stalin passed away, now this could not be discussed. At each regular meeting, Stalin attacked Molotov, Mikoyan, “bited” them. These two men were in disgrace, and their very lives were already in danger.<…>The 19th Congress ended. It was necessary to hold elections for the leading bodies of the party. All the preparatory work has already been done by the apparatus of the Central Committee.<…>They chose a new Central Committee. The congress is over. They sang "The Internationale". Stalin spoke, held a speech at the end for several minutes. Then everyone admired him, rejoiced at how brilliantly everything was said to him, and the like. He finished his speech, left the podium, the congress was closed, and the members of the Politburo went to the room of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Stalin tells us: “Look, I can still do it!” He stayed on the podium for about seven minutes and considered it his victory. And we all concluded how physically weak he already was, if it was an incredible difficulty for him to give a speech for seven minutes. And he believed that he was still strong and could well work.<…>

We were even more struck by the following fact, which is also quite revealing. The governing bodies of the party were formed: the Presidium of the Central Committee, its Secretariat, the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee. This was the most crucial moment: to create the governing bodies from the elected members of the Central Committee. We look, a plenum of the Central Committee is being convened, but Stalin did not raise any preliminary conversation about the Politburo. What will be the composition of the Presidium? He does not report either the number or the personnel - nothing is known! And at the plenum, Stalin, speaking, butchered Molotov and Mikoyan “under the nut”, calling into question their decency. His speech directly showed political distrust of them, suspicion of some kind of political dishonesty. Well well!

The elections have begun. We look back. I look at Malenkov: if anyone was supposed to prepare candidates, it was Malenkov. Stalin did not know people personally, with the exception of the top in which he rotated. Therefore, he had to inevitably resort to the help of the apparatus. We asked Malenkov about new people. He told us: “I don’t know anything, no instructions were given to me, and I didn’t take any part in this.” We were surprised: “How so? Who then prepared the candidates? Stalin himself opened the plenum and immediately made a proposal on the composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, pulled out some papers from his pocket and read them out. He proposed 25 people, and it was accepted without conversation or discussion. We are already accustomed to: since Stalin proposes, then there are no questions, this is a God-given proposal; everything that God gives is not discussed, but thanked for it.

When he read the composition of the Presidium, we all looked down without raising our eyes. 25 people, it is difficult to work with such a large team, solving operational issues. After all, the Presidium is an operational body and should not be very large. When the meeting closed, we looked at each other: how did it happen, who made such a list? Stalin did not know the people he named and could not have compiled this list himself. Frankly, I suspected that Malenkov did it, only he hides and does not tell us. Then I interrogated him in a friendly way: “Listen, I think that you put your hand in, although this is not only a product of your mind, but there were also amendments from Stalin.” He: “I assure you that I did not take any part at all. Stalin did not involve me in this and did not give me any instructions, I did not prepare any proposals. Both of us were even more surprised. I did not allow Beria's participation, because there were persons whom Beria could not have named to Stalin. And yet I asked him: "Lavrenty, did you have a hand?" “No, I myself attacked Malenkov, I thought about him. But he swears and swears that he also did not take part.

Molotov was excluded, Mikoyan too. And Bulganin knew nothing. Thoughts ran through our minds, but to no avail. We searched, who is the author? Of course, Stalin. But who helped him? We didn't participate. Poskrebyshev was still in charge of Stalin's secretariat at that time, but even he himself could not draw up such a list without the help of the apparatus. Maybe Stalin bypassed Malenkov and himself attracted someone from the apparatus. However, we did not allow this, because Malenkov would certainly have found out: in the apparatus for many years people worked next to it and under it. Therefore, at least secretly, in secret, they would have told Malenkov if they had such an order from Stalin. So we couldn't solve the mystery.

<…>When he read the composition of the Presidium, I, listening, thought: will Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov be included there? I doubted. These were people on whom Stalin had “waved his hand”, and the danger was already looming over their heads of falling into the newly appeared enemies of the people. But no, they are included. I was happy, it was already good. When he read out the composition of the bureau, it did not contain the names of Molotov and Mikoyan, but there was Voroshilov. Again I did not understand anything: how is it that Molotov is not there, Mikoyan is not, but Voroshilov is? Stalin began to suspect Voroshilov much earlier than Molotov and Mikoyan.