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Description of the Patriotic War in 1812 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky Alexander Ivanovich

Incidents of 1811

Incidents of 1811

Letter from Napoleon to the Emperor. - Answer. – Conversation between Napoleon and Chernyshev. - Continuation of the dispute. - Napoleon's preparations for war. – His conversation with Prince Kurakin. - The Sovereign's answer. – Reports from Prince Kurakin and Chernyshev about Napoleon’s indispensable intention to wage war. – Austria and Prussia offer their mediation. - The Emperor does not accept it. – Napoleon’s armament continues. - Turkish Affairs.

What was described in the previous chapter took place in 1810 and January 1811. Napoleon could not immediately start a war because he was not yet fully prepared for it. To gain time, he pretended, talked about the desire to preserve peace, about friendship for the Emperor. The whole of 1811 passed in these assurances and negotiations on controversial articles. What was the state of affairs at the beginning of this year, what exactly were the mutual displeasures of both great rivals, their own letters serve as an eloquent illustration of this. The reason for this was the appointment of General Count Lauriston as ambassador in St. Petersburg, in place of the Duke of Vicenza, Caulaincourt.

Letter from Napoleon dated February 16, 1811: “The poor state of health of the Duke of Vicenza forces me to recall him. I was looking among those around me for such a person, whose appointment could be most pleasing to Your Imperial Majesty and contribute to maintaining peace and alliance between us, I chose General Count Lauriston. I'm eager to know if my choice is successful.

I instruct Chernyshev to explain to Your Majesty my feelings for you. They will not change, although I cannot hide from myself that Your Majesty has deprived me of Your friendship. On your behalf they make me objections and all sorts of difficulties regarding Oldenburg, while I do not refuse the reward, and the position of this land, which has always been the center of smuggling with England, imposes on me an indispensable duty to annex it to my possessions, for the benefit of my Empire and successful completion of the ongoing struggle. Your Majesty's latest decree, in essence and especially in presentation, is directed, in fact, against France. In another time, Your Majesty would not have taken such a measure against my trade without first informing me, and I would probably have been able to offer you other means that would have corresponded to your main goal and yet would not have seemed like a change in the system for France. This is how all of Europe understood this, and in the opinion of England and Europe our union no longer exists. At least in Your Majesty’s soul it was as inviolable as in mine, nevertheless this general opinion is a great evil. Let me tell you frankly: Have you forgotten the benefits that the alliance brought you, and meanwhile look at what happened with the Tilsit peace? According to the Treaty of Tilsit, you had to return Moldavia and Wallachia to Turkey; Instead, Your Majesty annexed these regions to Your Empire. Wallachia and Moldavia make up a third of European Turkey. This huge acquisition, resting Your Majesty’s vast Empire on the Danube, completely weakens Turkey and even, one might say, destroys the Ottoman Empire, my oldest ally. Instead of insisting on the implementation of the Tilsit Treaty, I, with the greatest disinterestedness, and solely out of friendship for Your Majesty, recognized the annexation of these beautiful and rich countries to Russia; but if I were not confident in the continuation of your friendship, then even several unhappy campaigns would not have forced France to agree to such a seizure of regions from its ancient ally. In Sweden, at the time when I returned the conquests I had made in her possessions, I agreed that Your Majesty would retain Finland, which constitutes a third of the Swedish State and is such an important province for Your Majesty that after this union, one might say, there is no more Sweden, for Stockholm is now an outpost of the Kingdom. Meanwhile, Sweden, despite the false policy of the King, was also one of the ancient allies of France.

People who are insinuating and taught by England bother Your Majesty's ears with insidious speeches. They say that I want to restore Poland. I had the power to do this in Tilsit: twelve days after the Battle of Friedland I could be in Vilna. If I wanted to restore Poland, then in Vienna I would reward Austria: she wanted to preserve her ancient regions and communication with the sea, sacrificing possessions in Poland. I could have done this in 1810, when all the Russian troops were busy fighting the war against the Porte, therefore, I could have done it now, without waiting for Your Majesty to conclude an agreement with the Porte, which will probably take place during this summer. Under none of the above circumstances did I begin to restore Poland, and consequently, I did not even think about it. But if I do not want to change the position of Poland, then I also have the right to demand that no one interfere with my affairs on this side of the Elbe. I must, however, admit that our enemies were successful. The fortifications erected by order of Your Majesty on twenty places along the Dvina, the protest in favor of Oldenburg and your decree on the tariff serve as proof of this. I have not changed in my feelings towards you, but I am struck by the obviousness of these incidents and the thought that Your Majesty is completely disposed to make friends with England, as soon as circumstances lead to this, and this means kindling a war between the two Empires. If Your Majesty leaves the alliance and burns the Tilsit terms, war must obviously follow in a few months. This state of distrust and uncertainty has inconveniences for Your Majesty's Empire and mine. On both sides there should be tension in all methods of preparation. All this, of course, is very unpleasant. If Your Majesty has no intention of making peace with England, then you will feel how necessary it is for you and for me to dispel all these clouds. You do not enjoy peace, for you told the Duke of Vicenza that you would fight on Your borders, and peace is the first good of both great States. I ask Your Majesty, reading my letter, to believe in my good intentions, to see in it only a desire for peace, the removal of mutual distrust and the restoration between both nations in all respects of that close friendship that has made them so happy for about four years.”

Emperor Alexander answered Napoleon on March 13: “I hasten to answer Your Majesty’s letter dated February 16/28. I very much regret that the health of the Duke of Vicenza does not allow him to continue his embassy with Me. I was extremely pleased with him, for in any case I saw in him the greatest devotion to Your Majesty and constant concern for strengthening the ties that unite us. I thank Your Majesty for choosing General Lauriston: whoever enjoys your trust will always be pleasant to Me.

Chernyshev carried out My orders. I regret to see that you do not understand Me correctly. Neither My feelings nor my policy changed. I want nothing more than the preservation and strengthening of our union. On the contrary, do I have any reason to think that Your Majesty has changed in attitude towards Me? I consider it my duty to explain myself with the same frankness as Your Majesty did in his letter to Me.

You accuse Me of protesting the Oldenburg Case; but could I have done otherwise? A small piece of land belonged to a single person, My relative; all the required forms were completed by him; he is a member of the Rhine Confederation and therefore is under the protection of Your Majesty; the possessions were strengthened for him by the article of the Tilsit Treaty, and he is deprived of them, while Your Majesty did not warn Me with a single word. What importance could this piece of land have for France, and does your action prove to Europe your friendship for Me? All letters written from everywhere at this time testify that the annexation of Oldenburg to France was considered a consequence of Your Majesty’s desire to insult Me. As for My protest, the presentation of it serves as irrefutable proof that I place the alliance with France above all other considerations and clearly discover that it would be very erroneous to conclude from it that My alliance with Your Majesty is weakening.

You assume that My tariff decree is directed against France. I must refute this opinion as groundless and unfair. The tariff was necessarily required by the extremely constrained situation of maritime trade, the huge import by land of valuable foreign goods, the incredible duties on Russian products in Your Majesty's possessions and the terrible decline of our course. The tariff has a twofold purpose: 1) by prohibiting with the greatest severity trade with England, to grant some relief to trade with America, the only trade through which Russia can sell by sea its products that are too cumbersome for overland export; 2) limit as much as possible overland imports, which are the most unfavorable for our trade balance, because many very expensive luxury items are brought in, for which we paid in cash, while our own vacation is extremely constrained. These are the very simple reasons for the tariff decree. It is no more directed against France than against other lands of Europe, and is completely consistent with the continental system, prohibiting and destroying items of enemy trade. Your Majesty makes the remark that I did not first ask your opinion about this measure. Since it belongs to the actions of internal government, I think that every Government has the power to take such measures as seem beneficial to it, especially if they are not contrary to existing agreements. Let me make one remark to Your Majesty. Is it fair to reproach Me for this when you yourself did exactly the same and did not in the least inform Me about your orders regarding trade, not only in your Empire, but throughout Europe? Meanwhile, your decisions had a much stronger influence on Russian trade than what the Russian tariff could have on French trade: the numerous bankruptcies that followed them serve as proof of this.

It seems to me that I can honestly say that Russia complied with the Treaty of Tilsit more accurately than France. The remark about Moldavia and Wallachia cannot at all be imputed to Russia for violating the terms of this treaty, since it stipulates that these Principalities during the truce should remain unoccupied by the troops of the warring Powers. My army retreated four marches back, and I ordered it to return when the Turks made an attack, burned Galati and reached Focsani. After that, the Erfurt Convention strengthened My possession of Moldavia and Wallachia, therefore, I am right. As for the conquest of Finland, it was not part of My policy, and Your Majesty will remember that I started the war with Sweden only to enforce the continental system. The success of My weapons brought Finland to Me, just as failure could have deprived Me of My own regions. Consequently, regarding this second article, I believe that I am right. But if Your Majesty points out the benefits brought to Russia by its alliance with France, then can I, for My part, refer to the benefits of this alliance for France and the enormous annexation of parts of Italy, northern Germany, and Holland to it?

It seems to me that I have repeatedly demonstrated to Your Majesty how little attention I pay to the suggestions of those whose benefits encourage us to create a rift between us. The best proof is that I reported them to Your Majesty every time, always relying on your friendship. But when the deeds themselves began to confirm the rumors, I could not help but take precautions. In the Duchy of Warsaw, armaments continued unabated.

The number of troops in it has been multiplied without any proportionality, even with the population. Work on new fortifications did not stop; those erected by Me are on the Dvina and Dnieper. Your Majesty, so experienced in military affairs, cannot help but admit that fortifications built at such a distance from the border as Paris is from Strasbourg are not offensive measures, but purely defensive ones. My armaments were limited to the best arrangement of the already existing regiments; and Your Majesty did not stop doing the same. However, events in the Duchy of Warsaw and the continuous growth of Your Majesty’s forces in northern Germany forced me to arm myself. This is the current state of affairs. My fortifications can rather serve as proof of how little I am disposed to attack. My tariff, established only for a year, has no other purpose than to reduce the disadvantage of the exchange rate and provide Me with the means to maintain the system adopted and constantly preserved by Me, and the protest prescribed to Me by the duty to care for the honor of My State and Family, based on a direct violation of Tilsit agreement, is the most obvious sign of My desire to maintain the alliance with you.

Therefore, Your Majesty, discarding the idea that I am only waiting for a favorable moment to change the system, admit, if you want to be fair, that it is impossible to observe with greater accuracy the system that I have adopted. However, not envying my neighbors in anything, loving France, what benefit does it give me to want war? Russia has no need for conquest; it may already be too extensive.

The military genius that I recognize in Your Majesty does not allow Me to hide from Myself the difficulties of the struggle that could arise between us. Moreover, My pride is tied to the system of alliance with France. I made it a rule of policy for Russia, for which I had to struggle for quite a long time with nasty ancient opinions. Is it reasonable to assume in Me a desire to destroy My work and start a war with Your Majesty? And if you want war as little as I do, then, without any doubt, it will not happen. Showing you yet another piece of evidence, I am ready to provide Your Majesty with the solution to the Oldenburg case. Put yourself in My place and determine for yourself what you would want in such a case. Your Majesty has every means to arrange things in such a way as to bind both Empires even more closely and make a break forever impossible. For My part, I am ready to assist you for this purpose. I repeat: if there is a war, it will be according to your desire, and, having done everything to avert it, I will be able to fight and will sell My existence dearly. If, instead, you wish to recognize Me as a friend and ally, you will find the same feelings of affection and friendship that I have always had for you. I ask Your Majesty, reading this letter, to also believe My good intention and see in it only a decisive desire for reconciliation.”

Napoleon, having read to the end the letter handed to him by Chernyshev, said: “Who threatens your existence? Who intends to attack you? Do I really not understand my benefits to such an extent that, without any reason, I will start a war with a strong Power that has enormous means and an army ready to bravely fight for the fatherland? You say that the Emperor sincerely desires peace; but the order given to several divisions to move out of Wallachia to the western borders, is not this a very strong reason to declare war on you? What would you say if I ordered my troops to go to northern Germany, and would you have the right to take this as a declaration of war? I wish for peace: it is beneficial for me; but if our affairs remain in the current situation, then I give my word of honor, when you yourself do not start a war, not to attack you before four years. Waiting means winning for me.”

Napoleon counted all his troops and funds. Both were truly enormous, but Napoleon increased them even more, intending to intimidate Russia. Then he again began to assure of his love of peace and told Chernyshev that he could not win anything in the war with Russia, that the costs spent on weapons would not be repaid by war, that his life was too precious for his children and peoples and that he did not want to expose it to danger on a campaign for such unimportant items. Such a sudden arrangement

Napoleon's approach to peace stemmed from unfavorable news he received about the actions of French troops in Spain and Portugal. These failures worried Napoleon to such an extent that he postponed the break with Russia until the war on the Iberian Peninsula took a better turn. He also forbade the printing of offensive articles about Russia, which were already completely ready for publication in magazines, because, when embarking on any enterprise, Napoleon used to prepare in advance a general opinion in favor of his undertaking. The guise under which he tried to hide his intentions against Russia did not, however, mislead either our Ambassador in Paris or Chernyshev, who was constantly with Napoleon, accompanied him at shows, on hunts and was daily in the closest circle of sisters, relatives and dignitaries of the French Emperor. “Even in St. Petersburg, I had the good fortune to report to Your Majesty,” Chernyshev reported to the Tsar, “that Napoleon is only looking to gain time; present circumstances completely confirm this opinion. All the news that reaches Napoleon about our armaments worries him and forces him to hesitate to break with Russia, not because he cannot immediately unite 250,000 people against us, but for the reason that the war in the north will deprive him of the opportunity to arrange affairs in Spain.”

Trying to bring to an end the controversial articles, the essence of which lay in two subjects, Oldenburg and the tariff, the Sovereign proposed to the French Court: to begin negotiations on the first of these articles in St. Petersburg, inviting Denmark to join; in relation to the second, agree to change those articles of our new Trade Regulations that seemed offensive to France, and even over time conclude a trade agreement with her, because in eight months the tariff, issued for only one year, must cease. Napoleon, having in mind only the postponement of the war, replied that he was not opposed to entering into an agreement on Oldenburg, but allowed Russia to assign the reward it wanted for the Duke. On our part, it was objected that the proposal should come from Napoleon, who forcibly seized the Duchy; that the Sovereign does not accept Erfurt, but wants Oldenburg to be returned to the Duke or to be assigned in its place a region that, due to its local situation, could be under the direct protection of Russia; that the Sovereign does not ask Napoleon for mercy or a means of existence for the Duke, but looks at the annexation of Oldenburg to France as a violation of the Treaty of Tilsit, and demands that Napoleon himself provide means to make amends for his violent act.

Wanting to drag out the matter as long as possible, Napoleon said that our Ambassador in Paris, in order to enter into negotiations, was not given the authority that needed to be provided to him. The Emperor rejected this new demand, because the title of Ambassador in itself sufficiently authorized Prince Kurakin to listen to the proposals of the French Ministers and reason about them. Meanwhile, neither of the two powerful rivals agreed to be the first to announce what the Duke of Oldenburg's reward was to be, and both continued their armaments. All possible measures of severity were taken by Napoleon for a hasty conclusion. Camps were set up in various places in France to gather troops. A lot of artillery, shells, and commissariat items were sent to the Rhine and beyond. Separate teams of all kinds of troops were drawn there from France, along different roads, in large numbers. In Germany they set up shops and bought horses. The garrisons of Danzig and Prussian fortresses increased. The owners of the Rhine Confederation strengthened their auxiliary corps and stocked up on weapons. Napoleon showed special affection not only to the Austrians who were in Paris, but even to the Prussians, with whom, since the Peace of Tilsit, he treated with all the arrogance of an inexorable winner. “The minute of the great struggle is approaching,” Chernyshev reported. “The storm threatening us was stopped only by the fact that Napoleon is now inconvenient to open the campaign; but, no less, the danger is obvious and not far away. Napoleon persists in delaying negotiations, under the pretext that the first proposals should be made by us." The withdrawal of five Russian divisions from the banks of the Danube was the main subject of Napoleon's complaints. Destroying this pretext, the Emperor ordered him to be told that he would return the divisions to Wallachia if Napoleon reduced the Danzig garrison by half. The French Ministry replied that reduction required time and reflection; that it can be fulfilled only as a result of negotiations that should end all misunderstandings that have arisen. Napoleon did not agree to reduce the troops in Danzig and ordered to announce to our Ambassador that he was strengthening the army in German soil, “not, however,” he added, “to threaten Russia, or for political reasons, but solely with the intention of securing the northern shores of Germany from an attack by the British, to reinforce the local guard, to maintain public peace in this newly acquired region and, finally, because it is cheaper to maintain troops there than in France.”

The dubious state of affairs between the two Empires could not be hidden not only from astute observers, but also from Europe. Everyone saw that both Emperors were preparing for war, but no one knew what exactly their mutual claims were. The essence of the negotiations was kept secret and was known only to the St. Petersburg and Tuileries Cabinets. Napoleon was the first to break the silence. On his name day, August 3, 1811, there was, as usual, a large congress at the Court. Napoleon approached Prince Kurakin, stood next to him and, in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps, for exactly two hours, spoke to the Ambassador about his love of peace, about all the details of the controversial articles, constantly expressing the same thoughts in different turns of speech, trying to prove the correctness of his imaginary complaints against Russia . In conclusion, he said: “Emperor Alexander does not say what he wants, does not send you powers for negotiations, and yet does not stop armaments. I don’t want to wage war, I don’t think about restoring Poland, but you are thinking about annexing the Duchy of Warsaw and Danzig to Russia. No doubt the Emperor has some secret thought; Until the secret decisions of your Court are announced to us, I will not stop multiplying troops in Germany.”

The real purpose of this lengthy speech was to solemnly expose Russia as the initiator of the war before the world.

But Napoleon's personal qualities and his passion for conquest were known to everyone. Therefore, his words did not mislead anyone and only served to reveal to what extent the break with Russia was close. The Emperor, having received a report about this conversation, ordered Napoleon to answer that he did not find sufficient reasons to change his political rules, remained unshakable in his alliance with France, and was trying to eliminate everything that could weaken this alliance; that this has been the main basis of His Majesty’s political system since the time of the Peace of Tilsit and such will remain His disposition towards France as long as there is fair reciprocity in the actions of this Power. It is added that, in the opinion of the Sovereign, His Majesty should not make any proposals, although He is ready to listen to them from Napoleon, to put an end to controversial issues that have arisen between both Courts. In conclusion, the Emperor expressed his displeasure at Napoleon’s words about Russia’s desire to acquire Danzig or part of the Duchy of Warsaw. They answered that the Sovereign does not understand how such an unfounded assumption could arise, and declares in the most affirmative way that he does not extend His views either to Danzig or to any part of the Duchy of Warsaw; that, satisfied with the space and power of the Empire entrusted to Him by Providence, His Majesty does not desire foreign possessions and thinks only of maintaining the silence and general tranquility necessary to heal the wounds produced by twenty years of disasters.

These explanations, communicated to the French Ministry in October, did not have any effect. Napoleon's preparations for war were already completed in September, and if he did not open a campaign then, the reason for this was the late autumn time. “The war has been decided in Napoleon’s mind,” Chernyshev reported, “he now considers it necessary in order to achieve the power he seeks, the goal towards which all his efforts strive, that is, the possession of Europe. The thought of world domination so flatters his pride and occupies him to such an extent that no concessions, no accommodation on our part can delay the great struggle that must decide the fate of not only Russia, but the entire solid land.”

Indeed, during the remaining winter months of 1811, Napoleon did not give a satisfactory answer about his weapons. They even announced to our ambassador in Paris that they would not enter into negotiations or explanations with him until he was provided with a new authority. The Emperor, for His part, considered the authority unnecessary, for the reasons stated above. Napoleon's actions proved that authority could not serve as a means of reconciliation: if he really wanted peace, he would not have strengthened the army in German soil and would have long ago made the proposals required of him that could serve as the basis for negotiations.

Napoleon stopped grumbling about the tariff, which at first seemed to have irritated him, and, turning solely to the Oldenburg case, he admitted that he acted with excessive haste in appropriating Oldenburg and, while annexing this region to France, did not know about the rights to it of the Russian Court. He called the protest a call to war, and justified his weapons by the fact that Russian troops were increasingly concentrated on the western borders. He was not convinced by the repeated objections that it was impossible for the Emperor to look indifferently at the gathering of the French armies in northern Germany, where their number at that time had already increased to 300,000 people; that it was impossible not to take measures for defense when the garrisons of fortresses in Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw were strengthened, and weapons were being prepared in all parts of Napoleon's vast Empire and the regions of his tributaries. Napoleon's negative reviews did not shake Emperor Alexander, and His Majesty constantly answered one thing: Napoleon was the first to violate the Peace of Tilsit, and therefore the first should announce what rewards he would provide for it.

Austria and Prussia, foreseeing an imminent war, the consequences of which would certainly break out over them, offered their mediation to the Emperor. The Emperor did not accept him and, having informed Napoleon of His refusal, told him that the revived mutual misunderstandings should be stopped not by outside mediation, but by the sheer force of friendship connecting Him with Napoleon, and the mutual benefits of their Empires. The new proof of the Sovereign's power of attorney was accepted by Napoleon with gratitude, but had no effect on taming his hostile plans against Russia.

Paris was filled with rumors of war: everywhere they were clearly and loudly talking about an imminent, inevitable war. The capital of France was like a camp where troops were constantly being reviewed as they set out for the Rhine. “With regret, I must repeat,” reported Prince Kurakin on December 18, “that the war is no longer subject to the slightest doubt. All Napoleon's conversations, according to the general statement about them, are filled with indignation and bitterness against Russia. He ordered his adjutants to give money for the ascent, as usually happens at the beginning of a campaign. To protect the sea shores during his absence, he organized a customs guard, consisting of 214 companies, and a national guard to defend the Italian border. This year's plan will reach 200,000 people; a new construal will soon appear in the Kingdom of Italy. The Minister of War, in a frank conversation with one of his friends, said that France, now preparing for war against us, had never before had such an abundantly and carefully supplied army, both in the number of people and horses, and in artillery and all possible supplies and shells, because what time she had at that time and did not waste it. Great forces and methods have been prepared by Napoleon to take up arms against us. We can no longer flatter ourselves with empty hopes for peace. The time is coming to defend with courage and unshakable firmness the property and inviolability of Russia’s borders.”

The Russian Envoys who were at the Courts allied with Napoleon reported just as positively about their weapons, as did Chernyshev, who managed to obtain the most detailed combat reports and information about the locations of the French troops. “Napoleon is becoming more and more bitter against us every day,” Chernyshev reported on December 6. “There is no doubt about the likelihood of an imminent rupture; one cannot guarantee two or three months of peace; one can even expect that Napoleon, today or tomorrow, will suddenly go to the army. The Ministries of War and Finance are tirelessly engaged in supplying the army in Germany. Napoleon's attention is especially drawn to artillery and cavalry, with which he hopes to break our troops. In the arsenals of Mainz, Strasbourg and Lafer they work with the greatest activity; the roads to Strasbourg, Mainz, Koblenz and Wesel are covered with trucks carrying artillery shells. The Guard received orders to be ready to move; the other day they examined her guns, which is usually done before the start of a war. More than a hundred of Napoleon's riding horses were sent to Kassel; His crews are waiting for the order to move. Napoleon only dreams of breaking up Russia.”

The immediate opening of the war was hampered by winter and the fact that Napoleon had not yet reached an agreement with Sweden, Austria and Prussia, whose troops he wanted to join his own for the invasion of Russia. Until negotiations with these Powers were completed and in the intention of taking advantage of the time remaining until spring, Napoleon tried in every possible way to incite the Sultan not to make peace with Russia. Our six-year war with Turkey has not yet stopped. Our four Commanders-in-Chief: Mikhelson, Prince Prozorovsky, Prince Bagration and Count Kamensky, who led one after another against the Porte, acted successfully, but, however, not to such an extent as to force the Sultan to a peace beneficial for Russia. The glory of inflicting a decisive defeat on the Turks, destroying all the tricks of Napoleon's machinations in Constantinople and putting an end to the war at the moment when Russia was threatened with invasion, went to the commander, whose name will not die in the memory of the grateful Fatherland - Kutuzov.

In 1811 he took command of a small army. Due to his superiority in the number of Turks, Kutuzov acted defensively and ordered the demolition of the fortresses that were in his hands on the right bank of the Danube, with the exception of Rushchuk, which was preserved instead of a bridgehead.

On June 22, the battle of Rushchuk took place. Kutuzov won, but, despite the success, he considered himself unable to hold on to the Danube and, having destroyed the fortifications of Rushchuk, returned to the left bank of the river. Napoleon rejoiced when he learned of Kutuzov’s retreat; The Sultan celebrated it on a par with victory; but the joy of Napoleon and Mahmut was short-lived. The Turks crossed after Kutuzov. Having allowed them to cross the Danube, our commander dispatched his corps to the right side of the river, with the order to attack the Turkish reserve stationed there. The reserve was defeated, and the Turkish army, deprived of communication with the right bank, was surrounded on all sides. At the first news of this, Napoleon exclaimed with indignation. But would Napoleon subsequently experience such surprises from Kutuzov!

A courier was immediately sent from Paris to Constantinople to exhort the Porte to continue the war. Meanwhile, Kutuzov led the Turkish army surrounded by him to such exhaustion that it had to feed on horse carrion. The High Vizier, wanting to save the troops from inevitable captivity, from certain death, offered Kutuzov a truce, volunteering to immediately begin peace negotiations. Hostilities ceased, and the plenipotentiaries of both sides had their first meeting on October 18, in the camp near Zhurzha. But soon there was a delay in the negotiations, due to differences in the peace articles, which was the longed-for news for Napoleon. He sent one messenger after another to Constantinople, with notifications of his imminent break with Russia, with the conviction that the most favorable time had come for the Porte to fight against Russia. To speed up relations with Turkey, he ordered the establishment of relay races from Paris to Constantinople. Thus the year 1811 passed as a harbinger of a war that was soon to begin.